The Female Serial Killer Thread

MATAMUERTOS · Aug 2, 2012

softballmama said:
Karla Holmoka now goes by the name Emily Bordelais and is married and had her 3rd child in 2011! She lives in the Carribean, and believe it or not is A School Teacher!! What A world we live in!!!

they should have sterilised her or at least made it a condition of her release that she did not get anywhere close to children. She was complicit in the killing of her own sister! Imagine having that perverted raping killing pig for a teacher!

Time Bomb · Aug 11, 2012

Aileen Wuornos

Aileen Carol Wuornos (February 29, 1956 – October 9, 2002) was an American serial killer who killed seven men in Florida between 1989 and 1990, claiming they raped or attempted to rape her while she was working as a prostitute. She was convicted and sentenced to death for six of the murders, and executed via lethal injection on October 9, 2002.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aileen_Wuornos

check out her interview, look at her eyes, and she did pass the insanity test LOL
[/quote]

Kinda thinking the women have the men beat when it comes to wiping you off this green earth! lol,. Aileen Wuornos wasn't a stupid woman though. A few things she said were a little out there, but most of her words were the truth. There is such things as sonic frequencies, they use them in the movies to this very day. The frequencies adjust your moods throughout the whole movie! Music industry uses it as well. I know a bunch of cops, and even a female detective. They definitely know who the prostitutes are in town. And many of them can easily take advantage of the situation. I don't know .. I kinda have mixed reviews about her sentencing..

Hellwig · Aug 12, 2012

Deucalion said:
What exactly makes someone a serial killer rather than a mass murderer or spree killer?

Is there a certain time frame or body count?

A serial killer kills 3 or more victims, with a cooling off period of at least 24 hours between. A mass murderer kills a shitload of people at the same location in 1 continuous period. A spree killer kills 2 or more victims in more than 1 location, again, with no cooling off period.
:rant:

smutpeddler · Aug 25, 2012

I love all this shit, but when it comes to infants.. I can't stand that. Especially pictures of them. Just pisses me off.

limitfluid · Sep 27, 2012

i love Aileen man its cause of her circumstance in life that most serial kilers become serial killers RIP cant wait to meet You on the other side

limitfluid · Sep 27, 2012

i love Aileen man its cause of her circumstance in life that most serial kilers become serial killers RIP cant wait to meet You on the other side

Electricaliens · Sep 27, 2012

i actually sympathize for her i wish they hadnt put her to death. One day she will rise up out of the ashes and get her revenge Har Har Har

b2ux · Sep 28, 2012

Age_Of_Danger said:
Aileen Wuornos

Aileen Carol Wuornos (February 29, 1956 – October 9, 2002) was an American serial killer who killed seven men in Florida between 1989 and 1990, claiming they raped or attempted to rape her while she was working as a prostitute. She was convicted and sentenced to death for six of the murders, and executed via lethal injection on October 9, 2002.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aileen_Wuornos

check out her interview, look at her eyes, and she did pass the insanity test LOL

Kinda thinking the women have the men beat when it comes to wiping you off this green earth! lol,. Aileen Wuornos wasn't a stupid woman though. A few things she said were a little out there, but most of her words were the truth. There is such things as sonic frequencies, they use them in the movies to this very day. The frequencies adjust your moods throughout the whole movie! Music industry uses it as well. I know a bunch of cops, and even a female detective. They definitely know who the prostitutes are in town. And many of them can easily take advantage of the situation. I don't know .. I kinda have mixed reviews about her sentencing..[/quote]

bet ya didnt know she was a lez and totally hated men if i remember right her g/friend was involved with a couple of the killings....

b2ux · Sep 28, 2012

Age_Of_Danger said:
Aileen Wuornos

Aileen Carol Wuornos (February 29, 1956 – October 9, 2002) was an American serial killer who killed seven men in Florida between 1989 and 1990, claiming they raped or attempted to rape her while she was working as a prostitute. She was convicted and sentenced to death for six of the murders, and executed via lethal injection on October 9, 2002.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aileen_Wuornos

check out her interview, look at her eyes, and she did pass the insanity test LOL

Kinda thinking the women have the men beat when it comes to wiping you off this green earth! lol,. Aileen Wuornos wasn't a stupid woman though. A few things she said were a little out there, but most of her words were the truth. There is such things as sonic frequencies, they use them in the movies to this very day. The frequencies adjust your moods throughout the whole movie! Music industry uses it as well. I know a bunch of cops, and even a female detective. They definitely know who the prostitutes are in town. And many of them can easily take advantage of the situation. I don't know .. I kinda have mixed reviews about her sentencing..[/quote]

bet ya didnt know she was a lez and totally hated men if i remember right her g/friend was involved with a couple of the killings....

Hellwig · Sep 30, 2012

Minnie Dean

Williamina "Minnie" Dean

Minnie Dean at the time of her marriage in 1872

Born 2 September 1844

Greenock, Scotland

Died 12 August 1895 (aged 50)

Invercargill, New Zealand

Cause Hanged

Resting place Winton Cemetery

46°07.702′S168°19.529′E

Conviction(s) Murder (1895)

Penalty Death

Conviction Status Executed

Williamina "Minnie" Dean (2 September 1844 – 12 August 1895) was a New Zealander who was found guilty of infanticide and hanged. She was the only woman to receive thedeath penalty in New Zealand.

Contents

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Early life

Minnie Dean (also known as The Southland Witch) was born in Greenock, in western Scotland. Her father, John McCulloch, was a railway engineer. Her mother, Elizabeth Swan, died of cancer in 1857. It is unknown when she arrived in New Zealand, but by the early 1860s, she was living in Invercargill with two young children. She claimed she was the widow of a Tasmanian doctor, although no evidence of a marriage has been found. She was still using her birth name, McCulloch.
In 1872, she married an inkeeper named Charles Dean. The two lived in Etal Creek, then an important stop on the route from Riverton to the Otago goldfields. When the goldrush died down, the couple turned to farming, but were soon in dire financial straits. The family moved to Winton, where Charles Dean took up pig farming. Minnie Dean, meanwhile, began to earn money by taking in unwanted children in exchange for payment. In an era when there were few methods of contraception, and when childbirth outside marriage was frowned upon, there were many women wishing to discreetly send their children away for adoption — as such, Minnie Dean was not short on customers. It is believed that she was responsible for as many as nine young children at any one time. She received payment either weekly or in a lump sum.
Infant mortality was a significant problem in New Zealand at this time (as it was estimated to run to about eighty to one hundred infants out of one thousand colonial births).[1] As such, a number of children under Dean's care died of various illnesses. In March 1889, a six-month old child had died of convulsions, while in October 1891, a six-week old baby had perished from cardiovascular and respiratory ailments, while a boy allegedly drowned under her care during 1894. She hid the body in her garden, arousing further suspicions. A coroner's inquest was held, and Dean was not held responsible for the deaths, due to universally poor standards of hygiene, even at childbirth itself. Nevertheless, Dean came to be distrusted by the community, and rumours of mistreatment circulated. Additionally, children under Dean's care allegedly went missing without explanation. In the public's mind, this linked Dean to cases of infanticide or baby farming in the United Kingdom and Australia, where women killed children under their care to avoid having to support them. At the time, lax childcare legislation meant that Dean did not have to keep records of the children she agreed to take in, and so proving that the children had disappeared was difficult.
Before Dean's trial and execution, three other women had been tried and sentenced to death- Caroline Whitting (1872), Phoebe Veitch(1883: d.1891) and Sarah-Jane and Anna Flannagan (1891). In each case, those sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. In each case, child murder was the culpable offence. Thirty years later, in 1926, Daniel Cooper was also convicted of baby farming and also executed for the offence, although Martha, his second wife was acquitted.

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Murder case and execution

In 1895, Dean was observed boarding a train carrying a young baby and a hatbox, but observed leaving the same train without the baby and only the hatbox. As railway porters later testified, the object was suspiciously heavy. A woman, Jane Hornsby, came forward claiming to have given her granddaughter, Eva, to Dean, and clothes identified as belonging to this child were found at Dean's residence, but Dean could not produce the child herself. A search along the railway line found no sign of the child. Dean was arrested and charged with murder. Her garden was dug up, and three bodies (two of babies, and one of a boy estimated to be three years old) were uncovered. An inquest found that one child (Eva) had died of suffocation and one, later identified as one year-old Dorothy Edith Carter, had died from an overdose of laudanum (used on children to sedate them). The cause of death for the third child was not determined. Dean was charged with their murder.

Hatboxes containing baby dolls, such as this one, were sold outside the courthouse during Minnie Dean's 1895 trial.
In her trial, Dean's lawyer Alfred Hanlon argued that all deaths were accidental, and that they had been covered up to prevent adverse publicity of the sort that Dean had previously been subjected to. On 21 June 1895, however, Dean was found guilty of Dorothy Carter's murder, and sentenced to death. Between June and August 1895, Dean wrote her own account of her life. Altogether, she claimed to have cared for twenty eight children. Of these, five were in good health when her establishment was raided, six had died whilst under her care, and one had been reclaimed by her parents. Apart from her two adopted daughters, that left fourteen or so children unaccounted for, according to her own record.
On 12 August, she was hanged by the official executioner Tom Long in Invercargill, at the intersection of Spey and Leven streets, in what is now the Noel Leeming carpark. She is the only woman to have been executed in New Zealand, and as capital punishment in New Zealand has been abolished, it is likely that she will retain that distinction. She is buried in Winton, alongside her husband, who died in a house fire in 1908. Her crimes led to the belated passage of child welfare legislation in New Zealand- the Infant Life Protection Act 1893 and the Infant Protection Act 1896.

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In popular culture

In 1985, Dean's trial was the subject of In Defence of Minnie Dean, the first episode of the Emmy-nominated Hanlon New Zealand television drama series about the career of Dean's lawyer.[2][3] The episode won the Best Director, Best Drama Programme, Drama Script, and Performance, Female, in a Dramatic Role categories at the 1986 Listener Television Awards (also called the GOFTA Awards), and "contributed to a re-evaluation of Dean's conviction".[2][3][4]
Minnie Dean is referenced in Dudley Benson's 2006 song "It's Akaroa's Fault" ("I don't want to meet Minnie Dean at the end of my life/If I were to meet her I'd keep her hatbox in sight"). Authors Lynley Hood and John Rawle wrote posthumous accounts and reconstructions of the case as the centenary of her apprehension and execution occurred, in 1995.
On Friday 30 January 2009 the Otago Daily Times reported that a headstone had appeared mysteriously on Dean's grave. The headstone reads "Minnie Dean is part of Winton's history Where she now lies is now no mystery". It is unknown who placed the headstone there. Her family had been considering it but claim that this was not their doing.
The Southland Times reported on 23 February 2009 that the family laid a headstone to honour Dean and her husband's grave.

b2ux · Dec 24, 2012

Mary Ann Cotton

Born Mary Ann Robson

Classification: Serial killer
Characteristics: Poisoner - To collect insurance money
Number of victims: 1 - 21 +
Date of murder: 1857 - 1872
Date of arrest: 1973
Date of birth: October 1, 1832
Victims profile: Eight of her own children, seven stepchildren, her mother, three husbands, a lover – and an inconvenient friend
Method of murder: Poisoning (arsenic)
Location: North East England, England, United Kingdom
Status: Executed by hanging in Durham prison on March 24, 1873

In 1871, 40-year-old Mary Ann Cotton and her husband, 39-year-old Frederick moved into a home in County Durham, with his two stepsons and her 7-month-old baby. Two months later Frederick died of gastric fever and one of Mary's lovers, Joseph Natrass moved in.

In the space of a month Belle's baby, Natrass and Frederick's son all died in the house. On the 12 July 1872 the other son of Frederick died, all the deaths caused suspicion and a neighbour went to the police.

A post mortem was carried out on the stepson and it revealed him to be poisoned with arsenic. The bodies of the other dead were exhumed and they showed that arsenic was the cause of death. Mary was arrested and charged with the murder of her stepson. She went to trial in March 1873, claiming that they were accidentally killed by arsenic contained in wallpaper, but the prosecution had evidence that she had purchased arsenic. Mary Ann Cotton was found guilty and sentenced to death.

Cotton was suspected of the murders of 14 people, in her older life twenty one people close to her died. Her motive was gain, as she would marry, kill and collect the insurance money, then repeat it again. She was hanged in Durham prison on March 24, 1873.

Mary Ann Cotton (1832 – 1873) was a British serial killer in the 19th century. Employing poison, she is suspected of murdering up to twenty-one people. She was the most prolific British serial killer before Harold Shipman.

She was born Mary Ann Robson in 1832 in the village of Low Moorsley in Tyne and Wear, Northern England. Her father was a miner who died when she was eight, and Mary and her brother were raised by their mother, who was impoverished after the loss of her husband. Mary's mother later remarried, and Mary is said to have loathed her stepfather.

Conflict with her stepfather led her to flee the family home when she was 16. She married in 1852, aged 20, and had five children, four of whom died in infancy, a high rate of infant mortality even in the Victorian era. Mary frequently argued with her husband, who died suddenly in January 1865.

Now widowed, Mary returned to Sunderland and a few months later got married again, her new husband dying in October 1865 from an unexplained illness.

In 1866, Mary's mother died after a sudden illness. At the time Mary was enjoying a relationship with a widower, James Robinson, whom she soon married. Robinson had four children by his late wife, although two suddenly died soon after he met Mary. Robinson became suspicious of his new wife, especially when she kept pestering him to take out life insurance. In late 1869, having borne him a daughter, Mary walked out on Robinson, who was the only husband to survive a marriage to her.

In 1870 Mary married another widower, Frederick Cotton, whose surname she took and by which name she is usually known, even though the marriage was effectively null and void because Mary had not legally divorced her previous husband.

Mary Cotton had a son with Frederick Cotton. Soon, Frederick's sister, two sons from his previous marriage and a number of friends died after sudden illnesses. Frederick himself died in December 1871, soon followed by the baby Mary had by him. Mary quickly remarried, but her new husband quickly died after a short illness.

In the spring of 1872, one of Mary Cotton's few surviving stepchildren, Charles Cotton, whose father had been Frederick Cotton, died suddenly. Word quickly spread around the neighbourhood concerning the way so many of Mary's nearest and dearest had died so suddenly over the previous two decades.

Thomas Riley, a minor government official, was suspicious of the latest death. Mary Cotton had told him that Charles had been "in the way" of her plans of getting remarried. Furthermore, young Charles had appeared very healthy up until his sudden death, which was supposedly due to gastric fever. Mary tried to collect on the life insurance she had taken out on Charles Cotton's life, but the insurance company refused to pay until the body of the deceased had been investigated more thoroughly. Charles Cotton's remains were exhumed and a significant trace of arsenic was found in the deceased's stomach.

Charges soon followed and Mary Cotton was eventually tried for the murder of Charles Cotton, her final victim. She was convicted and sentenced to death.

On March 24, 1873, Mary Cotton was hanged. The execution was botched with Mary failing to die from the initial drop after the gallow's trapdoor opened. Instead, she slowly choked to death as she dangled on the end of the noose.

In spite of the fact that she maintained her innocence to the end, her reputation as the first female serial killer in Britain stands, and her story is the subject of a children's rhyme:

Mary Ann Cotton – She's dead and she's rotten! She lies in her bed With her eyes wide open.

Sing, sing! "Oh, what can I sing? Mary Ann Cotton is tied up with string."

Where, where? "Up in the air – selling black puddings a penny a pair."

Reference

Look For the Woman by Jay Robert Nash. M. Evans and Company, Inc. 1981. ISBN 0871313367

Mary Ann Cotton (born Mary Ann Robson in October 1832 in Low Moorsley, County Durham – died 24 March 1873) was an English woman convicted of murdering her children and believed to have murdered up to 21 people, mainly by arsenic poisoning.

Early life

Mary Ann Robson was born in October 1832 at Low Moorsley (now part of Houghton-le-Spring in the City of Sunderland) and baptised at St Mary's, West Rainton on 11 November. Her father Michael, a miner, was ardently religious and a fierce disciplinarian.

When Mary Ann was eight, her parents moved the family to the County Durham village of Murton, where she went to a new school and found it difficult to make friends. Soon after the move her father fell 150 feet (46 m) to his death down a mine shaft at Murton Colliery.

In 1843, Mary Ann's widowed mother, Margaret (née Lonsdale) married George Stott, with whom Mary Ann did not get along. At the age of 16, she moved out to become a nurse at Edward Potter's home in the nearby village of South Hetton. After three years there, she returned to her mother's home and trained as a dressmaker.

Husband 1: William Mowbray

In 1852, at the age of 20, Mary Ann married colliery labourer William Mowbray in Newcastle Upon Tyne register office; they soon moved to Plymouth, Devon. The couple had five children, four of whom died from gastric fever. William and Mary Ann moved back to North East England where they had, and lost, three more children. William became a foreman at South Hetton Colliery and then a fireman aboard a steam vessel. He died of an intestinal disorder in January 1865. William's life was insured by the British and Prudential Insurance office and Mary Ann collected a payout of £35 on his death, equivalent to about half a year's wages for a manual labourer at the time.

Husband 2: George Ward

Soon after Mowbray's death, Mary Ann moved to Seaham Harbour, County Durham, where she struck up a relationship with Joseph Nattrass. He, however, was engaged to another woman and she left Seaham after Nattrass’s wedding. During this time, her 3½-year-old daughter died, leaving her with one child out of the nine she had borne. She returned to Sunderland and took up employment at the Sunderland Infirmary, House of Recovery for the Cure of Contagious Fever, Dispensary and Humane Society. She sent her remaining child, Isabella, to live with her mother.

One of her patients at the infirmary was an engineer, George Ward. They married in Monkwearmouth on 28 August 1865. He continued to suffer ill health; he died in October 1866 after a long illness characterised by paralysis and intestinal problems. The attending doctor later gave evidence that Ward had been very ill, yet he had been surprised that the man's death was so sudden. Once again, Mary Ann collected insurance money from her husband's death.

Husband 3: James Robinson

James Robinson was a shipwright at Pallion, Sunderland, whose wife, Hannah, had recently died. He hired Mary Ann as a housekeeper in November 1866. One month later, when James' baby died of gastric fever, he turned to his housekeeper for comfort and she became pregnant. Then Mary Ann's mother, living in Seaham Harbour, County Durham, became ill so she immediately went to her. Although her mother started getting better, she also began to complain of stomach pains. She died at age 54 in the spring of 1867, nine days after Mary Ann's arrival.

Mary Ann's daughter Isabella, from the marriage to William Mowbray, was brought back to the Robinson household and soon developed bad stomach pains and died; so did another two of Robinson's children. All three children were buried in the last two weeks of April 1867.

Robinson married Mary Ann at St Michael's, Bishopwearmouth on 11 August 1867. Their child, Mary Isabella, was born that November, but she became ill with stomach pains and died in March 1868.

Robinson, meanwhile, had become suspicious of his wife's insistence that he insure his life; he discovered that she had run up debts of £60 behind his back and had stolen more than £50 that she was supposed to have put in the bank. The last straw was when he found she had been forcing his children to pawn household valuables for her. He threw her out.

"Husband" 4: FrederickCotton

Mary Ann was desperate and living on the streets. Then her friend Margaret Cotton introduced her to her brother, Frederick, a pitman and recent widower living in Walbottle, Northumberland, who had lost two of his four children. Margaret had acted as substitute mother for the remaining children, Frederick Jr. and Charles. But in late March 1870 Margaret died from an undetermined stomach ailment, leaving Mary Ann to console the grieving Frederick Sr. Soon her eleventh pregnancy was underway.

Frederick and Mary Ann were bigamously married on 17 September 1870 at St Andrew's, Newcastle Upon Tyne and their son Robert was born early in 1871. Soon after, Mary Ann learnt that her former lover, Joseph Nattrass, was living in the nearby village of West Auckland, and no longer married. She rekindled the romance and persuaded her new family to move near him. Frederick followed his predecessors to the grave in December of that year, from “gastric fever." Insurance had been taken out on his life and the lives of his sons.

Two lovers

After Frederick's death, Nattrass soon became Mary Ann’s lodger. She gained employment as nurse to an excise officer recovering from smallpox, John Quick-Manning. Soon she became pregnant by him with her twelfth child.

Frederick Jr. died in March 1872 and the infant Robert soon after. Then Nattrass became ill with gastric fever, and died — just after revising his will in Mary Ann’s favour.

The insurance policy Mary Ann had taken out on Charles' life still awaited collection.

Death of Charles Edward Cotton and inquest

Mary Ann's downfall came when she was asked by a parish official, Thomas Riley, to help nurse a woman who was ill with smallpox. She complained that the last surviving Cotton boy, Charles Edward, was in the way and asked Riley if he could be committed to the workhouse. Riley, who also served as West Auckland's assistant coroner, said she would have to accompany him. She told Riley that the boy was sickly and added: “I won’t be troubled long. He’ll go like all the rest of the Cottons.”

Five days later, when Mary Ann told Riley that the boy had died. Riley went to the village police and convinced the doctor to delay writing a death certificate until the circumstances could be investigated.

Mary Ann’s first port of call after Charles' death was not the doctor’s but the insurance office. There, she discovered that no money would be paid out until a death certificate was issued. An inquest was held and the jury returned a verdict of natural causes. Mary Ann claimed to have used arrowroot to relieve his illness and said Riley had made accusations against her because she had rejected his advances.

Then the local newspapers latched on to the story and discovered Mary Ann had moved around northern England and lost three husbands, a lover, a friend, her mother, and a dozen children, all of whom had died of stomach fevers.

Arrest

Rumour turned to suspicion and forensic inquiry. The doctor who attended Charles had kept samples, and they tested positive for arsenic. He went to the police, who arrested Mary Ann and ordered the exhumation of Charles' body. She was charged with his murder, although the trial was delayed until after the delivery of her last child in Durham Gaol on 10 January 1873, whom she named Margaret Edith Quick-Manning Cotton.

Trial and execution

Mary Ann Cotton's trial began on 5 March 1873. The delay was caused by a problem in the selection of the public prosecutor. A Mr. Aspinwall was supposed to get the job, but the Attorney General, Sir John Duke Coleridge, chose his friend and protégé Charles Russell. Russell's appointment over Aspinwall led to a question in the House of Commons. However, it was accepted, and Russell conducted the prosecution. The Cotton case would be the first of several famous poisoning cases he would be involved in during his career, including those of Adelaide Bartlett and Florence Maybrick.

The defence in the case was handled by Mr. Thomas Campbell Foster. The defence at Mary Ann's trial claimed that Charles died from inhaling arsenic used as a dye in the green wallpaper of the Cotton home. The jury retired for 90 minutes before finding Mary Ann guilty.

The Times correspondent reported on 20 March: "After conviction the wretched woman exhibited strong emotion but this gave place in a few hours to her habitual cold, reserved demeanour and while she harbours a strong conviction that the royal clemency will be extended towards her, she staunchly asserts her innocence of the crime that she has been convicted of." Several petitions were presented to the Home Secretary, but to no avail. Mary Ann Cotton was hanged at Durham County Gaol on 24 March, 1873 by William Calcraft.

Nursery rhyme

Mary Ann Cotton also had her own nursery rhyme of the same title, sung after her hanging on March 24, 1873.

Lyrics:

Mary Ann Cotton,
Dead and forgotten
She lies in her bed,
With her eyes wide open
Sing, sing, oh, what can I sing,
Mary Ann Cotton is tied up with string
Where, where? Up in the air
Sellin' black puddens a penny a pair.

"Black puddens" refers to black pudding, a type of sausage made with pig's blood.

Wikipedia.org

COTTON, Mary Ann (England)

Mary Ann Cotton was no ordinary, spur-of-the-moment killer; her murderous instincts were alleged to have resulted in the deaths of fifteen, perhaps even twenty people, including four husbands and eight children, and she gained the evil reputation of being the greatest mass murderess of all time.

By the age of forty she had married three times. Her first husband, whom she had married in 1852, was a young miner named William Mowbray, by whom she had four children. All of them just happened to die young, reportedly from gastric fever. William Mowbray also succumbed to illness, experiencing severe sickness and diarrhoea, and died in agony.

Mary, now seemingly grief-stricken at the loss of her husband and children, drew solace from her friends and cash from the insurance company. Realising that hospital work as a nurse would be the source not only of supplies of the poison she needed, but also of meeting further vulnerable and susceptible victims, she joined the staff of Sunderland Infirmary where, among others, she tended a patient named George Ward. So devoted were her ministrations that when he recovered he proposed marriage, her subsequent promise ‘in sickness and in health’ only applying to half the phrase, for fourteen months later, in 1866, he too shuffled off this mortal coil, but not before he had endowed all his worldly goods to her.

Not long afterwards, still in her widow’s weeds, she met James Robinson, a widower with three children. They were married in May 1867, and by December of that year regrettable coincidences also overwhelmed that family. Not only did James’ two young sons and daughter, plus William Mowbray’s nineyear-old daughter fall victim to gastric fever, but a later baby born to Mary and James joined its stepbrothers and sisters in the local cemetery. James himself had cause to thank his guardian angel when Mary incensed him so much by selling some of his possessions that he ejected her from the house.

The fact that her husband was still alive did not deter Mary from starting an intimate liaison with her next prey, Frederick Cotton, a man who already had two young sons from a former marriage. When he proposed to her, she bigamously married him, and, being a prudent wife who had to take care of her future, she took out three insurance policies, just in case. The number of children in their family became three when she had a little boy by Frederick, called Robert, the number of policies thereby increasing accordingly.

Early in 1872 a James Nattrass attracted her attention. This complicated matters, Frederick Cotton immediately becoming surplus to requirements – but not for long. Almost without warning he fell seriously ill, but by the time a doctor had arrived he was past all medical aid. Frederick’s 10-year-old son was not long in following his father to the grave, and Mary’s child, Robert, never reached puberty.

James now became her lover, but affection wasn’t everything, and eventually Mary decided that £30, the sum for which he had been insured, was preferable to the man himself, and so another coffin received an occupant and another grave was dug.

Mary could have continued in this manner, unchecked and unsuspected, until her stock of arsenic, a poison little recognised or diagnosed at the time, ran out, but for some unaccountable reason, perhaps a rare, charitable thought, she spared the life of Charles Edward, the eight-year-old Cotton boy; instead she decided to hand him over to the workhouse. When told that such was not possible without the parents also being admitted, she retorted, ‘I could have married again but for the child. But there, he won’t live long, he’ll go the way of all the Cotton family.’

Nor did he. Dispensing with mercy, she dispensed arsenic instead, gastric fever again being diagnosed as the cause of death.

But news of the child’s demise reached the ears of the workhouse master and, remembering the woman’s ominous rejoinder, he notified the authorities of his suspicions. The child’s body was exhumed and the amount of arsenic found within the viscera was unmistakable. And when the corpses of her other victims were disinterred and their post-mortems produced similar results, the game was up.

In March 1873 Mary Ann Cotton was charged at Durham with one murder, that of the young Charles Edward; so overwhelming was the evidence in that particular case that one charge was considered sufficient, and so it proved. Throughout the trial the woman in the dock remained composed and utterly self-assured; having borne a charmed life so far, she probably saw no reason why it should not continue. She pleaded not guilty and coolly explained that the arsenic in her possession was used to kill bedbugs in the house, but when the judge pronounced her guilty and sentenced her to be hanged, she fainted in the dock and had to be carried down to the cells.

If she had thought that because she was pregnant – she had wasted no time in taking a new lover, a local customs officer, following James’ funeral – she would escape the gallows, she was sadly mistaken: there was, of course, no question of executing her while heavy with child, but once the child was born, the law would take its course. After giving birth in gaol, she was deprived of her baby and arrangements were made for her to be deprived of her life in five days’ time.

The night before her execution she was heard by her warders to pray for salvation, a prayer which included James Robinson, her third husband and the only one to escape her homicidal proclivities. The customs man might also have congratulated himself on his lucky escape!

Feminine fashion at that time dictated that women wore dresses with long sleeves, plus a veil and gloves, and Mary Ann Cotton’s apparel on her execution day reflected this, for her veil was the white cap William Calcraft slipped over her head – nor did he omit the matching accessory, a hempen necklace. None of the watching officials saw him hesitate as he prepared his victim, nor did he waste a moment in operating the bolt.

However, as usual, nearly three minutes elapsed before the twitching figure ceased rotating and finally hung deathly still.

Following removal from the scaffold, Mary’s body was taken back into the prison building where, in order to take a cast of her head to be studied by members of the West Hartlepool Phrenological Society, all her luxurious tresses were cut off close to her skull. It was later stated that, far from being kept as gruesome souvenirs, every severed strand of hair was deposited in the coffin with her body.

Such was the publicity surrounding the case that shock waves of disbelief and horror spread across the country when the prosecuting lawyer described the ghastly deaths of her other victims, and with the minimum of delay a wax model of her joined the macabre company already occupying Mme Tussaud’s Chamber of Horrors, the museum publishing an updated catalogue which endorsed her execution as expiation ‘for crimes

for which no punishment in history could atone. The child she rocked on her knee today was poisoned tomorrow. Most of her murders were committed for petty gains; and she killed off husbands and children with the unconcern of a farm-girl killing poultry’.

Murderous though eternally feminine, Mary Ann was determined to look her best even for William Calcraft. When the wardresses went to escort her from the condemned cell to the scaffold, they found her brushing her long black hair in front of the mirror. As they approached her she turned and said brightly, ‘Right – now I am ready!’

Amazing True Stories of Female Executions by Geoffrey Abbott

She poisoned 21 people including her own mother, children and husbands. So why has no-one heard of Britain's FIRST serial killer, Mary Ann Cotton?

By David Wilson, Professor of Criminology at Birmingham University

DailyMail.co.uk

February 5, 2012

I pull up outside a house in the Durham mining village of West Auckland to find an anonymous-looking place: a slim, three-storey family home distinguished from its neighbours only by its pretty, blue-grey paint.

There are no clues as to its gruesome past. Even its original house number has been changed, perhaps from fear that the evil that was perpetrated here could pass down through successive generations of residents.

This is the home in which Britain’s first serial killer, Mary Ann Cotton, claimed her final victim. It is the house in which she was arrested and then taken away to be incarcerated, before eventually being executed at Durham Jail in March 1873.

Few have heard of the so-called ‘Black Widow’ killer who posed as a wife, widow, mother, friend and nurse to murder perhaps as many as 21 victims, living off her husbands before eventually claiming their estates. Two decades before Jack the Ripper would terrorise the streets of Whitechapel in London, Mary Ann Cotton had already become a killing machine, perhaps murdering as many as eight of her own children, seven stepchildren, her mother, three husbands, a lover – and an inconvenient friend.

Even crime aficionados, those familiar with such names as Shipman, Nilsen, Sutcliffe and West, know little or nothing of her. She has been largely erased from history and remains today only a half-remembered local curiosity even in her native North East.

There is certainly no walking tour retracing her murderous progress through County Durham, nor sad monuments erected to honour the memories of her victims. A woman who should have been a criminal icon has been reduced to little more than a chilling bedtime story and a Northern nursery rhyme: ‘Sing, sing, oh, what can I sing? Mary Ann Cotton is tied up with string. Where, where? Up in the air, sellin’ black puddens a penny a pair.’

A single book marked the centenary of her execution. As one of Britain’s leading criminologists and a former prison governor, I would like to know why. I have worked on police investigations and with many serial killers. Yet even to me, the life and terrible work of Mary Ann Cotton were largely a mystery.

And so throughout the spring and summer last year, I spent time in the North East researching a new book on this woman who travelled from one pit village to another leaving only gravestones behind her and who, in doing so, gained real, if loathsome, historical importance.

Here is not just the first British serial killer – someone who has killed more than three people in a period greater than 30 days – but the first to exploit and abuse the anonymity of a new industrial age.

My search began in the Home Office archives at Kew, South-West London, in the autumn of 2010. I found the usual records that measure the criminal careers of Victorian prisoners: her age, an occasional glimpse of what life had been like before prison, details of Mary Ann’s court appearances, and some letters from the governor of Durham Jail before her execution.

But these frustratingly formal scraps of biographical detail were hardly enough to explain what had caused Mary Ann to behave as she did, or to explain why she had all but disappeared.

There was, however, another valuable resource: scores of local newspapers and fragments of documents and artefacts in local archives and museums.

Victorian journalists had been adept at sketching in – and exaggerating – some of Mary Ann’s biographical background. There was also a crude ‘murderabilia’ market ensuring that some, at least, of Mary Ann’s correspondence had survived.

What is beyond dispute in an otherwise tangled search is that she was born Mary Ann Robson in 1832 at Low Moorsley, a small village near the town of Hetton-le-Hole. It would have been a hard upbringing. Her father Michael is recorded as a ‘pitman’, which meant that he worked in the local coal mines.

Soon after her arrival, they moved to East Rainton, and then to the pit village of Murton. This constant shifting from place to place was normal for the time and for the region.

Colliery contracts lasted no more than one year, and when their time was up, the miners and engineers went looking for more lucrative work. The mines drew in thousands of strangers from other parts of Britain, all eager to sell their labour, so adding to the sense of rootlessness.

Mary Ann’s father was killed in early 1842, when she was aged nine, apparently plummeting down a shaft while repairing a pulley wheel at the Murton Colliery. Mary Ann would have been instructed to find work and marry, which she did on July 18, 1852, becoming the wife of colliery worker William Mowbray.

First seeking their fortunes in Cornwall – another region where miners could find work – the Mowbrays returned to the North East in 1860, and this, so far as we know, is where the killing began. Her motives will always remain a matter of conjecture, but a strong pattern emerged: Mary Ann would find a man with an income, live with him until it became inconvenient, and then murder him. Numerous children – no one knows how many – were dispatched with the same callousness.

Her choice of poison was arsenic, favoured by murderers down the centuries for largely pragmatic reasons. First, it dissolves in a hot liquid, a cup of tea, for example, so is easy to administer. Second, it was readily available. Although by this stage, the authorities had started regulating the sale of arsenic, a high concentration could still be obtained in a substance known as ‘soft soap’, a household disinfectant.

There was a third reason, too: as Mary Ann well knew, the symptoms of arsenic poisoning were vomiting, diarrhoea and dehydration. A busy and unsuspecting doctor was always more likely to diagnose this cluster of symptoms as gastroenteritis – especially in patients who were poor and undernourished – than to suspect murder.

According to death and burial certificates, all her victims had died of gastric ailments.

It seems she also played the role of the grieving wife and mother to perfection, making it all the more difficult to be precise about the number of people she may have killed.

I’ve pieced together the trail of deaths associated with Mary Ann, and it starts with her first family. She bore William Mowbray, her first husband, at least four children, three of whom died young.

William died in January 1865, leaving Mary Ann to enjoy the £35 payout from British and Prudential Insurance, equivalent then to six months’ salary.

The total of murdered Mowbray children might have been greater still as, according to Mary Ann’s own testimony, she had earlier given birth to four children while the family was in the West Country. She used the insurance payout to move to Seaham Harbour, a port village in County Durham, so that she could be close to a lover called Joseph Nattrass.

Throughout her 20-year career of murder, wherever Nattrass went, she followed. He, too, would eventually become a victim. The insurance money also allowed her to embark on a career in nursing at Sunderland Infirmary – a deadly choice of occupation. There she met George Ward, an engineer who was a patient in the hospital, and who became her second husband in August 1865. He died little more than a year later in October 1866 leaving Mary Ann a second insurance payout.

Now a widow with just one living child from her marriage to Mowbray, Mary Ann was the perfect candidate for housekeeper to the newly widowed James Robinson, a shipwright at the Pallion yard on the River Wear in Sunderland. She took the job in November 1866 only for him to see his baby die a few weeks later.

Robinson turned to Mary Ann for comfort and yet again she became pregnant. But then her own mother fell sick. Mary Ann went to help – only for her mother to die nine days after Mary Ann returned home. Then Mary Ann’s daughter Isabella, who had been living with her grandmother, was brought back to the Robinson household at Pallion. She soon died too, as did two more of Robinson’s children, all three infants being buried in the last two weeks of April 1867.

Four months later, Robinson married Mary Ann, becoming her third husband. Their child, Mary Isabella, was born that November but died in March 1868. Robinson himself had a lucky escape. He was intrigued as to why she had wanted his life insured for a significant sum. He discovered that she had a secret debt of £60; that she’d stolen more than £50 that she should have banked on his behalf; and that she had forced his older children to pawn household valuables for her. He threw her out.

Mary Ann was desperate and, as newspaper reporters later suggested, was reduced to living on the streets. But yet again she found a man: her friend Margaret Cotton introduced her to her brother Frederick, a pitman and recent widower living in Walbottle, Northumberland.

Margaret was looking after Frederick and his two children, but she died from an undetermined stomach ailment in March 1870, leaving the coast clear for Mary Ann.

She and Frederick married bigamously in September and a son Robert was born in 1871. Frederick Cotton died in December of that year. Insurance, needless to say, had been taken out on his life and those of his sons.

Now Joseph Nattrass, her long-term lover, moved in as her lodger. However, she also found work as a nurse to an excise officer called John Quick-Manning, who was recovering from smallpox. As was her habit, she swiftly became pregnant by him (their daughter Margaret was born in prison while Mary Ann awaited execution) but, of course, she was still encumbered by her children from her third marriage. One of her stepsons died in March 1872 and her own son Robert soon after. Shortly after revising his will in her favour, Nattrass became sick and died in April.

The incompetence and heavy workload of local physicians, the poor nutrition of the urban working class, and imperfect record-keeping all helped the killings to go unchallenged. Meanwhile, Mary Ann’s experience as a nurse gave her perfect access – and she undoubtedly relished monitoring the painful, protracted deaths of her victims.

The court documents from her murder trial suggest an element of real sadism at work. Mary Ann’s neighbour Jane Hedley was one of those who witnessed the excruciating death of Nattrass.

Under oath, she told Durham Crown Court: ‘I was very friendly with the Prisoner. I assisted . . . during the time of the illness. I saw him have fits, he was very twisted up and seemed in great agony. He twisted his toes and his hands and worked them all ways. He drew his legs quite up.’

She describes how he ‘threw himself about’ and how his murderess – presumably in the guise of caring for him – was obliged to restrain him with force. It is clear from Jane Hedley’s account that, by this stage at least, Mary Ann had the confidence to kill right under the noses of the doctors.

It is hard not to believe that there was some element of enjoyment at the control she exercised – that she was, in other words, a psychopath. I believe she would have enjoyed holding down Nattrass as he died writhing in agony.

There is no doubt, too, that greed was a powerful motive as, husband by husband, she climbed the social ladder of a newly mobile society (in which, for the first time, ordinary people had life insurance).

In a previous, agricultural era, Mary Ann Cotton’s activities would have been watched, reported upon and controlled by her neighbours and their informal surveillance.

Only in the age of water power and steam were people free to leave their agricultural past behind them and shift restlessly from one settlement to another. In so doing, they could become whoever and whatever they wanted to be – even a serial killer.

If modern life had allowed her to become the ‘monster in human shape’ later described by the Newcastle Chronicle, it also provided the means of her eventual detection. She had poisoned her seven-year-old stepson Charles Edward Cotton in the summer of 1872, apparently to clear the way for yet another new relationship, this time with Quick-Manning. Following a hasty post-mortem conducted on a kitchen table, the inquest returned a verdict of death by natural causes.

But this was not enough for the police, the newspapers and the new discipline of forensic science, all of which played a part in uncovering her past. It was journalists, thriving on local gossip, who first prompted the investigations, soon exposing the tally of dead husbands, lost children, and the tell-tale signs of arsenic poisoning. And the police – still a comparatively new force in provincial life – were moved to act.

In 1873, Mary Ann Cotton was arrested, tried and hanged for the murder of the seven-year-old Charles Edward Cotton. Some of the child’s remains were exhumed from the garden of Dr Kilburn, the local GP, who had presumably buried them there because he harboured doubts about the death. Samples were taken and, using methods that were for the time revolutionary, the presence of arsenic was detected by Dr Thomas Scattergood at Leeds School of Medicine.

Mary Ann’s trial at Durham Crown Court lasted three days, and after being found guilty she was executed in Durham Jail on March 24, 1873, by hangman William Calcraft. Even the way she met her end proved sensational.

From her prison cell, Mary Ann wrote letter after letter to newspapers protesting her innocence. Further sympathy was generated when she gave birth in prison to the child of Quick-Manning and when the baby girl was taken from her before the execution.

Then the hanging itself was horribly botched. The drop below the trap door was too short. Mary Ann was left jerking on the end of the rope and Calcraft was obliged to press down upon her to finish the job.

Her desperate self-promotion and the terrible manner of her execution ensured a strangely sympathetic hearing in her final months and the immediate aftermath, and this has helped confuse our understanding of a woman who by any standards was a quite relentless killer. Had she not been arrested, I am confident there would have been many more victims.

What little historical analysis she has received has often been quite naive, citing her as an example of the hardships endured by women, or even suggesting that she had been the victim of a miscarriage of justice.

Perhaps this is why, today, some in the North East think of her only as ‘a kindly old lady’ from some dim and distant past. Geography and the methods that she chose to kill have contributed, too. Her crimes were not committed in one of the great cities, nor was she the kind of killer who left ripped or broken bodies on the street.

My search for her ended at Durham Prison, its flags flying in the wind and its new modern mission statement proudly on display. I asked to be shown the original gate through which Mary Ann would have entered prior to her appointment with the hangman so I could contemplate what, precisely, Mary Ann means in the modern world.

A prison officer told me that no one ever escapes from Durham Prison.

Not even Mary Ann, who remains – despite the odd bit of local lore in the villages of County Durham – long dead and buried in the prison’s grounds.

Murder Grew With Her: On The Trail Of Mary Ann Cotton, Britain’s First Serial Killer, by Professor David Wilson, will be published later this year.

Mary Ann Cotton

by Douglas MacGowan

Gastric Fever

Young Charles Cotton was dead. The doctor couldn't deny that. His stepmother, Mary Ann Cotton, claimed the seven-year-old boy had died from gastric fever, but the neighbors had noticed that a few too many in the Cotton household had died by similar stomach ailments in recent months, and gossip and suspicion ran rampant through the West Auckland neighborhood in County Durham, England. Slowly, investigators and gossips began looking into the background of 40-year-old Mary Ann.

The deeper they dug, the more Mary Ann's life looked like something out of a gothic horror novel: a childhood of near-abuse and near-poverty, an early marriage to flee an unkind stepfather, and a long string of family members who had succumbed to the mysterious “gastric fever” or other curious circumstances while Mary Ann was ominously close by.

Born in the small English village of Low Moorsley in October of 1832, Mary Ann Robson did not have a happy childhood, but neither did most children born in lower-class England in the early 19th century. Her parents were both younger than 20 when they married, and her father barely managed to keep his family fed by working as a miner in nearby East Rainton. Many who knew her spoke of her prettiness as a child and claimed that her beauty as a woman easily attracted many men who crossed her path. This is undoubtedly true, although a photograph taken of her after her incarceration shows a dowdy and somewhat plain figure.

Mary Ann's father was ardently religious, a fierce disciplinarian of Mary Ann and her younger brother Robert, and active in the local Methodist church’s choir and activities. No doubt his daughter feared him and his punishments. When Mary Ann was eight, her parents moved the family to the town of Murton, and her father continued working in the mines until one day about a year after their move when he fell down a mine shaft to an early death.

As Dickens would chronicle repeatedly in his classic writings, life for a lower-class family (especially one headed by a newly widowed woman) was extremely harsh in 19th century England. The specter of being sent to a workhouse, or being separated from her mother and brother, cast dark shadows over Mary Ann’s girlhood and was the cause of many nightmares.

Mary Ann never went into the workhouse, however, because her mother remarried. Her new stepfather did not like Mary Ann, and the feeling was mutual. Mary Ann began looking for an escape from her childhood home, although she owed one thing to her stepfather: his salary had kept her and her family from becoming homeless and destitute. Mary Ann learned at an early age that to avoid the miserable fate of her nightmares, she had to keep a steady flow of money coming her way – no matter what the method.

Mrs. Mowbray

Perhaps partly to escape the daily life with her stepfather, Mary Ann left home at the age of 16 to work as a servant in a prosperous household in South Hetton. The quality of Mary Ann’s work caused no complaint, although she began what would become a life riddled with sexual scandals. Soon after Mary Ann began working in the household, the South Hetton gossips were busy spreading tales about illicit meetings between Mary Ann and a local churchman.

After three years of service in South Hetton, Mary Ann left to train as a dressmaker and to marry a miner named William Mowbray, by whom she had become pregnant. After their wedding in July of 1852, the newlyweds moved around England as William got work at various mining sites and on railroad construction projects throughout England.

In the first four years of their marriage, William and Mary Ann had five children, although four of them died in infancy or soon after. Even though child mortality rates were high at the time, this was a bit extreme. However, Mary Ann and William were probably viewed as particularly unlucky parents suffering from grievous personal losses.

Mary Ann and William did not have a happy marriage. They argued frequently about money, as Mary Ann was still obsessed about never becoming poor. The quarrels grew so heated that William, in an apparent attempt to get some peace, landed a job on the steamer Newburn out of Sunderland, and was often away from home. Mary Ann and the surviving children followed him and took up residence in Sunderland, and the number of her children lost to indefinable illnesses continued at an alarming rate.

In January of 1865, William returned to the house to nurse an injured foot, and Mary Ann helped him with his recovery. Later that month, despite a doctor’s care, William died from a sudden intestinal disorder, which he had not shown evidence of before benefiting from Mary Ann’s care. Soon after William’s death, the doctor went to the Mowbray house to console the grieving widow but was surprised to find Mary Ann dancing about the room in a new dress she had bought with the money from William's life insurance.

Mrs. Ward

Soon after William Mowbray's death, Mary Ann moved her remaining children to Seaham Harbour, where she struck up a relationship with Joseph Nattrass, a local man who was engaged to another woman. Apparently unable to break up the engagement, Mary Ann left Seaham Harbour after Nattrass’s wedding (and after burying her 3 ½ year old daughter, leaving her with one living child out of the nine she had given birth to). Nattrass would reappear in Mary Ann's life several years later.

Mary Ann decided to return to Sunderland and found employment at The Sunderland Infirmary, House of Recovery for the Cure of Contagious Fever, Dispensary and Humane Society. Her remaining child, Isabella, was sent to live with her maternal grandmother, and would remain in her grandmother's care for more than two years.

At the Sunderland Infirmary, Mary Ann kept the wards clean with a mixture of soap and arsenic, and the Infirmary staff admired her diligence and friendliness with the patients. She chatted with many of them, but one in particular, engineer George Ward, took a fancy to Mary Ann. Soon after he was discharged from the Infirmary, he and Mary Ann were married at a church in Monkwearmouth in August of 1865. Although now settled into a new marriage and a steady household, Mary Ann did not fetch Isabella from her mother’s house.

Despite having been released from the Infirmary, George Ward developed health problems soon after marrying Mary Ann – and despite various treatments by his doctors, he died in October of 1866 after a long bout of paralysis in his limbs and chronic stomach problems. The doctor attending George was accused of incorrectly treating his patient, a point of view that Mary Ann actively encouraged, probably hoping to redirect any doubts away from herself.

Much later, at Mary Ann’s trial, people would wonder why nobody became suspicious of this woman who left a trail of husbands and children dead from startlingly similar illnesses over a very short time. But as Mary Ann had different doctors attend to her dying family and she relocated frequently, suspicions never built in a single community.

According to her pattern, after George Ward’s death in Sunderland, Mary Ann needed to move on.

Mrs. Robinson

Pallion shipwright James Robinson needed a housekeeper to care for his house and children after the death of his wife, Hannah. In November of 1866, Mary Ann applied for the position and was hired. Two days before Christmas, the baby of the family was interred after having developed, perhaps not surprisingly, gastric fever. Overcome with the grief of the recent deaths of his wife and then of his infant son, James turned to Mary Ann for solace and support. She provided comfort and apparently then some, as she was soon pregnant with Robinson's child.

A new marriage seemed in the forecast, but Mary Ann was diverted in March of 1867 by a sudden illness of her mother. Mary Ann returned to her mother’s home to help nurse the elderly lady back to health. As always, one of Mary Ann’s first tasks was to clean the house from top to bottom with soap and (her favorite cleaning additive) arsenic, of which she usually had an ample supply.

By the time Mary Ann arrived, however, her mother was doing much better, but Mary Ann decided to stay and look after her anyway – and to visit her own daughter Isabella, who was still living with her grandmother. Soon after being in Mary Ann’s care, her mother began complaining of stomach pains and died only nine days after Mary Ann’s arrival.

Returning to the Robinson household with her mother, young Isabella (who had enjoyed a life of good health while living away from Mary Ann) soon developed an incapacitating stomach ailment, as did two of Robinson’s children, and all three were buried within two weeks of each other at the end of April.

James Robinson must have grieved further over the loss of two more of his children, but apparently did not suspect any wrongdoing on Mary Ann’s part. He put his mourning aside in time for his wedding to Mary Ann in early August (at which Mary Ann stated her surname as "Mowbray" -- apparently her 14-month marriage to George Ward had slipped her mind). The couple's first child, Mary Isabella, was born in late November but had succumbed to illness by the first of March of 1868.

James now began to become suspicious of his new wife, not only by the frequency of deaths in the household since Mary Ann's arrival, but also by her constant requests for money and her pressing desire for him to insure his life.

Always punctual in his household finances, James was surprised when he received letters from his building society and his brother-in-law detailing debts Mary Ann had run up without his knowledge. He questioned his remaining children and found that they had been coerced by their new stepmother to pawn valuables from the house and give her the money. Irate, he threw Mary Ann out of the house, and she left – taking their young daughter with her.

In late 1869, after wandering the streets in the kind of life that Mary Ann had anxiously feared, Mary Ann and her daughter visited an acquaintance. During the course of the visit, Mary Ann asked her friend to watch the girl while she went out to mail a letter. Mary Ann never came back and the daughter was returned to James on the first day of 1870.

Mrs. Cotton

After weeks of desperate living, the year 1870 began well for Mary Ann. Her friend Margaret Cotton introduced her to her brother Frederick. Like James Robinson, Frederick was a recent widower and had lost two of his four children to early deaths. His sons Frederick Jr. and Charles were all that was left of his family. His sister acted as mother substitute for the family, although in late March she died from an undetermined stomach ailment – which left the opportunity wide open for Mary Ann to console the grieving Frederick and, in an echo of her relationship with James Robinson, she was soon pregnant with Frederick's child.

The couple were married in September of 1870, Mary Ann again signing the register as “Mary Ann Mowbray,” ignoring the fact that her surname was legally Robinson and that she was not divorced from James, who was very much alive. Mary Ann added bigamy to her growing list of crimes.

Mary Ann quickly set up housekeeping in Cotton’s house and just as quickly insured the lives of Frederick Cotton and his two sons.

After giving birth to a son, Robert, in early 1871, Mary Ann learned that her former paramour Joseph Nattrass was not married and was living in nearby West Aukland. Under some pretense Mary Ann moved the family there, and she quickly rekindled the relationship with Nattrass and became less interested in Frederick Cotton.

In December of 1871, Frederick died of gastric fever and Joseph Nattrass soon became a lodger in the three-time widow Mary Ann’s house. To keep her fears at bay and to keep money coming in, Mary Ann worked as a nurse to John Quick-Manning, an excise officer recovering from smallpox. Mary Ann apparently saw Quick-Manning as a better match than Nattrass, and soon became pregnant by him.

A marriage to Quick-Manning was hindered by the presence of the remaining Cotton household, so Mary Ann apparently went to work quickly and Frederick Jr. died in March of 1872 and the infant Robert soon after. Upon the death of her infant, Mary Ann stated that she did not want to bury the baby immediately, because Joseph Nattrass had also become ill with gastric fever, and she would wait and handle both burials at once. Nattrass obligingly passed away soon after Robert, but not before revising his will to leave everything to Mary Ann.

Only one of her husbands, James Robinson, had escaped a relationship with Mary Ann with his life. Other husbands, children, and most stepchildren had succumbed to gastric fever or stomach ailments – except for young Charles Cotton and Robinson’s children. The Robinson children were safely away from Mary Ann’s motherly care, but the insurance policy Mary Ann had taken out on Charles's life still waited to be collected.

The Trial of the Green Wallpaper

In late spring of 1872, Mary Ann sent Charles to a local chemist to purchase a small quantity of arsenic. The chemist refused to sell the poison to anyone under the age of 21, as was the law. Undeterred, Mary Ann asked a neighbor to purchase the substance and in July Charles died of gastric fever.

But Mary Ann had either been in the West Aukland area too long – or the neighbors were more readily skeptical – because suspicions were immediately aroused in neighbors and physicians.

The first person Mary Ann told about Charles’s death was Thomas Riley, a minor government official that she had consulted previously about the possibility of sending Charles into a workhouse. Riley had said that it would only be possible if she went with him, which she declined. She told Riley that the boy was “in the way” of a marriage with Quick-Manning, and predicted that, “I won’t be troubled long. He’ll go like all the rest of the Cotton family.” Riley said the boy appeared completely healthy, and so he was surprised when Mary Ann stopped him only five days later to say that young Charles had died.

Riley went to the village police office and to a doctor and outlined his growing suspicions. The doctor was similarly surprised to hear of the news, as he and his assistant had tended to Charles five times during the previous week and had detected nothing dire, let alone life threatening, in the young boy. Riley convinced the doctor to delay writing a death certificate until he could look into the situation further.

Mary Ann, instead of going to fetch the doctor after the boy’s death, hurried to the insurance office to collect on Charles’s policy. She learned that they would not issue the money until they had a death certificate, so she returned home to get the document from the doctor. Instead of receiving the certificate, Mary Ann received the startling news that she would not be receiving a signed death certificate until after a formal inquest was held.

A brief inquest was held and initial evidence did not indicate death by unnatural causes. Angry at Riley for initiating the investigation, Mary Ann told him that he could be responsible for the costs of Charles’s burial.

The young boy’s internment would most likely not have been the end of the story, and Mary Ann would have gone on with her plan to marry Quick-Manning and probably continue obtaining insurance monies from other gastric fever victims – but the local newspapers latched onto the story. They reported on the inquest but also alluded to the neighborhood gossip that Mary Ann was an active poisoner. These reports fanned the fires of rumors and hearsay and the feeling toward Mary Ann within West Aukland became bitter and suspicious. Quick-Manning was appalled by this type of gossip about his intended, and was apparently distressed enough to sever all connections with Mary Ann.

Mary Ann began preparations to leave the area, although her friends warned her that it would look suspicious if she did. Unknown to her, however, suspicions were already building and were about to close in around her. A doctor from the inquiry had kept samples of Charles’s stomach so that he could test them later in his lab. He did so, and the samples tested positive for arsenic. The doctor went to the authorities, who arrested Mary Ann and ordered Charles’s body exhumed and fully tested. The body of Joseph Nattrass was also dug up (after six exhumations of other corpses – the elderly sexton of the church couldn’t remember exactly where Nattrass was buried) and tested positive for the presence of arsenic. There was debate and talk of further exhumations, but it was decided to proceed with the single murder charge of young Charles Cotton – although the trial was delayed until after the delivery of the daughter fathered by John Quick-Manning.

Her trial began in March of 1873. The prosecution brought forth numerous witnesses who testified about Mary Ann's purchases of arsenic, the long list of gastric fever victims in her past, and about her statements regarding Charles being an obstacle to her marrying Quick-Manning.

The defense claimed that Charles may have obtained the arsenic that killed him from inhaling loose airborne particles of arsenic that was used as a dye in the green wallpaper of the Cotton home. The judge dismissed this theory and the jury retired for only 90 minutes before finding Mary Ann guilty of the murder of Charles Cotton.

Mary Ann continued to proclaim her innocence and wrote numerous letters to her friends and supporters. A letter to her estranged husband, James Robinson, asked him to bring her child and two stepchildren to visit her in prison. She went on to beg Robinson “if you have one spark of kindness in you – get my life spared…you know yourself there has been…most dreadful lies told about me. I must tell you: you are the cause of all my trouble. If you had not (abandoned me). I was left to wander the streets with my baby in my arms…no place to lay my head.”

Robinson ignored her letter, so she wrote him again and asked him to visit her. Robinson sent his brother-in-law to the prison in his stead. Mary Ann was upset that Robinson did not come himself, but asked the man about the children and requested that a petition be circulated in her support. Petitions were eventually created and signed by Mary Ann’s former employers, ministers, and other supporters. As her execution date neared, she was cheered by a letter from the couple who had adopted the infant she and Quick-Manning had conceived. She replied to the letter, asking the couple to “kiss my babe for me.”

On March 24, 1873, Mary Ann was led to the scaffold where the elderly hangman misjudged the logistics of the execution – so instead of dying quickly, Mary Ann struggled after the trapdoor was released, and it took at least three minutes for her to be slowly and painfully strangled by the noose.

Chances are, some of Mary Ann's alleged victims died from natural causes or reasons other than poisoning by her hands. Later researchers of the case would estimate her victims as numbering anywhere from 15 to the full count of 21 people who died while living with or near Mary Ann: ten of her children by various husbands, three of those husbands, five stepchildren, her mother, Cotton’s sister Margaret, and her lover Nattrass. Theories of motive range from the collection of insurance money to the desire to rid herself of people that she felt were “obstacles” – or a combination of both.

Because she maintained her innocence to the end, it will never be known for sure how many victims Mary Ann claimed in her endless quest for the money that made her feel secure. Her notoriety continues with her fame as Britain's first female serial killer and in a popular children's rhyme:

Mary Ann Cotton --
She's dead and she's rotten!
She lies in her bed
With her eyes wide open.

Sing, sing!
"Oh, what can I sing?
Mary Ann Cotton is tied up with string."

Where, where?
"Up in the air -- selling black puddings a penny a pair."

Mary with her kids

Mary Ann Cotton young

Mary Ann Cotton

The property, centre left, where Mary Ann cotton was living when she was arrested in 1873.

Mary Ann Cotton was hanged in 1873 at Durham Jail after she was accused of killing 21 people.

William Calcraft who had to ensure Cotton was dead after the execution was horribly botched.

A newspaper cutting on Victorian poisoner Mary Ann Cotton.

Top criminologist Professor David Wilson.

The Medical Certificate in respect of Frederick Cotton showing him to have died od 'Typhoid Hepatitis'.

The victims

b2ux · Dec 24, 2012

Debra Denise Brown

Classification: Serial killer
Characteristics: Kidnappings - Rapes - Armed robberies - Partner-in-crime of Alton Coleman
Number of victims: 8
Date of murders: May-July 1984
Date of arrest: July 20, 1984
Date of birth: November 11, 1962
Victims profile: Vernita Wheat, 9 / Tamika Turks, 7 / Donna Williams, 25 / Virginia Temple and her daughter Rachelle, 9 / Tonnie Storey, 15 / Marlene Walters, 44 / A 77-year-old man
Method of murder: Strangulation
Location: Indiana/Ohio/Illinois, USA
Status: Sentenced to death in Indiana on June 23, 1986

Debra Denise Brown is an African-American serial killer. The girlfriend and killing mate of Alton Coleman during a summer murder rampage across four states in 1984, was convicted and sentenced to death in both Ohio and Indiana.

BROWN, DEBRA DENISE # 45

ON DEATH ROW SINCE 06-23-86

DOB: 11-11-1962
DOC#: 864793 Black Female

Lake County Superior Court
Judge Richard W. Maroc

Prosecutor: Thomas W. Vanes, Kathleen O'Halloran

Defense: Daniel L. Toomey, Albert E. Marshall

Date of Murder: June 18, 1984

Victim(s): Tamika Turks B/F/7 (No relationship to Brown)

Method of Murder: ligature strangulation with bedsheet

Summary: 7 year old Tamika and her 9 year old niece, Annie, were walking back from the candy store to their home when they were confronted by Brown and Alton Coleman.

Brown and Coleman convinced them to walk into the woods to play a game. Once there, they removed Tamika's shirt and tore it into small strips which they used to bind and gag the children. When Tamika began to cry, Brown held her nose and mouth while Coleman stomped on her chest.

After carrying Tamika a short distance away, Annie was forced to perform oral sex on both Brown and Coleman, then Coleman raped her. Brown and Coleman then choked her until she was unconscious. When she awoke, they were gone.

Tamika was found dead in the bushes nearby, strangled with an elastic strip of bedsheet. The same fabric was later found in the apartment shared by Coleman and Brown. Annie received cuts so deep that her intestines were protruding into her vagina. Evidence of a remarkably similar murder in Ohio was admitted at trial. These acts proved to be part of a midwestern crime spee by Coleman and Brown that included up to 8 murders, 7 rapes, 3 kidnappings, and 14 armed robberies.

Trial: Information/PC for Murder and DP filed (11-26-84); Motion for Detainer filed (05-17-85); Initial Hearing (12-10-85); Coleman Trial (03-31-86 to 04-12-86); Voir Dire (05-07-86, 05-08-86, 05-09-86, 05-10-86, 05-12-86): Jury Trial (05-12-86, 05-13-86. 05-14-86, 05-15-86, 05-16-86, 05-17-86); Deliberations 3 hours, 37 minutes; Verdict (05-17-86); DP Trial (05-17-86; 05-19-86, 05-20-86, 05-21-86); Deliberations 10 hours, 30 minutes; Verdict (05-22-86); Court Sentencing (06-20-86, 06-23-86).

Conviction: Murder, Attempted Murder (A Felony), Child Molesting (A Felony)

Sentencing: June 23, 1986 (Death Sentence, 40 years, 40 years)

Aggravating Circumstances: b(1) Child Molesting; b (7) 2 prior murder convictions in Ohio

Mitigating Circumstances: borderline mental retardation, substantial domination by Coleman; dependent personality, general lack of aggressiveness, head trauma as a child, 21 years old at time of murder

Direct Appeal:
Brown v. State, 577 N.E.2d 221 (Ind. August 29, 1991)
Conviction Affirmed 4-1 DP Affirmed 4-1
Shepard Opinion; Givan, Dickson, Krahulik concur; Debruler dissents.

Brown v. State, 583 N.E.2d 125 (Ind. 1991) (Rehearing Denied 4-1)
Shepard Opinion; Givan, Dickson, Krahulik concur; Debruler dissents.

Brown v. Indiana, 113 S. Ct. 101 (1992) (Cert. denied)
Brown v. Indiana, 113 S. Ct. 639 (1992) (Rehearing denied)

PCR:
PCR Petition filed 04-08-93. Denied by Special Judge Richard J. Conroy 02-28-96

Brown v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1132 (Ind. 1990) (Appeal of PCR denial by Special Judge Richard P. Conroy)
Affirmed 5-0 Sullivan Opinion; Shepard, Dickson, Selby, Boehm concur.
Brown v. Indiana, 119 S. Ct. 1367 (1999) (Cert. denied).

Habeas:
Petition filed and pending in the United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio. The State of Indiana's Petition to Transfer was denied. (Brown has been incarcerated in Ohio since her 1991 convictions for Aggravated Murder in Hamilton County. Her Ohio death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in 1991 by outgoing Ohio Governor Richard Celeste. On April 26, 2002 Alton Coleman was executed by lethal injection in the state of Ohio.)

ClarkProsecutor.org

Serial Killer - Debra Brown

"I killed the bitch and I don't give a damn. I had fun out of it."

By Charles Montaldo, About.com Guide

In 1984, at age 21, Debra Brown became involved in a master/slave relationship with habitual killer and rapist Alton Coleman and the two went on a massive killing, raping and torture spree across the midwest.

A Change in Plans

At age 21, Debra Brown ended a marriage engagement, left her family and joined Alton Coleman, a sadistic rapist and murderer. During the summer of 1984, in what her attorneys described as a slave-master relationship, the two went on a burglary, rape and killing spree in Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky and Ohio.

Targeting African-Americans, the couple would often befriend strangers, then assault, sometimes raping and murdering their victims, including children and elderly.

FBI Ten Most Wanted

On July 17, 1984, Alton Coleman became the 388th fugitive listed by the FBI on the Ten Most Wanted list. Three days later the pair were caught and a multi-state coalition of police formed to strategize on how to best prosecute Coleman and Brown. Wanting the pair to face the death penalty, authorities selected Ohio as the first state to prosecute the couple.

No Remorse

In Ohio Coleman and Brown were sentenced to death in each case of the aggravated murders of Marlene Walters and Tonnie Storey. During the sentencing phase of the trial, Brown sent the judge a note which read in part, "I killed the bitch and I don't give a damn. I had fun out of it."

In separate trials in Indiana, both were found guilty of murder, rape and attempted murder and received the death penalty. Coleman also received 100 additional years and Brown received an additional 40-years on charges of kidnapping and child-molesting.

Alton Coleman was executed on April 26, 2002.

Brown's death sentence in Ohio was later commuted to life because of her low IQ scores and non-violent history prior to meeting Coleman and her dependent personality, making her susceptible to Coleman's control.

Currently in The Ohio Reformatory for Women, Brown still faces the death penalty in Indiana.

Alton Coleman (November 6, 1955 – April 26, 2002) was an African-American serial killer. He was executed by the state of Ohio for the murder of 44-year-old Marlene Walters of Norwood, Ohio during a six-state killing spree in 1984.

Overview

Coleman received four death sentences from three Midwest states: Illinois, Ohio (two times), and in Indiana. At the time of his execution he was the only condemned person in the country to have death sentences in three states. His partner-in-crime, Debra Denise Brown, was originally slated to be executed in Ohio, but in 1991 her death sentence was commuted to life in prison by Governor Richard Celeste. She still has a death sentence for the murder the duo committed in Indiana. However, Brown is serving her sentence, without possibility of parole, in the Ohio Reformatory for Women in Marysville, Ohio.

During the summer of 1984, the 28-year-old Coleman and Brown, who was 21 at the time, embarked upon a killing spree through several Midwestern states.

By the time the couple were caught, Coleman was charged or wanted for questioning in assaults on at least 20 people in 13 separate attacks, including seven murders. Almost all of the victims were African-American like Coleman and Brown, but authorities said that was simply because the duo knew they would blend better in the black community, and that there was no racial motive in the murders.

Background of Coleman and Brown

Coleman was a middle-school drop-out who lived with his 73-year-old grandmother in Waukegan, Illinois, and who was well-known to the Illinois law enforcement community. The son of a prostitute who would often have sex with customers in his presence, he was charged with sex crimes six times between 1973 and 1983. Two of the cases were dismissed, and Coleman pleaded guilty to lesser charges in two and was twice acquitted. He claimed to "like it in the butt", and Coleman was scheduled to go on trial in Illinois on charges stemming from the rape of a 14-year-old girl when he fled and began his indiscriminate killing.

One of 11 children, Brown was borderline mentally retarded, suffered head trauma as a child, and was described as a "dependent personality." She was engaged to another man when she met Coleman in 1983, but left her family and moved in with him shortly afterward. Although a willing participant in the assaults and murders, Brown was never violent or in trouble with the law until she met up with Coleman.

In commuting Brown's sentence, Governor Celeste cited her low IQ scores, ranging from 59 to 74, and her "master-slave" relationship with Coleman. Brown was one of eight Ohio death row inmates to have her sentence commuted by Celeste, a staunch opponent of capital punishment, a week before he left office. Four of those whose sentences were commuted were the state's only female death row inmates.

Despite her non-violent history before the spree, Brown remains unrepentant for her acts. During the sentencing phase of her first Ohio trial, Brown sent a note to the judge which read in part: "I killed the bitch and I don't give a damn. I had fun out of it."

Details of the Murders

May 1984

Their crimes began in May 1984 when Coleman befriended Juanita Wheat who lived in Kenosha, Wisconsin, and was the mother of nine-year-old Vernita. On May 29, 1984, Coleman abducted Vernita to Waukegan, Illinois. Her body was discovered on June 19, 1984 in an abandoned building, four blocks from Coleman's grandmother's apartment. The body was badly decomposed and the cause of death was ligature strangulation.

On May 31, 1984, Coleman befriended Robert Carpenter in Waukegan, Illinois, and spent the night at his home. The next day he borrowed Carpenter's car to go to the store and never returned.

June 1984

In June 1984, Coleman and Brown appeared in Gary, Indiana, where they encountered two young girls, 9-year-old Annie and 7 year old Tamika Turks. Tamika's partially decomposed body was discovered on June 19, 1984. The cause of death was ligature strangulation. Annie survived, even though she was sexually assaulted by both Coleman and Brown.

The day Tamika's body was found, Coleman befriended Donna Williams, 25, of Gary, Indiana. On July 11, 1984, Williams' badly decomposed body was discovered in Detroit, about a half-mile from where her car was found. The cause of death was again ligature strangulation.

On June 28, 1984, Coleman and Brown entered the home of Mr. and Mrs. Palmer Jones of Dearborn Heights, Michigan. Palmer was handcuffed by Coleman and then badly beaten. Mrs. Jones was also attacked. Coleman ripped the Jones' phone from the wall and stole their money and car.

July 1984

The day after Independence Day 1984, Coleman and Brown came to Toledo, Ohio, where Coleman befriended Virginia Temple, the mother of several children. Her eldest child was Rachelle, aged nine. When Virginia dropped out of communication with relatives, they became concerned about the children and entering the home found the young children alone and frightened. Virginia's and Rachelle's bodies were discovered in a crawl space. A bracelet was missing from the home and later was found in Cincinnati under the body of Tonnie Storey. The cause of death of both Virginia and Rachelle was strangulation.

The same morning as the murders of Virginia and Rachelle, Coleman and Brown entered the home of Frank and Dorothy Duvendack of Toledo where Coleman proceeded to bind the couple with appliance and phone cords which had been cut. Coleman and Brown took money and the Duvendack's car. One of Mrs. Duvendack's watches was stolen and found later under another victim.

Later that same day, Coleman and Brown appeared at the home of the Reverend and Mrs. Millard Gay of Dayton, Ohio. They stayed with them in Dayton and then accompanied them to Lockwood, Ohio, on July 9, to a religious service. On July 10, the Gays dropped off Coleman and Brown in downtown Cincinnati.

By this time, Coleman had come to the attention of the FBI, which on July 12, 1984, added him to its Ten Most Wanted List as a "special addition". Coleman was just the 10th person since the initiation of the list in 1950 to merit inclusion in such a manner.

Coleman and Brown bicycled into Norwood, Ohio, on July 13 at about 9:30 a.m. Less than three hours later they drove away in Harry Walters' car, leaving Harry Walters unconscious and his wife, Marlene, dead.

Harry Walters survived. He testified that Coleman and Brown inquired about a camper he had put up for sale. Walters sat on the couch as he and Coleman discussed the trailer title. Coleman picked up a wooden candlestick and, after admiring it, hit Harry Walters on the back of the head. The force of the blow broke the candlestick and drove a chunk of bone against Mr. Walters' brain. From that point on, Mr. Walters remembered little else.

Sheri Walters, Harry and Marlene's daughter, came home from work at about 3:45 p.m. and at the bottom of the basement steps, she found her father, barely alive, and her mother, dead. Both had ligatures around their throats and electrical cords tied around their bare feet. Her mother's hands were bound behind her back and her father's hands were handcuffed behind his back. Her mother's head was covered with a bloody sheet.

The coroner indicated Marlene Walters had been struck on the head approximately 20 to 25 times. Twelve lacerations, some of which were made with a pair of vice grips, covered her face and scalp. The back of her skull was smashed to pieces. Parts of her skull and brain were missing.

The living room hallway, and basement, were splattered with blood. Fragments of a broken soda bottle, bearing Coleman's fingerprints, were found in the living room. Strands of Marlene Walters' hair were found on a blood-stained magazine rack located in the living room. Bloody footprints, made by two different kinds of shoes, were found in the basement.

The family car, a red Plymouth Reliant, was gone. Money, jewelry, and shoes had been stolen. Left behind were two bicycles, clothes and shoes.

Two days later, the Plymouth showed up abandoned in Kentucky. The couple then kidnapped Oline Carmichael Jr., a Williamsburg, Kentucky, college professor and drove back to Dayton with their victim locked in the trunk of the car. On July 17, in Dayton, they abandoned this stolen vehicle and Carmichael was rescued by authorities.

Coleman and Brown reappeared at the home of Millard and Kathryn Gay. The Reverend Gay recognized Coleman, who was by this time the subject of a huge nationwide manhunt, and he and his wife were accosted with guns. The Reverend Gay asked Coleman, "Why you want to do us like that, like this," and according to Gay, Coleman responded: "I'm not going to kill you, but we generally kills them where we go." Coleman and Brown took their car and headed back toward Evanston.

On the way back home, they take time to steal another car, killing the 77-year-old man who owned it.

Capture and Trial

On July 17, 1984, Alton Coleman became the 388th fugitive listed by the FBI on the Ten Most Wanted list.

On July 20, 1984 in Evanston, illinois, someone from Coleman’s old neighborhood pulled up to a red light. As he waited for the light to change Coleman and Brown crossed the street in front of his car. He only knew Coleman casually but did recognize him. As Coleman and Brown continued walking west the witness drove north to a gas station where the police were notified.

The information was dispatched and a description of the two was broadcasted. As officers pulled into the area a detective saw Coleman and Brown sitting on probable bleachers in an empty Mason Park; but noted they were wearing different tee shirts. The detective informed the other units just as two sergeants were driving by the park. As they heard the broadcast they turned and saw the two. As Coleman was approached the officers observed Brown walking away from Coleman toward the rear of the park.

The detective joined the two sergeants and Coleman was approached for questioning. As Coleman was being interviewed, two other officers stopped Brown as she tried to exit the park. She was searched and a gun was found in her purse. Coleman had no identification and denied he was Alton Coleman. Both Coleman and Brown were taken into custody without incident and transported to the Evanston Police Department where both were identified by fingerprints.

In the police station Coleman was strip searched and a steak knife was found between two pair of sweat socks he was wearing. When taken into custody they had a shopping bag full of different tee shirts and caps. It was learned as the two walked they would stop every three to four blocks to change shirts and caps.

A week after they were arrested, more than 50 law enforcement officials from Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky and Ohio met to plan their strategy for prosecuting Coleman and Brown. Michigan, which does not have the death penalty, was quickly ruled out as the place to begin and eventually Ohio was given the first shot at the alleged spree killers.

"We are convinced that prosecution (in Ohio) can most quickly and most likely result in the swiftest imposition of the death penalty against Alton Coleman and Debra Brown", U.S. Attorney Dan K. Webb said.

Appeals and Execution

Ohio was successful in convicting Coleman and Brown on a pair of aggravated murder charges (In May 1985 for the murder of Tonnie Storey, and in June 1985 for the murder of Marlene Walters), as well as a plethora of other violent crimes. They were both sentenced to be executed and the lengthy appeals process began. Coleman's case went to the United States Supreme Court several times between 1985 and 2002, but his numerous arguments that his conviction and death sentence were unconstitutional failed to sway the justices.

By April 2002, time had run out for Coleman. His last-ditch effort to avoid lethal injection was unsuccessful when on April 25, 2002, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a claim by Coleman's attorneys that the state's plan to accommodate the large number of victims and survivors who wanted to view the execution would turn it into a "spectator sport". There were so many victims and survivors who were allowed to witness the execution that prison officials had been forced to set up a closed-circuit viewing outside the death house.

For his final meal, Coleman ordered a well-done filet mignon smothered with onions, fried chicken breasts, a salad with French dressing, sweet-potato pie topped with whipped cream, french fries, collard greens, onion rings, cornbread, broccoli with melted cheese and biscuits and gravy. He washed it all down with a Cherry Coke.

On April 26, 2002, reciting "The Lord is my shepherd", Alton Coleman died by lethal injection in the death chamber at the state prison in Lucasville, Ohio.

Reginald Wilkinson, director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, said Coleman did not convey remorse for the killings

Court Decisions

Coleman v. Mitchell, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 268 F.3d 417; 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21639; 2001 FED App. 0367P (6th Cir.), October 10, 2001

In re Coleman, Supreme Court of Ohio, 95 Ohio St. 3d 284; 2002 Ohio 1804; 767 N.E.2d 677; 2002 Ohio LEXIS 916, April 19, 2002

State v. Brown, Supreme Court of Ohio, 38 Ohio St. 3d 305; 528 N.E.2d 523; 1988 Ohio LEXIS 289, August 31, 1988

State v. Coleman, Supreme Court of Ohio, 37 Ohio St. 3d 286; 525 N.E.2d 792; 1988 Ohio LEXIS 212, July 6, 1988

State v. Coleman, Court of Appeals of Ohio, First Appellate District, Hamilton County, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 9048, October 7, 1987

Wikipedia.org

Alton Coleman and Debra Brown

Off2dr.com

Accompanied by his girlfriend Debra Brown, Alton Coleman went on a six-state raping and killing spree in 1984.

Early Years:

Alton Coleman was born on November 6, 1955 in Waukegan, Illinois, about 35 miles from Chicago. His elderly grandmother and his prostitute mother raised him. Mildly retarded, Coleman was often teased by schoolmates because he sometimes wet his pants. This problem earned him the nickname of "Pissy" among his young peers.

Insatiable Sex Drive:

Coleman dropped out of middle school and became known to local police for commiting petty crimes involving property damage and setting fires. But with every passing year, his crimes grew from petty into more serious charges of sex crimes and rape.

He was also known for having an insatiable and dark sex drive which he sought to satisfy with both men, women and children. By the age of 19, he was charged six times for rape, including that of his niece who later dropped the charges. Remarkably, he would convince jurors that the police had arrested the wrong man or intimidate his accusers into dropping the charges.

The Mayhem Begins:

In 1983, Coleman was charged with rape and murder of a 14-year-old girl who was the daughter of a friend. It was at this point Coleman, along with his girlfriend Debra Brown, fled Illinois and began their brutal rape and murder spree across six mid-western states.

Why Coleman decided to flee this time is unknown since he strongly believed he had voodoo spirits that protected him from the law. But what really protected him was his ability to blend into African American communities, befriend strangers, then turn on them with vicious brutality.

Vernita Wheat:

Juanita Wheat was living in Kenosha, Wisconsin, with her two children, Vernita, age nine, and her seven-year-old son. In early May 1984, Coleman, introducing himself as a nearby neighbor, befriended Wheat and visited her and her children often over a period of a few weeks. On May 29, Wheat gave permission for Vernita to go with Coleman to his apartment to pick up stereo equipment. Coleman and Vernita never returned. On June 19, she was found murdered, her body left in an abandoned building in Waukegan, Illinois. Police also found a fingerprint at the scene which was matched to Coleman.

Tamika and Annie:

Seven-year-old Tamika Turkes and her nine-year-old niece Annie were walking home from a candy store when Brown and Coleman led them into nearby woods. Both children were then bound and gagged with strips of cloth torn from Tamika's shirt. Annoyed by Tamika's crying, Brown held his hand over her nose and mouth while Coleman stomped on her chest, then strangled her to death with elastic from a bedsheet.

Annie was then forced to have sex with both adults. Afterwards they beat and choked her. Miraculously Annie survived, but her grandmother, unable to deal with what happened to the children, later killed herself.

Donna Williams:

On the same day that Tamika and Annie were attacked, Donna Williams, age 25, of Gary, Indiana, came up missing. She only knew Coleman for a short time before she and her car disappeared. On July 11, 1984 Williams was found strangled to death in Detroit. Her car was found parked close to the scene, four blocks from where Coleman's grandmother lived.

Virginia and Rachelle Temple:

On July 5, 1984, Coleman and Brown, now in Toledo, Ohio, gained the trust of Virginia Temple. Temple had several children, the oldest being her daughter, nine-year-old Rachelle. Both Virginia and Rachelle were found strangled to death.

Tonnie Storey:

On July 11, 1984, Tonnie Storey, age 15, from Cincinnati, Ohio, was reported missing after she failed to return home from school. Her body was found eight days later in an abandoned building. She had been strangled to death.

One of Tonnie's classmates testified that she saw Coleman talking to Tonnie the day she disappeared. A fingerprint at the crime scene was also linked to Coleman and a bracelett was found under Tonnie's body, which was later identified as one missing from the Temple home.

Harry and Marlene Walters :

On July 13, 1984, Coleman and Brown bicycled to Norwood, Ohio, but left almost as soon as they arrived. They made a stop before leaving to Harry and Marlene Walter's home under the pretense of being interested in a travel trailer the couple was selling. Once inside the Walter's home, Coleman struck the Walters with a candlestick, bound, then strangled them.

Mrs. Walters was struck up to 25 times and mutilated with a pair of vice grips on her face and scalp. Mr. Walters, survived the attack, but suffered brain damage. Coleman and Brown stole the couple's car which was found two days later in Lexington, Kentucky.

Oline Carmichael Jr.:

In Williamsburg, Kentucky, Coleman and Brown kidnapped college professor Oline Carmichael, Jr., forced him into the trunk of his car, and then drove it to Dayton, Ohio. Authorities found the car and Carmichael still alive in the trunk.

The End of the Killing Spree:

By the time authorities caught up to the deadly pair on July 20, 1984, they had committed at least eight murders, seven rapes, three kidnapping and 14 armed robberies.

After careful consideration by authorities from six states, it was decided that Ohio would be the best place to first prosecute the pair because of its death penalty. Both were found guilty for the murder of Tonnie Storey and Marlene Walters and received the death penalty.

Brown's death sentence was later commuted by Ohio Governor Celeste.

Coleman Fights for His Life:

Coleman's appeal efforts were unsuccessful and on April 25, 2002, while reciting, "The Lord is my shepherd," Coleman was executed by lethal injection.

Killer convicted in 2 states remains behind bars in Ohio

Columbus Dispatch

April 9, 2002

For the past 11 years, Ohio has kept convicted killer Debra Denise Brown behind bars -- at a total cost to taxpayers of $200,000. Brown faces a death sentence in Indiana, while Ohio's case against Brown is dormant, thanks to a commutation by former Gov. Richard F. Celeste. So why is she imprisoned here?

The answer is simple: Indiana hasn't asked for her. "We can't just send her over there,'' said Andrea Dean, spokeswoman for the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. "A request has to be made by Indiana authorities.''

Brown, 39, the girlfriend and killing mate of Alton Coleman during a summer murder rampage across four states in 1984, was convicted and sentenced to death in both Ohio and Indiana.

However, Celeste -- a death-penalty opponent -- commuted Brown's death sentence to life in prison on Jan. 10, 1991, days before he left office. Celeste said he spared Brown's life because she was retarded, had childlike emotional development and had a "master-slave'' relationship with Coleman.

Brown's death sentence for the murder of 7-year-old Tamika Turks of Gary, Ind., remains in force. She is appealing the Indiana conviction in U.S. District Court in Columbus. Indiana officials are prosecuting the case; Brown's attorneys are court-appointed public defenders from out of state. Indiana officials, including former Gov. Evan Bayh, said immediately after Celeste's commutation that they planned to file a request to extradite Brown.

However, that never happened, perhaps in part because of criticism about the cost of bringing Coleman and Brown to Indiana for trial in 1986 after Ohio already had convicted them of murder.

"Ohio has a lawful right to hold her as well as Indiana,'' said Pam Pattison, spokeswoman for the Indiana Department of Correction. "There has been discussion about bringing her back to Indiana. Ohio kept her,'' Pattison said.

She offered no reason why Indiana has not extradited Brown. Brown is incarcerated at the Ohio Reformatory for Women in Marysville at an annual cost now figured at $22,014.

If Brown were shipped to Indiana, she would be housed at the Indiana Women's Prison in Indianapolis where Indiana taxpayers would pick up the annual cost of $19,374. Coleman's execution has been set for April 26 at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility near Lucasville.

He was sentenced to die for the murder of Marlene Walters of Cincinnati. The case is being appealed. Although Coleman and Brown were close at the time of the murders in 1984, they no longer communicate or have any kind of relationship, one of Coleman's attorneys said.

Alton Coleman & Debra Brown: Odyssey of Mayhem

By Mark Gribben - The Crime Library

Deadly Duo

Maybe people shouldn’t be surprised that a boy who had to endure the nickname “Pissy” because of a tendency to wet his pants would grow up to be one of America’s most savage spree killers.

And it certainly didn’t help that Pissy would go to prison on a robbery charge and emerge two years later with a tendency to dress in women’s clothing and a desire for rough sex.

Whatever the reasons, Alton Coleman and his girlfriend Debra Denise Brown will go down in history as a short-lived U.S. version of Great Britain’s multiple sex-slayers Myra Hindley and Ian Brady.

The story of Coleman and Brown begins in the mid-1970s, takes place in five states and involves one of the largest manhunts in recent history.

It is a tale of American criminal justice that stands among the most depraved and cruel incidents of the modern age -- Coleman and Brown demonstrated a lack of respect for human life that shocked even hardened FBI agents and police officers.

In less than two months, they assaulted, raped and murdered their way from Illinois to Michigan and down to Kentucky before authorities were finally able to capture then.

Coleman and Brown are behind bars, each awaiting a date with the executioner, but the evil they wrought upon their innocent victims lives on to this day. The duo have used every avenue of judicial appeal possible and seek mercy from the courts – mercy they rarely showed when they prowled the Midwest.

With every new court ruling or delay, dozens of survivors relive the horror of their encounters with the murderous pair of lovers.

A child victim who managed to avoid death at their hands vows that she will never marry because of her inability to trust and questions whether she is still “pure”. Another survivor battles drug addiction, suicide attempts, and post-traumatic stress disorder.

A mother and father must adjust to the fact that Coleman will never stand trial for their daughter’s murder and they may never find out the circumstances surrounding her slaughter.

Coleman’s family, on the other hand, consider themselves victims – not of their deadly relative, but of a system that they believe persecutes and plans to kill an innocent man. Debra Brown's mother continues to rue the day her daughter met Alton Coleman.

Brown was “a good girl,” unknown to police before she fell under Coleman’s spell, but by the time the pair were caught, it was clear that Brown was just as vicious and murderous as her ex-con boyfriend.

Probably what is most disturbing about Alton Coleman is that he shouldn’t have been on the streets to begin his rape- robbery -murder spree. Over and over Coleman managed to manipulate the judicial system in his favor, beating sexual assault charges on several occasions.

Frustrated prosecutors and lawmen knew they had a monster on their hands, but could only stand by helplessly as jury after jury let the him walk, confident the system had “worked” to free an innocent man.

A Boy Called "Pissy"

Born in Waukegan, an Illinois town about a half-hour’s drive north of Chicago, Alton Coleman endured the taunts of schoolchildren who teased him because he so often wet his pants. They christened the mildly retarded boy “Pissy.”

Family members and law enforcement officials who had dealings with Coleman since his teen years said Alton was slow to show emotion and generally kept to himself.

Clearly alienated from his peers, Coleman had a reputation for his strong sex drive – reportedly he was bisexual and willing to engage in sex any time, any place with anyone. Said one friend of Coleman’s late mother: “He knew he was different… even as a young child. “As he grew up, (Coleman) was deeply into insidious kinds of sexual gratification.”

Coleman first came to the notice of police as a teenager when he was picked up for breaking windows in his Waukegan housing project. He was quickly labeled as a troublemaker, but for the most part, his crimes were of the petty sort.

There was little indication to authorities of the mayhem to come. Interestingly, property damage, often in the form of arson, can be an indicator of serial murder tendencies. That is not to say that every youngster who breaks windows or lights fires is bound to be a serial killer, but only that many multiple murderers committed similar acts as children.

On the way to becoming a serial killer, Coleman gave the law many chances to put him away, but Alton was “smooth as silk,” according to those who fought him in court. Lawmen said Coleman put on a good appearance in court which often convinced jurors that authorities had the wrong man.

Alton, according to friends, also relied upon the supernatural to help him escape justice. He claimed that voodoo made him invulnerable to attack by the law.

“He was good at conning jurors,” Waukegan Police Lt. Marc Hansen told the Detroit Free Press in 1984 when Coleman and Harris were hiding out in Detroit. “He tells a convincing story in court. People are impressed with his testimony. He comes off as a decent person.”

A prosecutor who watched Coleman beat a rape charge agreed. “He knows what kind of case holds up in court and which ones don’t,” said former U.S. attorney Fred Foreman. “He’s been to the penitentiary. He’s a career criminal”

But when the façade wouldn’t work and voodoo god Baron Samedi wasn’t listening, Coleman resorted to more common forms of beating the rap, most notably witness intimidation. “It’s difficult to get people in court to prove these charges because they are sexual assault charges, they involve kids, they involve family that don’t want to see him go to jail,” said Hansen.

In 1983, Coleman’s sister went to authorities and told them her brother tried to rape her eight-year-old daughter. Three weeks later, she went to court to have the charges dropped. “It’s a misunderstanding,” she said. “A lot of families go through that. It doesn’t make any difference now.”

The judge hearing the motion for dismissal was astounded by the 25-year-old woman’s testimony “I think the woman as she stands here today, is terrified of this man,” the judge said. He called her account of the incident “completely implausible.” But in the end, with no victim and no witnesses, the judge had no choice but to free Alton Coleman and dismiss the charges.

Coleman’s rap sheet before his Midwestern spree reads like a one-man sex crime wave. In 1973 he and an accomplice kidnapped, robbed and raped an elderly woman.

She refused to testify about the rape and Coleman served two years on the robbery charge. Three months after his release from Joliet, Coleman was arrested for another rape. He was acquitted but served time for a lesser charge. Four years after that spell in the pen, Coleman was acquitted of rape.

A year later he was arrested for an attempted rape – the charge was dismissed. In July, 1983 he was charged with the rape of his niece. That charge was dismissed. In early 1984 he was indicted for the knifepoint rape and murder of a suburban Chicago girl whose mother was a friend of his.

Coleman learned he was wanted for that crime but disappeared, kicking off his multi-state crime spree with his girlfriend, Debra Brown.

Odyssey of Mayhem

Why Alton and Debra went underground is still a mystery 15 years after they were arrested. Police blamed Coleman’s “intense hatred of blacks,” but longtime friends dismissed that reason as absurd.

The pair’s victims were mostly black because they were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Coleman stayed in traditionally black neighborhoods because they provided a place for him to hide.

“That sounds so crazy to me,” said one Waukegan public official who knew Coleman since “he was in diapers.” “Why does he victimize blacks? Black neighborhoods are the logical place for him to go. If he went into a white community, they would have found him long ago.”

A friend of the family said Coleman could not deal with his homosexual tendencies. “He used to dress up like a woman a lot. It was well known that he had different habits than a normal male,” the friend said.

Coleman is a classic “disorganized serial killer.” He rarely stalked a particular victim, but instead lashed out at whomever was nearby.

He used whatever tools he had handy to kill or incapacitate his victims and there did not appear to be any ritual to his violence.

What probably set him off was the realization that he no longer had anything to lose. Perhaps the indictment on the aggravated rape and murder charges – which could have brought the death penalty – were enough to finally push him over the brink to whatever madness prompts such violence.

While the pair was on the run, Coleman was indicted on murder charges in Wisconsin and a federal warrant was issued for his capture.

Regardless of the motivation, Coleman and Brown began their spree on June 5, 1984 when the pair rented an apartment in Gary, Ind. Coleman had been wanted by police since May 31 and Debra Brown had been interrogated about his disappearance June 1.

The pair laid low for two weeks until June 18 when two young girls, Tamika Turks and her 9-year-old aunt disappeared on their way to a candy store. Later that day, the 9-year-old was found beaten and raped. Tamika was missing.

A day later, Tamika's badly ravaged body was found in a wooded area in Gary. She had been raped and killed by someone stomping on her chest.

The older girl was forced to watch as the pair killed Tamika – Brown holding Tamika to the ground and covering her nose and mouth and Coleman jumping on her chest and face until her ribs fractured and punctured her vital organs.

The older girl then was forced to have sex with both Brown and Coleman before being beaten about her head. To this day the young woman suffers severe headaches and screaming fits.

“She will get to screaming and crying like someone is hitting her on the back of the head,” said Mary Hilliard, the child’s mother. Her injuries left the family with $15,000 in medical bills, which were substantially, but not completely covered by insurance.

LaVerne Turks, Tamika’s mother, was forced to move to Minneapolis because the memories of Tamika in Gary, Indiana, were too painful. “LaVerne’s gone. Tamika’s missing. My daughter is having these problems. Our family will never be the same,” said Hilliard, who attempted suicide shortly after her granddaughter’s death.

The same day Tamika's body was discovered, Donna Williams, 25, was reported missing by her parents. Her car was stolen, as well.

A week later, Williams’s car was found abandoned in Detroit with a forged identification card featuring Brown’s picture. Residents from the area said the car had been parked in the alley since June 19.

Police in four states were now looking for the pair, working on the assumption that Donna Williams had been murdered, even though her body had not been found.

In the meantime, two days after Williams was reported missing, a Detroit woman was kidnapped by a man and woman whom she later identified as Coleman and Brown. She escaped while driving the pair to Toledo by purposefully ramming her car into oncoming traffic.

Coleman and Brown were able to survive by befriending good Samaritans and later turning on their friends, authorities said. “We’ve come to the conclusion that Coleman and Brown are staying with people they meet,” said FBI Special Agent John Anthony in Detroit. “They spend a day or two with the people, get a little money gambling with them and then assault and rob them and steal their car.”

While in Detroit, Coleman and Brown eluded police while instigating a small, but violent, crime wave. Warrants for their arrest were issued for the kidnapping and robbery of the 28-year-old Detroit woman who managed to escape the killers, a June 28, 1984 robbery and beating of an elderly Dearborn Heights couple and the June 30 robbery of two Detroit men.

By the time the deadly duo left Detroit, police in Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio and Michigan, as well as federal authorities, were on the lookout.

Despite Coleman’s disorganized pattern of murder, there were some similarities among the crimes – in every case the cars stolen by Coleman and Brown were recovered within 12 hours.

When authorities were not able to locate a 1975 Buick stolen by the pair after they beat and robbed a 55-year-old woman and her companion, they had good reason to suspect that Coleman and Brown had left the Motor City.

Sadly, even though the pair had fled to Toledo, the evidence of their crimes continued to surface. In an abandoned house near Wayne State University in Detroit, the badly decomposed body of Donna Williams was found on July 11. It was clear that she hadn’t lived long after she arrived, as a hostage, in Detroit.

There will likely never be any closure – legal or psychological – for the family of Donna Williams. When authorities gathered to determine the best course of action against Coleman and Brown, the Williams case was not tried.

“We chose to go with the strongest cases against the two that would result in the death penalty,” said Lake County, Indiana prosecutor Jack Crawford. “It appeared that Williams was killed in Michigan, which does not have the death penalty.”

For Robert and Zenota Williams, Donna’s parents, punishment is not foremost on their minds. “I will always wonder what, exactly, happened,” Zenota Williams told the Detroit Free Press in a retrospective on the spree three years later.

Three other homicides tied to the pair will also probably not ever be tried: the slaying of 77-year-old Eugene Scott of Indianapolis and the killings of Virginia Temple and her 10-year-old daughter in Toledo.

Scott was suspected of being their last murder victim because his car was found in Evanston, Ill. where they were arrested.

From Toledo, the pair continued south, stopping long enough in Cincinnati to murder Marlene Waters, who was found bludgeoned to death in the basement of her home.

Waters’ husband was badly beaten in the attack and left for dead. Coleman and Brown stole the Waters’ car and headed to Lexington, Ky., where they abandoned the car in a cornfield.

In nearby Williamsburg, the duo kidnapped Oline Carmical and drove to Dayton, Ohio leaving Carmical locked in the trunk of his car. An elderly Dayton couple was found beaten and gagged in their home after the fugitives stole their car. Another Dayton couple reported to police that Coleman and Brown robbed them.

The trip from Tamika Turks’ murder to the crimes in Indianapolis took less than a month, with the pair committing felonies on the average of crime every other day. In all, the murderous 53-day rampage – from the time Coleman raped and murdered the 9-year-old in Kenosha, Wis., to the time they were arrested in Illinois -- resulted in a slew of felonies: eight homicides, as many as seven rapes, three kidnappings and 14 armed robberies.

Capture

Some time after the murders of the Temples and Scott, Coleman and Brown returned to the Waukegan area. Their case had inspired a great deal of notoriety across the country and Coleman had recently been named as a “special addition” the FBI’s 10 Most Wanted list.

In becoming a special addition, Coleman joined such notable felons as H. Rap Brown and Martin Luther King’s murderer, James Earl Ray.

Coleman’s family aside, they had few friends left after their spree and it wasn’t surprising that when an acquaintance of Coleman’s saw the pair walking near Evanston, Ill., he would turn them in. Authorities had been watching Evanston closely because of Coleman’s known associates there and the fact that the duo had rented an apartment in Evanston prior to fleeing to Gary.

Knowing that there were few criminals as desperate as Coleman and Brown, authorities were cautious in making the arrest.

Once police pinpointed their location – the pair was spotted by undercover officers in a local park – state, local and federal authorities began to converge on the couple.

Shortly before noon on July 20, 1984 Coleman and Brown were watching a pick-up basketball game from the bleachers at Mason Park on the west side of Evanston as officers began to approach.

Coolly, as if he hadn’t a care in the world, Coleman began walking away as plainclothes and uniformed cops neared. Wearing a torn yellow shirt and sporting a short haircut unlike the jheri-curl ‘do he wore in published photos, Coleman surrendered peacefully when confronted. “You got the wrong man,” he told arresting officers. He provided two aliases and Brown identified herself as “Denise Johnson.”

She was carrying a loaded revolver and Coleman had a long knife hidden in his boot, but neither went for their weapon.

“They looked like they did on TV,” said an 11-year-old who witnessed the arrest. “The capture was quick and easy.”

Although there were some holes in the authorities’ investigation, it was clear that they had been expecting the two-person crime wave to return to Evanston. Neighbors in the area said they had heard for three weeks that Coleman and Brown would eventually turn up there.

The mood of the neighbors was as jubilant as that of police who clearly basked under the media spotlight. “There was a community awareness about him,” said one neighbor. “He wasn’t going to be able to come in here and snatch anybody. We were waiting for him.”

Residents of the Mason Park area told the media that Coleman looked tired and emaciated when arrested and they speculated that the lethal duo had “just run out of steam.”

Law enforcement officials thought along similar lines with one officer wondering if they had unconsciously wanted to do so: Coleman had never worried about leaving fingerprints at his crime scenes, and FBI agents said he was so lackadaisical it was almost as if he was trying to leave a calling card.

Those same fingerprints would eventually do in Alton Coleman. Despite his protests that officials had the wrong man, Evanston police were able to positively identify the man arrested in Mason Park as the man who left fingerprints at crime scenes in Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan and Kentucky. Fingerprints on file with the FBI conclusively proved that the suspects in custody were Coleman and Brown.

Courtroom Battles

With Coleman and Brown in custody, the problem fell to state and federal officials to untangle the slew of accusations against the couple and to decide which cases to prosecute. It was clear from the outset that the most punitive states would have first shot at the pair.

That meant capital crimes committed in Michigan and Wisconsin, which have no death penalty, would be tried last – if at all. “We want him first,” said Lake County DA Fred Foreman. “I’ve been in court with this man before and I want to bring him back.”

Brown and Coleman were separated by police and Debra, easily the most wanted woman in the country, was advised of her constitutional rights. She immediately invoked her right to remain silent and asked to speak to an attorney.

In the Evanston police station, the FBI agent who administered the Miranda warning continued to ask Brown questions about her identity – things like her name, age, birth date, and address, according to court documents. An Evanston detective questioned Brown as well, seeking clues to an attack in his jurisdiction for which the pair was suspected.

When the time came to transport Brown to the federal lockup, she spoke with agents on the trip to Chicago. Arriving at the federal building, she was once again advised of her rights and she once again refused to sign a waiver. She did, however, agree to talk to officers as long as she could stop when she wanted to.

Over the next two and a half hours, Brown discussed the crime spree in detail, in effect confessing to many of the crimes committed during the brief, but violent odyssey across the upper Midwest.

When she finished, she once again asked to speak with an attorney. No further inquiry was made until after Brown spoke to a lawyer.

During trial, Brown’s attorney protested that her Fifth Amendment right – the right against self-incrimination – was violated because authorities continued to interrogate after she had asked for counsel.

The trial court found that the Evanston detective did violate her rights and the evidence from his questioning was ruled inadmissible.

However, the confession given to federal authorities in Chicago was used in the trial and with it conviction was easily obtained.

Brown was sentenced to die for the murder of Tamika Turks. Later, Brown was sentenced to die for the Cincinnati murders, but she continued to be held on Indiana’s death row.

Coleman was convicted of the same murders and also sentenced to die. In January 1991 the governor of Ohio commuted Brown’s death sentence, saying she was retarded and “dominated by” Coleman. She is now serving two life sentences in Ohio for her crimes there. However, Indiana is not finished with her.

It took almost seven years, but in August 1991 the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had not erred by allowing the confession into evidence. The conviction and death sentence would stand.

The appeals court found that despite her repeated attempts to speak to an attorney, the confession was separated by “space, time and subject matter” from her first request for counsel that it was proper. Brown willfully gave the confession, the court noted, after being advised of her rights.

Interestingly, it was Brown’s conversations with authorities while she was being transported to federal custody that created the loophole which could result in her execution. She asked questions like “where am I going?” and “what am I charged with?”

Criminal defense attorneys fumed at the court’s decision, with one saying to the Indianapolis Star that the Fifth Amendment was being “squeezed to death.” “If you ask anything, you create an opening the state can drive a truck through,” said Daniel L. Toomey, who argued Brown’s case before the Court of Appeals. Today, Debra Brown, the only woman on Indiana’s Death Row, is serving out her sentences in Ohio. Whether or not she will ever see the executioner in the Hoosier State remains up in the air.

Alton Coleman is on Indiana’s death row, but he also won a small, but significant, court victory recently. In August 2000, ruling in a Virginia capital murder case, the U.S. Supreme Court said a murder defendant is entitled to constitutionally adequate legal representation.

Coleman’s attorneys immediately filed for relief under the high court’s ruling and the Court ordered the Indiana Supreme Court to reconsider Coleman’s death sentence.

Coleman alleged that during the sentencing phase of his trial his counsel was inadequate and did not bring up mitigating factors that might have spared Coleman from a trip to the electric chair. Alton suffered from a troubled childhood, a personality disorder and brain dysfunction, attorneys said.

The Indiana high court had already upheld his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. “Given these aggravating circumstances, even had his counsel presented the evidence of Coleman’s impoverishment and abuse, we see little likelihood the jury recommendation or the trial judge’s sentence would have been different,” wrote the Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court.

Even if the state of Indiana spares Alton Coleman, there are any number of prosecutors who are still awaiting a crack at him.

The chances of Coleman, or for that matter, Brown, ever seeing the outside of a prison cell are slim. If Indiana takes a pass on Coleman, then Ohio wants its turn, and if the Buckeye State spares his life, then it’s on to Kentucky.

Odds are that Alton Coleman, somewhere down the line, will pay for his crimes with his life.

Bibliography

Chicago Tribune, July 22, 1984, “Police Bask In Glory Of Fugitives' Arrests”

Detroit Free Press:
June 28, 1984, “FBI, Police Search For Slaying Suspect”
July 4, 1984, “Unsuspecting Residents Aid 2 Fugitives, FBI Says”
Friday, July 6, 1984, “Mother Fears 'Some Kind Of Spell'”
July 15, 1984,“Mother Frets For Daughter With Fugitive”
July 15, 1984, “Alton Coleman 'Smooth As Silk': Police Say Fugitive Has Frustrated Justice”
July 21, 1984, “Alton Coleman Held In Illinois: Bond Set At $25 Million Cash”
July 21, 1984, “The Chase For Alton Coleman”

Associated Press
February 13, 1987, “1984 Midwest Crime Spree Continues To Exact Price In Pain”

Indianapolis Star
August 30, 1991, “Murder Spree Conviction Upheld”
November 17, 1991, “Confession From A Killer: Did Police Cross The Line?”
February 3, 1998, “Lone Woman On State's Death Row Is In Ohio”
April 25, 2000, “High Court Edict May Aid State Death Row Inmate: Justices Tell Court To Restudy Sentence Of Murderer Who Claims He Received Ineffective Legal Counsel".

Supreme Court of Indiana

Brown v. State

Debra Denise BROWN, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 45S00-9212-PD-939.

July 17, 1998

Susan K. Carpenter, Public Defender, Indianapolis, Ken Murray, Columbus, OH, Janet S. Dowling, Evans, Dowling & Youngcourt, P.C., Indianapolis, for Appellant.Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General, Christopher L. LaFuse, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.

Petitioner Debra Denise Brown appeals the denial of post-conviction relief with respect to her convictions for Murder 1 and Attempted Murder,2 and her sentence of death.3 We earlier affirmed these convictions and this sentence on direct appeal. Brown v. State, 577 N.E.2d 221 (Ind.1991), reh'g denied, 583 N.E.2d 125, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 833, 113 S.Ct. 101, 121 L.Ed.2d 61 (1992). We now affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Background

Debra Denise Brown and her companion, one Alton Coleman, were convicted and sentenced to death in separate proceedings for stomping a seven-year old girl to death and attempting to choke a nine-year old girl to death with a belt after sexually assaulting the latter. These crimes were part of a crime spree which also took Brown and Coleman to Ohio, Michigan and Illinois. About a month after the Indiana crimes were committed, Brown was apprehended in Illinois and turned over to the FBI, which had been actively engaged in the investigation.

Our discussion infra and our opinions on Brown's and Coleman's direct appeals contain additional details of their crimes, trials, and claims for relief. See Brown, 577 N.E.2d at 224-25; Coleman v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1059, 1060-61 (Ind.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2912, 115 L.Ed.2d 1075 (1991).

Discussion

I

Brown contends that she is entitled to post-conviction relief because the State violated its obligation to disclose material exculpatory evidence by failing to disclose prior to her trial certain psychological profiles and related materials compiled by the FBI. As noted in Background, supra, Brown and Coleman had been interstate fugitives. As such, the FBI prepared a psychological profile and related material on Brown to assist in her capture. During preparation for Brown's trial, Indiana authorities had in their possession a substantial volume of FBI materials. When the FBI sought to have these materials returned, Brown's trial counsel protested, contending that he had not yet had time to review all of the materials. Upon a representation from the State that the files contained no exculpatory material, the trial judge permitted the materials to be returned to the FBI.

In preparation for post-conviction proceedings, Brown obtained four documents in the possession of the FBI which she contends are exculpatory. Brown is, of course, correct that the State has an affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a criminal defendant. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)). Brown raises several interesting questions as to whether the State had a pre-trial obligation to disclose these four documents. However, an allegation of a Brady violation requires a demonstration that the undisclosed favorable evidence “could be reasonably taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence” in the trial court's judgment. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555. We elect to proceed to that inquiry first. Because we find that these four documents could not be reasonably taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the trial court's judgment, we hold that Brown is not entitled to post-conviction relief on this contention.4

A

We note first that while Brown seeks to have both her convictions and her sentence reversed on the basis of this claim, she makes no specific argument as to how these four documents undermine confidence in the jury's guilty verdicts. Rather, her specific claims are that these documents contain important evidence of her psychological domination and control by Coleman, mitigating circumstances which should have been considered by the jury during the penalty phase.

Certainly the subject matter of these four documents comprise mitigating circumstances appropriate for consideration in a death penalty case. Our death penalty statute specifically itemizes the domination and control of another person as a mitigating circumstance.5 Acting under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance is another statutory mitigating circumstance.6 And the mental health of the defendant is frequently considered as a mitigating circumstance under the “catch-all” mitigator.7 These four documents implicate each of these circumstances.

The first FBI document, Brown's Exhibit 31, states in pertinent part:

Coleman has a violent temper, and when he is upset he is uncontrollable. * * * Ever since Coleman's mother died of cancer, Coleman seems to have gone off his rocker. * * * Debra Denise Brown has lived with Coleman and his blind grandmother for the past two years. Brown has lost about 35 pounds during this time. She has been virtually a prisoner in the house. If she left without Coleman, he would beat her. During [an] interview with FBI agents, Brown was very docile. She admitted that scars and scratches on her face were from Coleman. It is believed that she is completely under the control of Coleman.

(R. at 1894-96.) 8 The second and third FBI documents, Brown's Exhibits 32 and 33, contain essentially the same information. (R. at 1898; 1902.) The fourth FBI document, Brown's Exhibit 36, is an extensive report prepared by the FBI regarding her background, including an interview with Lottie Mae Brown, Brown's mother. The report indicates that:

1. Brown's father had severe mental problems, drank to excess, and physically abused family members including the children.

2. Brown had experienced a drug overdose which required hospitalization in 1980 and may have been using drugs regularly.

3. Brown's personality changed drastically after she met Coleman.

4. Brown moved in with Coleman and would not talk to her family, but would look to Coleman to answer for her.

5. Brown's mother felt that Coleman completely controlled Brown and that she would do whatever Coleman asked her to do; Brown's mother also believed that Coleman was beating Brown and using her as a prostitute.

6. Brown's mother had seen Brown with her face “all beaten up” during the time Brown was living with Coleman.

(R. at 1931.)

B

From the very outset of the penalty phase, defense counsel made it clear that his principal argument would be that Brown should not be sentenced to death because she had been acting “under the substantial domination of Alton Coleman.” (T.R. at 3344.) In a powerful fourteen page opening statement to the jury at the beginning of the penalty phase, defense counsel spent thirteen pages of it emphasizing Coleman's control over Brown. (T.R. at 3385-3400.) Specific testimony to this effect was presented by defense counsel throughout the penalty phase.

Counsel proceeded to make his argument primarily through expert testimony. First, a Dr. Batacan, a psychiatrist who had examined Coleman, testified as to Coleman's manipulative personality. Then a Dr. Periolet, another psychiatrist who had examined Coleman, testified that one characteristic of Coleman's sociopathic personality was that he would assess who he could control. Counsel then called a Beverly Perkins, Coleman's ex-wife, who testified that Coleman used physical violence and threats of harm to her family whenever she tried to leave their apartment to do something by herself.

Next counsel called a Dr. Kelly, a psychiatrist, who testified as to the results of his examination of Brown. Dr. Kelly had examined Brown twice and also discussed the results of his examination with a psychologist, Dr. Rogers, who had independently examined her. In compiling the results of his examination, Dr. Kelly also examined additional hospital records, school records and the report of another psychologist, Dr. Suran, concerning Brown. Dr. Kelly testified as to Brown's difficult upbringing, based on his conversation with members of her family, including her mother and sister. He discussed her poor school record, a serious auto accident in which she had been involved, and her record of truancy from school. He noted that her school records showed an IQ at the age of 12 of 59 and a current IQ of 74.

In Dr. Kelly's expert opinion, Brown suffered from the mental illness of dependent personality disorder. Among the causes of the dependent personality disorder identified by Dr. Kelly were her limited intelligence and difficult family upbringing. Dr. Kelly also gave his expert opinion that Brown was under the domination and control of Coleman at the time of the crime and that she was a good candidate for rehabilitation.

Defense counsel also called a Dr. Suran, a clinical psychologist, who had conducted a diagnostic psychological evaluation of Brown, including a social history. Dr. Suran reported that Brown scored 75 on the Wechsler IQ test and that she functioned as mildly retarded. His examination showed her to have “a very depraved background” and that she never evolved to the level of emotional development consistent with her age. More specifically, in his interview with her dealing with her family and background, he learned that she had been the subject of “frequent and repeated physical abuse, sexual abuse, and a very strong sense of rejection and abandonment.” Dr. Suran found Brown to be the victim of severe environmental deprivation.

It was Dr. Suran's expert opinion that Brown suffered from borderline retardation, depression, and had a dependent personality or passive dependent personality. Dr. Suran also made reference to Brown's childhood abuse, collected school and medical records, and noted her childhood mental retardation diagnosis.

Two statements from Dr. Suran's testimony bear citation here:

ndependent of her relationship with Alton Coleman, I really find no evidence in Debra's personality or functioning of tendencies to commit the kinds of offenses for which she has been convicted, and it is my conclusion that it is only in and through her relationship with Alton Coleman that she has had any involvement in these crimes.

(T.R. at 3746-47). Further:

I do not find in Debra Brown the kind of impulse type of hostile, aggressive, resolved or unresolved, instincts and impulses that is capable of committing the kinds of offenses for which she has been convicted. What I do find is a pathological degree of dependent behavior on her part that through association with another agent that was capable and that did have such hostile impulses that she would act out those impulses dependently serving the other agent, in this case, the agent being Alton Coleman.

(T.R. at 3757.)

The trial court gave reasonably extensive treatment to this evidence in its sentencing order:

There is a large quantity of evidence from the reports and testimony of a clinical psychologist who examined defendant Brown on April 18, 1986 and testified at trial and the report of a psychiatrist who examined Deborah [sic] Brown on August 1 and August 8, 1984, and testified at trial and other psychological reports that the Defendant was under the substantial domination of her co-defendant at the time these offenses were committed. The Court has already detailed the Defendant's mental state at the time of the commission of these offenses. It is agreed by the experts that the Defendant was a young woman with borderline intellectual functioning with a dependent personality disorder. It is further agreed that she had demonstrated an inability to function independently and to assume responsibility for major areas of her life. It is evident from her interview with Dr. Suran that Alton Coleman provided her with attention and support and that he is someone that this defendant became devoted to. Further evidence was presented of the dominant, manipulative personality of Alton Coleman. Truly he is such a person and appears to be totally without conscience. The affect of such a person on one with Deborah [sic] Brown's inadequacies is also obvious. The central question to this Court is whether or not Deborah [sic] Brown was so under the domination of Alton Coleman because of her own inadequacies and personality disorders that she could not make a rational choice as to her own participation in repeated violent criminal acts, accompanied by repeated efforts to deceive intended victims and others and to evade prosecution. Defendant Brown was not and is not insane nor mentally ill. She was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. In the opinion of this Court she made a choice to follow Coleman and to prove herself to him. She stated to Dr. Suran “I know I have to suffer for what I did, but I'll give my life for him. I'll fight for my husband's (Coleman) life. I'll go down for him. I'll put my life on the roll for him ․ I loved him so much, I told him that I would go down with him, and I would give up my life for him.” The Court would agree that defendant Brown reached her decision making processes in this crime spree with limited intellectual tools. But the Defendant made a rational decision to become involved with Coleman no matter what the consequences, including these horrible crimes committed against innocent children and many others including at least two other vicious murders. The domination over this defendant by Alton Coleman is not sufficient to excuse her criminal conduct.

(T.R. at 355-57.)

It is true that at the post-conviction hearing, both trial counsel and the experts who testified at trial indicated that they would have been able to make their case that Brown was under Coleman's domination and control more persuasively had they known what was in the four FBI documents. The post conviction court disagreed, finding that these materials did not add anything to the evidence which was presented to the jury. We find no basis to disagree with this conclusion.9 While the FBI reports contained information relevant to mitigating circumstances appropriate for consideration in the penalty phase of Brown's trial, trial counsel in fact argued those mitigating circumstances vigorously with the help of expert testimony and the trial court clearly took them into account in pronouncing sentence.

C

In a related argument, Brown contends that the FBI wrongfully denied her access to a substantial quantity of documents concerning her case.10 She argues that this denial has prevented her from fully and adequately investigating, preparing and presenting her claim for post-conviction relief. She further asserts that as a result certain federal and state constitutional rights have been violated.

Brown has not presented us with any basis for concluding that her ability to assert entitlement to post-conviction relief has been limited in any material way or that any of her constitutional rights have been violated as a result. Brown's claim appears to be that there might be additional information in the FBI files of the character discussed in part I-A, supra, i.e., information showing that she was under the domination and control of Coleman. But as we have already discussed, extensive evidence in support of this mitigating circumstance was presented to the jury and the court during the guilt and penalty phases of Brown's trial. Nothing in Brown's argument gives us any basis for concluding that any undisclosed information “could be reasonably taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence” in the trial court's judgment, Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555.

Brown's principal argument here seems to be along the lines that there might have been additional evidence in the FBI files supporting her claim of domination and control by Coleman. But she also suggests entitlement to the FBI files “to learn what, if any, additional exculpatory information is hidden in the FBI files and to pursue whatever leads might be uncovered.” Br. of Appellant at 121. We have recently observed that the post-conviction relief process “is not a device for investigating possible claims, but a means for vindicating actual claims” and that “[t]here is no postconviction right to ‘fish’ through official files for belated grounds of attack on the judgment or to confirm mere speculation or hope that a basis for collateral relief may exist.” Roche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1115, 1132 (Ind.1997), reh'g denied (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal.3d 1179, 275 Cal.Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159, 1206 (1990)). To the extent that Brown does not contend that there is any specific information in the FBI files that supports her claims to post-conviction relief, no rule of constitutional law or state procedure mandates unfettered access to the FBI files in the hopes of uncovering such. See Roche, 690 N.E.2d at 1133 (citing State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 690 A.2d 1 (1997)).

II

Brown contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel to which she was entitled at the penalty phase of her trial because her lawyers failed fully to investigate, develop and present evidence at the penalty phase of her trial. We analyze such claims according to the two-part test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See e.g., Canaan v. State, 683 N.E.2d 227, 229 (Ind.1997), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 906, 118 S.Ct. 2064, 141 L.Ed.2d 141 (1998); Lowery v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1031, 1041 (Ind.1994). First, we require the defendant or petitioner to show that, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or wrongs of counsel were outside the range of professionally competent assistance. Id. This showing is made by demonstrating that counsel's performance was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Id. (citing Turner v. State, 580 N.E.2d 665, 668 (Ind.1991)). “Isolated poor strategy, bad tactics, a mistake, carelessness or inexperience do not necessarily amount to ineffective assistance of counsel unless, taken as a whole, the defense was inadequate.” Davis v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind.1996) (quoting Terry v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1085, 1089 (Ind.1984)). Second, we require the defendant or petitioner to show adverse prejudice as a result of the deficient performance. This showing is made by demonstrating that counsel's performance was so prejudicial that it deprived defendant or petitioner of a fair trial. Lowery, 640 N.E.2d at 1041. See Games v. State, 690 N.E.2d 211, 213 (Ind.1997). We will conclude that a fair trial has been denied when the conviction or sentence has resulted from a breakdown of the adversarial process that rendered the result unreliable. Lowery, 640 N.E.2d at 1041 (citing Best v. State, 566 N.E.2d 1027, 1031 (Ind.1991)).

A

Brown's claim of failure fully to investigate, develop and present penalty phase evidence focuses on four areas: (1) her family and upbringing; (2) her intellectual and educational deficits; (3) her absence of any criminal record or history of violence, and her generally positive character, prior to meeting Alton Coleman; and (4) she was suffering from Battered Women's Syndrome.

At the post-conviction hearing, Brown presented extensive evidence in each of these areas.11 Nevertheless, the post-conviction court found that she had not been denied the effective assistance of counsel in this regard because prejudice had not been shown. The post-conviction court concluded that given the seriousness of the crimes for which Brown had been convicted, the jury was unlikely to reach a different result even with this evidence.

Without reaching the issue of prejudice, we agree with the post-conviction court's conclusion because we do not find counsel's performance to have been deficient. As discussed in part I, supra, counsel's strategy at the penalty phase was to argue that Brown should not be sentenced to death because she had been acting “under the substantial domination of Alton Coleman” when she committed the crimes for which she had been convicted. In part I-B, supra, we detailed the testimony elicited by defense counsel at the penalty phase. That recitation demonstrates that counsel did present to the jury at the penalty phase of Brown's trial evidence of her difficult family upbringing, her limited educational and intellectual abilities, her positive record of behavior prior to meeting Alton Coleman and, if not that she was explicitly the victim of Battered Women's Syndrome, that she functionally suffered from it at Coleman's hands.12 It appears to us that Brown's quarrel with her trial counsel is over the amount of evidence presented in these three areas at trial, not whether any investigation, development or presentation took place.13

On this record, we cannot say that counsel's performance was deficient in concentrating his penalty phase argument on Brown's relationship with Coleman. To be more specific, we cannot say that it was deficient performance for counsel to marshal his witnesses to try to present as strong a case as possible that Brown committed the crimes for which she had been convicted under the domination and control of Coleman and that her submission to his domination and control was accounted for by her difficult upbringing, her limited IQ and her mental illness of dependent personality disorder. Brown has not demonstrated deficient performance by her trial counsel in this regard.

B

In a related claim, Brown contends that the post-conviction court improperly excluded evidence relevant to her claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing fully to investigate, develop and present mitigating evidence. She argues that the exclusion of this evidence denied her a full and fair post-conviction hearing. According to Brown, the excluded evidence consisted of the following four items:

1. The testimony of a Mr. See, a Cleveland-based executive of an offender re-entry program with experience as a witness concerning mitigating circumstances, which was “offered to show the social, racial and cultural environment in which Brown was raised and to demonstrate how the individuals and social service institutions charged with [Brown's] care defaulted on their responsibilities.” Br. of Appellant at 93. While See's testimony is of record, the post-conviction court ultimately excluded it. (R. at 1637-38.)

2. Certain unspecified affidavits relevant to the claim of failure to investigate and discover mitigating evidence. Br. of Appellant at 98. These affidavits appear to be of the same nature as those discussed in part III-A of our recent opinion in Roche, 690 N.E.2d at 1131. They are included in the record but were “not admitted.” (R. at 98.)

3. The post-conviction testimony of Dr. Suran to “the effect of the recently discovered mitigating evidence on the conclusions he described at trial.” Br. of Appellant at 99. The record contains a filing styled “Proffer of Testimony of Bernard Suran, Ph.D.,” summarizing the testimony he would have given. (R. at 506-08.)

4. A “social history report” prepared by a Mr. Coconis, a social worker with experience as an investigator of mitigating circumstances, which was to have been used as the basis of Dr. Suran's testimony. Br. of Appellant at 101. Although the State's objection to the introduction of this report was sustained, a copy is included in the record. (R. at 1908-17.)

5. The post-conviction testimony of Brown's trial counsel, Mr. Toomey, as to whether he thought and felt he gave Brown effective representation at trial. Br. of Appellant at 102. The post-conviction court sustained the State's objection on grounds that the question of counsel's effectiveness was for the court to decide. (R. at 1430.)

We find no error with respect to item (2), the exclusion of the affidavits. See Roche, 690 N.E.2d at 1131 (affidavits prepared for similar purpose excluded). We also find no error with respect to item (5), the prohibition on counsel's testifying as to his own ineffectiveness. Compare Ind.Evidence Rule 704(a) (testimony is not objectionable merely because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact) and Evid.R. 704(b) (witnesses may not testify to opinions concerning legal conclusions).

Items (1), (3) and (4) all relate to Brown's family and upbringing, her intellectual and emotional development, her lack of criminal history before meeting Alton Coleman, and her relationship with Coleman. The post-conviction court generally excluded this information on grounds that, even if it had been presented to the jury during the penalty phase of Brown's trial, it “would not have made a difference to the jury's recommendation or the trial court's sentence.” 14 (R. at 778.) As such, the post-conviction court concluded, the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel had not been satisfied.

We are not as willing as the post-conviction court to imply that there are circumstances in which no quantum of evidence would be sufficient to change a jury's recommendation or a trial court's sentence. But, as noted at the outset of part II-A, supra, we find it unnecessary to analyze this issue in terms of prejudice. Our purpose here is not to replay Brown's trial; it is to determine whether she was denied the effective assistance of counsel to which she was entitled. We concluded supra that counsel did not render deficient performance with respect to the presentation of mitigating circumstances. The fact, without more, that the additional evidence excluded by the post-conviction court could have been presented at trial does not affect this conclusion.

III

Brown contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel to which she was entitled when counsel failed to present evidence of Brown's borderline mental retardation in support of his contention that Brown's confession had been involuntary. Noting that this Court gave extensive consideration to the voluntariness of Brown's confession in her direct appeal, Brown, 577 N.E.2d at 229, the State argues that the issue is not available for relitigation here. See Ind.Post-Conviction Rule 1(8); Canaan, 683 N.E.2d at 235; Lamb v. State, 511 N.E.2d 444, 447 (Ind.1987); Ingram v. State, 508 N.E.2d 805, 807 (Ind.1987).

We agree with the State's argument that the doctrine of res judicata bars consideration of Brown's argument here. Brown's argument is essentially this: (1) her borderline retardation and mental illness (severe passive-dependent personality disorder) impacted her ability to make a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of her constitutional rights in giving her confession; (2) her lawyer was unaware of case law that holds that evidence of mental retardation is relevant and material to determining whether or not a defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his or her rights; and (3) counsel's failure to know the law effectively precluded the suppression of Brown's confession. As the phrasing of her argument suggests, a defendant's limited intelligence or mental health alone does not render a confession involuntary. Indeed, in Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), the United States Supreme Court said that the purpose of the Fifth Amendment's testimonial privilege against self-incrimination and the requirements of Miranda are to protect against police misconduct. “Although a person's mental condition is relevant to the issue of susceptibility to police coercion, where the person voluntarily makes a confession without police coercion the confession may be considered in spite of the mental condition.” Pettiford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ind.1993). See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167, 107 S.Ct. 515. Thus the issue here really turns on whether the police conduct was coercive within the meaning of Connelly. We decided this issue on direct appeal. Brown, 577 N.E.2d at 230 (“no inducements or threats were made by law enforcement officials to gain the confession”). It is not available for relitigation here.

IV

Brown contends that she was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel to which she was entitled in several respects. As with claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we analyze claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel according to the two-part test announced in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. See, e.g., Lowery, 640 N.E.2d at 1048 (“standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is identical to the standard for trial counsel”). A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Roche, 690 N.E.2d at 1120. The failure to establish either prong will cause the claim to fail. Id.

Brown first contends that her appellate counsel (who was the same as trial counsel) was ineffective for failing to raise on direct appeal the issues discussed in parts IV-A and IV-B, infra. These were issues, Brown points out, that counsel raised in his motion to correct errors following trial but did not raise on direct appeal.15 The post-conviction court appears to have concluded that these contentions were tantamount to an argument “that appellate counsel did not pursue a claim in the direct appeal that the trial court judge erred in imposing the death sentence.” (R. at 765.) But, the post-conviction court continued, “Because the Supreme Court fulfilled its independent duty to review the propriety of the death sentence and upheld that sentence, that issue is res judicata.” Id. We find this conclusion too attenuated to affirm without further analysis.

The State points out that in the direct appeal, counsel raised five substantial errors for our review and rightly cites our opinion in Lowery to the effect that counsel is not required to raise every possible claim in a direct appeal. As we said in Lowery, counsel should exercise professional judgment and expertise in choosing the issues raised on appeal. Lowery, 640 N.E.2d at 1049. This comports with the United States Supreme Court pronouncement to the same effect-that effective advocacy does not mandate that the appellate attorney raise each and every non-frivolous issue. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). See Bieghler v. State, 690 N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ind.1997) (“the reviewing court should be particularly sensitive to the need for separating the wheat from the chaff in appellate advocacy, and should not find deficient performance when counsel's choice of some issues over others was reasonable in light of the facts of the case and the precedent available to counsel when that choice was made”), reh'g denied. See also Page v. United States, 884 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir.1989) (“One of the principal functions of appellate counsel is winnowing the potential claims so that the court may focus on those with the best prospects.”). Nevertheless we elect here to address the claims on the merits.

A

One of the mitigating circumstances specified in our death penalty statute is the absence of prior criminal history. During the penalty phase, defense counsel questioned Dr. Suran as to whether Brown had any prior criminal history prior to her association with Coleman. Dr. Suran testified that Brown had no criminal history prior to that time. The crimes Brown committed with Coleman began in June, 1984, with the crimes that are the subject of this proceeding and then continued with additional crimes in Ohio in July of that year. In rebuttal, the State introduced evidence over the objection of Brown's counsel that Brown had been convicted of a kidnaping which occurred after June, 1984. Brown now says, “Defense counsel attempted to establish that Brown had no previous juvenile or adult criminal history prior to her crime spree with Coleman, which began in June, 1984. Admission of a kidnaping conviction which occurred after June, 1984 did not logically tend to rebut the defense evidence. Moreover, admission of [the evidence of the kidnaping conviction] impaired the jury's ability to find the existence of, or give weight to, the [absence of prior criminal history] statutory mitigator.” Br. of Appellant at 81.

We have never been called upon to address whether evidence of crimes committed after the offense for which the defendant is on trial is admissible in rebuttal of an assertion of absence of prior criminal history on the defendant's behalf. While such evidence is certainly not relevant to determining whether the defendant had a criminal history prior to committing the offense for which he or she is being tried, we nevertheless believe that such evidence is relevant to determining the weight to be given to the no prior criminal history mitigator. See generally Cozzolino v. State, 584 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tenn.1979) (evidence of subsequent crimes admissible in penalty phase only if it is relevant to an aggravating circumstance or a mitigating circumstance raised by the defendant). We further note that two of the aggravating circumstances in this case were murders committed by Coleman and Brown (and reduced to conviction) after the date of the offenses for which she was being tried and Brown has never raised any question as to the propriety of using these later-occurring offenses as aggravating circumstances. If Brown has no objection to using later-occurring offenses as aggravating circumstances to justify the imposition of the death sentence, the argument against the use of a later-occurring offense as rebuttal to a claim of no prior criminal history seems far less compelling. We find the trial court well within its discretion to admit the evidence of the later occurring offense in rebuttal and consequently find no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal.

B

At the outset of proceedings in the trial court, Brown filed a motion to dismiss the death penalty count on grounds that the Indiana death penalty statute was unconstitutional. This claim was raised again in the motion to correct errors but not on direct appeal. Brown now argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to claim that the trial court erred by not denying the motion to dismiss. As best as we can understand Brown's argument in this appeal, she contends that the Indiana death penalty statute is unconstitutional for failing to give adequate guidance to the sentencer in two respects: (1) the statute does not provide any standard of proof for finding the existence of mitigating circumstances; and (2) the statute does not provide any guidance as to how the sentencer is to assess the relative weight of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances found to exist.

We recently addressed the first of these claims in Matheney v. State, 688 N.E.2d 883, 902 (Ind.1997), reh'g denied. Here, Brown argues “This capital sentencing [sic] permits the sentencer to arbitrarily apply any standard of proof to the existence of mitigators it chooses. While the sentencer might apply some low standard of proof to mitigating circumstances, it is equally likely that the sentencer might apply a standard of proof which is higher than contemplated, possibly higher than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the sentencer is free to apply a completely subjective standard of proof to mitigating circumstances which effectively bars the consideration of both statutory and non-statutory mitigating circumstances.” But in Matheney we said, “Without something specific in the given jury instructions which would clearly lead a jury to such a misunderstanding, a bald assertion as to what a jury is likely to presume will not suffice.” Matheney, 688 N.E.2d at 902. Brown's argument is even weaker than Matheney's because the record reveals that the trial court instructed Brown's jury, “A circumstance need not be proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be considered a mitigating circumstance by you.” (T.R. at 290.).

As to the second contention, we resolved the question of whether our death penalty statute provides adequate guidance to the sentencer on the assessment of the relative weight to aggravating and mitigating circumstances adverse to Brown's position in Miller v. State, 623 N.E.2d 403, 408-09 (Ind.1993) (citing Fleenor v. State, 514 N.E.2d 80 (Ind.1987))

C

Brown contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to claim on direct appeal that the Indiana death penalty statute was unconstitutional as applied to Brown in this case because it failed to narrow the class of persons eligible for capital punishment. Specifically, she argues that the first aggravating circumstance alleged by the State in support of its death penalty request, that Brown intentionally killed while committing child molesting, duplicated the elements of the underlying murder and child molesting charges. She begins by observing that the United States Supreme Court held in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988), to the effect that a legislature may achieve the constitutionally required narrowing either by defining certain murders as capital offenses or by requiring findings of aggravating circumstances at the penalty phase. Noting that Indiana has chosen the later approach, she contends that in her situation no narrowing occurred because the aggravating circumstance charged was no different than the underlying offenses with which she was charged. As the State properly points out, this court has previously held that such a contention misconstrues the narrowing function of our death penalty statute:

Appellant ․ claims that the overlap between the aggravating circumstance found at the sentencing phase and the convictions at the guilt phase violates constitutional principles by eliminating the critical narrowing function of the sentencing process, allowing the State to enter the penalty phase with the aggravating circumstance already proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Our death penalty statute requires the sentencer to find at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, to consider and evaluate any mitigating factor it may find to exist, and to weigh the aggravators and mitigators, finding that the mitigating circumstances are outweighed by the aggravating circumstances, before it may impose death. This scheme adequately structures and channels the discretion of the jury and the court and satisfies the ruling in Lowenfield v. Phelps[.]

Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170, 1183 (Ind.1992).

D

Brown contends that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise three claims of trial court error in instructing the jury.16 Brown's assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel are conclusory in nature and not supported by any argument or authority as to deficient performance. We find such claims waived for failure to comply with Ind.Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7) (requiring an appellant's brief to set forth “the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, reasons in support of the contentions along with citations to authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied upon”).

V

Brown contends that the operation of the Lake County public defender system created a conflict of interest for her trial counsel, denying her the effective assistance of counsel. The conflict alleged appears to be that counsel's loyalty to Brown was compromised by his loyalty to the trial court judge who, under the Lake County scheme, appointed him. Brown also argues that Lake County public defenders were provided insufficient resources by the judges.

Brown's claim is similar to-though less developed than-several claims recently rejected by this court. See Johnson v. State, 693 N.E.2d 941, 952 (Ind.1998) (alleging systemic deficiencies in the Madison County public defender system), reh'g denied; Roche, 690 N.E.2d at 1135 (Lake County); Games v. State, 684 N.E.2d 466, 478-80 (Ind.1997) (Marion County), reh'g granted on other grounds, 690 N.E.2d 211. We reach the same conclusion here. First, absent authority or cogent argument from Brown, we decline to find that any conflict of interest that might exist as a result of a trial judge appointing the public defender in his or her court rises to the level of constitutional violation.17 Second, irrespective of whether there were problems with the Lake County public defender system, Brown must show that her trial counsel provided deficient performance and that it was prejudicial. Johnson, 693 N.E.2d at 953. Brown has shown neither deficient performance nor prejudice.

Conclusion

We affirm the denial of post-conviction relief with respect to Debra Denise Brown's convictions for Murder and Attempted Murder and sentence of death.

FOOTNOTES

1. Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1 (1982).

2. Ind.Code §§ 35-41-5-1 & 35-41-1-1 (1982).

3. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9 (Supp.1983). Unless otherwise indicated, references to Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9 refer to the version published in the 1983 Supplement to the Indiana Code, the death penalty statute in effect at the time the crimes at issue were committed.

4. Following oral argument in this case, Brown filed a motion seeking “judgment on the arguments and concessions of the State.” She contends that certain statements made by the deputy attorney general arguing the case concerning the FBI material “effectively conceded error of constitutional magnitude.” Appellant's Verified Motion for Judgment on the Arguments and Concessions of the State (July 25, 1997). To the extent the State made any concessions in this regard, the State most assuredly did not concede that the FBI documents introduced at the post-conviction proceeding “could be reasonably taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence” in the trial court's judgment. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Appellant's motion is denied.For many years in capital cases, this Court has greatly appreciated and valued the willingness of the State to acknowledge the legitimacy of contentions made by criminal defendants and weaknesses in its own cases. Brown's attempt to turn into an admission of constitutional error the State's longstanding policy of forthright and candid discussion of the issues is not well taken.

5. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(c)(5) (“The mitigating circumstances that may be considered under this section are as follows: ․ The defendant acted under the substantial domination of another person.”).

6. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(c)(2) (“The mitigating circumstances that may be considered under this section are as follows: ․ The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he committed the murder.”).

7. Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(c)(7) (“The mitigating circumstances that may be considered under this section are as follows: ․ Any other circumstances appropriate for consideration.”).

8. Citations to the record of post-conviction proceedings are denominated as “R.”; to the trial record as “T.R.”

9. The post-conviction court also concluded that this evidence did not constitute exculpatory evidence and that there was no evidence before it that established that the information in question was ever in the possession of the State. We find it unnecessary to address these findings.

10. Brown represented to us that she pursued, in a timely manner, all available agency and administrative appeals and that these appeals were denied. Appellant's Verified Motion to Compensate and Authorize Counsel to Pursue Necessary Collateral Litigation (Dec. 20, 1996). She then sought a mandate from this court for funds to litigate a Freedom of Information Act claim against the FBI in federal court. We denied this request by Order dated January 6, 1997.

11. The post-conviction court excluded some of this evidence. Brown's claim of error in this regard is discussed in part II-B, infra.

12. While Brown asserts that she was the victim of Battered Women's Syndrome in her post-conviction appeal brief, she points us to no evidence presented to the post-conviction court that actually uses the term “Battered Women's Syndrome.”

13. We note in this regard Brown's use of the adverb “fully” to describe counsel's alleged deficient performance, e.g., “Trial counsel's failure to fully investigate, develop and present penalty phase evidence denied Brown the effective assistance of counsel.” Br. of Appellant at 51 (emphasis supplied).

14. As Brown points out, there is language in the post-conviction court's findings and conclusions that suggests that although the post-conviction court announced during the proceedings that the additional evidence of mitigating circumstances was being excluded, the court did take it into account in its findings. See Br. of Appellant at 92.

15. At the time of Brown's direct appeal, raising an issue in a motion to correct errors was a prerequisite to appellate review.

16. Brown also challenges these and an additional instruction as erroneous. Claims of trial court error in instructing the jury not raised on direct appeal are not available for post-conviction review unless the failure to raise them was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel or, perhaps, unless they constituted fundamental error. Although Brown refers to these instructions as “fundamentally erroneous” in the caption to the relevant section of her brief, the narrative portion of that section makes no effort to demonstrate fundamental error. We find such claims, even if available under the fundamental error doctrine, waived for failure to comply with Ind.Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7).

17. The conflict of interest present in the sole case cited by Brown involved two lawyers jointly engaged to represent three co-defendants at separate trials. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Such a conflict is, of course, very different from the one Brown asserts.

SULLIVAN, Justice.

SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SELBY and BOEHM, JJ., concur.

Debra Brown

Debra Brown

Debra Brown

Debra Brown

Debra Brown

Alton Coleman and Debra Brown

Alton Coleman and Debra Brown in 1985.
(AP file photo)

Alton Coleman and Debra Brown

Alton Coleman

Alton Coleman

Alton Coleman

Debra Brown

Debra Brown

b2ux · Dec 24, 2012

Judias Anna BUENOANO

A.K.A.: "The Black Widow"

Born: Judias Welty

Classification: Serial killer
Characteristics: Poisoner - To collect insurance money
Number of victims: 3
Date of murders: 1971 - 1980
Date of arrest: January 11, 1984
Date of birth: April 4, 1943
Victims profile: James Goodyear (her husband) / Bobby Joe Morris (her boyfriend) / Michael Goodyear (her partially paralyzed 19-year-old son)
Method of murder: Poisoning (arsenic) - Drowning
Location: Florida/Colorado, USA
Status: Executed by electrocution in Florida on March 30, 1998

Summary:

Buenoano, known as the "Black Widow," was executed in Florida's electric chair following her 1985 conviction for poisoning her husband, Air Force sergeant James Goodyear in 1971.

Goodyear had died barely three months after returning from Vietnam suffering from symptoms staff physicians never quite identified. His body was exhumed 12 years later after Buenoano became a suspect in another case and found to contain arsenic.

In 1984, a jury convicted Buenoano of killing her partially paralyzed 19-year-old son, Michael Goodyear, and sentenced her to life in prison. Michael wore heavy metal leg braces and he was unable to walk or use his hands.

On May 13th, 1980 Judi took Michael and his younger brother James canoeing on the East River. Sadly the canoe capsized. James and Judi were able to get out from under the upturned canoe but Michael, weighed down by the heavy braces didn't stand a chance and drowned.

In 1984, a jury convicted Buenoano of attempting to kill her boyfriend, Pensacola businessman John Gentry, and sentenced her to 12 years imprisonment.

On June 25th 1983 Judi announced she was pregnant and John went out to get some champagne to celebrate. When he started his car a bomb exploded and he was seriously injured as a result. John later said Judi had been giving her vitamins.

In fact, she was not pregnant and had booked a cruise for herself and her children. She had also recently been telling her friends that John had a terminal illness. Several of the alleged vitamin capsules were recovered and found to contain the arsenic.

She collected more than $240,000 in insurance money from the deaths of her husband, a son, and a boyfriend in Colorado, but was never prosecuted. Insurance benefits were also the motive in each of the Florida cases which resulted in conviction.

Buenoano never admitted any of the killings. Buenoano was the first woman executed in Florida since 1848, and the third executed in the United States since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976.

Florida's 'Black Widow' Executed

March 30, 1998

STARKE, Florida (CNN) - Fifty-four-year-old Judy Buenoano, known as the "Black Widow," was executed in Florida's electric chair Monday morning for poisoning her husband in 1971.

Buenoano, who was given the nickname by a Florida prosecutor who said she preyed off her mates and her young, was the first woman executed in Florida since 1848, and the third executed in the United States since the U.S. Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in 1976.

She passed 13 years on Florida's death row writing letters, crocheting blankets and baby clothes, and maintaining her innocence. "I have eternal security and I know that when I die I will go straight to heaven and I will see Jesus," she recently said.

But unlike Karla Faye Tucker, the pickax killer executed in Texas last month, Buenoano did not get sympathy from religious circles. That may be because she has never shown remorse and because of the nature of her crimes.

Unraveling her web of crimes

From 1983 to 1985, Buenoano faced three separate Florida juries who convicted her of crimes against her loved ones. Pensacola prosecutor Russell Edgar, who gave Buenoano her spider nickname, says her motive was "twisted greed."

She collected more than $240,000 in insurance money from the deaths of her husband, a son, and a boyfriend in Colorado. Colorado never prosecuted her.

The crimes dated back to 1971, but Buenoano never aroused suspicion until 1983, when her fiancee John Gentry survived a car bombing attack in downtown Pensacola.

During the investigation, Gentry told police that Buenoano had given him "vitamins" that made him sick. She was sentenced to 12 years in prison for the car bombing, and Gentry's story about the vitamins led investigators to unravel a web of crimes against her family members.

In 1984, a jury convicted Buenoano of killing her partially paralyzed 19-year-old son, Michael Goodyear, and sentenced her to life in prison. Prosecutors say she gave four different versions of what happened, but that she pushed him out of a canoe near Pensacola's East River in 1980. "It wasn't an accident. The guy was paralyzed," Edgar said. "He had 15 pounds of braces on his legs without a life jacket. He was taken up the river in a canoe and basically pitched out."

Goodyear's autopsy revealed traces of arsenic in his system. Although it was never proved, prosecutors believed his crippling illness resulted from her poisoning him. "A person this cruel really needs to get what she deserves," said Ted Chamberlain, who investigated the case.

Michael's father, too

Buenoano's death sentence resulted from a 1985 conviction for killing her husband of nine years, Air Force Sgt. James Goodyear. The elder Goodyear, Michael's father, died of arsenic poisoning in 1971, just three months after returning from a year's tour of duty in Vietnam.

Despite the convictions, Buenoano's daughter, Kimberly Hawkins, 30, steadfastly believes in her mother's innocence. "She did things with us," Hawkins has told The Associated Press. "She worked a lot ... but she always made time for us." Edgar says he feels sorry for Buenoano's surviving children but not for Buenoano herself.

"They're without a father, without a brother, and now without a mother. And we lay it all at Judy's feet. She did it." Buenoano was electrocuted in Florida's electric chair.

Two executions in the chair, including one last year, resulted in fires, and state officials were forced to examine whether using it was cruel and unusual punishment. Florida's governor, Lawton Chiles, signed a bill continuing its use and adding the provision that if courts ever rule use of the chair unconstitutional, lethal injection would be the state's designated backup.

Judias "Judy" Buenoano (born Judias Welty, also known as Judias Goodyear, also known as Judias Morris) (April 4, 1943 - March 30, 1998), was a convicted murderer who was executed for the 1971 murder of her husband James Goodyear.

She was also convicted for the 1980 murder of her son Michael Goodyear, and of the 1983 attempted murder of her fiancé John Gentry. She is also acknowledged to have been responsible for the 1978 death of her boyfriend Bobby Joe Morris in Colorado; however, by the time authorities made the connection between Buenoano and Morris, she had already been sentenced to death in the state of Florida.

She is also believed to have been involved in a 1974 murder in Alabama; on his deathbed, Bobby Joe Morris confessed to having participated in that murder, but police were unable to find enough evidence to press charges. She was also suspected in the 1980 death of her boyfriend Gerald Dossett. After her arrest, Dossett's body was exhumed and analysed for signs of arsenic poisoning. No charges were laid in that case.

Buenoano was the first woman to be executed in Florida since 1848 (when a slave named Celia was hanged for killing her master), and was only the third woman to be executed in the United States since the reinstatement of capital punishment in 1976. Nationally, she was the first woman executed in the electric chair since 1957, when Rhonda Belle Martin was electrocuted in Alabama.

Crimes

In 1971, she was married to James Goodyear (1934–1971), a sergeant in the United States Air Force. According to prosecutors, she was motivated by insurance money when she poisoned him with lethal doses of arsenic. However, his death was initially believed to be due to natural causes.

In 1973, she moved in with Bobby Joe Morris (?-1978); in January 1978, he succumbed to arsenic poisoning. Later that year, she legally changed her name to "Buenoano" (corrupted Spanish for "good year," from "buen año").

Buenoano's son Michael Goodyear (1961–1980) became severely ill in 1979, his symptoms including paraplegia; post-mortem examination indicated that he had been the victim of severe arsenic poisoning, which caused his disability. In 1980, Buenoano took Michael out in a canoe; the canoe rolled, and Michael, weighed down by his arm and leg braces, drowned.

In 1983, Buenoano was engaged to John Gentry. Gentry was severely injured when his car exploded. While he was recovering from his injuries, police began to find several discrepancies in Buenoano's background; further investigation revealed that, in November 1982, she had begun telling her friends that Gentry was suffering from a terminal illness. Upon learning this, Gentry provided police with the "vitamin pills" which Buenoano had been giving him; these were found to contain arsenic and formaldehyde. This led to the exhumations of Michael Goodyear, James Goodyear, and Bobby Joe Morris, and to the discovery that each man had been the victim of arsenic poisoning.

In 1984, Buenoano was convicted for the murders of Michael and James Goodyear, and in 1985 she was convicted for the attempted murder of John Gentry. She received a twelve-year sentence for the Gentry case, a life sentence for the Michael Goodyear case, and a death sentence for the James Goodyear case. She was convicted of multiple counts of grand theft (for insurance fraud), and is thought to have committed multiple acts of arson (again, for purposes of insurance fraud).

Judy Buenoano

Yoda's Page: Serial Killer Central

Born at Quanah, Texas, on April 4, 1943, Judias Welty was the daughter of an itinerant farm worker, named after her mother.

In later years, Judi would describe her mother as a full-blooded member of the nonexistent Mesquite Apache tribe, but in fact, they hardly knew each other. The elder Judias Welty died of tuberculosis when her daughter was barely two years old, and the family disintegrated.

Judi and her infant brother Robert were sent to live with their grandparents, while two older siblings were placed for adoption. It was all downhill from there, in terms of Judis family life.

Reunited with her father in Roswell, New Mexico, after his next marriage, she found herself the target of abuse from both parents--beaten, starved, burned with cigarettes, forced to work slave hours around the house. At age fourteen, her anger finally exploded: Judi scalded two of her stepbrothers with hot grease and lit into her parents with flying fists, feet, any object she could lay her hands on.

The episode cost her sixty days in jail, confined with adult prostitutes, but when the judge asked if she was ready to go home, Judi opted for reform school. She remained at Foothills High School--a girls reformatory in Albuquerque-- until her graduation in 1959, at age sixteen, and she would despise her family from that day on.

Of brother Robert, she once said, I wouldnt spit down his throat if his guts were on fire. The year 1960 found Judi back in Roswell, working as a nurses aide under the pseudonym of Anna Schultz. She gave birth to an illegitimate son, christened Michael Schultz, on March 30, 1961, and ever after refused comment on rumors that his father was a pilot from the nearby air force base.

On January 21, 1962, she married another air force officer, James Goodyear, and their first child--James, Jr.--was born four years later, on January 16, 1966. Judis husband celebrated the event by adopting Michael Schultz. Daughter Kimberly followed in 1967, after the family had moved to Orlando, Florida.

A year later, Judias opened the Conway Acres Child Care Center in Orlando, listing her husband as co-owner despite his continuing service with the Air Force, which would soon include a tour of duty in Vietnam.

In fact, James Goodyear, Sr., had been home from Southeast Asia for barely three months when he was admitted to the U.S. Naval Hospital in Orlando, suffering from symptoms staff physicians never quite identified.

He died on September 15, 1971, and Judi waited a discreet five days before cashing in his three life insurance policies. Before years end, an accidental blaze at her Orlando home paid Judy another $90,000 in fire insurance. It was rotten luck all around ... but at least it paid well.

Loneliness was not a problem for the recent widow. She moved her family to Pensacola in 1972, and was living with new lover Bobby Joe the following year. Son Michael, meanwhile, had become a problem for his mother, raising hell in school, scoring in the dull-normal range on IQ tests.

James Goodyears death barred Mike from treatment at a residential facility reserved for military dependents, but Judi wangled an evaluation at the state hospital in 1974, farming her first-born out to foster care with a provision for psychiatric treatment.

Bobby Morris moved to Trinidad, Colorado, in 1977, inviting Judi and her brood to join him. She hung around Pensacola long enough to collect fire insurance on a second house, then reclaimed Michael from foster care and moved west with her tribe, settling in Trinidad as Judias Morris.

Bobby Joe was admitted to San Rafael Hospital on January 4, 1978, but doctors could find no cause for his sudden illness, and he was released to Judis care on January 21.

Two days later, he collap ed at the dinner table and was rushed back to the hospital, where he died on January 28, his death officially ascribed to cardiac arrest and metabolic acidosis.

In early February, Judi cashed three life insurance policies on Morris, further fattening her bank account. Bobby Joes family suspected murder from the first, and Morris was not the only victim on their list.

In 1974, Judi and Bobby Joe had been visiting Morriss hometown of Brewton, Alabama, when a male resident of Florida was found dead in a Brewton motel. An anonymous call, traced to a local pay phone, led police to the room where the victim was found, shot in the chest with a .22-caliber weapon, his throat slashed for good measure.

After the news broke, Bobby Joes mother overheard Judy telling Bobby Joe, The son of a bitch shouldnt have come up here in the first place. He knew if he came up here he was gonna die. Later, raving in delirium on his deathbed, Morris blurted out, Judi, we should never have done that terrible thing.

Police in Brewton, meanwhile, report that they could find no fingerprints inside the room, no bullet was recovered from the corpse, and they have no firm suspects in the case.

On May 3, 1978, Judias legally changed her own last name and that of her children to Buenoano, the Spanish equivalent of Goodyear, in an apparent tribute to her late husband and mythical Apache mother.

A month later, the family was back in Pensacola, settling into a home on Whisper Pine Drive, in suburban Gulf Breeze. Michael Buenoano had continued his pattern of academic failure by dropping out of high school in his sophomore year, and he joined the army in June 1979, drawing an assignment to Ft. Benning, Georgia, after basic training.

En route to his new post, he stopped off to visit his mother in Florida, and that was the beginning of the end. When he reached Ft. Benning on November 6, he was already showing symptoms of base metal poisoning.

Army physicians found seven times the normal level of arsenic in Michaels body, and there was little they could do to reverse its destructive action. After six weeks of care, the muscles of his arms and lower legs had atrophied to the point where Michael could neither walk nor use his hands.

He finally left the hospital wearing braces and a prosthetic device on one arm, the gear weighing a total of sixty pounds.

On May 13, 1980, Michael was canoeing with his mother and younger brother on the East River, near Milton, Florida, when their boat overturned. James and Judi-- described in press reports of the incident as Dr. Judias Buenoano, a clinical physician in Ft. Walton--made it safely to shore, but Michael sank like a stone and drowned.

Local authorities accepted Dr. Judis description of the accident and closed their files, but army investigators were more persistent, launching their own search for evidence on May 27. Michaels military life insurance finally paid off in mid-September, to the tune of $20,000, and sheriffs officers began taking a new look at the case when they discovered two civilian policies on Michaels life.

Handwriting experts suggested that Michaels signature on the insurance applications may have been forged. Judy, meanwhile, went on as best she could without her eldest son, opening a beauty parlor in Gulf Breeze, dating Pensacola businessman John Gentry II.

For Gentrys benefit, she fabricated a stint at nursing school, with Ph.D.s in biochemistry and psychology from the University of Alabama, plus a recent tour of duty as the head of nursing at West Florida Hospital. It was all nonsense, but Gentry swallowed the bait, indulging Judis taste for expensive gifts, Caribbean cruises, and imported champagne.

In October 1982, John and Judi purchased life insurance policies on one another, Judi later boosting the coverage from $50,000 to $500,000 without Gentrys knowledge, paying the premiums out of her own pocket. By December, she was feeding Gentry vitamin capsules that produced dizziness and vomiting.

Hospitalized for twelve days beginning December 16, Gentry noted that his symptoms disappeared when he stopped taking the vitamins. Even so, he was not suspicious enough to break off his relationship with Judi in the interest of survival.

On June 25, 1983, Gentry left a dinner party early, planning to pick up some champagne for a private session with Judi. They had much to celebrate, it seemed, for Judi had told him she was carrying his child. John never made it to the liquor store, however, as a bomb exploded in his car when he turned the ignition key. Near death, he was rushed to the hospital where trauma surgeons managed to save his life.

Police got their first crack at questioning Gentry on June 29, learning of the victims curious insurance situation. A background check revealed the gaping holes in Dr. Buenoanos new biography, and Gentry was stunned to discover that her pregnancy was also a lie, Judi having been surgically sterilized in 1975.

Detectives further learned that Judi had been telling friends about Gentrys terminal illness since November 1982, lately booking tickets for a world cruise including herself and her children ... without Gentry. It was enough for John, and he provided police with several of the vitamin capsules Judi had prescribed in 1982.

Analysis revealed that they contained paraformaldehyde, a poison with no known medical uses, but Floridas state attorney declined to file charges of attempted murder, citing insufficient evidence to prosecute.

On July 27, count officers and federal agents searched Judis home in Gulf Breeze, retrieving wire and tape from her bedroom that seemed to match the Gentry car bomb. In Jamess room, they also found marijuana and a sawed-off shotgun, jailing him for possession of drugs and an illegal weapon.

Judi, meanwhile, was arrested at her beauty shop on charges of attempted murder. By mid-August, authorities had traced the source of the dynamite used in the bomb, linking the Alabama buyer to Judi via phone records showing a dozen long-distance calls from her home. Judi made bail on the attempted murder charge, but there was worse in store.

On January 11, 1984, she was indicted for first-degree murder in the death of her son, with an additional count of grand theft for the insurance scam. Arrested that evening, she staged a fit of convulsions and wound up in Santa Rosa Hospital under guard.

The wheels of justice were sluggish, but there was no stopping them once they started to roll. Bobby Joe Morris was exhumed on February 11, with arsenic found in his remains. Identical results were obtained with the exhumation of James Good-year, on March 14, 1984. Judis trial in the first murder case-- Michaels--began on March 22, and she was convicted on all counts nine days later.

On June 6 she was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the first twenty-five years. July found Florida authorities exhuming the body of late boyfriend Gerald Dossett, deceased since 1980, in another search for arsenic, but no charges were filed in that case. On August 10, James Buenoano was acquitted of trying to kill James Gentry, but his mother would be less fortunate.

Judis trial in that case opened October 15 and lasted three days; jurors deliberated a mere two hours before voting to convict, and Judis 12-year prison sentence was made consecutive with her life term for Michaels slaying. A year later, on October 22, 1985, Judi went to trial for the murder of husband James Goodyear.

The trial consumed a week, with Judi denying any criminal activity, but jurors werent buying her act. Convicted on her second charge of first-degree murder, she was formally sentenced to death on November 16.

Her latest stay of execution was granted by a federal court in June 1990, and the case remains under appeal. In the unlikely event of Judis release from Florida, Colorado authorities stand ready to prosecute capital charges in the death of Bobby Joe Morris.

UPDATE: Judy was executed March 30, 1998.

Florida Court Denies Appeal to Killer Known as "Black Widow"

March 27, 1998

TALLAHASSEE, Florida (CNN) -- Florida's Supreme Court unanimously ruled not to delay the scheduled Monday execution of Judy Buenoano, known as the "black widow" because she poisoned her husband, and drowned her son and tried to blow up her fiance.

Buenoano is to be put to death in the electric chair at 7:01 a.m. Monday for the arsenic poisoning of Sgt. James Goodyear, three months after he returned to Orlando from Vietnam in 1971.

Buenoano is serving a life sentence for the 1980 drowning of her 19-year-old partially paralyzed son, Michael, and she was sentenced to 12 years in prison for the 1983 attempted car-bombing murder of John Gentry in Pensacola.

Until the car bombing, Buenoano had not been investigated or under suspicion for the earlier deaths of her husband and son. In Thursday's ruling, the Florida court rejected appeals based on the background of a juror at Buenoano's trial and the work of an FBI chemist. Buenoano's attorney said she was working on a federal appeal.

Florida hasn't executed a woman in 150 years, and only two women have been executed in the nation since the U.S. Supreme Court allowed capital punishment to resume in 1976 after a three year moratorium. But Buenoano's case has not drawn as much attention as Karla Faye Tucker's execution in Texas earlier this year. Russell Edgar, who prosecuted Buenoano years ago for her son's drowning, gave her a nickname that stuck. "I likened her to a black widow who fed off her males and her young."

Buenoano said she has been the victim of "defamation, assassination of character... to make me into a vile monster." Also, she says she is innocent and insists jurors have been swayed by manufactured evidence.

"I would have found myself guilty if I were the jury," she said.

But three separate juries have agreed that Buenoano's motive was money -- to collect life insurance. Edgar, who calls it "twisted greed," said: "I feel sorry for her surviving children. They're without a father, without a brother and now without a mother, and we lay it all at Judy's feet 'cause she did it."

Judias (Judi) Buenoano - Florida's "Black Widow"

Fight the Death Penalty USA

Judi Buenoano became the first woman to get the electric chair in America since Rhonda Belle Martin was executed in Alabama on the 11th October 1957.

She was the first woman to be executed in Florida since 1848, when a slave girl named Celia was hanged for battering her master to death.

As at July 2000, four other women remain on death row there. Her execution on the 30th March 1998 was a relatively low key affair unlike those of the two women who had preceded her to the death chamber. (Velma Barfield and Karla Faye Tucker)

She was not an especially attractive 54 year old and her execution was the third in a series of four that Florida carried out in quick succession that Spring. It did not attract the media attention that Karla Faye Tucker's execution had.

Early Days

Like so many of the other criminals discussed in these pages she had had a difficult childhood. She was born Judias Welty, in Quanah, Texas, on April 4, 1943, the daughter of a farm laborer. She was of Latina ethnic background.

Apparently Judi described her mother as a member of a non-existent Mesquite Apache tribe although they were not close to each other. Her mother (also named Judias) died of tuberculosis when Judi was four years old, and the family were parted. Judi and her infant brother Robert were sent to live with their grandparents, while two older children were put up for adoption.

Her father remarried and took Judi and Robert to live with his new wife in Roswell, New Mexico. Judi was miserable there and claimed that both her father and step mother abused her.

Allegedly she was beaten, starved forced to work long hours as a virtual slave - hardly an ideal upbringing for an adolescent girl. Her family eventually pushed her too far and at the age of 14 she was sentenced to 2 months in prison for attacking them and her two step brothers.

After she was released she chose to go a reform school rather than back to her abusive family and went to the Foothills High School in Albuquerque from where she graduated in 1959, at sixteen. She had, not surprisingly, a poor view of her family and is reported to have said of her brother Robert "I wouldn't spit down his throat if his guts were on fire".

Her first job came in 1960 when she was employed as a nursing assistant in Roswell under the assumed name of Anna Schultz. In 1961 she gave birth to an illegitimate son whom she christened Michael Schultz. She refused to confirm rumors that his father was a pilot from the nearby USAF base.

A life of crime

She married for the first time on January 21st 1962, to James Goodyear who was an air force officer and Judi gave birth to their first child, James, Jr. in January 16, 1966. James Goodyear adopted Michael.

In 1967 they had a daughter, Kimberley and were now living in Orlando, Florida. 1968 saw Judi open her first business - the Conway Acres Child Care Center in Orlando with the financial backing of her husband. James Goodyear, Sr. had done a tour of duty in Vietnam and three months after his return home was admitted to the U.S. Naval Hospital in Orlando, suffering from mysterious symptoms.

He died on September 15th 1971, and Judi cashed in his three life insurance policies. Towards the end of that same year Judi suffered a house fire at her home for which she received a further $90,000 from the insurers. Judi soon found a new boyfriend in the shape of Bobby Joe Morris who lived in Pensacola and with whom she moved in with in 1972.

Her new life was marred by her son Michael who was disruptive at school and of low intelligence. She was able to get him into residential foster care for a time. Bobby Morris moved to Trinidad, Colorado, in 1977 and Judi and her family (including Michael) joined him there a little later.

Before she left Pensacola, however, she was the victim of another house fire which brought another insurance pay out. Soon after she moved to Colorado, Bobby Joe became ill and was admitted to hospital on January 4th, 1978.

Again the cause was a mystery to his doctors and he was soon discharged. Two days after he went home he collapsed and was taken back to hospital where he died on January 21st of that year. Once again Judi benefited from the insurance policies taken out on his life.

His family, however, suspected that Bobby Joe had been murdered and that he was not the only victim. In 1974, Judi and Bobby Joe had been visiting Bobby Joe's hometown of Brewton in Alabama, where a man from Florida had been found dead in a motel room.

The local police received an anonymous phone call, traced to a local pay phone which led them to the motel room where the dead body of a man was found who had been shot in the chest and had his throat cut. It is claimed that Bobby Joe's mother overheard Judi telling "The son of a bitch shouldn't have come up here in the first place. He knew if he came up here he was gonna die".

Bobby Joe confessed to his part in this killing on his deathbed. However at the time the police could find no fingerprints inside the room and no bullet was recovered from the corpse so they did not have enough evidence to bring charges.

On May 3rd 1978, Judi legally changed her surname and that of her children to Buenoano, the Spanish equivalent of Goodyear, in an apparent tribute to her late husband. She and her family moved back to Pensacola. Michael Buenoano, as he had now become, had done badly a school and joined the army in June 1979.

He was based in Georgia. He soon started to show signs of illness and was diagnosed as suffering from arsenic poisoning which rapidly affected his upper and lower limbs.

He was given heavy metal leg braces in the military hospital and on discharge into the care of his mother unable to walk or use his hands.

On May 13th, 1980 Judi took Michael and his younger brother James canoeing on the East River. Sadly the canoe capsized. James and Judi were able to get out from under the upturned canoe but Michael, weighed down by the heavy braces didn't stand a chance and drowned.

The police accepted Judi's account of what happened but the army investigators were not so easily taken in. Judi received $20,000 from Michael's military life insurance but the sheriffs officers began taking interest in the case when it was discovered that there were also two other, civilian, policies on Michael's life.

It was suggested by handwriting experts that Michael's signature on the insurance applications may have been forged. After Michael's death Judi opened a beauty salon in Gulf Breeze and also began seeing a Pensacola businessman named John Gentry II.

She told John Gentry that she had various bogus qualifications and had worked as a senior nurse in Florida. She persuaded him that they should take out life insurance policies on each other in October 1982 and later increased the size of the one on him to$500,000.

She also persuaded him to take vitamin capsules which made him feel nauseous and dizzy. When he complained of these effects Judi allegedly told him to double the dose!

On June 25th 1983 Judi announced she was pregnant and John went out to get some champagne to celebrate.

When he started his car a bomb exploded and he was seriously injured as a result. Four days later he was well enough to answer questions from the police which led them to examine Judi's background in minute detail. Many inconsistencies between what John thought was the case and what the police found to be reality emerged.

Judi had no medical qualifications, she was not pregnant and had booked a cruise for herself and her children. She had also recently been telling her friends that John had a terminal illness. Several of the alleged vitamin capsules were recovered and found to contain the arsenic.

At this stage however, there wasn't sufficient evidence to charge Judi with attempted murder. A later search of Judi's house revealed wire and tape in her bedroom which matched the remains from the bomb in John's car. Later the police also traced the source of the dynamite and were able it to link Judi through telephone records.

She was duly arrested and bailed on the charge of attempted murder of John Gentry. On January 11th 1984 she was arrested again and charged with first degree murder in respect of Michael's death. In February the body of Bobby Joe Morris was exhumed and arsenic found. It was also found in the body of James Goodyear who was exhumed in March of that year.

Judi was tried separately for each murder and for the attempted murder. She was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the first twenty-five years on June 6th 1984 for Michael's murder. Surprisingly she was acquitted of the charge of attempted murder but she was found guilty of first degree murder in the case of her first husband James Goodyear.

The jury deliberated for 10 1/2 hours and for this she was sentenced to death by electrocution on the 26th of November 1985. Colorado prosecutors decided not to continue with case against her over the murder of Bobby Joe Morris as she was already under sentence of death in Florida. It is estimated that she collected around $240,000 in insurance money from the deaths of her husband, son and boyfriend in Colorado.

On death row

Condemned female inmates are housed at the Broward Correctional Center at Pembroke Pines in Florida - where Judi was to spend the next 13 years. She continued to appeal and had three death warrants handed down over the years. She spent her time confined to 6 x 9 x 9.5 feet high cell.

Death row inmates are served meals three times a day: at 5:00 a.m., from 10:30 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and from 4:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. Food is prepared by prison personnel and is transported in insulated carts to the cells. Inmates are allowed plates and spoons to eat their meals. Visitors are allowed every weekend from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m.

Inmates may receive mail every day except holidays and weekends. They may have cigarettes, snacks, radios and black and white televisions in their cells. They do not have cable television or air-conditioning and they are not allowed to associate with each other. They can watch church services on closed circuit television. While on death watch, (after a death warrant has been signed) inmates may have radios and black and white televisions positioned outside their cell bars.

Death row inmates wear orange t-shirts and blue colored pants (as worn by regular inmates). They are counted at least once an hour and are escorted in handcuffs to the exercise yard and the shower.

They are confined to their cells at all other times, except for medical reasons, exercise, social or legal visits or media interviews. It is a fairly harsh regime for long term incarceration. Judi spent the 13 years writing letters and crocheting blankets and baby clothes and also taught Bible study to other inmates. A former death row inmate, Deirdre Hunt, claimed that "Judy was like a mother to me."

Execution

All executions in Florida are carried out at the State Penitentiary at Starke and prior to 2000 all were carried out by electrocution in the state's 75-year-old electric chair. A total of 240 men and one woman have been put to death in the three-legged chair which was built by inmates in 1923. (It was rebuilt in 1999 for the execution of Allen Lee "Tiny" Davis who was considered to be too heavy for the old chair)

Judi's last appeal was turned down on March 29th 1998 (see Appendix) and the then state Governor Lawton Chiles duly signed her death warrant. She was transferred to Starke and confined to a 12-by-7 foot cell where she passed her time watching a small black and white television through the bars in the death watch area adjacent to the execution room.

Judi spent her final hours seeing her adult children, Kim Hawkins and James Goodyear, other relatives and her legal and religious advisers. Jeanne Eaton, a cousin, who visited before the execution was quoted as saying afterwards "She had no fear at all, she’s mostly afraid of leaving her children and how upset they were." In a television interview a few days before the execution Judi said "I would like to clear the record for my grandson, I would like for him to know that his grandmother was not a murderer."

Execution was set for 7.00 a.m. on the Monday 30th March 1998. At 4:30 a.m. she was showered and dressed, probably by female corrections and her head shaved to give good electrical conductivity and so that her hair did not catch fire during the electrocution. Her final meal consisted of broccoli, asparagus, strawberries and hot tea.

Judi entered the execution chamber at 7:02 a.m. accompanied by several guards. She was strapped into the large oak chair (see left) with 8 leather straps over her waist, wrists, chest and legs.

The calf and head piece electrodes were fitted, each containing moistened sponge to reduce burning of the flesh. Asked if she had a final statement she replied "No, sir," squeezing her eyes shut and keeping them shut, not looking at the witnesses on the other side of a glass partition.

A leather mask was placed over her face and at the signal from the warden the automatic electrocution cycle commenced at 7:08 a.m. A small amount of white smoke (or steam?) was seen to curl up from her right leg throughout the 38 second cycle, but there were no flames.

She was pronounced dead at 7:13 a.m. In an interview afterwards prison spokesman Gene Morris said. "She was very solemn. This is the first time I’ve seen that expression on her," he said. "She stared straight ahead, made no visible expression." Judi's was the third of a series of four executions carried out in Florida over the period 23/03/98 to 31/03/98. The identity of the executioner is a well kept secret.

The execution protocol is as follows : - The automatic cycle begins with a nominal 2,300 volts, 9.5 amps, for 8 seconds; 1,000 volts, 4 amps for 22 seconds; and 2,300 volts, 9.5 amps for 8 seconds (actual values below). When the cycle is complete, the equipment is manually disconnected and the safety switch is then opened. In Judi's case the cycles of electricity were officially recorded.

Conclusion

Judy was dubbed the "Black Widow" at her trial by Pensacola prosecutor Russell Edgar and the name was ceased upon by the media. Edgar described her as a scheming, cold-blooded killer. "She’s like a black widow - she feeds off her mates and her young. It does appear the motive was twisted greed," he said.

Like so many of the other cases examined on these pages Judi had a hard and difficult upbringing. One wonders how this affected her personality. Did her own low self worth lead her to the view that the lives of others were also of little value while her hatred of childhood poverty make her resolve never to be poor herself?

It would seem that the motive for the arsons and the murders was principally for financial gain as Russell Edgar said and that she had a shallow relationship with her husband and boyfriends. Did she think, as so many have done before her, that she would somehow get away with murder.

She very nearly did - had she not tried to kill John Gentry she may well have done. According to Ted Chamberlin, the Pensacola detective who painstakingly examined her past and discovered her trail of insurance scams and death. "Judy just went one murder too far. If she’d just let that last boyfriend alone, she probably could have walked away from the other murders."

He described her as " the coldest killer I ever knew" It seems that once a person has committed the first murder each successive crime is easier and when the perpetrator can just walk away from it without too many awkward questions (as she had done) - why not do it again when it so profitable?

It is probable also that she never thought that she would actually one day sit in the electric chair. Hardly any of the women who committed murder in the US have been sentenced to death and virtually none executed even if the occasional jury had voted for death. No woman had been executed in Florida in her life time and only two others in the country as whole, so the potential of the death penalty was unlikely to have been much of a deterrent to her.

Amnesty International

Judy Buenoano was the 1st woman put to death in Florida since 1848, and only the 3rd woman executed in the nation since 1976. She was pronounced dead at 7:13 a.m. (eastern time)

Buenoano, 54, a former nail salon owner, was executed for the arsenic poisoning of her husband in 1971. Prosecutors said she committed that murder for the same reasons she killed her son in 1980 and tried to kill her fiance in 1983 -- insurance money.

She also was suspected of killing a boyfriend in 1978 but was never charged because she had already been sentenced to death.

The last woman executed in Florida was a freed slave who was hanged for killing her master. Only 2 other women had been executed since the U.S. Supreme Court lifted the ban on the death penalty in 1976, and both were by injection. In 1984, North Carolina executed Velma Barfield for poisoning her boyfriend.

Last month, Texas put Karla Faye Tucker to death for a double-pickax murder. Tucker was a telegenic, avowed Christian who ministered to her fellow inmates, expressed contrition for her crimes and even received support from the pope.

Buenoano crocheted blankets and baby clothes in prison and said she wanted to be remembered as a good mother. She adamantly maintained her son's drowning was an accident. "Seeing the face of Jesus, that's what I think about," she recently told a Florida television station. "I'm ready to go home."

Until she tried to kill her fiance, John Gentry, in 1983 by bombing his car in Pensacola, Buenoano had not been suspected of the other killings. Gentry said she had given him pills that made him sick but told him they were vitamins.

When investigators realized Buenoano was Spanish for "Goodyear," and learned she had been married to Air Force Sgt. James Goodyear, they exhumed his body and found he had lethal amounts of arsenic in his body when he died in 1971.

There was also evidence she fatally poisoned a boyfriend, Bobby Joe Morris, in Trinidad, Colo., in 1978. She was convicted of drowning Michael Goodyear, her 19-year-old son, by giving him arsenic -- which might have caused his paralysis -- and pushing him out of a canoe. Monday would have been his 37th birthday.

The motive for the murders was "twisted greed," because she was trying to claim about $240,000 in insurance money, said prosecutor Russell Edgar, who gave Buenoano her nickname.

On Sunday, the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta and then the U.S. Supreme Court denied her last appeals, which claimed she was innocent and called Florida's electric chair "barbaric.... It belongs in Frankenstein's laboratory."

Judy Buenoano

Reuters

FLORIDA: An attorney for death row inmate Judi Buenoano, who may be the next woman executed in the United States, told the Florida Supreme Court on Thursday sealed FBI documents might weaken the case against her client. Buenoano, 54, who has been nicknamed the "Black Widow," is scheduled to be electrocuted March 30 for the death of her 1st husband.

She also was convicted of drowning her handicapped son and plotting to blow up her boyfriend. Buenoano's husband, Air Force Sgt. James Goodyear, died of an apparent heart attack shortly after returning home from a tour of duty in Vietnam in 1971. But an investigation 13 years later revealed that he had been poisoned. Buenoano was convicted in 1985.

Sylvia Smith, Buenoano's state-appointed attorney, said she has been unable to see sealed documents that might cast doubt on the accuracy of FBI analysis of arsenic-laced pills that were used to convict Buenoano.

But state prosecutors, who pointed out that Buenoano has been convicted of multiple murders, told the court that Smith was only trying to postpone her client's execution date. "This case clearly shows that (Smith) would like to start this case all over again," said Katherine Blanco, assistant attorney general arguing against the appeal.

In April, 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a report detailing the results of an 18-month investigation of certain components of the FBI's laboratory. The records contained allegations critical of the reliability and integrity of some of the examiners. Much of the report was sealed.

Smith argued that the FBI report could bolster her case if it showed that the scientist or lab was incompetent. A lower court ruled against her and the record remained sealed. When Texas executed Karla Faye Tucker on Tuesday, 14 years had passed since a woman was put to death in the United States.

As Buenoano's execution date approaches, death penalty opponents are expected to focus attention on the fact that Buenoano would be the 1st woman executed in Florida since 1848.

Judy Buenoano

FLORIDA: Saying she is afraid her mother will be disfigured by Florida's electric chair, the daughter of a woman on death row begged state lawmakers to allow execution by lethal injection instead of electrocution.

Kimberly Hawkins, 30, said that "I'm fixing to watch my mom die in the electric chair. People have burned alive in it. I don't want to see her burned alive in it. I accept the penalty that she has to die. But we can choose a better way for her to die." Her mother, Judy Buenoano, is scheduled to die in the electric chair on March 30. Buenoano was convicted of poisoning her husband with arsenic in 1971, then collecting $85,000 in life insurance proceeds. Hawkins was 3 when her father died.

Florida's electric chair has been idle since last March 25, when a footlong flame erupted from Pedro Medina's headpiece as he was being electrocuted. The fire was blamed on human error. Later, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that the chair is not cruel or unusual punishment.

The fire led many to say injection is a more humane method of execution. Tuesday, Rep. Tracy Stafford, a Democrat from Broward County, argued that the electric chair "tends to be sensationalized and trivialized. There are few things we do that are more solemn than carrying out a death penalty.

Sometimes, electrocution lends itself to a little more frivolity than I think the state should be involved in." Stafford could not persuade his colleagues to unplug Old Sparky just yet, and the House committee voted down a propsoal to institute lethal injection. The issue may be revived this spring, as another bill moving through the Florida Senate also promotes lethal injection as an alternative to the electric chair.

Rep. Victor Crist, R.-Temple Terrace, who once suggested the guillotine as a humane means of execution, said electrocution is quick and painless. Hawkins "was very emotional and very touching,but she was incaccurate in her information.

She said that bodies are scarred by electrocution, and they are not. Medina had a slight scar; it is like sunburn in a spot," Crist said. He added that he is concerned that nay change in death penalty methods could spur appeals, slowing executions for the 380 people now on Florida's death row.

Hawkins, a waitress in Navarre, near Pensacola, was 16 when her mother was arrested. Dubbed the "black widow," Buenoano, 54, also was convicted in 1980 of killing her 19-year-old paralyzed son by pushing him from a canoe.

In 1983, she was found guilty of attempted murder in a car bombing that injured her boyfriend, John Gentry. She had insurance policies on both men. Buenoano would be the 1st woman that Florida has executed since 1848, 3 years after statehood, she is 1 of 6 women on Florida's death row.

Also this week, a lawyer for Buenoano went to the state Supreme Court, alleging that the state has refused to disclose information that would show an FBI crime lab manager provided unreliabel evidence against her client.

Judy Buenoano

Monday, Feb. 9, 1998

She poisoned her husband with arsenic, drowned her paralyzed son and tried to blow up her fiance with a car bomb. Another boyfriend mysteriously died. It's no wonder that Judy Buenoano is called the "Black Widow." "When I was asking the judge in the drowning case to admit the other killings (as evidence), I said 'Judge ... she's like a black widow -- she feeds off her mates and her young,'" prosecutor Russell Edgar said.

Ms. Buenoano, a 54-year-old former nail salon owner, is scheduled to die in Florida's electric chair March 30. The death sentence would come months after Karla Faye Tucker of Texas become the 2nd woman to die in the United States since the Supreme Court allowed executions to resume in 1976.

Ms. Tucker's lethal injection drew worldwide attention, including pleas from the pope for clemency, because of her behind-bars religious conversion. There has been no similar outcry for Ms. Buenoano, described as one of the most infamous women in Florida's prison system.

Ms. Buenoano's daughter believes she is innocent, but concedes little has changed about her mother since she went to prison more than a decade ago. "Even now she is the same," said Kimberly Hawkins. "I love her letters. They cheer me up."

Investigators 1st became suspicious of Ms. Buenoano in 1983, after her fiance, John Gentry, survived a car bombing in downtown Pensacola. Gentry, who met Ms. Buenoano at a mud-wrestling match in the early 1980s, told police she had also given him pills that made him sick. She told them they were vitamins.

That was the key to uncovering the other crimes in Ms. Buenoano's past, Edgar said. Investigators had plenty to find -- including the crime that sent her to death row, the murder of Air Force Sgt. James Goodyear. Goodyear died in 1971 of arsenic poisoning 3 months after he returned to Orlando from a year's tour in Vietnam and 9 years after he married the former cocktail waitress. Ms. Buenoano collected $85,000 in life insurance and veteran benefits after Goodyear died.

In each of the 3 cases -- that of her husband, her son and her fiance -- she received or stood to collect insurance benefits, Edgar said. A year before being sent to death row in 1985, Ms. Buenoano was convicted of the 1980 drowning of Michael Goodyear, the son she had as a teen-ager before she met the Air Force sergeant. Michael, 19, partially paralyzed and wearing leg and arm braces, was pushed out of a canoe into a river by his mother. Edgar said evidence also suggests Ms. Buenoano poisoned boyfriend Bobby Joe Morris in Trinidad, Colo., in 1978. Colorado prosecutors decided not to file murder charges after she got the death sentence in Florida.

The last known execution of a woman in Florida occurred in 1848, when a freed slave was hanged in Jacksonville for the murder of her master. Ms. Tucker, who hacked 2 people t death, was only the 2nd women executed in the nation since the Supreme Court lifted the death penalty ban in 1976.

Mrs. Hawkins said her mother would rather die than live her life in the Broward Correctional Institution just north of Miami, where the 6 women sentenced to death in Florida are housed. "She's not scared because it's like she said, she goes to a better place," said Mrs. Hawkins, 30. "Because where she's at now is not fun."

Ms. Buenoano was born in 1943 in Quanah, Texas, a little town 200 miles northwest of Dallas. Her mother died when she was 4, and Ms. Buenoano spent her early years passed among relatives and foster families in Texas and Oklahoma.

She told a federal judge during a 1990 hearing that she was sexually abused in some homes, physically abused in others and many times went hungry.

At age 10, she lived in Roswell, N.M., with her father and new wife whom she said beat her. She got pregnant at 17 and gave birth to Michael in March 1961. A few months later she met Goodyear. Now, as she waits for her execution, she spends her time reading and knitting blankets and baby clothes that she gives to her daughter to sell.

Ms. Buenoano's best hope to avoid becoming the next woman scheduled to be executed may rely on Florida's means of death. During Florida's last electrocution a year ago, a foot-long flame shot out from the headpiece worn by the inmate, Pedro Medina. The state Supreme Court upheld use of the electric chair last fall, but a federal judge scheduled a hearing on the constitutionality of the chair later this month.

Black Widow Says She's Innocent, But Tired and Ready to Die

March 18, 1998

PENSACOLA, Fla. -- "Black Widow'' killer Judy Buenoano, in a sometimes tearful television interview, has said that she is ready to die, but is appealing to prove to her grandson she is not a murderer.

Ms. Buenoano continued to insist she is innocent of killing her husband with arsenic, drowning a teen-age son and attempting to murder her fiance with a car bomb, during the interview broadcast Monday night by WEAR-TV.

She is scheduled for execution March 30 for the 1971 murder of husband James Goodyear in Orlando. If pending appeals fail, she would be the first woman executed in Florida in 150 years.

Ms. Buenoano was questioned by WEAR anchorwoman Sue Straughn, who had patronized Ms. Buenoano's Pensacola nail salon before the condemned woman's arrest in 1983. ``Seeing the face of Jesus, that's what I think about. I'm ready to go home,'' Ms. Buenoano said, breaking into tears. ``I'm tired, Sue. It's enough of it. I'm ready to go.'' Her lawyers contend newly discovered records cast doubt on the accuracy of evidence processed by the FBI crime laboratory. They also are challenging the constitutionality of Florida's electric chair. ``I would like to clear the record for my grandson,'' Ms. Buenoano said. ``I would like for him to know that his grandmother was not a murderer.''

Ms. Buenoano, 54, who lived in suburban Gulf Breeze, was interviewed at Broward Correctional Institution in Pembroke Pines, outside Fort Lauderdale. She previously had declined to be interviewed by The Associated Press. Pensacola Police Det. Ted Chamberlain began unraveling the case after the 1983 car bombing seriously injured John Gentry in downtown Pensacola.

On learning Chamberlain Buenoano is Spanish for "good year,'' the detective managed to find out Ms. Buenoano had changed her last name from Goodyear. Looking into Judy Goodyear's past led him to the 1980 drowning of her 19-year-old paraplegic son, Michael Goodyear, when their canoe supposedly capsized during a river fishing trip. Then Chamberlain learned that Goodyear's husband, an Air Force sergeant, died after returning from Vietnam and a boyfriend, Bobby Joe Morris, died in 1978, when they were living together in Trinidad, Colo. Both deaths were mysterious.

Bodies were exhumed and autopsies indicated evidence of poisoning in all three cases. Poison also was found in ``vitamin'' capsules Gentry said Ms Buenoano had given him. He said he had stopped taking them when they made him sick.

In all four cases, Ms. Buenoano was the beneficiary of life insurance policies. She was convicted and sentenced to terms of life and 12 years for murdering her son and for attempting to kill Gentry, before she was convicted in a separate trial for her husband's death. Colorado authorities decided not to charge her in the death of Morris after the Florida convictions.

In the television interview, Ms. Buenoano contends the deaths and the bombing all were coincidental. She was most vehement in denying she had pushed her son, his paralyzed legs weighed down by heavy braces, from their canoe as prosecutors alleged.

She said Michael disappeared as she rescued her younger son, James, then about 12. "I almost lost both of my sons that day,'' she said, stopping to wipe tears from her eyes. "Mothers just don't murder their children. If I'd have lost both of them, I don't know what I would have done. They would have had to put me in a mental institution.''

Ms. Buenoano said if her husband died of arsenic, he had been poisoned in Vietnam. "He came home from Vietnam ill and he never got well,'' she said. "It had nothing to do with me. I was not in Vietnam.''

There has been no public outcry over her impending electrocution as there had been prior to the Feb. 4 execution in Texas of another woman, Karla Faye Tucker, who admitted murdering two people with a pickax. "Karla was a young female, very attractive and she had become a Christian in prison,'' Ms. Buenoano said. "We all prayed that she would be granted a stay of execution and clemency because we felt that she was a different person and she deserved a chance. Possibly, I am a different person. But I was a Christian when I came here. I was a devout Catholic. I've not changed in that.''

No Victims' Kin See 'Black Widow' Die

Buenoano Had No Last Words

Tuesday, March 31, 1998

STARKE - Judy Buenoano told her family her only fear about going to the electric chair yesterday was leaving her children behind. Buenoano, known as the ''Black Widow'' for preying on those who loved her, was executed for murdering her husband.

She also was convicted of drowning her paraplegic son and with blowing up her fiance's car. She was the first woman ever to be electrocuted in Florida. Daniel Remeta, convicted of killing a convenience store clerk in Ocala during a multistate crime spree in 1985, was scheduled to be executed this morning, the last of four inmates executed in nine days.

While the 54-year-old said she was unafraid, her face told a different story yesterday as prison officials nearly carried the frail woman into the death chamber at the Florida State Prison. She clenched her fists, shut her eyes and lowered her head as prison officials securely strapped her into the wooden chair.

She didn't look at the 46 witnesses behind a glass partition. When asked if she had any last words before 2,300 volts of electricity were applied to her body, her eyes remained shut and she whispered, ''No, sir.'' At 7:08 a.m., the power was turned on.

She flinched, hands still in fists as smoke rose from her bare right leg. She was pronounced dead five minutes later - the day that would have been her drowned son's 37th birthday.

''I don't have any fear about where Judy is right now, and she had no fear,'' said Jeanne Eaton, a cousin from Houston. ''She was mostly afraid of leaving her children and how upset they were.''

Buenoano maintained her innocence until she died, claiming her son's death was an accident and denying murdering the others. Prosecutors said she killed to collect $240,000 in insurance. Until she tried to kill her fiance in 1983 by bombing his car in Pensacola,

Buenoano had not been a suspect in the other killings. It led to the body of her husband, Air Force Sgt. James Goodyear, being exhumed. Lethal amounts of arsenic were found in his body.

Pensacola police detective Ted Chamberlain, who uncovered the murders, witnessed the execution and said the punishment didn't seem cruel. ''Here you have a woman who killed her own - husband, boyfriends and son,'' he said. ''This was a mean person. She needed to go.'' The victims' families were not represented at the prison. ''Judy could have been guilty, she could have been innocent,'' said Eaton. ''The way it was handled, she could only be convicted.''

Buenoano spent her final day watching a hunting and fishing show, eating chocolates, reminiscing with her children and cousin. She finished reading Remember Me, a suspense novel. Her last meal was steamed broccoli and asparagus, strawberries and hot tea.

Eaton wondered why her cousin didn't receive the same support as Karla Faye Tucker, whose death sentence in Texas was opposed by the pope and civil rights leader Jesse Jackson. She was executed in February. ''She may not have been as photogenic, as young or as pretty as Karla, but she was just as good a Christian,'' Eaton said.

Judias Buenoano

Dubbed "The Black Widow" for preying on her family and leaving a dead husband, boyfriend and son in her trail, Judy Buenoano was executed on Florida's temperamental Old Sparky on March 30, 1998.

Asked if she had a final statement, she answered weakly, "No, sir," squeezing her eyes shut and keeping them shut, not looking at the witnesses on the other side of the glass. In her final days Judy said she wanted to be remembered as a good mother. "Seeing the face of Jesus, that's what I think about," she recently told a TV station. "I'm ready to go home."

In June 1971, Buenoano's husband, James Goodyear, returned to Orlando from a tour of duty in South Vietnam and started feeling ill. Goodyear died in September. Buenoano went to live with Bobby Joe Morris, who also grew ill and died. Then John Gentry, who started getting ill and checked into a hospital. Gentry had vitamins that Buenoano was giving him analyzed and found poison.

Buenoano was convicted of drowning her 19-year-old son, Michael Goodyear, in 1980 by pushing him out of a canoe into a river. He was paralyzed from arsenic poisoning and was wearing heavy leg and arm braces.

Buenoano was not a suspect in the death of her husband, James Goodyear, or her son's drowning until she tried to kill her fiance, John Gentry, and collect on a $500,000 insurance policy by blowing up his car in 1983. After the attempt on Gentry's life, she changed her name from "Goodyear" to the"Buenoano" (good year in Spanish). When police made the Goodyear-Buenoano connection the kid's body was exhumed and it was found to be plump with arsenic.

Prosecutors in Colorado also found evidence Ms. Buenoano poisoned a boyfriend in 1978 but did not charge her because she had already gotten the death penalty in Florida. Judy mantained her innocence until the very end.

Judias Buenoano

Born at Quanah, Texas, on April 4, 1943, Judias Welty was the daughter of an itinerant farm worker, named after her mother. In later years, Judi would describe her mother as a full-blooded member of the nonexistent Mesquite Apache tribe, but in fact, they hardly knew each other.

The elder Judias Welty died of tuberculosis when her daughter was barely two years old, and the family disintegrated. Judi and her infant brother Robert were sent to live with their grandparents, while two older siblings were placed for adoption.

It was all downhill from there, in terms of Judis family life.

Reunited with her father in Roswell, New Mexico, after his next marriage, she found herself the target of abuse from both parents--beaten, starved, burned with cigarettes, forced to work slave hours around the house. At age fourteen, her anger finally exploded: Judi scalded two of her stepbrothers with hot grease and lit into her parents with flying fists, feet, any object she could lay her hands on.

The episode cost her sixty days in jail, confined with adult prostitutes, but when the judge asked if she was ready to go home, Judi opted for reform school. She remained at Foothills High School--a girls reformatory in Albuquerque-- until her graduation in 1959, at age sixteen, and she would despise her family from that day on. Of brother Robert, she once said, I wouldnt spit down his throat if his guts were on fire.

The year 1960 found Judi back in Roswell, working as a nurses aide under the pseudonym of Anna Schultz. She gave birth to an illegitimate son, christened Michael Schultz, on March 30, 1961, and ever after refused comment on rumors that his father was a pilot from the nearby air force base.

On January 21, 1962, she married another air force officer, James Goodyear, and their first child--James, Jr.--was born four years later, on January 16, 1966. Judis husband celebrated the event by adopting Michael Schultz. Daughter Kimberly followed in 1967, after the family had moved to Orlando, Florida.

A year later, Judias opened the Conway Acres Child Care Center in Orlando, listing her husband as co-owner despite his continuing service with the Air Force, which would soon include a tour of duty in Vietnam.

In fact, James Goodyear, Sr., had been home from Southeast Asia for barely three months when he was admitted to the U.S. Naval Hospital in Orlando, suffering from symptoms staff physicians never quite identified. He died on September 15, 1971, and Judi waited a discreet five days before cashing in his three life insurance policies. Before years end, an accidental blaze at her Orlando home paid Judy another $90,000 in fire insurance. It was rotten luck all around ... but at least it paid well.

Loneliness was not a problem for the recent widow. She moved her family to Pensacola in 1972, and was living with new lover Bobby Joe the following year. Son Michael, meanwhile, had become a problem for his mother, raising hell in school, scoring in the dull-normal range on IQ tests.

James Goodyears death barred Mike from treatment at a residential facility reserved for military dependents, but Judi wangled an evaluation at the state hospital in 1974, farming her first-born out to foster care with a provision for psychiatric treatment. Bobby Morris moved to Trinidad, Colorado, in 1977, inviting Judi and her brood to join him.

She hung around Pensacola long enough to collect fire insurance on a second house, then reclaimed Michael from foster care and moved west with her tribe, settling in Trinidad as Judias Morris. Bobby Joe was admitted to San Rafael Hospital on January 4, 1978, but doctors could find no cause for his sudden illness, and he was released to Judis care on January 21.

Two days later, he collapsed at the dinner table and was rushed back to the hospital, where he died on January 28, his death officially ascribed to cardiac arrest and metabolic acidosis. In early February, Judi cashed three life insurance policies on Morris, further fattening her bank account. Bobby Joes family suspected murder from the first, and Morris was not the only victim on their list.

In 1974, Judi and Bobby Joe had been visiting Morriss hometown of Brewton, Alabama, when a male resident of Florida was found dead in a Brewton motel. An anonymous call, traced to a local pay phone, led police to the room where the victim was found, shot in the chest with a .22-caliber weapon, his throat slashed for good measure.

After the news broke, Bobby Joes mother overheard Judy telling Bobby Joe, The son of a bitch shouldnt have come up here in the first place. He knew if he came up here he was gonna die. Later, raving in delirium on his deathbed, Morris blurted out, Judi, we should never have done that terrible thing. Police in Brewton, meanwhile, report that they could find no fingerprints inside the room, no bullet was recovered from the corpse, and they have no firm suspects in the case.

On May 3, 1978, Judias legally changed her own last name and that of her children to Buenoano, the Spanish equivalent of Goodyear, in an apparent tribute to her late husband and mythical Apache mother. A month later, the family was back in Pensacola, settling into a home on Whisper Pine Drive, in suburban Gulf Breeze.

Michael Buenoano had continued his pattern of academic failure by dropping out of high school in his sophomore year, and he joined the army in June 1979, drawing an assignment to Ft. Benning, Georgia, after basic training. En route to his new post, he stopped off to visit his mother in Florida, and that was the beginning of the end. When he reached Ft. Benning on November 6, he was already showing symptoms of base metal poisoning.

Army physicians found seven times the normal level of arsenic in Michaels body, and there was little they could do to reverse its destructive action. After six weeks of care, the muscles of his arms and lower legs had atrophied to the point where Michael could neither walk nor use his hands. He finally left the hospital wearing braces and a prosthetic device on one arm, the gear weighing a total of sixty pounds.

On May 13, 1980, Michael was canoeing with his mother and younger brother on the East River, near Milton, Florida, when their boat overturned. James and Judi-- described in press reports of the incident as Dr. Judias Buenoano, a clinical physician in Ft. Walton--made it safely to shore, but Michael sank like a stone and drowned.

Local authorities accepted Dr. Judis description of the accident and closed their files, but army investigators were more persistent, launching their own search for evidence on May 27. Michaels military life insurance finally paid off in mid-September, to the tune of $20,000, and sheriffs officers began taking a new look at the case when they discovered two civilian policies on Michaels life. Handwriting experts suggested that Michaels signature on the insurance applications may have been forged.

Judy, meanwhile, went on as best she could without her eldest son, opening a beauty parlor in Gulf Breeze, dating Pensacola businessman John Gentry II. For Gentrys benefit, she fabricated a stint at nursing school, with Ph.D.s in biochemistry and psychology from the University of Alabama, plus a recent tour of duty as the head of nursing at West Florida Hospital. It was all nonsense, but Gentry swallowed the bait, indulging Judis taste for expensive gifts, Caribbean cruises, and imported champagne.

In October 1982, John and Judi purchased life insurance policies on one another, Judi later boosting the coverage from $50,000 to $500,000 without Gentrys knowledge, paying the premiums out of her own pocket. By December, she was feeding Gentry vitamin capsules that produced dizziness and vomiting.

Hospitalized for twelve days beginning December 16, Gentry noted that his symptoms disappeared when he stopped taking the vitamins. Even so, he was not suspicious enough to break off his relationship with Judi in the interest of survival.

On June 25, 1983, Gentry left a dinner party early, planning to pick up some champagne for a private session with Judi. They had much to celebrate, it seemed, for Judi had told him she was carrying his child. John never made it to the liquor store, however, as a bomb exploded in his car when he turned the ignition key. Near death, he was rushed to the hospital where trauma surgeons managed to save his life.

Police got their first crack at questioning Gentry on June 29, learning of the victims curious insurance situation. A background check revealed the gaping holes in Dr. Buenoanos new biography, and Gentry was stunned to discover that her pregnancy was also a lie, Judi having been surgically sterilized in 1975.

Detectives further learned that Judi had been telling friends about Gentrys terminal illness since November 1982, lately booking tickets for a world cruise including herself and her children ... without Gentry.

It was enough for John, and he provided police with several of the vitamin capsules Judi had prescribed in 1982. Analysis revealed that they contained paraformaldehyde, a poison with no known medical uses, but Floridas state attorney declined to file charges of attempted murder, citing insufficient evidence to prosecute.

On July 27, count officers and federal agents searched Judis home in Gulf Breeze, retrieving wire and tape from her bedroom that seemed to match the Gentry car bomb. In Jamess room, they also found marijuana and a sawed-off shotgun, jailing him for possession of drugs and an illegal weapon.

Judi, meanwhile, was arrested at her beauty shop on charges of attempted murder. By mid-August, authorities had traced the source of the dynamite used in the bomb, linking the Alabama buyer to Judi via phone records showing a dozen long-distance calls from her home.

Judi made bail on the attempted murder charge, but there was worse in store. On January 11, 1984, she was indicted for first-degree murder in the death of her son, with an additional count of grand theft for the insurance scam. Arrested that evening, she staged a fit of convulsions and wound up in Santa Rosa Hospital under guard.

The wheels of justice were sluggish, but there was no stopping them once they started to roll. Bobby Joe Morris was exhumed on February 11, with arsenic found in his remains. Identical results were obtained with the exhumation of James Good-year, on March 14, 1984. Judis trial in the first murder case-- Michaels--began on March 22, and she was convicted on all counts nine days later.

On June 6 she was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the first twenty-five years. July found Florida authorities exhuming the body of late boyfriend Gerald Dossett, deceased since 1980, in another search for arsenic, but no charges were filed in that case. On August 10, James Buenoano was acquitted of trying to kill James Gentry, but his mother would be less fortunate. Judis trial in that case opened October 15 and lasted three days; jurors deliberated a mere two hours before voting to convict, and Judis 12-year prison sentence was made consecutive with her life term for Michaels slaying.

A year later, on October 22, 1985, Judi went to trial for the murder of husband James Goodyear. The trial consumed a week, with Judi denying any criminal activity, but jurors werent buying her act. Convicted on her second charge of first-degree murder, she was formally sentenced to death on November 16.

Her latest stay of execution was granted by a federal court in June 1990, and the case remains under appeal. In the unlikely event of Judis release from Florida, Colorado authorities stand ready to prosecute capital charges in the death of Bobby Joe Morris.

Judy BUENOANO

Judy Buenoano was the 1st woman put to death in Florida since 1848, and only the 3rd woman executed in the nation since 1976.

She was pronounced dead at 7:13 a.m. (eastern time)

Buenoano, 54, a former nail salon owner, was executed for the arsenic poisoning of her husband in 1971. Prosecutors said she committed that murder for the same reasons she killed her son in 1980 and tried to kill her fiance in 1983 -- insurance money. She also was suspected of killing a boyfriend in 1978 but was never charged because she had already been sentenced to death.

The last woman executed in Florida was a freed slave who was hanged for killing her master.

Only 2 other women had been executed since the U.S. Supreme Court lifted the ban on the death penalty in 1976, and both were by injection.

In 1984, North Carolina executed Velma Barfield for poisoning her boyfriend. Last month, Texas put Karla Faye Tucker to death for a double-pickax murder. Tucker was a telegenic, avowed Christian who ministered to her fellow inmates, expressed contrition for her crimes and even received support from the pope.

Buenoano crocheted blankets and baby clothes in prison and said she wanted to be remembered as a good mother. She adamantly maintained her son's drowning was an accident.

"Seeing the face of Jesus, that's what I think about," she recently told a Florida television station. "I'm ready to go home."

Until she tried to kill her fiance, John Gentry, in 1983 by bombing his car in Pensacola, Buenoano had not been suspected of the other killings. Gentry said she had given him pills that made him sick but told him they were vitamins.

When investigators realized Buenoano was Spanish for "Goodyear," and learned she had been married to Air Force Sgt. James Goodyear, they exhumed his body and found he had lethal amounts of arsenic in his body when he died in 1971.

There was also evidence she fatally poisoned a boyfriend, Bobby Joe Morris, in Trinidad, Colo., in 1978.

She was convicted of drowning Michael Goodyear, her 19-year-old son, by giving him arsenic -- which might have caused his paralysis -- and pushing him out of a canoe. Monday would have been his 37th birthday.

The motive for the murders was "twisted greed," because she was trying to claim about $240,000 in insurance money, said prosecutor Russell Edgar, who gave Buenoano her nickname.

On Sunday, the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta and then the U.S. Supreme Court denied her last appeals, which claimed she was innocent and called Florida's electric chair "barbaric.... It belongs in Frankenstein's laboratory."

Buenoano, Judias Anna Lou

Born at Quanah, Texas, on April 4, 1943, Judias Welty was the daughter of an itinerant farm worker, named after her mother.

In later years, Judi would describe her mother as a full-blooded member of the nonexistent Mesquite Apache tribe, but in fact, they hardly knew each other.

The elder Judias Welty died of tuberculosis when her daughter was barely two years old, and the family disintegrated. Judi and her infant brother Robert were sent to live with their grandparents, while two older siblings were placed for adoption. It was all downhill from there, in terms of Judis family life. Reunited with her father in Roswell, New Mexico, after his next marriage, she found herself the target of abuse from both parents--beaten, starved, burned with cigarettes, forced to work slave hours around the house.

At age fourteen, her anger finally exploded: Judi scalded two of her stepbrothers with hot grease and lit into her parents with flying fists, feet, any object she could lay her hands on. The episode cost her sixty days in jail, confined with adult prostitutes, but when the judge asked if she was ready to go home, Judi opted for reform school.

She remained at Foothills High School--a girls reformatory in Albuquerque-- until her graduation in 1959, at age sixteen, and she would despise her family from that day on. Of brother Robert, she once said, I wouldnt spit down his throat if his guts were on fire. The year 1960 found Judi back in Roswell, working as a nurses aide under the pseudonym of Anna Schultz.

She gave birth to an illegitimate son, christened Michael Schultz, on March 30, 1961, and ever after refused comment on rumors that his father was a pilot from the nearby air force base. On January 21, 1962, she married another air force officer, James Goodyear, and their first child--James, Jr.--was born four years later, on January 16, 1966. Judis husband celebrated the event by adopting Michael Schultz. Daughter Kimberly followed in 1967, after the family had moved to Orlando, Florida.

A year later, Judias opened the Conway Acres Child Care Center in Orlando, listing her husband as co-owner despite his continuing service with the Air Force, which would soon include a tour of duty in Vietnam. In fact, James Goodyear, Sr., had been home from Southeast Asia for barely three months when he was admitted to the U.S. Naval Hospital in Orlando, suffering from symptoms staff physicians never quite identified.

He died on September 15, 1971, and Judi waited a discreet five days before cashing in his three life insurance policies. Before years end, an accidental blaze at her Orlando home paid Judy another $90,000 in fire insurance. It was rotten luck all around ... but at least it paid well. Loneliness was not a problem for the recent widow.

She moved her family to Pensacola in 1972, and was living with new lover Bobby Joe the following year. Son Michael, meanwhile, had become a problem for his mother, raising hell in school, scoring in the dull-normal range on IQ tests.

James Goodyears death barred Mike from treatment at a residential facility reserved for military dependents, but Judi wangled an evaluation at the state hospital in 1974, farming her first-born out to foster care with a provision for psychiatric treatment.

Bobby Morris moved to Trinidad, Colorado, in 1977, inviting Judi and her brood to join him. She hung around Pensacola long enough to collect fire insurance on a second house, then reclaimed Michael from foster care and moved west with her tribe, settling in Trinidad as Judias Morris. Bobby Joe was admitted to San Rafael Hospital on January 4, 1978, but doctors could find no cause for his sudden illness, and he was released to Judis care on January 21.

Two days later, he collapsed at the dinner table and was rushed back to the hospital, where he died on January 28, his death officially ascribed to cardiac arrest and metabolic acidosis.

In early February, Judi cashed three life insurance policies on Morris, further fattening her bank account. Bobby Joes family suspected murder from the first, and Morris was not the only victim on their list.

In 1974, Judi and Bobby Joe had been visiting Morriss hometown of Brewton, Alabama, when a male resident of Florida was found dead in a Brewton motel. An anonymous call, traced to a local pay phone, led police to the room where the victim was found, shot in the chest with a .22-caliber weapon, his throat slashed for good measure.

After the news broke, Bobby Joes mother overheard Judy telling Bobby Joe, The son of a bitch shouldnt have come up here in the first place. He knew if he came up here he was gonna die. Later, raving in delirium on his deathbed, Morris blurted out, Judi, we should never have done that terrible thing. Police in Brewton, meanwhile, report that they could find no fingerprints inside the room, no bullet was recovered from the corpse, and they have no firm suspects in the case.

On May 3, 1978, Judias legally changed her own last name and that of her children to Buenoano, the Spanish equivalent of Goodyear, in an apparent tribute to her late husband and mythical Apache mother. A month later, the family was back in Pensacola, settling into a home on Whisper Pine Drive, in suburban Gulf Breeze.

Michael Buenoano had continued his pattern of academic failure by dropping out of high school in his sophomore year, and he joined the army in June 1979, drawing an assignment to Ft. Benning, Georgia, after basic training. En route to his new post, he stopped off to visit his mother in Florida, and that was the beginning of the end.

When he reached Ft. Benning on November 6, he was already showing symptoms of base metal poisoning. Army physicians found seven times the normal level of arsenic in Michaels body, and there was little they could do to reverse its destructive action.

After six weeks of care, the muscles of his arms and lower legs had atrophied to the point where Michael could neither walk nor use his hands. He finally left the hospital wearing braces and a prosthetic device on one arm, the gear weighing a total of sixty pounds.

On May 13, 1980, Michael was canoeing with his mother and younger brother on the East River, near Milton, Florida, when their boat overturned. James and Judi--described in press reports of the incident as Dr. Judias Buenoano, a clinical physician in Ft. Walton--made it safely to shore, but Michael sank like a stone and drowned. Local authorities accepted Dr. Judis description of the accident and closed their files, but army investigators were more persistent, launching their own search for evidence on May 27.

Michaels military life insurance finally paid off in mid-September, to the tune of $20,000, and sheriffs officers began taking a new look at the case when they discovered two civilian policies on Michaels life. Handwriting experts suggested that Michaels signature on the insurance applications may have been forged.

Judy, meanwhile, went on as best she could without her eldest son, opening a beauty parlor in Gulf Breeze, dating Pensacola businessman John Gentry II. For Gentrys benefit, she fabricated a stint at nursing school, with Ph.D.s in biochemistry and psychology from the University of Alabama, plus a recent tour of duty as the head of nursing at West Florida Hospital. It was all nonsense, but Gentry swallowed the bait, indulging Judis taste for expensive gifts, Caribbean cruises, and imported champagne.

In October 1982, John and Judi purchased life insurance policies on one another, Judi later boosting the coverage from $50,000 to $500,000 without Gentrys knowledge, paying the premiums out of her own pocket. By December, she was feeding Gentry vitamin capsules that produced dizziness and vomiting.

Hospitalized for twelve days beginning December 16, Gentry noted that his symptoms disappeared when he stopped taking the vitamins. Even so, he was not suspicious enough to break off his relationship with Judi in the interest of survival. On June 25, 1983, Gentry left a dinner party early, planning to pick up some champagne for a private session with Judi.

They had much to celebrate, it seemed, for Judi had told him she was carrying his child. John never made it to the liquor store, however, as a bomb exploded in his car when he turned the ignition key. Near death, he was rushed to the hospital where trauma surgeons managed to save his life. Police got their first crack at questioning Gentry on June 29, learning of the victims curious insurance situation.

A background check revealed the gaping holes in Dr. Buenoanos new biography, and Gentry was stunned to discover that her pregnancy was also a lie, Judi having been surgically sterilized in 1975.

Detectives further learned that Judi had been telling friends about Gentrys terminal illness since November 1982, lately booking tickets for a world cruise including herself and her children ... without Gentry. It was enough for John, and he provided police with several of the vitamin capsules Judi had prescribed in 1982. Analysis revealed that they contained paraformaldehyde, a poison with no known medical uses, but Floridas state attorney declined to file charges of attempted murder, citing insufficient evidence to prosecute.

On July 27, count officers and federal agents searched Judis home in Gulf Breeze, retrieving wire and tape from her bedroom that seemed to match the Gentry car bomb. In Jamess room, they also found marijuana and a sawed-off shotgun, jailing him for possession of drugs and an illegal weapon.

Judi, meanwhile, was arrested at her beauty shop on charges of attempted murder. By mid-August, authorities had traced the source of the dynamite used in the bomb, linking the Alabama buyer to Judi via phone records showing a dozen long-distance calls from her home. Judi made bail on the attempted murder charge, but there was worse in store.

On January 11, 1984, she was indicted for first-degree murder in the death of her son, with an additional count of grand theft for the insurance scam. Arrested that evening, she staged a fit of convulsions and wound up in Santa Rosa Hospital under guard. The wheels of justice were sluggish, but there was no stopping them once they started to roll.

Bobby Joe Morris was exhumed on February 11, with arsenic found in his remains. Identical results were obtained with the exhumation of James Good-year, on March 14, 1984. Judis trial in the first murder case-- Michaels--began on March 22, and she was convicted on all counts nine days later. On June 6 she was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the first twenty-five years. July found Florida authorities exhuming the body of late boyfriend Gerald Dossett, deceased since 1980, in another search for arsenic, but no charges were filed in that case.

On August 10, James Buenoano was acquitted of trying to kill James Gentry, but his mother would be less fortunate. Judis trial in that case opened October 15 and lasted three days; jurors deliberated a mere two hours before voting to convict, and Judis 12-year prison sentence was made consecutive with her life term for Michaels slaying. A year later, on October 22, 1985, Judi went to trial for the murder of husband James Goodyear.

The trial consumed a week, with Judi denying any criminal activity, but jurors werent buying her act. Convicted on her second charge of first-degree murder, she was formally sentenced to death on November 16.

Her latest stay of execution was granted by a federal court in June 1990, and the case remains under appeal. In the unlikely event of Judis release from Florida, Colorado authorities stand ready to prosecute capital charges in the death of Bobby Joe Morris.

Michael Newton - An Encyclopedia of Modern Serial Killers - Hunting Humans

Buenoano v. State, 478 So.2d 387 (Fla.App. 1985) (Direct Appeal-Michael).

Appellant appeals from judgments and sentences for the offenses of first degree murder and first degree grand theft. Appellant was accused of murdering her invalid son, Michael Goodyear, by drowning him and of stealing more than $20,000 from Prudential Life Insurance Company by defrauding the company of insurance proceeds on the son's life. We affirm as to both convictions.

After three months of therapy at Walter Reed Hospital beginning January 24, 1980, Michael Goodyear (age 19) had been transferred to Tampa to begin long- term physical therapy and occupational rehabilitation for profound heavy metal neuropathy, a degeneration of nerves outside the spinal column which had left Michael with no nerve or muscle function below his knees and elbows.

On May 12, 1980, appellant traveled to the Veterans' Administration Hospital in Tampa to pick up Michael, her son, and return to their home in Pensacola. Michael required braces, weighing approximately 3 1/2 pounds each, on both legs for ambulation and a Robbins hook on his right arm, weighing approximately two pounds, to enable him to hold objects.

His treating physician at Walter Reed, Dr. Barry, had cautioned Michael that adequate provisions for his safety would have to be taken should he go for a boat ride, because he would be unable to swim or save himself should the boat overturn. Michael was discharged to his mother, appellant, so that he could receive long-term rehabilitative care in Pensacola. Appellant had stated that she was spending nearly $40,000.00 in home alterations for Michael's return. Dr. Barry informed appellant that Michael had a severe impairment and might never regain complete function of his arms and legs. According to Dr. Barry, Michael would be unable to walk without his braces, cast a fishing line, or swim.

The day after Michael's discharge from the VA hospital, appellant, Michael, and appellant's other son, James (age 14), and daughter, Kimberly (age 13), went on a fishing trip on the East River in Santa Rosa County. While Kimberly was left ashore at the East River Bridge, appellant, James, and Michael went out in the river in a two-seater canoe in the middle of which a folding lawn chair with legs approximately eight inches high had been placed for Michael. They started fishing between 10:30 and 11:00 A.M., moving upriver along the shore. Michael, seated in the lawn chair, wore both his leg braces with leather shoes, his Robbins hook and, by James' account, a ski belt.

At trial, James testified that approximately a mile upriver from the bridge, about two hours after they had started fishing, they were six to eight feet from shore when a snake fell into the canoe and, in the ensuing confusion, the canoe hit a submerged log and capsized. James said that he was knocked unconscious and remembered nothing more until he was in an ambulance.

James' grand jury testimony reflected that he was unsure of how the canoe capsized. His written statement made for an Army investigator referred to the submerged log, but made no reference to the snake. Curiously, James was unable to say whether his written statement was his handwriting or bore his signature.

Ricky Hicks testified that he had gone fishing on the East River between 2:00 and 2:30 PM. He had been fishing for about an hour when he retrieved appellant and James from the river approximately 600 feet from the bridge. Hicks said that an overturned canoe, an ice chest, a flip-flop and a plastic lunch bag were floating near them in the river.

Hicks testified that appellant told him that she had "lost the other boy" after a snake had gotten into the canoe which overturned as she tried to hold the snake down with a paddle. She said it was useless to go back for Michael.

Upon returning to shore, appellant's first concern appeared to be for James. She asked Hicks for a beer and drank it. Hicks *389 drove appellant's car to a nearby phone where he called the county rescue squad. The county sheriff and Hicks returned to the capsized canoe to look for Michael.

They picked up the debris, including two ski belts. Hicks stated that thirty minutes had passed since he had rescued appellant and James. During that time the canoe and debris had barely moved as the river's current was very slow that day.

Rescue squad diver Diamond testified that approximately three hours after the canoe allegedly capsized, Michael's brace-laden body was found midriver approximately one-quarter mile upriver from where the canoe had been recovered and appellant and James had been rescued.

Diamond stated the river's current was "very, very slow" that day and was no impediment to swimming upstream. Appellant first reported that Michael was wearing a life jacket, but later stated that he wore a ski belt.

While appellant and James stated Michael was wearing a ski belt when the canoe capsized, no ski belt was on Michael's body when it was recovered. Dr. Barry testified that a secured ski belt could not have slipped off Michael, given the braces he was wearing.

The appellant's version was that Michael was thrown into the water when the canoe capsized, which she said occurred approximately a mile upstream from where Hicks discovered her and James.

She said that she surfaced after the canoe capsized, spotted James face down in the water, cleared his air passage, and resuscitated him. Not finding Michael, she said she began swimming downstream with James until she was picked up by Ricky Hicks. She said the current was too strong to swim anywhere but downstream.

A former neighbor and, later, housemate, Constance Lang, testified that appellant was ashamed of Michael. Appellant would have Lang, who was acting as a live-in baby sitter, take Michael from the house when visitors arrived.

Lang said that appellant was distant to Michael, while being close to James and Kimberly. Former neighbor Ken Barnes visited often in appellant's home and observed that James and Michael did not have a good relationship.

He felt that appellant had an obvious bond with James, but not with Michael. Appellant's former sister-in-law, Peggy Goeller, testified that she had spoken by telephone with appellant twice in November, 1980.

Appellant made no mention of Michaels' death during the first call. During the second call, appellant told her that Michael had recently died during Army maneuvers. Kimberly testified for the defense that appellant and Michael had a loving relationship.

However, she admitted that she had made the statement to appellant during an argument "... just like you killed Michael." On rebuttal, the state presented Kimberly's boyfriend, David Lackey, who testified that Kimberly had told him that appellant had drowned Michael in order to collect insurance.

Bank records showed that appellant had a history of returned checks from June, 1979 until July, 1980. Employment records showed that appellant worked as a licensed practical nurse from December, 1978 to September, 1980, earning $3.50 per hour.

At the time of his death, Michael was covered by several insurance policies.

Two policies, one issued in 1962, the other issued in 1964, with face values of $1,000.00 each and double indemnity provisions in case of accidental death, were owned by appellant.

On April 5, 1980 there was a *390 request signed by appellant and Michael for duplicates of these policies. A third policy owned by appellant, with a face amount of $15,000.00 and an accidental death benefit of an additional $30,000.00 was purchased March 22, 1978.

The fourth policy purchased by appellant on October 8, 1978 insured Michael for $20,000.00 with a double indemnity accidental death provision.

There was no requirement that an insured of Michael's age undergo a health physical for the amounts of coverage involved.

As a member of the Army, Michael was insured for $20,000.00 under a servicemen's group life policy on which he had designated the principal beneficiary to be determined "by law." Subsequent to Michael's death, appellant, as beneficiary of the above policies, received over $100,000.00 in benefits.

The state's theory was that appellant did not love Michael, viewed him as a burden and set out to kill him in such a way that his death would appear as an accidental drowning so that she could collect the life insurance proceeds. The defense's version was that Michael's death was a result of accidental drowning.

Buenoano v. State, 527 So.2d 194 (Fla. 1988) (Direct Appeal-Goodyear).

Judias V. Buenoano appeals her conviction for first degree murder and sentence of death. We affirm both the conviction and sentence.

On August 31, 1984, Buenoano was indicted for first degree murder for the September 16, 1971 death by suspected arsenic poisoning of her husband, Sergeant James E. Goodyear.

Evidence at trial revealed that, shortly after Sergeant Goodyear returned to Orlando from a tour of duty in South Vietnam, he began suffering from nausea, vomiting and diarrhea.

When hospitalized at the naval hospital in Orlando on September 13, 1971, Goodyear reported to Dr. R.C. Auchenbach that he had been ill with these symptoms for two weeks.

When Dr. Auchenbach could find no explanation for these symptoms, he attempted to *196 stabilize Goodyear's condition but these attempts failed. Goodyear suffered fluid overload and pulmonary congestion and died as a consequence of cardiovascular collapse and renal failure.

No toxicological assay was performed at the time of Goodyear's death because there was no reason to suspect toxic poisoning. However, Dr. Auchenbach testified that, had he known in 1971 arsenic was present in Goodyear's body, his medical opinion would be that Goodyear could have died as a result of acute arsenic toxication because circulatory collapse and the other symptoms Goodyear exhibited are manifestations of acute arsenic poisoning.

Forensic toxicologist Dr. Lenard Bednarczyk analyzed tissue samples from the exhumed body of Goodyear. He testified that the level of arsenic found in the liver, kidneys, hair and nails of Goodyear indicated chronic exposure to arsenic poison.

The opinion of Dr. Bednarczyk and Dr. Thomas Hegert, the Orange County medical examiner who autopsied Goodyear's remains in 1984, was that Goodyear's death was the result of chronic arsenic poisoning occurring over a period of time.

In addition to the medical evidence regarding Goodyear's condition, Debra Sims, who lived with Buenoano and Goodyear shortly before Goodyear's death, testified that Goodyear became sick gradually and that she witnessed him having hallucinations about a rabbit on his bed as he picked at the bed linens.

She also testified that Buenoano hesitated to take Goodyear to the hospital when he became ill. Two of Buenoano's acquaintances, Constance Lang and Mary Beverly Owens, both testified that Buenoano discussed with each of them on separate occasions the subject of killing a person by adding arsenic to his food. Owens and Lodell Morris each testified that Buenoano admitted she killed Goodyear.

Evidence was also presented at trial that Bobby Joe Morris, with whom Buenoano lived after Goodyear's death, became ill and died after exhibiting the same symptoms of vomiting, nausea, fever and hallucinating that Goodyear exhibited before his death.

When Morris' remains were exhumed in 1984, the tissue analysis revealed acute arsenic poisoning. After Morris' death Buenoano and John Gentry began living together and later became engaged. Gentry testified at trial that Buenoano told him Goodyear died in a plane crash in Vietnam and Morris died of alcoholism.

In November of 1982, Gentry caught a cold, and Buenoano began giving him the vitamin C capsule Vicon C to treat it. Because he was experiencing extreme nausea and vomiting, Gentry checked into a hospital on December 15, 1982.

After a full recovery he returned home, and on that same day Buenoano gave him Vicon C capsules again. The nausea and vomiting returned. Gentry had the capsules chemically analyzed, and the capsules were found to contain paraformaldehyde, a class III poison. Testimony at trial was that Buenoano had been telling her associates Gentry was suffering from terminal cancer.

Following Goodyear's death in 1971, Buenoano collected the benefits from various life insurance policies on her husband's life totalling approximately $33,000. She also received $62,000 in dependency indemnity compensation from the Veterans Administration.

When Bobby Joe Morris died, Buenoano again received insurance money from three separate policies on Morris' life totalling approximately $23,000. The house mortgage was also paid off. Buenoano owned life insurance on Gentry's life totalling $510,000 in benefits, and she was a 50% beneficiary under his will.

At trial the jury found Buenoano guilty of first degree murder for the death of James Goodyear and recommended imposition of the death penalty. The trial court found four aggravating circumstances and no mitigating factors and sentenced Buenoano to death.

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.

No. 98-1104.

In Re: Judy A. BUENOANO, Petitioner.

March 29, 1998

Application for Leave to File Second or Successive Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Before TJOFLAT, COX and CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Judy Buenoano is scheduled to be executed on the morning of March 30, 1998 for the arsenic poisoning murder of her husband James Goodyear in 1971. We have previously affirmed the denial of her first federal habeas petition. See Buenoano v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir.1992), on return from remand, Buenoano v. Singletary, 74 F.3d 1078 (11th Cir.1996).

The procedural history of the case through that stage is contained in our two prior opinions. The procedural history of the case since our last opinion was issued is contained in the Florida Supreme Court's latest opinion in the case, Buenoano v. State, --- So.2d ---- (Fla. Mar. 26, 1998), which affirmed the state trial court's denial of Buenoano's third state post-conviction motion and her request for stay of execution.

Buenoano has now filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) seeking an order authorizing her to file and the district court to consider a second federal habeas corpus petition attacking the state court judgment pursuant to which she is to be executed. She seeks to raise two claims in that second petition: 1) the State withheld critical exculpatory evidence of guilt or presented false or misleading evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); and 2) she was denied her right to a fair and impartial jury because one of the jurors failed to disclose during jury selection that he had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Buenoano raised both of these claims in her third state post-conviction proceeding, and the Florida Supreme Court's comprehensive opinion affirming the denial of relief in that proceeding accurately sets out the facts relating to each of the claims. See Buenoano, --- So.2d at ----.

The showing Buenoano must make before she is entitled to file a second federal habeas petition, since her claims are not based on a retroactively applicable new rule of constitutional law, is prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B). Under § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i), Buenoano is required to show that the factual predicate of her claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Under § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii), she is also required to show that "the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [her] guilty of the underlying offense."

As to the Brady and Giglio claim, even assuming that Buenoano has met the first requirement of § 2244(b)(2)(B), she has failed to meet the second one. Her new evidence relates to Special Agent Roger Martz's credibility. He did not even testify against her in the trial that resulted in her death sentence, which was imposed for the murder of James Goodyear. His laboratory examination of capsules Buenoano had given to John Gentry, a man with whom she was living in 1982, did lead to a stipulation at the trial that those capsules contained poison. The most Buenoano could hope to achieve with her new evidence about Special Agent Martz is erasure of that stipulation. However, even erasing that stipulation entirely, the evidence that Buenoano murdered James Goodyear in 1971, the only crime for which she was sentenced to death, is still quite strong.

It was essentially undisputed that John Goodyear, Buenoano's husband, died as a result of acute arsenic poisoning. See Buenoano v. Singletary, 74 F.3d at 1080. Special Agent Martz had nothing to do with that determination. Despite the fact that Goodyear was obviously seriously ill and even hallucinating, Buenoano hesitated to take him to the hospital. See id. Furthermore, as we have previously summarized:

Two of Buenoano's acquaintances, Constance Lang and Mary Beverly Owens, testified that Buenoano discussed with each of them on separate occasions the subject of killing a person by adding arsenic to his food. Lang testified that Buenoano had joked on several occasions about lacing her husband's food with arsenic.

Owens testified that after hearing an upsetting phone call between Owens and her husband, Buenoano suggested that Owens take out more life insurance and then poison him with arsenic. Following Goodyear's death, Buenoano collected $33,000 in life insurance proceeds and $62,000 in indemnity compensation from the Veterans Administration. Owens and another acquaintance, Lodell Morris, both testified that Buenoano admitted killing Goodyear.

Id. at 1080-81. There was more evidence:

After Goodyear's death, Buenoano lived with Bobby Joe Morris, who became ill and died after exhibiting the same symptoms that Goodyear had exhibited. When Morris's remains were exhumed in 1984, the tissue analysis revealed acute arsenic poisoning. Buenoano collected approximately $23,000 in life insurance proceeds following Morris's death.

Id. at 1081. None of that evidence involved, either directly or indirectly, Special Agent Martz.

Accordingly, even if there is some constitutional error (which is by no means clear) connected with the new evidence relating to the stipulation about the capsules Buenoano gave to John Gentry, Buenoano clearly has failed to meet her § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) burden of showing that but for that error "no reasonable factfinder would have found [her] guilty of the underlying offense."

Buenoano's claim concerning one of the jurors at her trial failing to disclose that he had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter is not based upon a new rule of constitutional law that the Supreme Court has made retroactively applicable to her case, so the § 2244(b)(2)(A) exception to the bar against second habeas petitions does not apply. The § 2244(b)(2)(B) exception is also inapplicable because, even if the facts she alleges concerning the juror were proven, that would not establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for any related constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found her guilty of the underlying offense.

The application for an order authorizing the filing of a second federal habeas petition is DENIED.

Buenoano's request for a stay of execution is denied. The panel will not entertain a petition for rehearing.

APPLICATION DENIED; STAY DENIED

Judy Buenoano

b2ux · Dec 24, 2012

Cynthia Lynn Coffman

Classification: Serial killer
Characteristics: Kidnapping - Rape - Robberies
Number of victims: 4
Date of murders: October-November 1986
Date of arrest: November 14, 1986
Date of birth: January 19, 1962
Victims profile: Sandra Neary, 32 / Pamela Simmons, 35 / Corinna Dell Novis, 20 / Lynel Murrays, 19
Method of murder: Strangulation
Location: California/Arizona, USA
Status: Sentenced to death in San Bernardino County, California, on August 31, 1989

Coffman, Cynthia Lynn: White; age 24 at crime (DOB 1-19-1962); murder of white female age 20 in San Bernardino County on 11-7-1986; sentenced on 8-31-1989.

Cynthia Coffman (born 1962) was the partner in crime of James Gregory Marlow. She was born St. Louis, Missouri.

Coffman and Marlow were accused of killing four women in October–November 1986. They were arrested on November 14, 1986, following which Coffman confessed to the murders. They were put on trial in July 1989, and in 1990 sentenced to death, Coffman being the first woman to receive a death sentence in California since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1977.

A further trial in 1992 convicted her for another murder with a sentence of life imprisonment. She was still on death row in 2011.

Case summary

Born in 1962, Cynthia Coffman was the privileged daughter of a St. Louis businessman, raised by her parents as a devout Catholic.

Abortion was unthinkable when she got pregnant at age seventeen, and she was forced into a loveless marriage, enduring five years of domestic captivity before she left home and fled west, traveling with little more than her car and the clothes on her back. She wound up in Page, Arizona, waiting tables in a diner, moving in with a local man after several weeks. In the fall of 1985, they were evicted from their small apartment after numerous complaints from neighbors of their drunken all-night parties.

On May 8, 1986, Cynthia and her boyfriend were stopped for running a stop sign in Barstow, California. Police found a loaded derringer and a quantity of methamphetamine in her purse, but she was released on her own recognizance the charges subsequently dropped. Her lover wound up serving six weeks in the county jail, and it was during one of Cynthias visits that she first met his cell mate, the man who would irrevocably change her life.

James Gregory Marlow was doing time for the theft of his sixth wifes car when Cynthia walked into his wasted life. Born in 1957, he had been a dedicated thief from age ten, committed to Folsom Prison in 1980 for a series of home invasions and knife-point robberies. Marlow served three years on that conviction, earning himself a reputation as The Folsom Wolf. proudly wearing tattoos of the neo-Nazi Aryan Brotherhood.

It was love at first sight for Cynthia and James, her boyfriend instantly forgotten when Marlow hit the street and they left California together in June. Marlow had relatives in the Border South, and the couple began working their way through the family tree, sponging room and board where they could, ripping off any obvious valuables when they were finally asked to leave.

In time, it reached the point where Marlows relatives could see them coming , turning them away with angry words or pocket change, depending on the latest pigeons mood. At last, they were reduced to sleeping in the woods, where Cynthia contracted head lice and James was forced to bathe in kerosene to rid himself of biting chiggers.

On July 26, 1986, Coffman and Marlow were linked to the burglary of a home in Whitley County, Kentucky, making off with cash, some jewelry, and a shotgun.

Days later, in Tennessee, they were married. Cynthia celebrated the occasion by having her buttocks tattooed with the legend: I belong to the Folsom Wolf. That done, they drifted west again, in search of easy prey.

On the evening of October 11, 1986, 32-year-old Sandra Neary left her home in Costa Mesa, California, to obtain some cash from the automatic teller machine at her bank. She never returned, though her car was found by police in a local parking lot. Two weeks later, on October 24, her strangled, decomposing corpse was found by hikers near Corona, in Riverside County.

Pamela Simmons, age thirty-five, was the next to die, reported missing in Bullhead City, Arizona, on October 28. Her car was found abandoned near police headquarters, detectives theorizing that she had been snatched while drawing money from a curbside ATM.

Ten days later, on November 7, 20-year-old Corinna Novis vanished on a similar errand in Redlands, California. The latest victim had been kidnapped from an urban shopping mall in broad daylight. Lynel Murrays boyfriend was worried on November 12, when the 19-year-old psychology student failed to keep a date after work. He found her car outside the dry cleaning shop where she worked, in Orange County, California, but another day would pass before her naked, strangled body was discovered in a Huntington Beach motel room. In addition to kidnapping and murder, there was also evidence of sexual assault. Police were praying for a break, and when it came, the case unraveled swiftly. First, Corinna Noviss checkbook was found in a Laguna Niguel trash dumpster, tucked inside a fast-food takeout bag with papers bearing the names of Cynthia Coffman and James Marlow.

Around the same time, Marlow and Coffman were linked to a San Bernardino motel room, where the manager found stationery bearing practice signatures of Lynel Murrays name. A glance at Marlows criminal record did the rest, and a statewide alert was issued for both fugitives .

On November 14, 1986, police were summoned to a mountain lodge at Big Bear City, California, where the proprietor identified his latest guests as Marlow and Coffman. A 100-man posse found the lodge empty, fanning out through the woods for a sweep that paid off around 3:00 P.M., when the suspects were found hiking along a mountain road. Coffman and Marlow surrendered without a fight, both wearing outfits stolen from the dry cleaning shop where Lynel Murray worked.

Within hours, Cynthia led officers to a vineyard near Fontana, where they found Corinna Novis, sodomized and strangled, lying in a shallow grave.

Marlow and Coffman were formally charged with that murder on November 17, held over for trial without bond. If any further proof of guilt were needed, homicide investigators told press that fingerprints from both defendants had been found inside Corinnas car, and Coffman had been linked to the Fontana pawn shop where the victims typewriter was pawned.

Another thirty-two months would pass before the killer couple went to trial, and in the meantime they experienced a falling-out, each blaming the other for their plight. On one jailhouse visit, Cynthias lawyer asked if there was anything she needed from the outside world. Yeah, she told him, pointing to her backside. You can find someone to help me lose this damn tattoo!

The couples murder trial finally opened in San Bernardino County on July 18, 1989. Both defendants were convicted across the board, and both were sentenced to death on August 30. Cynthia Coffman thus became the first woman sentenced to die in California since that state restored capital punishment under a new statute in 1977. It seems unlikely that a woman will actually be put to death in liberal California, but the 1992 execution of Robert Alton Harris cancels all bets, making anything possible.

Michael Newton - An Encyclopedia of Modern Serial Killers - Hunting Humans

S.C. Upholds Death Sentences for ‘Folsom Wolf’ and Girlfriend Who Claimed He Battered Her

By Kenneth Ofgang - MetNews.com

Friday, August 20, 2004

The California Supreme Court yesterday unanimously upheld the death sentences for a man who told a judge he killed three people and deserved to die, as well as for the girlfriend whom he claimed drove him to commit the crimes.

The justices rejected claims by attorneys for James Gregory Marlow and Cynthia Coffman that their defenses were so mutually inconsistent it was an abuse of discretion for retired San Bernardino Superior Court Judge Don Turner, assigned to hear the case, not to grant separate trials.

There was plenty of independent evidence against both defendants, Justice Kathryn M. Werdegar wrote. Not only was there no abuse of discretion, she said, the case against both defendants was so strong that any error would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Marlow admitted to his involvement in three 1986 murders—one in his native Kentucky as well as those of Lynell Murray in Huntington Beach and Corinna Novis in Redlands. But he sought to shift much of the blame for the California killings to Coffman.

The pair met after Coffman and her previous boyfriend, Doug Huntley, were arrested after an altercation with several men at a convenience store. Coffman was released after five days, but Huntley remained in jail and Marlow showed up at the apartment she and Huntley had shared.

Marlow, who had served time at Folsom prison and called himself the “Folsom Wolf,” said he was there at Huntley's request to look after Coffman. The pair and Huntley remained friendly after Huntleyís release, but by June 1986—five months before the Novis and Murray murders—Huntley was back behind bars and Marlow and Coffman began what both later said was a violent relationship.

Both were sentenced to death for the Novis murder. Coffman drew a life-without-parole sentence in the Murray killing, while Marlow's Orange Superior Court death sentence in that case was affirmed yesterday in a separate opinion.

Novis, 20, was abducted after cashing a check at a First Interstate Bank drive-through window near the Redlands Mall. Her body was found eight days later in a shallow grave in Fontana; she had either been strangled or suffocated.

Murray, 19, was abducted at gunpoint from the Huntington Beach dry cleaners where she worked, then was raped and strangled in a seaside motel room’s bathtub, five days after Novis was killed.

A San Bernardino Superior Court jury found both defendants guilty of the murder of Novis, as well as kidnapping, kidnapping for robbery, robbery, residential burglary, and forcible sodomy. In returning death penalty verdicts as to both defendants, jurors apparently rejected Coffmanís testimony that she only went along with Marlow because he had hit and threatened her and she was afraid he would harm her son, then six years old.

Coffman, whose defense also included testimony by an expert on battered womanís syndrome, said Marlow told her he was a white supremacist and killed blacks in prison. Marlow denied on rebuttal that he had done or said he had done any such thing.

Marlow testified it was Coffman's idea to kill Novis; all he wanted to do, he said, was steal her car and get her personal identification number so that he could get money from an ATM. Coffman, he said, insisted on Novis being killed.

Prosecutors presented testimony from police witnesses, as well as from a cellmate of Coffmanís, suggesting that both defendants had taken credit for the murder.

Werdegar rejected the argument that Turner abused his discretion by not granting a change of venue. She noted the size of San Bernardino County, and pointed out that while there was a good deal of pretrial publicity, the reports were not particularly inflammatory, the victim not a prominent person, and the seating of a jury no more difficult than in other capital cases.

Werdegar also rejected Coffman's contention that she should not be executed because she was less culpable than Marlow.

“...Coffman, 24 years old at the time of the offenses, was found by the jury to have committed murder and to have engaged in the charged felonies with the intent to kill or to aid or abet Marlow in killing the victim,” the justice wrote. “The jury also heard evidence that Coffman, together with Marlow, had committed another similar murder and other felony offenses in Orange County. Evidently the jury was not persuaded that Coffman suffered from such physical abuse or emotional or psychological oppression as to warrant a sentence less than death. Contrary to Coffmanís argument, the offenses here were of the most serious nature, and her sentence clearly befits her personal culpability.”

The cases are People v. Marlow and Coffman, 04 S.O.S. 4515, and People v. Marlow, 04 S.O.S. 4561-

Condemned and Waiting: Cynthia Coffman Came West for a New Life; Now She Faces 2nd Death Sentence

By Nancy Wride - Los Angeles Times

April 26, 1992

SANTA ANA — Here we are in "the Cindy Room," surrounded by remnants of her violent past and, possibly, her deadly future.

From this cubbyhole near the Orange County Courthouse, two public defenders are marshaling their arguments to save Cynthia Lynn Coffman, the first woman sentenced to California's gas chamber since the Manson followers.

There is the bulletin board of color snapshots: the Fontana vineyard where the first victim was buried; Cindy smiling broadly with her attorneys; a close-up of her behind tattooed with Property of Folsom Wolf, her co-defendant's prison nickname, and there is the smiling face of the last victim who was raped and strangled in the tub of a seaside motel.

Across the street, the former factory worker and mother of a fifth-grader spends an afternoon answering questions at the Orange County Jail, where she spends her days in isolation, studying history, reading the novels of American Indians and Danielle Steele.

"I'm afraid of the death penalty . . .but I'd hope to go to a better place than here," said Coffman, 30, in the first interview since her arrest--conducted just days before Robert Alton Harris was executed. "But I'd still rather have life."

Three years ago, Coffman was sentenced to die for the 1986 San Bernardino County kidnaping, robbery, sodomy and murder of 20-year-old Corinna Novis. This week, she faces the same fate in the abduction and slaying of Lynell Murray, 19, of Huntington Beach.

A Missouri Catholic girl who got divorced and looked for a new life out West, Coffman rode shotgun for months with James Gregory Marlow, a powerfully built Kentucky outlaw and speed addict who sported tattoos all over his body.

Why she stuck with Marlow during a kinky 1986 cross-country crime rampage, in which they married atop a Harley-Davidson motorcycle, will be disputed. And it may, in the end, figure critically in the jury's decision on whether she lives or dies.

"At the first trial (her) attorneys wanted so much to convince the jury that she was afraid of Marlow they didn't want to show that she loved him," said Leonard Gumlia, a deputy public defender and Coffman's lead attorney. "There will be no question for the (current) jury that this was a classic battered-woman situation."

Her attorneys argue that she was so battered, starved and brainwashed by Marlow that she was afraid to bolt when given the opportunity. Some court insiders have called it the Patty Hearst defense. Lawyers for Coffman, who has pleaded not guilty, will argue that she acted under the control of Marlow, who beat and stabbed her.

Whether she was an unwilling accomplice or avid participant in Murray's murder will factor into a key question facing the jury.

"I'm trying to understand myself why I did things," Coffman said, scratching the bandage covering the word Wolf tattooed around her ring finger, "but I'm still not all the way yet."

What is not in dispute is that everything in this case circles back to the electric attraction between Marlow and Coffman. He called her Cynful, she called him Squeeze, and even after their arrest they exchanged passionate love letters from their cells, using sideways hearts to create the letter B and swastikas to dot I's.

"They were two flaky sociopaths separately," said Raymond Haight, the San Bernardino County deputy district attorney whose prosecution resulted in death sentences for the couple. "But you put them together and it was like Bonnie and Clyde all the way."

Slim and pretty with brown hair spilling down her back, Coffman wore lipstick and mascara and appeared in good spirits, smiling and laughing with ease during a two-hour interview. Born Cynthia Haskins, she was raised in lower middle-class St. Louis neighborhoods. Her father left by the time she was 6, and her mother had once tried to give her and her two brothers away. Her father's desertion was the first of several formative events that, her defense claims, left her in need of the attentions of the wrong kind of man.

"To get attention I'd get in trouble, and for that," Coffman said with an amused sigh, "I'll always remember the taste of Dove."

The spring of her sophomore year, she smoked her first marijuana joint. She was married and a mother at 18. After little more than a year, the marriage unraveled.

For the next few years she struggled to support her son, Josh, on the swing shift at a carburetor factory. Sizing up her dead-end job, Gumlia said, Coffman decided to travel with a girlfriend and "start over" in Page, Ariz., where she planned to bring her son once she settled.

"Almost as soon as she got there she wanted to find a man, any man," Gumlia said. "The truth is, Cindy always had to have a guy around."

Within a month she had found one. Some time later he was arrested on a warrant and delivered to a Barstow jail. Coffman followed him.

At their apartment one day, Coffman said, a stranger showed up to tell her that her boyfriend had been moved to a different jail. It was Marlow, who had just been released from jail.

"I thought it was strange for him to show up at my door," Coffman said. But her first impression was that he was "nice looking." The sparks flew.

Soon the couple was kicking around high desert haunts, often indulging in injections of crystal methamphetamine. Eventually, they headed east for Kentucky and the start of a violent cross-country rampage. Coffman and Marlow were charged with the execution-style slaying of a Kentucky drug dealer. Marlow told police he shot the dealer with Coffman's help for $5,000. Because of the death penalty cases here, that case has not been pursued.

Along the way, Coffman and Marlow were unofficially married atop a motorcycle during what Gumlia called a "biker wedding." During numerous angry fits, Gumlia said, Marlow beat and bit Coffman and hacked off her hair, which was crew-cut length at the time of her arrest. Always, he apologized and showered his girlfriend with affection, Gumlia said. They eventually drifted back to California.

On Nov. 7, 1986, Coffman and Marlow approached Corinna Novis at the Redlands Mall in San Bernardino County and asked for a ride. At gunpoint, Novis was taken to the home of a friend of Marlow, handcuffed and gagged, then sexually assaulted. Coffman and Marlow were convicted of strangling Novis, who was found buried face down in a Fontana field.

Three days later, authorities allege, the pair rode in Novis' Honda to the Orange County coast, where they lived off her bank and credit cards and prowled beach towns for their next victim.

On Nov. 12, they found her, and the resemblance to Novis was striking.

Lynell Murray, a Golden West College student with pretty brown hair and long red fingernails, was working part time at a Huntington Beach dry cleaners, about to close up when Coffman approached her alone.

The pair robbed the business of cash and clothes, then forced Murray into the Honda and drove to the Huntington Beach Inn. There, she was raped by Marlow, beaten, blindfolded and strangled with a towel, authorities say. A maid arriving to clean the room found her face down in a full bathtub.

On Nov. 14, after wiping the car clean of fingerprints and abandoning it in the Running Springs community in the San Bernardino Mountains, Coffman and Marlow were captured in Big Bear during a police dragnet. At their woodsy motel room, police found several of Murray's earrings, described in a police bulletin as possible "trophies."

Had she not been sent to Orange County to face the second murder charge, Coffman would have been the first woman on Death Row since Californians reinstated capital punishment 15 years ago. Maureen McDermott, a Los Angeles nurse convicted of ordering the stabbing murder of her roommate, awaits appeals there alone.

In order to win the death penalty he is seeking against Coffman, Orange County Deputy Dist. Atty. Robert C. Gannon Jr. must prove she is guilty of murder with a special circumstance--in this case, murder in the course of a burglary, rape, kidnaping or robbery.

But Gannon must also show that Coffman intended for Murray to die, a legal requirement at the time of the murders that has been changed. It was established to prevent execution of those who "aid and abet" a killing.

Gannon declined requests to be interviewed. But Haight, the prosecutor for her first trial, said jurors believed that Coffman wanted Novis murdered.

"She's a very bright woman," he said. "She is very manipulative and very clever, and she reeked of sexuality. . . . The jury could see that manipulation, and the women jurors were more against her than the men. She came off so much smarter than (Marlow), and the jury told me they didn't believe this guy sitting there was outsmarting her, out-manipulating her."

For now, Coffman passes the time in jail studying history. She has ambitions of a college degree and teaching fellow inmates.

She followed much of the Harris execution coverage, and remembers a story chronicling how an execution occurs--"This is where you go, this is what happens, and I thought: 'Oh my God!' "

Each Sunday night she calls her mother and exchanges letters monthly with her son. He assumes she is in jail on drug charges, but one day she knows he will have to be told the truth.

"I know I want to be the one to tell him," Coffman said, "(but) what could you say to him to make him understand? I don't think you ever could."

People v. Marlow

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

August 19, 2004

THE PEOPLE, PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT,
v.
JAMES GREGORY MARLOW AND CYNTHIA LYNN COFFMAN, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Court: Superior County: San Bernardino Judge: Don A. Turner *fn1 San Bernardino County Super. Ct. No. SCR-45400

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Werdegar, J.

(this opn. should precede P. v. Marlow, S026614, also filed 8/19/04)

A San Bernardino County jury convicted James Gregory Marlow and Cynthia Lynn Coffman of one count of each of the following offenses: murder (Pen. Code, § 187), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), kidnapping for robbery (§ 209, subd. (b)), robbery (§ 211), residential burglary (§ 459) and forcible sodomy (§ 286, subd. (c)). The same jury found true as to both defendants special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed in the course of, or immediate flight from, robbery, kidnapping, sodomy and burglary within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A), (B), (D) and (G). The jury further found that Coffman and Marlow were personally armed with a firearm. (§ 12022, subd. (a).) Following Marlow's waiver of a jury trial on allegations that he had suffered two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a), the trial court found those allegations to be true. The jury returned a verdict of death, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. This appeal is automatic. (§ 1239, subd. (b).) We affirm the judgment in its entirety.

I. Facts

A. Guilt Phase

1. Prosecution's case-in-chief

On Friday, November 7, 1986, around 5:30 p.m., Corinna Novis cashed a check at a First Interstate Bank drive-through window near the Redlands Mall, after leaving her job at a State Farm Insurance office in Redlands. Novis, who was alone, was driving her new white Honda CRX automobile. Novis had been scheduled for a manicure at a nail salon owned by her friend Terry Davis; she never arrived for the appointment. Novis also had planned to meet friends at a pizza parlor by 7:00 that evening, but she never appeared.

That same day, Coffman and Marlow went to the Redlands Mall, where Marlow's sister, Veronica Koppers, worked in a deli restaurant. Between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m., Veronica pointed the couple out to her supervisor as they sat in the mall outside the deli. Coffman was wearing a dress; Marlow, a suit and tie. Later, at the time they had arranged to pick Veronica up from work, Coffman and Marlow entered the deli and handed Veronica her car keys, explaining they had a ride.

Around 7:30 p.m., Coffman and Marlow brought Novis to the residence of Richard Drinkhouse. Drinkhouse, who was recovering from injuries sustained in a motorcycle accident and had some difficulty walking, was home alone in the living room watching television when the three arrived. Marlow was wearing dress trousers; Coffman was still wearing a dress; and Novis wore jeans, a black and green top, and had a suit jacket draped over her shoulders. Marlow told Drinkhouse they needed to use the bedroom, and the three walked down the hallway. The women entered the bedroom. Marlow returned to the living room and told Drinkhouse they needed to talk to the girl so they could "get her ready teller number" in order to "rob" her bank account. Drinkhouse complained about the intrusion into his house and asked Marlow if he were crazy. Marlow replied in the negative and assured Drinkhouse "there won't be any witnesses. How is she going to talk to anybody if she's under a pile of rocks?" Drinkhouse asked Marlow to leave with the women. Marlow declined, saying he was waiting for Veronica to bring some clothing. He told Drinkhouse to stay on the couch and watch television.

Knowing Marlow had a gun and having previously observed him fight and beat another man, and also being aware of his own physical disability, Drinkhouse was afraid to leave the house. At one point, when Drinkhouse appeared to be preparing to leave, he saw Coffman, in the hallway, gesture to Marlow, who came out of the bedroom to ask where he was going. Drinkhouse then returned to his seat on the couch in front of the television.

Veronica arrived at the Drinkhouse residence 10 to 15 minutes after Coffman, Marlow and Novis. Marlow came out of the bedroom, told Veronica he "had someone [t]here" and cautioned her not to "freak out" on him. Marlow said he needed something from the car; Coffman and Veronica went outside and returned with a brown tote bag. About 10 minutes later, Coffman drove Veronica to a nearby 7-Eleven store in Novis's car, leaving Marlow in the bedroom with Novis. Drinkhouse heard Novis ask Marlow if they were going to take her home; Marlow answered, "As soon as they get back." Veronica testified that, during this period, Coffman did not appear frightened or ask her for help in escaping from Marlow. Drinkhouse likewise testified Coffman appeared to be going along willingly with what Marlow was doing.

Upon returning from the 7-Eleven store, Coffman entered the bedroom where Marlow was holding Novis prisoner and remained with them for 10 to 15 minutes. During this time, Drinkhouse heard the shower running. After the shower was turned off, Marlow emerged from the bedroom wearing pants but no shoes or shirt; he had a towel over his shoulders and appeared to be wet. He walked over to Veronica, said, "We've got the number," and started going through a purse, removing a wallet and identification. Marlow then returned to the bedroom with the purse. Veronica left the house. About five minutes later, Coffman, dressed in jeans, emerged from the bedroom, followed by Novis, handcuffed and with duct tape over her mouth, and Marlow. Novis's hair appeared to be wet. The three then left the house. Drinkhouse never saw Novis again.

Marlow and Coffman returned the following afternoon to ask if Drinkhouse wanted to buy an answering machine or knew anyone who might. When Drinkhouse responded negatively, the two left.

Novis's body was found eight days later, on November 15, in a shallow grave in a vineyard in Fontana. She was missing a fingernail on her left hand, and her shoes and one earring were gone. An earring belonging to Novis was later found in Coffman's purse. Forensic pathologist Dr. Gregory Reiber performed an autopsy on November 17. Dr. Reiber concluded that Novis had been killed between five and 10 days previously. Marks on the outside of her neck, injuries to her neck muscles and a fracture of her thyroid cartilage suggested ligature strangulation as the cause of death, but suffocation was another possible cause of death due to the presence of a large amount of soil in the back of her mouth. Marks on her wrists were consistent with handcuffs, and sperm were found in her rectum, although there was no sign of trauma to her anus.

When Novis uncharacteristically failed to appear for work on Monday, November 10, without calling or having given notice of an intended absence, her supervisor, Jean Cramer, went to Novis's apartment to check on her. Cramer noticed Novis's car was not parked there, the front door was ajar, and the bedroom was in some disarray. Cramer reported these observations to police, who found no sign of a forced entry. Terry Davis went to Novis's apartment later that day and determined Novis's answering machine and typewriter were missing.

Around 9:30 p.m. on Friday, November 7, the night Novis apparently was killed, Veronica Koppers visited her friend Irene Cardona and tried to sell her an answering machine, later identified as the one taken from Novis's apartment. Cardona accompanied Veronica, Coffman and Marlow to the house of a friend, who agreed to trade the answering machine for a half-gram of methamphetamine. The next day, Debra Hawkins bought the answering machine that Cardona had traded. The Redlands Police Department eventually recovered the machine. Harold Brigham, the proprietor of the Sierra Jewelry and Loan in Fontana, testified that on November 8, Coffman pawned a typewriter, using Novis's identification.

Victoria Rotstein, the assistant manager of a Taco Bell on Pacific Coast Highway in Laguna Beach, testified that between 11:00 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. one night in early November 1986, after the restaurant had closed for the evening, a woman came to the locked door and began shaking it. When told the restaurant was closed, the woman started cursing, only to run off when Rotstein said she was going to call the police. Rotstein identified Coffman in a photo lineup and a physical lineup, but did not identify her at trial. On November 11, 1986, the Taco Bell manager found a bag near a trash receptacle behind the restaurant; inside the bag were Coffman's and Novis's drivers' licenses, Novis's checks and bank card, and various identification papers belonging to Marlow.

The day after Novis's disappearance, Marlow, Coffman and Veronica Koppers returned to Paul Koppers's home; Marlow asked him if he could get any "cold," i.e., nontraceable, license plates for the car. On the morning of November 12, Marlow and Coffman returned to Paul Koppers's residence, where they told him they had been down to "the beach," "casing out the rich people, looking for somebody to rip off." Koppers asked Marlow if he knew where Veronica was; after placing two telephone calls, Coffman learned Veronica was in police custody. On the Koppers' coffee table, Marlow saw a newspaper containing an article about Novis's disappearance with a photograph of her car. Marlow told Coffman they had to get rid of the car. Paul Koppers refused Marlow's request to leave some property at his house.

Coffman and Marlow left the Koppers residence and drove to Big Bear, where they checked into the Bavarian Lodge using a credit card belonging to one Lynell Murray (other evidence showed defendants had killed Murray on November 12). Their subsequent purchases using Murray's credit card alerted authorities to their whereabouts, and they were arrested on November 14 as they were walking on Big Bear Boulevard, wearing bathing suits despite the cold weather. Coffman had a loaded .22-caliber gun in her purse. Novis's abandoned car was found on a dirt road south of Santa's Village, about a quarter-mile off Highway 18. Despite Coffman's efforts to wipe their fingerprints from the car, her prints were found on the license plate, hood and ashtray; a print on the hood of the car was identified as Marlow's. A resident of the Big Bear area later found discarded on his property a pair of gray slacks with handcuffs in the pocket, as well as a receipt and clothing from the Alpine Sports Center, where Coffman and Marlow had made purchases.

2. Marlow's case

Dr. Robert Bucklin, a forensic pathologist, reviewed the autopsy report and related testimony by Dr. Reiber. Based on the lack of anal tearing or other trauma, Dr. Bucklin opined there was insufficient evidence to establish that Novis had suffered anal penetration. He also questioned Dr. Reiber's conclusion that Novis might have been suffocated, as opposed to aspirating sandy material during the killing or coming into contact with it during the burial process.

3. Coffman's case

Coffman testified on her own behalf, describing her relationship with Marlow, his threats and violence toward her, and other murders in which, out of fear that he would harm her or her son, she had participated with him while nonetheless lacking any intent to kill. Coffman also presented the testimony of Dr. Lenore Walker, a psychologist and expert on battered woman syndrome, in support of her defense that she lacked the intent to kill. The trial court admitted much of this evidence over Marlow's objections.

Coffman testified she was born in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1962 and, following her graduation from high school, gave birth to a son, Joshua, in August 1980. Shortly thereafter she married Joshua's father, Ron Coffman, from whom she separated in April 1982. In April 1984, Coffman left St. Louis for Arizona, leaving Joshua in his father's care, intending to come back for him when she was settled in Arizona.

Coffman testified that when she met Marlow in April 1986, she was involved in a steady relationship with Doug Huntley. She and Huntley had lived in Page, Arizona, before moving to Barstow, where Huntley took a job in construction. Coffman, who previously had worked as a bartender and waitress, was briefly employed in Barstow and also sold methamphetamine. In April 1986, both Coffman and Huntley were arrested after an altercation at a 7-Eleven store in which Coffman pulled a gun on several men who were "hassling" Huntley and "going to jump him." Charged with possession of a loaded weapon and methamphetamine, Coffman was released after five days. The day after she was released, Marlow, whom she had never met, showed up at the apartment she shared with Huntley. Marlow said he had been in jail with Huntley and had told him he would check on Coffman to make sure she was all right. Coffman and Marlow spent about an hour together on that occasion and smoked some marijuana. After Huntley's release, he and Coffman visited Marlow at the Barstow motel where Marlow was staying.

By June 1986, Huntley was again in custody and Coffman was preparing to leave him when Marlow reappeared at her apartment. At Marlow's request, Coffman drove him to the home of his cousin, Debbie Schwab, in Fontana; while there, he purchased methamphetamine. Within a few days, Coffman moved with Marlow to Newberry Springs, where they stayed with Marlow's friends Steve and Karen Schmitt. During this period, Marlow told her he was a hit man, a martial arts expert and a White supremacist, and that he had killed Black people in prison. In Newberry Springs, Coffman testified, Marlow for the first time tied her up and beat her after accusing her of flirting with another man. During this episode, his demeanor and voice changed; she referred to this persona as Folsom Wolf, after the prison where Marlow had been incarcerated, and over the course of her testimony identified several other occasions when Marlow had seemed to become Wolf and behaved violently toward her. After this initial beating, he apologized, said it would never happen again, and treated her better for a couple of days. She discovered he had taken her address book containing her son's and parents' addresses and phone numbers, and he refused to give it back. He became critical of the way she did things and when angry with her would call her names. He refused to let her go anywhere without him, saying that if she ever left him, he would kill her son and family.

After some weeks in Newberry Springs, Marlow told Coffman his father had died and left him some property in Kentucky and that they would go there. Coffman would get her son back, he suggested, and they would live together in Kentucky or else sell everything and move somewhere else. Marlow prevailed on her to steal a friend's truck for the journey; after having it repainted black, they set off. Not long before they left, Marlow bit her fingernails down to the quick. They went by way of Colorado, where they stayed with a former supervisor of Marlow's, Gene Kelly, who discussed the possibility of Marlow's working for him again in Georgia. They then passed through St. Louis. Arriving in the evening and reaching her parents by telephone at midnight, Coffman was told it was too late for her to visit that night; the next morning, Marlow told her there was no time for her to see her son. Accordingly, although Coffman had not seen her son since Christmas 1984, they drove straight to Kentucky.

On arriving, they stayed with Marlow's friend Greg ("Lardo") Lyons and his wife Linda in the town of Pine Knot. Marlow informed Coffman the real reason for the trip was to carry out a contract killing on a "snitch." Once they had located the intended victim's house, Marlow told her she was to do the killing. She protested, but ultimately did as he directed, carrying a gun, fashioning her bandana into a halter top, and luring the victim out of his house on the pretext of needing help with her car. When the victim, who had a gun tucked into his belt, had come to the spot where their truck was parked and was taking a look under the hood, Marlow appeared and demanded to know what the man was doing with his sister. Marlow then grabbed the man's gun. Coffman testified she heard a shot go off, but did not see what happened. Coffman and Marlow returned to Lyons's home. Sometime later, Marlow and Lyons left the house and returned with a wad of money. Coffman counted it: there was $5,000.

Coffman testified that Marlow subjected her to several severe beatings in Kentucky. In mid-August 1986, they drove to Atlanta, where Marlow told her he had a job. While in a bar after his fourth day working for Gene Kelly, Marlow became angry at Coffman. That night, in their hotel room, he began beating her, took a pair of scissors, threatened to cut her eye out, and then cut off all her hair. He forced her out of the motel room without her clothes, let her back in and forcibly sodomized her. Marlow failed to show up for work the next day and was fired. They then returned to Kentucky, where they unsuccessfully attempted a burglary and spent time going on "pot hunts," i.e., searching rural areas for marijuana plants to steal. Just before they left Kentucky to go to Arizona, they stole a station wagon.

Back in Arizona, they burglarized Doug Huntley's parents' house and stole a safe. After opening it to find only some papers and 10 silver dollars, they took the coins and buried the safe in the desert. Returning to Newberry Springs and again briefly staying with the Schmitts, they sold the stolen car and stole two rings belonging to their hosts, pawning one and trading the other for methamphetamine.

From Newberry Springs, in early October 1986, Marlow and Coffman took a bus to Fontana, where they again stayed with Marlow's cousins, the Schwabs. During that visit, Marlow tattooed Coffman's buttocks with the words "Property of Folsom Wolf" and her ring finger with the letters "W-O-L-F" and lightning bolts, telling her it was a wedding ring. Leaving the Schwab residence in late October, they hitchhiked to the house of Rita Robbeloth and her son Curtis, who were friends of Marlow's sister, Veronica. From there, Veronica brought Coffman and Marlow to the home she shared with her husband, Paul, and his brother, Steve. At the Robbeloths' one day, Coffman, Marlow and Veronica were sharing some methamphetamine, and Marlow became enraged over Coffman's request for an equal share. Although Coffman quickly backed down, Marlow began punching her and threatened to leave her by the side of the road. Later, back at the Koppers' residence, Marlow continued to beat, kick and threaten to kill her, forced her to consume four pills he told her were cyanide, extinguished a cigarette on her face and stabbed her in the leg, rendering her unconscious for a day and unable to walk for two days.

Coffman recounted how she and Marlow, along with Veronica, left the Koppers' and came to stay at the Drinkhouse residence the night before they abducted Novis. On the morning of November 7, 1986, Marlow told her to put on a dress, saying they would not be able to rob anyone if they were not dressed nicely. Marlow borrowed a suit from Curtis Robbeloth and told Coffman they had to "get a girl." She testified she did not understand he intended to kill the girl. After dropping Veronica off at her job, Coffman and Marlow drove around in Veronica's car looking for someone to rob. Eventually they parked in front of the Redlands Mall. When they saw Novis's white car pull up in front of them and Novis enter the mall, Marlow said, "That is the one we are going to get," despite Coffman's protests that the girl was too young to have money. He directed Coffman to get out of the car and ask Novis for a ride when the latter returned to her car. Coffman complied, asking Novis if she could give them a ride to the University of Redlands. When Novis agreed, Marlow got in the two-seater car with Coffman on his lap. As Novis drove, Marlow took the gun from Coffman, displayed it and told Novis to pull over. Then Coffman drove while Novis, handcuffed, sat on Marlow's lap. He told Novis they were going to a friend's house and directed Coffman to the Drinkhouse residence, where they arrived between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m. When Novis told them she had something to do that evening, Marlow assured her, "Oh, you'll make it where you are going. Don't worry."

As Marlow went in and out of the bedroom at the Drinkhouse residence, Coffman sat with Novis. When Novis asked if she was going to be allowed to leave, Coffman told her to do what Marlow said and he would let her go. Showing Novis the stab wound on her leg, Coffman told her Marlow was "just crazy." Marlow dispatched Coffman to make coffee and proceeded to try to get Novis to disclose her personal identification number (PIN). Finally Novis gave him a number. Marlow then taped Novis's mouth and said, "We are going to take a shower." He removed Novis's clothes and put her, still handcuffed, into the shower. Coffman testified he told her (Coffman) to get into the shower, but she refused. Thinking Marlow was going to rape Novis, Coffman testified she "turned around" and "walked away" into the living room. There she retrieved her jeans and returned to the bedroom to get dressed. Coffman denied either arousing Marlow sexually or having anything to do with anything that happened in the shower. When Marlow told her to dress Novis, Coffman responded that if he uncuffed her, she could do so herself. He removed the handcuffs to permit Novis to dress, then handcuffed her again to a bedpost.

Around this time, Veronica arrived at the Drinkhouse residence. Marlow took Novis's purse, directed Veronica to get his bag out of her car, and told Coffman and his sister to go to the store, where they bought sodas and cigarettes. Back at the Drinkhouse residence, Veronica departed and, soon thereafter, Marlow, Coffman and Novis left, with Coffman driving and Novis, duct tape on her mouth, handcuffed, and covered with blankets, in the back of the car. Marlow told Coffman to drive to their drug connection in Fontana, but directed her into a vineyard. There, Marlow and Novis got out of the car, and he removed her handcuffs and tape. He explained they could not bring a stranger to the drug connection's house, so he would wait there with Novis while Coffman scored the dope. They walked off, with Marlow carrying a blanket and a bag containing a shovel.

Coffman testified she felt confused at that point because she possessed only $15, insufficient funds for a drug purchase. Believing Marlow intended to rape Novis, she backed the car out of the vineyard, parked down the street and smoked a cigarette. When she returned, no one was there. She could hear the sound of digging. Some 10 to 15 minutes later Marlow reappeared, alone. Without speaking, he threw some items into the back of the car and, after Coffman had driven for a while, began to hit her and berated her for driving away.

They returned to the Robbeloths' house, where Marlow changed clothes. Next they drove to a First Interstate Bank branch, but were unable to access Novis's account because she had given them the wrong PIN. From there, around 9:30 p.m., they went to Novis's apartment and, after a search, found a card on which Novis had written her PIN. They also took a typewriter, a telephone answering machine and a small amount of cash. They returned to the Robbeloths', where Marlow spoke with Veronica, who then drove them around unsuccessfully looking for a friend to buy the machine. Leaving Veronica around 3:00 or 4:00 a.m., Coffman and Marlow tried again to access Novis's account, only to learn there was not enough money in the account to enable them to withdraw funds using the automated teller. They returned to the Drinkhouse residence.

The next morning, Veronica joined them around 8:00 or 9:00. After trying again to sell the answering machine, they pawned the typewriter for $50 and bought some methamphetamine. That afternoon Coffman and Marlow went to Lytle Creek to dispose of Novis's belongings. Coffman had not asked Marlow what had happened to Novis; she testified she did not want to know and thought he had left her tied up in the vineyard. They returned to the Drinkhouse residence around 5:00 p.m. Later that evening, after trading the answering machine for some methamphetamine in the transaction described in Irene Cardona's testimony, Coffman and Marlow went with Veronica to the Koppers residence, where they "did some speed" and developed a plan to go to the beach in Orange County on Marlow's theory that "it would be easier to get money down there because all rich people live down at the beach." Veronica drove Coffman and Marlow back to Novis's car, which they drove to Huntington Beach, arriving at sunrise.

After lying on the beach for several hours, they looked unsuccessfully for people to rob. Marlow berated Coffman for their inability to find a victim, held a gun to her head and ordered her to drive. After threatening to shoot her, he began to punch the stab wound on her leg. That night, they slept in the car in front of some houses near the beach. The next day, Coffman cashed a check on Novis's account, receiving $15. They continued their search for a potential victim and eventually bought dinner at a Taco Bell, where Marlow discarded their identification, along with Novis's. They drove up into the hills and spent the night. The next day, they resumed their search for someone to rob. Seeing a woman walking out of Prime Cleaners, Marlow commented that she would be a good one to rob. They continued to drive around, however, and spent the night in the car behind a motel on Pacific Coast Highway after removing the license plates from another car and putting them on Novis's car.

The following afternoon, Coffman and Marlow entered Prime Cleaners and committed the robbery, kidnapping, rape and murder of Lynell Murray detailed below (see post, at pp. 25-28).

Coffman also presented the testimony of several witnesses suggesting her normally outgoing personality underwent a change and that she behaved submissively and fearfully after she became Marlow's girlfriend. Judy Scott, Coffman's friend from Page, Arizona, testified that when Coffman and Marlow visited her in October 1986, Coffman, who previously had been talkative and concerned about the appearance of her hair, avoided eye contact with Scott, spoke tersely and had extremely short hair that she kept covered with a bandana. Lucille Watters testified that during the couple's July 1986 visit to her house, Coffman appeared nervous, rubbing her hands and shaking. Linda Genoe, Lyons's ex-wife, testified she met Coffman in June 1986 when she and Marlow visited her at her home in Kentucky. Genoe observed that whenever Marlow wanted something, he would clap, call "Cynful" and tell her what to do. Coffman would always sit at his feet. On one occasion, Genoe saw Coffman lying on the floor of the bedroom in which she was staying, naked and crying; Coffman did not respond when Genoe asked what was wrong. The next morning, Genoe saw scratches on Coffman's face and bruises around her neck, and Coffman seemed afraid to talk about it. Once Genoe observed Coffman cleaning between the spokes on Marlow's motorcycle with a toothbrush while Marlow watched. While at Genoe's house, Coffman and Marlow got "married" in a "biker's wedding."

Coffman also presented the testimony of psychologist Lenore Walker, Ph.D., an expert in battered woman syndrome. Dr. Walker opined that Coffman was generally credible and suffered from battered woman syndrome, which she described as a collection of symptoms that is a subcategory of posttraumatic stress disorder. Certain features of defendants' relationship fit the profile of a battering relationship: a pattern of escalating violence, sexual abuse within the relationship, jealousy, psychological torture, threats to kill, Coffman's awareness of Marlow's acts of violence toward others, and Marlow's alcohol and drug abuse. Dr. Walker administered the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory to Coffman and diagnosed her as having posttraumatic stress disorder and depression with dysthymia, a depressed mood deriving from early childhood.

Officer Lisa Baker of the Redlands Police Department testified that on November 15, 1986, she took Coffman to the San Bernardino County Medical Center and there observed various scratches and bruises on her arms and legs, a bite mark on her wrist, and a partly healed inch-long cut on her leg. Coffman told Baker the bruises and scratches came from climbing rocks in Big Bear.

Gene Kelly, formerly Marlow's supervisor in his employment with a company that erected microwave towers, testified that one evening in June 1986 he saw Marlow, who believed Coffman had been flirting with another man, yank her out of a restaurant door by her hair.

4. Prosecution's rebuttal

Jailhouse informant and convicted burglar Robin Long testified that in January 1987 she met Coffman in the San Bernardino County jail. Coffman told Long that when Marlow took Novis into the shower, she got in with them, and Marlow fondled both of them. Coffman also told Long that Novis was alive and at the Drinkhouse residence when Marlow and Coffman went to Novis's apartment to look for her PIN. Coffman said she told Novis they would have to kill her because they could not leave any victims alive. After Marlow killed Novis, Coffman told Long, he came back to the car and got the shovel, whereupon Coffman went with him into the vineyard and was present when Novis was buried. Coffman told Long that killing Novis made her feel "really good." Coffman also said they had taken a number of items from Novis, including a watch, earrings and makeup.

With respect to Lynell Murray, Coffman told Long (contrary to Coffman's trial testimony) that she had gotten into the shower with Marlow and Murray. Coffman never told Long that Marlow had beaten her or that the only reason she had participated in the killings was because she was afraid for her son's safety.

The prosecution presented the testimony of several police officers regarding Coffman's prior inconsistent statements. Odie Lockhart, an officer with the Huntington Beach Police Department, and other officers accompanied Coffman to the vineyard where Novis was buried. Contrary to her testimony, Coffman did not tell Lockhart that when Marlow took Novis into the vineyard, she had backed her car out; rather, Coffman told him she stayed in the same location. When Lockhart asked Coffman how Marlow had killed Novis, she said she "guessed" he strangled her, but indicated she was only supposing. Contrary to Coffman's testimony that she did not know Novis was dead when she and Marlow went to Novis's apartment to search for her PIN, Coffman told Sergeant Thomas Fitzmaurice of the Redlands Police Department in a November 17, 1986, interview that the reason they did not ask Novis for the correct PIN after the number Novis initially gave them did not work was that "she was already gone by then." Despite Coffman's trial testimony that Marlow had beaten her while they were holding Lynell Murray at the motel in Huntington Beach, Fitzmaurice testified that Coffman never mentioned such a beating during a formal interview at the Huntington Beach Police Department and, indeed, said Marlow "wasn't mean" to her.

Finally, to rebut Coffman's claim that she continued to fear Marlow after her arrest, Deputy Blaine Proctor of the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department testified that he was working courthouse security during September and October of 1987, and while preparing Coffman and other inmates for transportation to court on one occasion he noticed Coffman had left her holding cell and gone to the area where Marlow was located. When he next saw Coffman, she was in front of Marlow's cell; Marlow was standing on his bunk with his hips pressed against the bars and Coffman was facing him with her head level with his hips. When Coffman and Marlow observed Proctor, Coffman stepped back and Marlow turned, revealing his genitals hanging out of his jumpsuit. Marlow appeared embarrassed and told Proctor that "nothing happened."

5. Marlow's rebuttal

Clinical psychologist Michael Kania testified, based on Coffman's psychological test results and Dr. Walker's notes and testimony, that Coffman was exaggerating her symptoms, was possibly malingering, and did not suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder, although she met most of the criteria for a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.

Various individuals acquainted with both defendants testified that Marlow and Coffman seemed to have a normal boyfriend-girlfriend relationship and, although Coffman wore a bikini on many occasions, the witnesses had never observed cuts or bruises on her.

Veronica Koppers testified that when she was around Coffman, Coffman was under the influence of methamphetamine almost every day. Coffman never expressed fear of Marlow for herself or her son; instead, she wanted Marlow to get her son back for her by taking the boy and "getting rid" of her ex-husband and former in-laws. Coffman frequently nagged Marlow to acquire more money. With one exception, all of the arguments between defendants that Veronica witnessed were verbal and nonphysical. The one exception was an argument that occurred while Veronica was driving defendants to a drug connection to purchase methamphetamine. Coffman, in the front seat, kept telling Marlow they needed to get more money to score speed and to get Joshua; Marlow told her to shut up. Coffman kept it up and Marlow slapped her. Veronica told both to get out of her car; they complied. After defendants continued to argue for a few minutes, Marlow got back into the car and told Coffman that if she wanted to leave, she could. She begged him not to leave her. He said, "Okay, get in [the car] and get off my back." Coffman got back into the car and was silent. Veronica acknowledged that one day, after she had returned home following work, Marlow told her he had accidentally stabbed Coffman; the wound was a small puncture-type wound that did not bleed a lot and, contrary to Coffman's testimony, Coffman did not seem to have any trouble walking the next day.

Veronica testified that, at the Drinkhouse residence on the night Novis was abducted, she saw Coffman going through Novis's purse. She also saw Coffman coming out of the bedroom wearing jeans and with wet hair.

Marlow testified he was not a member of or affiliated with any prison gang and had never told Coffman he had been a member of such a gang or had killed anyone while in prison. He acknowledged to the jury that he had had several disciplinary write-ups while in prison but claimed they were for verbal disrespect toward the staff. He denied telling Coffman she would be killed if she ever left him or threatening to have her son killed. He admitted he and Coffman had had physical fights. He had never forced her to have sex, and Coffman never told him she disliked oral sex. Contrary to Coffman's testimony, they had had sex on the occasion when they first met.

Marlow acknowledged that during their stay in Newberry Springs, he and Coffman had had two real arguments, but he denied, contrary to Coffman's testimony, that on the first occasion he kicked her, tore off her clothes, tied her up or threatened to kill her. Instead, he had merely pushed her to the ground with an open hand. On the second occasion, Coffman had rebuffed several of Marlow's requests for assistance in painting a trailer, claiming she was busy gluing together a broken nail; finally, Marlow claimed, he had bitten off the broken nail and trimmed her other nails with a nail clipper. Marlow testified that on their trip east in June 1986, Coffman had declined to visit her mother on the morning following their arrival in St. Louis. A few days after they reached Kentucky, Lyons and another man approached Marlow about killing one Gregory Hill; Marlow testified that, although he had told Coffman he would rather wait for an expected job opening with his former supervisor, Gene Kelly, Coffman told him the hit would be faster money. Finally, he agreed to do the killing, and Lyons gave him a .22-caliber pistol to do the job. Marlow testified he had never killed anyone before and, when he and Coffman had parked their truck on a hill overlooking Hill's house, he expressed reservations centering on whether Hill might have a wife and children and whether in fact he might not have snitched as he was alleged to have done. Coffman told him he was going to have to deal with that and, when he said he could not, she demanded the gun and told him she would deal with it. After Coffman got Hill to come and take a look at the truck, Marlow, who had secreted himself in the woods, noticed that Hill had a gun in his back pocket. Marlow emerged and demanded to know what Hill was doing with his sister. When Hill pulled out his gun, Marlow grabbed his arm and the gun went off in the course of the struggle.

Later, Coffman expressed interest in a second contract killing proposed to them, but Marlow balked at the idea. During the ensuing argument, Coffman revealed that her ex-husband and former in-laws had legal custody of her son, and she wanted them to "pay" with their lives for taking him away from her. When Marlow refused to kill them, she threatened to inform the police about the Hill killing; the argument became heated, and he pushed her down; she got up and slapped him, and he slapped her. Contrary to Coffman's testimony, he did not kick her or hit her in the face with a clutch plate.

In Atlanta, after a few days of working for Gene Kelly, Marlow agreed to Kelly's offer to take him and Coffman out for dinner and drinks; Marlow felt reluctant, however, because Coffman had been flirting with other men, and he was afraid of getting into another argument with her in which the subject of the killing might come up. They first went to a pool hall where, after drinking a lot of tequila, Marlow got involved in an argument over Coffman with two other men. Marlow told Coffman he wanted to leave the pool hall. Entering a restaurant as the argument continued, Marlow became angry when Coffman told him she was going to sleep with Kelly. He pulled her out of the restaurant by the hair, and they went back to their motel room. In the past, Marlow had threatened to cut her hair when she had flirted with other men; this time, he did it. He denied Coffman's accusations that he had threatened to put out her eye, beat her and sodomized her.

Marlow testified he and Coffman returned to Kentucky, where he was offered $20,000 to kill a pregnant woman in Phoenix, Arizona; Marlow was not interested, but Coffman wanted him to take the job or to get her to Arizona so that she could do it. They traveled as far as Page, Arizona, before running out of money and heading to Newberry Springs, where they stayed with the Schmitts for a week. There, at Coffman's request, Marlow tattooed her ring finger and buttocks.

In early October, Marlow and Coffman arrived at Veronica's house. Marlow described the incident in which Coffman was stabbed: High on methamphetamine, they had been arguing about money and her son, Joshua; Coffman wanted him to take the contract to kill the woman in Phoenix, but Marlow was unwilling. Coffman threatened to "tell on [him] for Kentucky" if he did not, and said she would do the job herself. Coffman was in bed, under the covers. Marlow stabbed the bed, wounding Coffman's leg. Marlow asked one of the Koppers if they had anything for pain, and they gave him Dilantin, which he in turn gave to Coffman. Marlow denied Coffman's claim that he told her the pills were cyanide and threatened to kill her.

Marlow recounted his version of the offenses against Novis. On November 7, 1986, after moving to the Drinkhouse residence, Marlow and Coffman discussed committing a robbery for money to get Coffman to Arizona. After donning borrowed clothes that afternoon, while they were waiting to pick up Veronica at the Redlands Mall, Coffman noticed Novis pull up alongside their car and commented that she wanted that car for the trip to Arizona. When Novis came out of a store, Coffman asked her for a ride. She and Marlow got into the car, and Novis started driving. Coffman nudged him several times to pull out the gun. He did so and told Novis to pull over. Coffman took over the wheel and, without any prompting from Marlow, drove to the Drinkhouse residence. Marlow testified his intention at that point was to take the car and get Novis to obtain money from her ATM.

At the Drinkhouse residence, they went straight into the bedroom, where Coffman handcuffed Novis to the bed, took her purse to the living room and searched it, finding an ATM card. Coffman took Novis into the shower and asked Marlow to join them, saying she wanted to see him have sex with Novis. Marlow entered the shower but was not aroused by the prospect, and Coffman performed oral sex on him. After getting out of the shower, Marlow took some money from Novis's purse and asked Coffman to go to the store and get cigarettes. She and Veronica did so. While they were gone, Drinkhouse asked Marlow for $1,000 for bringing Novis to his house and told Marlow he could not simply let her go because she would bring the police to his house. Upon her return, Coffman too told him he could not just let Novis go.

Marlow, Coffman and Novis left the Drinkhouse residence. Coffman was driving and, with no direction from Marlow, drove to the vineyard. They argued and, Marlow testified, Coffman insisted he "do something." He told her, "You do something." Coffman said she wanted to get some speed. Marlow took a sleeping bag out of the car and sat down with Novis while Coffman drove off. She returned some 15 minutes later and commented, "You still haven't done anything." Marlow told her to kill the lady if she wanted the lady killed. After Coffman continued to insist, he put his arm around Novis from behind and began choking her. Marlow testified he told Novis to lie down, remain still until they left, and then get up and run away. He then let go of her; she was lying on her side and still breathing. He spread a little dirt over her, avoiding her head. Shown pictures of the grave site, Marlow testified it did not look like that when he left her. When he returned to the car, Coffman asked if he was sure Novis was dead. He told her he was not sure and they left. When they stopped by a field near the Drinkhouse residence, Marlow got out of the car and waited in the field while Coffman took off. When she returned, she asked him if he was okay.

Later, after an unsuccessful attempt to use Novis's ATM card, Marlow and Coffman went to Novis's house. As they approached the apartment, Marlow told Coffman they should not go in because he did not think Novis was dead and the police might be watching; Coffman told him not to worry.

Dr. Michael Kania testified about an interview he had had with Marlow in January 1987. In that interview, Marlow expressed a desire to protect Coffman and said he would do anything to help her. Marlow told him that killing Novis was a response to his wanting to "do good" and to hear Coffman tell him he "did good." Marlow had only killed Novis, he told Kania, because of pressure from Coffman and Drinkhouse.

6. Prosecution surrebuttal

To impeach Marlow's testimony, Sergeant Fitzmaurice recounted statements obtained from him without waiver of the rights described in Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436. Marlow told Fitzmaurice, among other things, that the killing of Novis was "a 50-50" thing, and Coffman "got the ball rolling." Marlow indicated both he and Coffman took Novis into the shower, but he was unable to perform sexually despite Coffman's attempting to help him maintain an erection. He also said that they had tried to use Novis's ATM card after she was dead, that he did not tell Novis what was going to happen to her, and that he had dug a hole for Novis's body with the shovel the police later found at the Bavarian Lodge.

B. Penalty Phase

1. Prosecution's case in aggravation

In addition to the guilt phase evidence of the offenses defendants committed against Corinna Novis, the prosecution's case in aggravation included evidence that, on November 12, 1986, Marlow and Coffman committed murder, rape and other offenses against Lynell Murray, a young college student, in Orange County. The prosecution also presented evidence that Marlow committed, and was convicted on his plea of guilty to, three robberies in 1979 (§ 190.3, factors (b) & (c)) and that, while incarcerated pending trial in the present case, he committed an act of violence against a jail trustee (id., factor (b)). Aggravating evidence against Coffman consisted of an incident of brandishing a deadly weapon and possessing a concealed weapon, and an act of violence against her former boyfriend, Doug Huntley.

a. Murder of Lynell Murray

On November 12, 1986, Lynell Murray failed to return home from her job at Prime Cleaners in a Huntington Beach mall. Around 6:00 p.m. that evening, a half-hour before Murray was to get off work, Lynda Schafer drove into the parking lot of the mall and noticed Coffman, dressed in tight jeans, walking in front of various businesses in the mall. Schafer entered Prime Cleaners and left some clothing with Murray, who was alone at the time. As Schafer left the parking lot, she noticed Coffman passionately embracing a man, later identified as Marlow, near an alley behind the cleaners.

About 6:30 p.m. that evening, Linda Whitlake was leaving her health club, located near Prime Cleaners. As Whitlake walked to her car, Coffman, cursing profanely, approached her, claiming her new car would not start. When Whitlake agreed to give Coffman a ride to her motel, down Pacific Coast Highway, Coffman said she would go tell her boyfriend that Whitlake would drive them. Seeing a man in a small white car with its hood up, Whitlake had misgivings, locked her purse in her car and started over to tell them she had changed her mind. Coffman met her halfway and said her boyfriend had decided to telephone the auto club instead.

Around 7:00 p.m., a half-hour after Murray was scheduled to get off work, her boyfriend Robert Whitecotton arrived at Prime Cleaners, which appeared to have been burglarized and ransacked. Murray's car was parked in the store's back lot. Whitecotton called the police.

At 7:13 p.m., Coffman, wearing a black and white dress, checked into room 307 of the Huntington Beach Inn. She registered under the name of Lynell Murray, using Murray's credit card to pay for the room. At 8:19 p.m., a balance inquiry regarding Murray's Bank of America checking account and a withdrawal of $80 from that account were made at an ATM located at a Corona del Mar branch of the bank. One minute later an additional $60 was withdrawn, leaving a balance of $4.41.

Later that night, Coffman checked into the Compri Hotel in the City of Ontario, again using Murray's credit card. Around midnight on November 13, Coffman and Marlow dined on shrimp and steak at the Denny's restaurant across the street from the hotel. The two were seen embracing in the restaurant. Coffman, wearing a skirt and blouse, did all the ordering and paid for the meal using Murray's credit card; Marlow, in a three-piece suit, neither smiled nor said anything to restaurant staff.

Around 3:00 p.m. on November 13, an employee of the Huntington Beach Inn entered room 307 and found Murray's body. The cause of death was determined to be ligature strangulation. Murray's head was in six inches of water in the bathtub; her head and face were bound with towel strips, and two gags were in and over her mouth. Her right arm was secured to a towel binding her waist. Her right leg lay across the toilet, and her left leg rested on the floor in front of the toilet. Her ankles apparently had been bound with duct tape, although most of the tape had been removed. Murray's bra, pantyhose and one earring were missing; evidence suggested she had been raped and possibly urinated on. She had suffered premortem blunt force trauma to the head, midsection injuries, bruising of the legs and two black eyes consistent with having suffered blows before death. A footprint on a bathmat near the body was consistent with prints made by boots belonging to Marlow.

After visiting the Koppers' residence on the morning of November 13, Marlow and Coffman drove to the City of Big Bear and checked into the Bavarian Lodge. Coffman registered using Murray's credit card. Further attempts to purchase clothing at a sporting goods store using Murray's credit card alerted authorities to defendants' whereabouts and led to their arrest on November 14 while they walked along a road near Big Bear. When officers seized Coffman's purse, they found it contained Murray's identification cards and wallet, an earring matching the lone leaf-shaped earring Murray was wearing when her body was discovered at the Huntington Beach Inn, a loaded .22-caliber revolver and .22-caliber ammunition, credit card receipts bearing Murray's forged signature, and a brown paper bag, similar to those used at Prime Cleaners, containing coins. A search of the room defendants had occupied at the Bavarian Lodge yielded clothing stolen from Prime Cleaners and a gray suit jacket matching the one Marlow earlier had been seen wearing, with a set of handcuffs (later determined to be the ones Marlow had taken from Paul Koppers) in the pocket, identification in the name of James Gregory Marlow, a ladies' blue wallet and various single earrings. Novis's white Honda was found parked off a highway near Santa's Village, an amusement park in San Bernardino County, bearing license plates stolen from a vehicle parked at the Huntington Beach Inn. Inside a trash can in Santa's Village, a maintenance worker found a pillowcase with, among other items, a maroon bra identified as belonging to Murray and laundry receipts from Prime Cleaners.

b. Marlow's 1979 robberies and 1988 assault

i. Upland robbery

On November 5, 1979, Jeffrey Johnson lived in an apartment upstairs from sisters Lori and Kathy Liesch on Silverwood Avenue in Upland. At 6:45 that morning, Johnson answered a knock at his door. Marlow and one Allen Smallwood, at the time both heroin addicts, asked Johnson if he worked in construction. When Johnson answered affirmatively, Smallwood hit him in the face, causing him to fall to the floor. Entering the apartment, the two men asked where the drugs were, and Marlow starting beating Johnson with a chain. Smallwood restrained Johnson while Marlow searched the apartment. Johnson was then told to put his shoes on and was taken downstairs to the Liesches' apartment.

Smallwood, holding a knife to Johnson's back, and Marlow entered the Liesches' apartment, where Lori was still in bed. Smallwood ordered her to get out of bed and, when she said she had no clothes on, Marlow attempted to pull the covers off her. After Smallwood told Marlow to stop, Marlow started searching the apartment for drugs over Lori's protests that she knew nothing about any drugs. While searching, Marlow surprised Kathy, who was returning to the apartment after taking her boyfriend to work. He brought Kathy to the bedroom, where she, Lori and Johnson were tied up with electrical cord. Marlow and Smallwood warned them not to contact the police because they had taken all their identification and would come back for them. At one point during the ordeal, when Lori would not stop crying after Smallwood demanded she stop, Marlow grabbed his crotch and told her he had "something to shut her up." The Liesch sisters each found that a small amount of cash was missing from their wallets, as well as Kathy's keys, while Johnson found $180 was missing from his dresser.

ii. Robbery at leather goods store

On November 6, 1979, Joanne Gilligan owned a leather goods store in Upland. On that day, while she was helping a customer in the store, Marlow walked in and came to the counter. When Gilligan asked if she could help him, Marlow told her he had a gun and she should lie down on the floor. Marlow's hand was in the pocket of his sweatshirt and it appeared to Gilligan that he could have had a gun, although she did not actually see one. Gilligan and the customer she had been helping each got down on the floor, while Marlow removed money from the register, grabbed a couple of coats and fled. Gilligan identified Marlow at the preliminary hearing and at the present trial.

iii. Robbery at methadone clinic

On November 20, 1979, Gertrude Smith and Wilson Lee were working at a methadone clinic in the City of Ontario in San Bernardino County. At 10:00 a.m. that day, Marlow, armed with a sawed-off shotgun, and Smallwood, carrying a pistol, entered the clinic. Marlow ordered clinic employees not to move. Marlow and Smallwood demanded methadone but were told the drug was locked in the safe. As Marlow held the shotgun on Smith, Smallwood went down a hallway with Wilson and confronted an employee, demanding he open the safe where the methadone was kept. When the employee had difficulty opening the safe, Marlow urged Smallwood to shoot him in the head. After the safe was opened, Marlow and Smallwood fled with methadone having a street value of $10,000.

At the time of his arrest, on November 26, 1979, Marlow had a bottle containing methadone in his jacket pocket and was carrying a loaded sawed-off shotgun wrapped in a shirt. He claimed to have recently purchased the methadone, but refused to identify who sold it to him or to discuss the clinic robbery.

iv. Assault against jail trustee

On February 17, 1988, Gary Hale, a jail trustee facing charges of driving under the influence, was bringing breakfast to other inmates at the San Bernardino County jail. When Marlow complained, Hale assured him he had been given the same quantity of potatoes as everyone else. Shortly afterward, Hale noticed Marlow was pointing a blow gun at him. As Hale walked away, he was hit by a paper blow dart with a pin at the end. Marlow later bragged to Deputy Carvey that "It was a lucky shot through the bars."

c. Evidence against Coffman

California Highway Patrol Officer Robert W. Specht testified that about 4:00 a.m. on April 5, 1986, he detained Doug Huntley for driving erratically and at high speed. The car, in which Coffman was a passenger, stopped at an apartment complex in Barstow. While officers attended to the irate Huntley, Coffman, yelling obscenities at the officers, ran toward a house carrying her purse. Specht, who had received a radio report of an earlier incident linked to Huntley and Coffman, in which Coffman had brandished a gun at several men who were engaged in an altercation with Huntley at a 7-Eleven store, ordered her to come out of the house with her purse. When she complied, Sergeant James Lindley of the Barstow Police Department retrieved a bindle of cocaine or methamphetamine from her purse; a silver derringer was recovered from the house where Coffman had hidden it.

Doug Huntley testified that at the 7-Eleven store, three men had followed him to the parking lot, and one had assaulted him. After Huntley threw his assailant to the ground, Coffman pulled the derringer from her purse and held it on the other two men. Huntley also testified about an incident that had occurred about a year before the 7-Eleven incident. Huntley was walking down the street after arguing with Coffman, who drove up beside him and asked him to get in the car. When he told her he would rather walk home, she drove down the street, turned around and drove in his direction, coming up on the sidewalk and forcing him to move out of the way.

2. Marlow's case in mitigation

Marlow's sister, Veronica Koppers, testified she was born in 1959 and spent her early childhood in rural Stearns, Kentucky, with Marlow, who was some four years older; her mother, Doris Hill; her father (Marlow's stepfather), Wendell Hill; and Doris's mother, Lena Walls. Her parents fought constantly; her father shot her mother, and she stabbed him seven times.

In 1963, Doris, Lena, Marlow, Veronica, an aunt and uncle, and their five children all moved to California to get away from Wendell Hill. They first lived in East Los Angeles and then moved to El Monte, Azusa and San Dimas. Doris developed a pattern of not staying with her children on a regular basis, frequently leaving them for extended periods in Lena's care. Neither Doris nor Lena worked and, while Lena received Social Security and AFDC payments for the children, Veronica did not know how Doris supported herself at this time. Doris customarily had parties, with drinking and marijuana smoking, going on in her house around the clock. Doris neglected the children, never taking them to the doctor or dentist and often leaving no food for them. One Thanksgiving, Veronica recalled, Doris took her and Marlow to dinner at their uncle's house; Doris said she was going to the liquor store and did not return for several months. From time to time, Marlow was sent to stay with his father, Arnold Marlow; he also spent time in foster homes. Doris enjoyed many types of drugs, became addicted to heroin, and openly used drugs in front of her children. She also brought home many different men. Veronica recalled visiting her mother at the Sybil Brand Institute for Women and at the state prison in Frontera.

When Doris got out of prison in 1972, she introduced Veronica to drugs, as she had Marlow and their cousins Pam and Clel. When Marlow was 15, Veronica saw Doris administer heroin to him by tying his arm and injecting it. Doris, who was then supporting herself with prostitution and stealing from her "tricks," also taught Veronica how to burglarize houses.

Ray Saldivar testified that he met Doris in 1964, when she bought drugs from him. As of the time of trial, Saldivar had conquered his drug habit and was working as a tree trimmer. In 1965, Saldivar moved in with Doris and, after living there for several days, first discovered that Doris had children, despite the fact he had visited her house numerous times before moving in. She was not a loving mother, frequently having to be reminded to feed the children. Marlow was constantly afraid his mother was going to leave him, to the point that he sometimes slept on the floor next to her bed. In their household, people came and went all day long to buy drugs. In Saldivar's opinion, Marlow was an "innocent child" who "didn't [ask] to grow up" in "that abnormal home" and "grew up around nothing but dope fiends all his life."

Lillian Zamorano testified that she met Doris in the mid-1960's at a bar in Pico Rivera where the two women came to spend a good part of their time. They became good friends, and Doris eventually moved into Zamorano's house. Doris did not mention to Zamorano that she had children until at least six months after they met. Zamorano never saw Doris display any affection toward her children. Zamorano's daughter, Rosemary Patino, met Marlow on Christmas 1966 and remembered him as a "good," "normal," "playful" child. On that occasion, she testified, they expected a family holiday, but Doris and Lillian left to go to a bar despite Marlow's crying and pleading with Doris to stay.

Doris died in a fire in 1975.

Sue Warman, formerly the wife of Arnold Marlow, testified she first met Marlow when he was six and a half years old and was sent to live with his father. Marlow's "mouth had sores all around it and his teeth were rotten." Warman took Marlow to the dentist and the doctor, bought him new clothes and enrolled him in school. Although initially positive about Marlow's arrival, Arnold soon began giving Marlow frequent "whippings" "if everything wasn't done . . . just right." In Warman's view, Marlow was "a lonely, lost little boy wanting somebody to love him." Marlow stayed with his father and Warman for about three months, until Doris came to his school, unannounced, and took him away. Because Doris had legal custody of Marlow, Warman was told nothing could be done. Warman did not see Marlow again for another seven years. In 1969, California welfare officials contacted Arnold, asking if he could take care of Marlow. At 13, Marlow appeared in better condition than the first time Warman had seen him, but he "still looked like that little, lost, lonely boy." Marlow got along well with his half siblings, and Warman never had any problems with him. Arnold, however, continued to beat his children, including Marlow. After about a year, Warman-tired of Arnold's drinking and abusive behavior-made plans to leave him. Knowing she would not get custody, she took Marlow to a foster home so that he would not have to stay with his father. Warman asked the jury to spare his life, commenting that his death "won't bring those people back. And Greg never had a chance from the day he was born either. And I love him. I always loved him."

Allen Smallwood, who at the time of trial was serving a sentence at Folsom State Prison for a series of robberies, testified that he met Marlow at a party when Marlow was 23 years old; Smallwood was 35 and had already been convicted of two robberies and two escapes. Smallwood was then a heroin addict with a $700 per day habit; Marlow had a somewhat lesser habit. Smallwood testified he recruited Marlow, who was undergoing heroin withdrawal, to rob a man named Johnson, who Smallwood had heard was a police informant. Smallwood and Marlow robbed Johnson of several thousand dollars in cash and about six ounces of cocaine. Smallwood denied that Marlow had a chain during the robbery. Later, Smallwood traded some of the cocaine for heroin and some for weapons he planned to use in robbing the methadone clinic, for which effort he again recruited Marlow, who was again going through withdrawal. Smallwood testified he did not think Marlow would have committed those robberies without his importunings. Smallwood had to "show him the ropes," as Marlow, whose criminal experience was limited to "stuff like" "petty shoplifting," was "kind of naïve."

Clinical psychologist George Askenasy testified that in 1975, when he conducted a psychological examination of Marlow for the California Youth Authority, he had found him "a pathetic young man with a chaotic life history," whose father showed no interest in him and whose mother exhibited a "smothering" "possessiveness" toward him. Marlow, the witness stated, was "caught in an approach-avoidance conflict with many guilt feelings about his relationship with his mother," "anxious, feeling of inadequacy, sexual confusion, [and] unmet dependency needs . . . ."

3. Coffman's case in mitigation

Katherine Davis, Marlow's former wife, testified regarding Marlow's violence and jealousy and its emotional and physical effects on her. Her testimony is summarized below in connection with a related claim of error (see post, at p. 96). Marlene Boggs, Davis's mother, confirmed much of her daughter's testimony and described observing her daughter's scars and bruises, as well as a 75-pound weight loss and hair loss, during Davis's relationship with Marlow.

Coffman's former employers testified she was a good worker when employed as a waitress and bartender in Arizona.

Carol Maender, Coffman's mother, testified about the marital, financial and other difficulties she encountered in raising Coffman and sons Robbie and Jeff, the latter of whom was given up for adoption. As an infant, Coffman had suffered from a painful double inguinal hernia that required surgical repair while she was still in early infancy.

Maender testified to a lack of closeness with Coffman, progressing to irritability and aggression on Coffman's part toward her mother. Coffman bonded well, however, with her stepfather, Bill Maender. Coffman went through Catholic grammar school and public junior high school without major difficulty, but once in high school she encountered problems with grades, truancy and drugs. At one point, she ran away and stayed at the home of her boyfriend, Ron Coffman, for a couple of months; the Maenders did not know where she was. Coffman returned to her own home when she discovered she was pregnant. Their son was born after Coffman graduated from high school; the couple married and, with the baby, moved into a bungalow on Ron's parents' property. The marriage was not a happy one; Ron was mean, abused her physically and cheated on her with other women. Eventually Coffman left him, moving into an apartment and working while Ron's mother took care of the baby. Then Coffman left Missouri for California, planning ultimately to have her son with her, but Ron's parents obtained custody of the child. Bill Maender, Coffman's stepfather, testified Coffman did not abandon her son when she moved west.

Clinical psychologist Craig Rath, Ph.D., examined Coffman and opined that Coffman's relationship with Marlow was precipitated by impaired bonding in her early life. He felt she was not malingering and discounted the possibility that she suffered from antisocial personality disorder catalyzed by Marlow.

4. Prosecution's rebuttal

Sergeant Richard Hooper of the Huntington Beach Police Department testified that Chuck Coffman, Ron Coffman's father, told him Cynthia Coffman's personality was aggressive when he knew her in St. Louis.

II. Pretrial and Jury Selection Issues

A. Denial of Severance Motion

Before and at various points during trial, each defendant unsuccessfully moved for severance. Defendants now contend the denial of their motions requires reversal of the judgment.

Section 1098 expresses a legislative preference for joint trials. The statute provides in pertinent part: "When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any public offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, they must be tried jointly, unless the court order separate trials." (See People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 231, affd. on other grounds sub nom. Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 [acknowledging legislative preference].) Joint trials are favored because they "promote economy and efficiency" and " `serve the interests of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts.' " (Zafiro v. United States (1993) 506 U.S. 534, 537, 539.) When defendants are charged with having committed "common crimes involving common events and victims," as here, the court is presented with a "classic case" for a joint trial. (People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 499-500.)

The court's discretion in ruling on a severance motion is guided by the nonexclusive factors enumerated in People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899, 917, such that severance may be appropriate "in the face of an incriminating confession, prejudicial association with co-defendants, likely confusion resulting from evidence on multiple counts, conflicting defenses, or the possibility that at a separate trial a co-defendant would give exonerating testimony." Another helpful mode of analysis of severance claims appears in Zafiro v. United States, supra, 506 U.S. 534. There, the high court, ruling on a claim of improper denial of severance under rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, observed that severance may be called for when "there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." (Zafiro, supra, at p. 539; see Fed. Rules Crim.Proc., rule 14, 18 U.S.C.) The high court noted that less drastic measures than severance, such as limiting instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice. (Zafiro, supra, at p. 539.)

A court's denial of a motion for severance is reviewed for abuse of discretion, judged on the facts as they appeared at the time of the ruling. (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 167.) Even if a trial court abuses its discretion in failing to grant severance, reversal is required only upon a showing that, to a reasonable probability, the defendant would have received a more favorable result in a separate trial. (People v. Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 503.)

Coffman argues that several factors dictated severance of her trial from Marlow's: the antagonistic nature of their defenses, the expected introduction of Marlow's extra-judicial statements implicating her in the offenses (see People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, 526-527), and the risk of prejudicial association with the assertedly more culpable Marlow. Citing, inter alia, Johnson v. Mississippi (1988) 486 U.S. 578, Coffman also relies on the need for heightened reliability of the determination of guilt and penalty in a capital case. Marlow, in turn, relies on the antagonistic nature of Coffman's defense and the resultant admission of much evidence inadmissible on any theory as to him but relevant to Coffman's state of mind. As will appear, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of defendants' severance motions.

In People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at page 168, we said: "Although there was some evidence before the trial court that defendants would present different and possibly conflicting defenses, a joint trial under such conditions is not necessarily unfair. [Citation.] `Although several California decisions have stated that the existence of conflicting defenses may compel severance of co-defendants' trials, none has found an abuse of discretion or reversed a conviction on this basis.' [Citation.] If the fact of conflicting or antagonistic defenses alone required separate trials, it would negate the legislative preference for joint trials and separate trials `would appear to be mandatory in almost every case.' " We went on to observe that "although it appears no California case has discussed at length what constitutes an `antagonistic defense,' the federal courts have almost uniformly construed that doctrine very narrowly. Thus, `[a]ntagonistic defenses do not per se require severance, even if the defendants are hostile or attempt to cast the blame on each other.' [Citation.] `Rather, to obtain severance on the ground of conflicting defenses, it must be demonstrated that the conflict is so prejudicial that [the] defenses are irreconcilable, and the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty." (Ibid., last italics added.) When, however, there exists sufficient independent evidence against the moving defendant, it is not the conflict alone that demonstrates his or her guilt, and antagonistic defenses do not compel severance. (Ex parte Hardy (Ala. 2000) 804 So.2d 298, 305.)

In this case, although Coffman's defense centered on the effort to depict Marlow as a vicious and violent man, and some evidence that would have been inadmissible in a separate guilt trial for Marlow occupied a portion of their joint trial, the prosecution presented abundant independent evidence establishing both defendants' guilt. Such evidence showed that Coffman and Marlow, with Novis, came to the Drinkhouse residence around 7:30 on the evening of Novis's disappearance; Marlow indicated to Drinkhouse that they needed to get Novis's PIN in order to rob her. When Drinkhouse asked Marlow if he were crazy and complained about their bringing Novis to his house, Marlow told him not to worry, saying, "How is she going to talk to anybody if she's under a pile of rocks?" When Veronica Koppers arrived at the Drinkhouse residence a while later, Marlow told her he had someone there and "not to freak out on him." Coffman appeared to be going along willingly with Marlow's actions and did not ask for Veronica's help to escape Marlow. Marlow took Novis into the shower, and both left the house with wet hair, along with Coffman. Novis had duct tape over her mouth. Novis's apartment later was found to have been entered and her typewriter and answering machine stolen. Marlow and Coffman traded the answering machine for drugs, and Coffman, using Novis's identification, pawned the typewriter. The day after Novis's disappearance, Marlow, Coffman and Veronica Koppers returned to Paul Koppers's home; Marlow asked him if he could get any "cold," i.e., nontraceable, license plates for the car. Three days later, near a trash receptacle located behind a Taco Bell restaurant in Laguna Beach, where Coffman previously had been seen, a bag was found containing identification and other items belonging to Coffman, Marlow and Novis. Novis's car was found on November 14, 1986, abandoned on a dirt road south of Santa's Village near where Marlow and Coffman were seen walking on Big Bear Boulevard. Coffman's fingerprints were found on the license plate, hood and ashtray of the car; one print on the hood of the car was identified as Marlow's. An earring of Novis's was later found among Coffman's belongings. After defendants were arrested, Novis's body was found in a vineyard in Fontana where she had been strangled and buried. An autopsy revealed sperm in Novis's rectum. Based on the foregoing evidence, we conclude the nature of the defenses here did not compel severance.

Even were we to conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance, the same independent evidence of defendants' guilt would lead us to conclude defendants have not demonstrated a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome as to either guilt or penalty had severance been granted, as would be required for reversal. That evidence, as recited above, virtually ensured the jury would reach the verdicts it did. In severed trials, moreover, the prosecutor could have introduced evidence of the Orange County offenses to show defendants' intent in committing the crimes against Corinna Novis, further bolstering the People's case. (See Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) With respect to penalty, we note that in addition to the evidence of the Orange County and Kentucky killings, most if not all of Marlow's violent conduct as described by Coffman and other witnesses potentially was admissible under section 190.3, factor (b), as was Coffman's prior criminality involving violence. In the face of this overwhelming evidence, we see no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome for either defendant had severance been granted.

We further conclude that introduction of defendants' extra-judicial statements implicating each other in the offenses did not dictate severance. Both defendants in this case took the stand and submitted to cross-examination, thus vindicating each co-defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. This procedure satisfied the rule of Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123 and its progeny, which provides that if the extra-judicial statement of a non-testifying co-defendant is to be introduced at a joint trial, either the statement must be redacted to avoid implicating the defendant or severance must be granted. (Id. at pp. 135-136; see Richardson v. Marsh (1987) 481 U.S. 200, 208-210; Nelson v. O'Neil (1971) 402 U.S. 622, 629-630.) Although California law predating Bruton had required severance whenever a co-defendant's extra-judicial statement implicating the defendant was to be introduced, barring effective redaction, regardless of whether the co-defendant testified at trial (see People v. Aranda, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 530-531), since the adoption by the voters in June 1982 of Proposition 8, with its preclusion of state constitutional exclusionary rules broader than those mandated by the federal Constitution (see Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d)), the Aranda rule is coextensive with that of Bruton. (People v. Boyd (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 541, 562.) Consequently, the introduction of defendants' extra-judicial statements did not compel the trial court to grant severance.

We also reject Coffman's contention that severance was compelled by the factor of prejudicial association. The evidence here showed defendants both took an active role in the commission of the crimes; this is not a situation in which a marginally involved defendant might have suffered prejudice from joinder with a co-defendant who participated much more actively. Nor is this a situation in which a strong case against one defendant was joined with a weak case against a co-defendant.

In sum, given the prosecution's independent evidence of defendants' guilt and the trial court's carefully tailored limiting instructions, which we presume the jury followed (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 436), even under the heightened scrutiny applicable in capital cases (Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 441, 454), we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of severance. For the same reasons, defendants' claims that the joint trial deprived them of their federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial and a reliable penalty determination likewise must fail.

B. Denial of Motion for Change of Venue

Defendants contend the trial court erred in denying their motions for a change of venue and thereby violated various state and federal constitutional guarantees, including those of due process, a fair trial and a reliable penalty determination.

The applicable principles are settled. "A trial court should grant a change of venue when the defendant demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, he or she cannot obtain a fair trial." (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 905.) On appeal, "we make an independent determination of whether a fair trial was obtainable" (People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 360) and reverse when the record discloses a reasonable likelihood the defendant did not have a fair trial (People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 672-673 [reasonable likelihood in this context means something less than "more probable than not," and something more than merely possible], overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823). To make that decision, we examine five factors: the nature and gravity of the offense, the nature and extent of the media coverage, the size of the community, the status of the defendant in the community, and the prominence of the victim. (People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 495, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 933, fn. 4.)

At the evidentiary hearing on the venue change motion, the defense presented more than 150 articles from regional newspapers and various videos of television coverage of the case. In addition to the Novis homicide, many of the articles referred to the Orange County and Kentucky cases and an alleged contract to kill a pregnant woman in Arizona, and characterized defendants as armed and dangerous transients implicated in serial killings. Some articles recounted Marlow's criminal history and alleged ties to the White supremacist Aryan Brotherhood, and some alluded to defendants' use of methamphetamine. A few articles mentioned Coffman's Roman Catholic upbringing. Many articles referred to defendants' confessions and cooperation with authorities. Others reported procedural developments in the Novis and Murray cases and the prosecutions of Veronica Koppers and Richard Drinkhouse on lesser charges in the Novis case. The amount of media coverage declined substantially shortly after the discovery of Novis's body.

The defense also presented testimony by two California State University, Chico, professors, Robert S. Ross, Ph.D., an expert in survey methodology, and Edward J. Bronson, Ph.D., who designed a telephone public opinion survey administered to 526 San Bernardino County residents in early 1988, some nine months before trial. The survey was designed to have a margin of error of 4.5 percent. Participants were first asked whether they recalled a November 1986 incident in which a young woman named Corinna Novis was reported missing in Redlands and her body was found a few days later in a shallow grave in a Fontana vineyard, having been sexually molested, strangled and then buried. Of the 282 participants who resided in the judicial district from which the jury in this case was drawn, 70.9 percent responded affirmatively. When provided a few additional facts, the number of participants recognizing the case increased. Over 80 percent of participants who recognized the case from the facts recited in the survey believed defendants were definitely or probably guilty.

The trial court denied the motion to change venue, noting the case had received less publicity than other cases tried without difficulty in the county of original venue. The court distinguished the prejudgments of guilt "glibly" espoused by the telephone survey participants from the "decision made by a jury sworn to abide by the law, carefully voir dired and instructed as to the law and having a tremendous sense of their responsibility for the lives of the defendants." The court found no reason to believe that prospective jurors with "irreversible" opinions as to a defendant's guilt would not disclose them on voir dire, or that jurors who had merely heard of the case could not put aside any knowledge and base their decision on the evidence and the law given to them during the trial.

Independently reviewing the relevant factors, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying the motion. The gravity of the offenses with which defendants were charged weighs in favor of a change of venue, but does not compel it. (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 943.) As for the size of the community, while arguing San Bernardino County is like a collection of small towns, defendants acknowledge the county's population is the fourth largest in the state. Venue changes are seldom granted from counties of this size. (See People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 818 [Ventura County].) With respect to the status of the victim and the accused, we observe that before her death Novis was not prominent, nor were defendants well known, in the community. Although some of the media coverage of this case referred to defendants as transients, Marlow in fact had friends and relatives who lived in San Bernardino County and himself had lived in the county for a time. These factors, therefore, do not militate in favor of a venue change. The pretrial publicity, while extensive, substantially predated the trial. (Jenkins, supra, at p. 944.) And in the course of the actual voir dire, all of the jurors eventually seated who said they remembered hearing about the case indicated that pretrial publicity would not prevent them from acting as fair and impartial jurors. That neither Coffman nor Marlow exhausted their peremptory challenges strongly suggests the jurors were fair and that the defense so concluded. (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 807.)

People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, on which Marlow relies, is distinguishable. That case involved a county (Placer) of very small population where media coverage of the offense was continuous up to the time of trial and where the victim and her family had long and extensive ties to the community, such that a substantial proportion of prospective jurors acknowledged they knew the victim, her family and her boyfriends, and a smaller but still significant number knew the prosecutor, his investigators or deputy sheriffs who were to testify. (Id. at pp. 1126-1131.) Similar circumstances are not present here.

We therefore find no reasonable likelihood the denial of a change of venue deprived defendants of a fair trial or due process of law.

C. Restriction on Voir Dire

Coffman contends the trial court improperly restricted death-qualification voir dire in a way that prevented her from effectively exercising challenges for cause and deprived her of her state and federal constitutional rights to due process of law, a fair trial and an impartial jury, and a reliable determination of guilt and penalty. Specifically, Coffman complains the trial court prevented her counsel from questioning the prospective jurors on their views regarding the circumstances of the case that were likely to be presented in evidence in order to determine how such circumstances might affect their ability to fairly determine the proper penalty in the event of a conviction.

Prospective jurors may be excused for cause when their views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors. (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 431.) A challenge for cause may be based on the prospective juror's response when informed of facts or circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried. (People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1005.) Thus, we have affirmed the principle that either party is entitled to ask prospective jurors questions that are specific enough to determine if those jurors harbor bias, as to some fact or circumstance shown by the trial evidence, that would cause them not to follow an instruction directing them to determine penalty after considering aggravating and mitigating evidence. (People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 720-721; see CALJIC No. 8.85 (7th ed. 2004).) "Our decisions have explained that death-qualification voir dire must avoid two extremes. On the one hand, it must not be so abstract that it fails to identify those jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in the case being tried. On the other hand, it must not be so specific that it requires the prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty issue based on a summary of the mitigating and aggravating evidence likely to be presented. (See People v. Jenkins[, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp.] 990-991 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044] [not error to refuse to allow counsel to ask juror given `detailed account of the facts' in the case if she `would impose' death penalty].) In deciding where to strike the balance in a particular case, trial courts have considerable discretion." (Cash, supra, at pp. 721-722.)

We conclude Coffman fails to establish an abuse of discretion, in that she cites no trial court ruling precluding her from asking questions necessary to identify jurors unable to discharge their sentencing responsibility consistently with the law. Unlike in People v. Cash, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pages 720-722, the trial court did not categorically prohibit inquiry into the effect on prospective jurors of the other murders, evidence of which was presented in the course of the trial. Rather, the trial court merely cautioned Coffman's counsel not to recite specific evidence expected to come before the jury in order to induce the juror to commit to voting in a particular way. (See People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 865.) Notably, the trial court invited counsel to draft a proposed question for prospective jurors eliciting their attitudes toward the death penalty and in fact itself questioned a prospective juror whether he could weigh all the evidence before reaching a penalty determination in a case involving multiple murder. Even if counsel believed they were precluded from inquiring into a juror's ability to fairly determine penalty in such a case, Coffman failed to exhaust her peremptory challenges or to express dissatisfaction with the jury as sworn on this ground. Any error, therefore, was non-prejudicial. (Id. at p. 866.)

D. Alleged Juror Bias and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Exercise Challenges

Coffman argues we must reverse her conviction and sentence because four of the jurors who decided her case were biased in favor of the death penalty. She acknowledges her trial counsel failed to challenge any of the four, either for cause or by using available peremptory challenges, and thus forfeited any appellate claim of error in the seating of those jurors. (See People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 184, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830.) She asserts, however, that she should be relieved of the consequences of counsel's inaction because they rendered ineffective assistance in this regard. On this record, we conclude her claims lack merit.

As noted above, a prospective juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or her views regarding capital punishment only if those views would " ` "prevent or substantially impair the juror's performance of the duties defined by the court's instructions and his or her oath." ' " (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 975, quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.) A prospective juror who would be unable conscientiously to consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including, when appropriate, the death penalty, is properly subject to excusal for cause. (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 987.) Our review of the record confirms that none of the four jurors who defendant asserts were biased would have been properly excused under this standard, as each expressed a willingness to consider all the evidence presented before reaching a decision as to penalty. Counsel therefore did not perform deficiently in not challenging those jurors for cause. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [claims of ineffective assistance of counsel entail deficient performance assessed under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and prejudice measured by a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the deficient performance]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.) Nor can we say counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to exercise peremptory challenges with respect to these jurors: " `Because the use of peremptory challenges is inherently subjective and intuitive, an appellate record will rarely disclose reversible incompetence in this process.' " (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 485, quoting People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 911.)

E. Allegedly Improper Excusal of Prospective Juror B.

Coffman contends the trial court deprived her of her state and federal constitutional rights of due process, equal protection and an impartial jury in granting a challenge for cause, joined by the prosecutor and both defendant Marlow's counsel and her own, to Prospective Juror B. Coffman further contends her counsel rendered ineffective assistance in joining in the challenge. Her contentions lack merit.

Preliminarily, respondent argues Coffman invited any error by joining defendant Marlow's challenge. As articulated in People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 330, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201: "The doctrine of invited error is designed to prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on appeal because of an error made by the trial court at his behest. If defense counsel intentionally caused the trial court to err, the appellant cannot be heard to complain on appeal. . . . t also must be clear that counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or mistake." In cases involving an action affirmatively taken by defense counsel, we have found a clearly implied tactical purpose to be sufficient to invoke the invited error rule. (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 150; People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 657-658; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 152.) Here, Coffman's counsel did not merely acquiesce, but affirmatively joined in the challenge to Prospective Juror B., and thus cannot be heard to claim the court erred in excusing her.

In any event, the trial court did not err. "On appeal, we will uphold a trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause by either party `if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court's determination as to the prospective juror's true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.' " (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 537.) Although Coffman urges that Prospective Juror B.'s remarks were, at most, ambiguous and reflected merely hesitancy or reluctance and not outright refusal to impose the death penalty, read in context the prospective juror's comments indicated that, while she favored the death penalty as a sentence for first degree murder, she could not personally impose it owing to her religious background. Because excusal therefore was appropriate, trial counsel did not perform deficiently in joining the challenge.

F. Motion to Disqualify Trial Judge

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, Coffman moved to disqualify Judge Don Turner, the superior court judge assigned to preside over her case for all purposes. That statute requires disqualification, inter alia, whenever "a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial." (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1, subd. (a)(6)(C).) In support of the motion, Coffman's counsel, Alan Spears, declared he was a candidate for the office of San Bernardino County Superior Court judge and, as such, was running in opposition to Judge Duane Lloyd. Counsel further declared that Judge Turner was a member of the Committee for Judge Duane Lloyd, had allowed his name to be used on Judge Lloyd's campaign letterhead, and had failed to disclose to counsel his involvement in Judge Lloyd's re-election effort. As a result of these facts, counsel alleged, Coffman reasonably might entertain a doubt that Judge Turner would be able to remain impartial in her case. Counsel further alleged on information and belief that Judge Turner was biased against him. Judge Turner filed a responsive declaration denying any such bias or grounds for disqualification, stating he "fores[aw] no difficulty in being completely impartial in the trial of this case or any other case in which Mr. Spears is involved," and noting "Mr. Spears has tried many cases (including death penalty cases) in my courtroom. I respect his ability and he is welcome in my department at any time." Judge Turner observed he had "no objections to continuing as the trial judge in this case," nor did he "object to having the case reassigned depending upon the needs of the court."

The motion was assigned to another judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court, who denied the motion by minute order stating: "Court finds Judge Turner does not have any bias or prejudice toward Mr. Spears, nor will have in the future."

Coffman assigns the ruling as error in this appeal, contending it invalidates all of Judge Turner's subsequent rulings in the case and requires reversal of the judgment. She acknowledges that in People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 334, we held that Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3 precludes appellate review of a ruling on a statutory motion for disqualification, but contends her non-statutory claims arising under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and the Eighth Amendment's guarantee of reliability in penalty determinations in capital cases are cognizable on appeal. Respondent contends Coffman failed to articulate a due process claim below and cannot do so for the first time here.

Assuming Coffman's motion alleging judicial bias sufficiently preserved the constitutional claims she advances on appeal, or at least the due process claim (People v. Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 334; see People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 133 [objection on grounds of due process and equal protection sufficiently preserved 8th Amend. claim based on same facts]), we conclude her contention lacks merit. The allegations presented in support of her disqualification motion simply do not support a doubt regarding Judge Turner's ability to remain impartial.

G. State Action Allegedly Interfering with Coffman's Presentation of a Defense

Coffman contends that certain actions by the prosecution effectively dissuaded certain witnesses from testifying on her behalf, thus suppressing favorable evidence within the meaning of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83 and depriving her of her federal constitutional rights of compulsory process and to a reliable determination of guilt and penalty. She also contends that the San Bernardino County Superior Court denied her due process by failing to pay on time certain authorized investigative expenses, resulting in the unavailability, during the guilt phase, of witness Katherine Davis, the former wife of defendant Marlow, who would have testified about Marlow's physical and emotional abuse during their marriage. Coffman raised these contentions in an unsuccessful pretrial motion to strike the special circumstance allegations against her and in a motion for new trial. She now reasserts them as a basis for reversal of the judgment. For the reasons that follow, we conclude the contention lacks merit.

As relevant to the claim that the prosecution dissuaded potential witnesses, at an evidentiary hearing on the motion to strike the special circumstance allegations, Coffman's counsel presented defense investigator Barbara Jordan's testimony to the effect that her efforts to obtain witnesses in Page, Arizona, had been hampered by disinformation Redlands Police Sergeant Larry Scott Smith had spread there. Jordan further testified that potential witness Judy Scott, who had roomed with Coffman, reported to Jordan that she felt the police had pressured her not to talk to Coffman's defense team; they told her Coffman was a lesbian and asked her how close Scott and Coffman were and whether Coffman had brought prostitution customers to the house when the two were living together. According to Jordan, other potential witnesses who had spoken with the police declined to speak with Coffman's investigators and treated them with hostility. Jordan stated that Scott and another witness, Debbie Pugh, denied using words or making statements attributed to them in the Redlands police reports, which omitted information exculpatory as to Coffman. Sergeant Smith acknowledged visiting Page with Detective Dalzell of the Redlands Police Department and interviewing Judy Scott; Smith testified he asked Scott if Coffman was bisexual, but elicited no information in that regard; following up on information received in Page, he also asked Scott about Coffman's possible involvement in prostitution.

The trial court denied the motion, commenting: "I have seen nothing, either in the offer of proof or in the questioning of this witness, which substantiates any [allegation of improper conduct by police in relation to prospective witnesses]. All I have heard so far is that witnesses are telling somewhat different stories to different people, and you've been in this business long enough to know that that's not a novel concept."

" `Governmental interference violative of a defendant's compulsory-process right includes, of course, the intimidation of defense witnesses by the prosecution. [Citations.] [¶] The forms that such prosecutorial misconduct may take are many and varied. They include, for example, statements to defense witnesses to the effect that they would be prosecuted for any crimes they reveal or commit in the course of their testimony. [Citations.]' (In re Martin (1987) 44 Cal.3d 1, 30 [241 Cal.Rptr. 263, 744 P.2d 374].) Threatening a defense witness with a perjury prosecution also constitutes prosecutorial misconduct that violates a defendant's constitutional rights. (People v. Bryant (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 582 [203 Cal.Rptr. 733].)" (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 835.) Due process also is violated when the prosecution makes a material witness unavailable by, for example, deportation. (United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal (1982) 458 U.S. 858, 873 [due process mandates dismissal of charges when defendant makes a plausible showing that the deported witness's testimony would have been material and favorable to the defense, in ways not merely cumulative to the testimony of available witnesses].)

The record before us contains no evidence that the prosecution engaged in witness intimidation or other conduct depriving Coffman's defense of a material witness. The circumstance that a witness is reluctant to assist one side or the other of a criminal prosecution, or tells different stories to different investigators, is, as the trial court observed, far from unusual and does not, in itself, support a claim that the prosecution interfered with a defendant's right of compulsory process or suppressed material evidence within the meaning of Brady v. Maryland, supra, 373 U.S. 83, even if we assume Brady applies in this situation, where the prosecution did not control the witnesses. Consequently, the trial court committed no error in denying Coffman's motion to strike the special circumstance allegations, and reversal of the judgment is unwarranted.

Coffman also urges that the court's delay in paying investigative expenses incurred in developing her defense of battered woman syndrome deprived her of a potential witness in the guilt phase of trial, namely, defendant Marlow's former wife Katherine Davis, and thus violated Coffman's right to due process as articulated in Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68, 80-83. Davis did testify in Coffman's case in mitigation during the penalty phase concerning Marlow's abusive conduct during their marriage some years before the present offenses. Because Coffman made no offer of proof sufficient to enable us to determine that Davis would have given relevant, admissible testimony during the guilt phase, and because Coffman's argument before the trial court focused on the failure to pay the expenses of investigators for trips to such places as Missouri and Kentucky, rather than the delay in paying Davis's expenses in coming to California to testify in this trial, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in denying Coffman's motion to strike the special circumstance allegations.

III. Guilt and Special Circumstance Issues

A. Introduction of Allegedly Coerced Statements

Defendants contend their convictions must be reversed because the trial court improperly allowed the prosecutor to impeach them with post-arrest statements that each allegedly made involuntarily as a result of police coercion. Although the issue is close, we reject defendants' contentions and conclude the statements were voluntarily made.

1. Factual background

In order to resolve this issue, we find it necessary to recite in some detail the circumstances under which the statements were given. By the time of defendants' arrest on November 14, 1986, seven days after Novis disappeared, Redlands Police Department investigators had become aware of possible connections between the Novis case and the murder of Lynell Murray in Huntington Beach. After defendants' arrest, investigators from both localities interviewed them at the Redlands Police Department.

Officers believed that, in light of Marlow's criminal experience, he probably would not be forthcoming during interrogation and that Coffman, by contrast, was more likely to cooperate with them. Accordingly, they first questioned Coffman for some three and a half hours, from about 5:30 p.m. until about 9:00 p.m. During the course of this interview, officers gave Coffman coffee, cigarettes, food and socks for her bare feet. Coffman complained of a wound on her leg, but the record does not reflect that she was provided medical attention during this period. Officers also falsely told Coffman that Marlow was providing police with information and "ratting on her." At the end of this first interview, officers drove Coffman to the area of Lytle Creek, where officers believed defendants had spent time, returning to Redlands in the early morning hours of November 15. Coffman then was questioned further until she agreed to take investigators to Novis's body, which was found, pursuant to her direction, around 4:00 a.m. in a vineyard in Fontana.

Marlow, meanwhile, was questioned for over three hours, from 9:00 p.m. until after midnight. During this interrogation Marlow was provided with food and allowed to smoke. Marlow ultimately agreed to try to take officers to Novis's burial site. Marlow directed officers to the Sierra Street off-ramp in Fontana, but once there he asked that Coffman be brought to the scene so she could show the officers where the body was located. As the officers could not at that time reach Sergeant Smith, who then had custody of Coffman, they returned Marlow to the Redlands Police Department. At 8:30 the same morning, after the discovery of Novis's body, officers resumed interrogating Marlow and informed him that Coffman had told them all about the Novis and Murray homicides. During this portion of the interrogation, Marlow gave a detailed statement about both murders, as well as the Kentucky killing. A further interrogation took place two days later, on November 17.

At the outset of the interviews, defendants each were advised of and invoked their Miranda rights. (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436.) Investigators nevertheless continued to question each defendant despite their repeated requests for counsel. Sergeant Fitzmaurice told Marlow, numerous times, that because he had invoked his Miranda rights, whatever he told officers in the course of the interrogation could not be used in court.

Ruling on defendants' motions to suppress their statements to investigators, the trial court concluded all statements had been made voluntarily and thus could properly be used for impeachment purposes under Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 225-226, despite the officers' noncompliance with Miranda. With respect to Coffman's motion to suppress the fruits of her statement, namely the location of Novis's body and testimony relating to its condition, after hearing evidence regarding the grave's shallowness and its proximity, in a working vineyard, to roads and a residential area, the court ruled that testimony regarding the body and its location was admissible pursuant to the doctrine of inevitable discovery.

2. Legal principles

Recently, in People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 79-80, we reviewed certain legal principles governing the admissibility of defendants' custodial statements. "It long has been settled under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution that an involuntary statement obtained by a law enforcement officer from a criminal suspect by coercion is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. (See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi (1936) 297 U.S. 278, 285-286 [80 L.Ed. 682, 56 S.Ct. 461].) In Miranda v. Arizona[, supra,] 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602] (Miranda), recognizing that any statement obtained by an officer from a suspect during custodial interrogation may be potentially involuntary because such questioning may be coercive, the United States Supreme Court held that such a statement may be admitted in evidence only if the officer advises the suspect of both his or her right to remain silent and right to have counsel present at questioning, and the suspect waives those rights and agrees to speak to the officer. The court further held in Miranda that if the suspect indicates that he or she does not wish to speak to the officer or wants to have counsel present at questioning, the officer must end the interrogation. In Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477 [68 L.Ed.2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880] . . . , the high court held that if the suspect invokes the right to counsel, the officer may not resume questioning on another occasion until counsel is present, unless the suspect voluntarily initiates further contact. In Harris v. New York [, supra,] 401 U.S. 222 [28 L.Ed.2d 1, 91 S.Ct. 643] (Harris), the court held that although a statement obtained in violation of Miranda may not be introduced by the prosecution in its case-in-chief, Miranda was not intended to grant the suspect license to lie in his or her testimony at trial, and thus if an ensuing statement obtained in violation of Miranda is voluntary, the statement nonetheless may be admitted to impeach a defendant who testifies differently at trial.

"In People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184 [73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865, 953 P.2d 1212], we addressed the issue whether a law enforcement officer's intentional continuation of interrogation of a defendant, in spite of the defendant's invocation of his or her right to counsel-in deliberate violation of Miranda-renders the statement obtained by the officer inadmissible even for impeachment purposes. We concluded that in light of the emphasis in Harris that Miranda should not be interpreted to permit a defendant to testify falsely at trial with impunity, under Harris the officer's misconduct in Peevy did not affect the admissibility of the statement as impeachment evidence. (Id. at pp. 1193-1194, 1203-1205.)" (People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 67.)

"A statement is involuntary [citation] when, among other circumstances, it `was " `extracted by any sort of threats . . . , [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight . . . .' " ' [Citations.] Voluntariness does not turn on any one fact, no matter how apparently significant, but rather on the `totality of [the] circumstances.' " (People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 79.)

"In reviewing the trial court's determinations of voluntariness, we apply an independent standard of review, doing so `in light of the record in its entirety, including "all the surrounding circumstances-both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the [encounter]" . . . .' " (People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 80.) But "we accept the trial court's factual findings, based on its resolution of factual disputes, its choices among conflicting inferences, and its evaluations of witness credibility, provided that these findings are supported by substantial evidence." (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 733.)

Relevant to this case, too, is the line of judicial decisions, beginning with the pre-Miranda decision in People v. Modesto (1965) 62 Cal.2d 436 and finding support in the high court's decision in New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649, that recognized an exception to the usual constraints on custodial interrogation in the situation where an overriding need exists to rescue persons in danger or to protect human life. In Modesto, the defendant was arrested on suspicion of murdering one young girl, whose body had been found, and harming another, who was missing. This court concluded that the possibility of finding a missing child alive allowed interrogation without advising the suspect of his rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel. (Modesto, supra, at p. 446.) The Court of Appeal in People v. Dean (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 875, involving custodial questioning of a kidnap suspect concerning a missing victim's whereabouts, concluded that the Modesto rule remained viable after Miranda. (Dean, supra, at p. 882.) Similarly, the Court of Appeal in People v. Riddle (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 563, 574-575, relied on Modesto in holding that Miranda did not preclude recognition of a limited exception to the normal rules governing custodial interrogation under exigent circumstances involving a possible threat to human life. Riddle held that "under circumstances of extreme emergency where the possibility of saving the life of a missing victim exists, non-coercive questions may be asked of a material witness in custody even though answers to the questions may incriminate the witness. Any other policy would reflect indifference to human life." (Riddle, supra, at p. 578.) Since in the Riddle case the court concluded the defendant's statements were voluntarily made and lawfully obtained, it found no basis on which to exclude them. (Id. at pp. 580-581.)

In New York v. Quarles, the high court recognized an analogous exception to Miranda in situations involving a threat to public safety. In that case, a woman approached police officers to say she had just been raped and that her assailant, who had carried a gun, had entered a nearby grocery store. Officers entered the store and confronted Quarles, who fit the woman's description of her assailant. Frisking him, an officer discovered an empty shoulder holster. After handcuffing him, the officer asked where his gun was located. Quarles nodded toward some empty cartons, saying, "The gun is over there." After retrieving a loaded .38-caliber gun from an empty carton in the area Quarles had indicated, officers read Quarles his Miranda rights and questioned him further following his waiver of rights. (New York v. Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at pp. 651-652.) The Supreme Court reversed the state court's decision suppressing the gun and initial statement, concluding that "the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination." (Id. at p. 657.) The court declined to make the availability of the public safety exception turn on the subjective motivation of the particular officers involved. (Id. at p. 656.) The court noted that Quarles was free, on remand, to argue his statement was coerced under traditional due process standards. (Id. at p. 655, fn. 3.)

Under New York v. Quarles and People v. Modesto, the circumstances in the present case, involving the rescue of a known individual, were sufficiently exigent to place the initial interrogations, that is, those taking place before the discovery of Novis's body, outside the scope of Miranda. Novis had been missing for a week at the time defendants were questioned, this passage of time lessening but by no means eliminating the possibility that she remained alive. (Compare People v. Manning (Colo. 1983) 672 P.2d 499, 509 [police concern for rescuing child who had been missing for 14 weeks "had long since ceased to be realistic," hence rescue doctrine inapplicable].) Before the interrogation, Marlow's sister, Veronica Koppers, had told the police that Marlow previously had been known to leave individuals bound and stranded alive in rural areas. Officers did not know whether defendants had done the same with Novis, or whether she was being held in a residence or other structure somewhere. The absence of any blood or other signs of physical trauma in Novis's car supported a reasonable hope that she might be alive and justified questioning defendants despite their invocation of their Miranda rights. That officers employed an interrogation technique of referring to Novis alternately as dead and as still alive by no means negated the exigency, as the officers apparently sought to avoid alienating defendants and instead attempted to gain their confidence, whichever circumstance might in fact exist. Under these circumstances, the rescue doctrine applied, and statements defendants made before police discovered the victim's body, if voluntarily made, were admissible despite the officers' noncompliance with Miranda.

3. Voluntariness of Marlow's statements

As noted, whether the admission of Marlow's statements violated due process depends upon whether they were voluntarily made in the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 79-80.) Marlow, joined by Coffman, contends his November 14 statement was involuntary because (1) his interrogator, Sergeant Fitzmaurice, ignored his nine requests to speak with an attorney; (2) Fitzmaurice repeatedly assured Marlow that nothing he said could be used in court, a promise that both rendered Marlow's statement involuntary and gave rise to estoppel or use immunity; (3) the statement was induced by a promise of better jail conditions if Marlow cooperated and a threat of worse conditions if he did not; and (4) the police exercised a coordinated strategy of extracting statements first from Coffman and then from Marlow. We disagree: Marlow's interrogation, while prolonged, was not accompanied by a denial of all creature comforts or accomplished by means of physical or psychological mistreatment, threats of harsh consequences or official inducement amounting to coercion, nor were Marlow's admissions the product of coerced statements by Coffman.

The record reflects that what Marlow characterizes as a promise of better jail conditions if he cooperated or a threat of worse if he did not simply amounted to Fitzmaurice's acknowledgment that the nature of the crimes of which Marlow stood accused tends to evoke negative feelings, that Marlow's cooperation could be made known to jail authorities, and that the latter might look favorably on such cooperation-all of which Marlow evidently well knew. Any "coordinated strategy" of confronting Marlow with Coffman's statements violated his due process rights only if doing so actually and proximately caused him to make his admissions against his will. (See People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1240-1241.) Marlow points to no evidence in the record supporting such a conclusion; his interrogators' comments that Coffman was cooperating with them surely did not render Marlow's statements involuntary. That Sergeant Fitzmaurice repeatedly ignored Marlow's requests for an attorney does give rise to concern, but-given Marlow's maturity and criminal experience (he was over 30 years old and a convicted felon at the time of the interrogation)-it was unlikely Marlow's will was thereby overborne.

Fitzmaurice's assurances that any statements Marlow might make could not be used in court similarly raise the specter of coercion, but after independently reviewing the transcripts of the interrogation and the hearing on Marlow's suppression motion, we see no reason to disturb the trial court's determination that his statements were voluntarily made. Significantly, for a considerable period after Fitzmaurice began to assure Marlow his statements would not be used, Marlow continued to resist disclosing Novis's whereabouts or admitting he committed the offenses. His resistance, far from reflecting a will overborne by official coercion, suggests instead a still operative ability to calculate his self-interest in choosing whether to disclose or withhold information. Marlow's admissions followed and appeared to be precipitated by continued confrontation with the evidence authorities possessed. (Cf. State v. Walton (1989) 159 Ariz. 571 [769 P.2d 1017, 1025-1026] [when 45 minutes elapsed between officer's assurance that "it's nothing that can't be worked out" and defendant's admissions, during which time officer continued to confront defendant with known evidence, court concluded admissions were not made in reliance on the assurance].) Moreover, Marlow was not promised leniency in exchange for admissions; rather, his interrogators advised him they had sufficient evidence to convict him without them.

Marlow contends that under People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, the use of his statements in court violated due process. In Quartermain, this court, relying on the rationales of Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257, 262 (when a guilty plea rests in any significant degree on the prosecutor's promise or agreement, the promise must be fulfilled), Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, 618 (fundamental fairness precludes use of a defendant's post-Miranda-warning silence to impeach his trial testimony), and their progeny, concluded that when a prosecutor violated an agreement made with the defendant not to use his statement in any court proceedings against him, fundamental fairness required that the prosecutor honor the agreement, and under the circumstances the introduction of the statement to impeach the defendant resulted in prejudice requiring reversal of the judgment. (Quartermain, supra, at pp. 618-622.) We observed that the prosecutor's improper use of the defendant's statements for impeachment purposes and in closing argument, by "paint[ing] defendant as a fabulist," "struck at the heart of his defense," as to which the jury's assessment of his credibility was crucial. (Id. at pp. 620, 622.) Assuming the use of Marlow's statements after repeated assurances to the contrary was fundamentally unfair, here the prosecutor presented abundant other evidence of defendants' guilt, enabling us confidently to conclude the verdict was unattributable to any error in admitting the statements. (Id. at p. 622, citing Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279; cf. People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1132-1133 [defendant's statement not involuntary despite circumstance that investigating officer told him it would not be used in court for any purpose].)

Marlow's further contentions that the officers' representations that any statements he might make would not be used in court estopped the prosecution to introduce them, or resulted in a kind of use immunity, are unpersuasive. The Right to Truth-in-Evidence Law (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d)), added to our state Constitution in 1982 when the voters passed Proposition 8, provides in pertinent part that "relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding." The provision was intended to abrogate judicially created rules requiring the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence, such as voluntary admissions. (See People v. Macias (1997) 16 Cal.4th 739, 749; People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 318.) Marlow does not explain how a common law estoppel or immunity theory might avoid the stricture of this constitutional provision.

Even were we to assume, for argument's sake, the trial court erred in finding Marlow's statements were voluntarily made and thus admissible for impeachment purposes, we would conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 487.) As respondent observes, Marlow did not challenge the prosecution's evidence that, in concert with Coffman, he kidnapped, robbed and killed Corinna Novis, and that he entered her apartment and stole several items of property; his only defense was that he lacked the intent to kill. Yet the evidence of Marlow's intent to kill, apart from his statements, was overwhelming: Marlow, with Coffman, abducted Novis and sodomized her in the shower at the Drinkhouse residence, inducing her to disclose the PIN for her bank card in order to steal her money. Marlow sought to assuage Drinkhouse's anxiety at Novis's presence in his house by saying, "How is she going to talk to anybody if she's under a pile of rocks?" Defendants equipped themselves with a shovel when they drove to the vineyard where Novis was strangled. Sufficient force was employed in the strangulation to permit the pathologist to opine a second person (such as Coffman) might have assisted Marlow in the killing, or the killer might have placed his foot on Novis's back as her face was pressed into the ground, accounting for the soil inside her mouth. On this record, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt the error, if any, did not contribute to the verdict. (Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 15; Chapman, supra, at p. 24.)

4. Voluntariness of Coffman's statements and admissibility of evidence derived therefrom

A similar analysis leads to the conclusion that Coffman's statements were voluntary and thus properly admitted. Although Coffman's interrogation was lengthy and officers ignored her requests for an attorney, they provided her with food and coffee, allowed her a cigarette, and brought her socks and other clothing after she complained of feeling cold. Although officers did not immediately provide medical attention for Coffman's leg wound, the injury, approximately two weeks old at the time, clearly was not as serious as that in Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 399-402, in which the high court held that statements resulting from the repeated interrogation of a hospitalized suspect suffering from a gunshot wound were involuntary. Coffman's admissions occurred after repeated confrontation with the known evidence. She contends that investigators improperly threatened to have her child removed from his home in Missouri, but since she rejected the factual possibility their suggestion clearly had no coercive effect on her. Coffman also contends the officers induced her to involuntarily admit her guilt by falsely telling her Marlow had incriminated her and by making promises of assistance. What the officer meant in asserting he would "help" Coffman is unclear, but we are unpersuaded his comments constituted a promise of leniency that rendered her subsequent statements and conduct involuntary.

The scenario here differs from Collazo v. Estelle (9th Cir. 1991) 940 F.2d 411, on which Coffman relies. There, the federal court of appeals found reversible error in the admission of a confession obtained after an interrogating officer attempted to discourage a suspect from talking with a lawyer by predicting a lawyer would direct him not to speak with the police and "it might be worse" for the suspect. (Id. at pp. 414, 416, 420.) Here, the officers-questioning Coffman in the midst of authorities' efforts to locate Novis-did not hint she would receive harsher treatment if she failed to cooperate.

Moreover, Coffman continued for a considerable period to resist the officers' requests that she tell them where Novis could be found. Rather than threaten Coffman, interrogators attempted by various techniques to appeal to her sense of moral integrity and any possible sympathy or sensitivity she might have toward the victim's family. The record supports the conclusion that Coffman's statements were the product of her own free will.

Even were we to conclude otherwise, i.e., that the trial court erred in finding Coffman made her statements voluntarily, the record contains overwhelming evidence of her guilt. Specifically, the testimony of Richard Drinkhouse and Veronica Koppers supported the conclusion that Coffman willingly participated in the offenses; Harold Brigham testified Coffman was the person who pawned the stolen typewriter using Novis's identification; Victoria Rotstein placed Coffman near the location where identification belonging to Coffman, Marlow and Novis was found several days after the offenses; and Coffman's (along with Marlow's) fingerprints were found on Novis's car. Any error in the admission of Coffman's statements therefore did not, beyond a reasonable doubt, contribute to the verdict. (Neder v. United States, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 15.)

Coffman further contends the discovery of Novis's body and the evidence derived from it were the product of her coerced statements and should have been excluded. Having concluded Coffman's statements were voluntarily made, we further conclude the fruits of those statements were properly admitted. Moreover, even had the statements been involuntary, the trial court properly ruled the physical evidence was admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery, which recognizes that if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, then the exclusionary rule will not apply. (Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 443-444.) This is so because the rule is intended to ensure that the prosecution is not placed in a better position than it would have been had no illegality occurred; the rule does not require it be put in a worse one. (Ibid.) Novis's body lay, partially exposed, in a shallow grave in a working vineyard near a residential area. Investigators found evidence that bicycles and horses had been ridden nearby. On these facts, the trial court reasonably could find that Novis's body ultimately would have been found regardless of defendants' statements.

5. Failure to instruct regarding impeachment use of defendants' admissions

When defendants' extra-judicial statements were admitted into evidence, the trial court gave the jury no instruction limiting their use to impeachment of defendants' credibility. Among the instructions the trial court read at the close of the guilt phase was CALJIC No. 2.13, which informs the jury that a witness's prior inconsistent statements may be considered not only as they bear on the witness's credibility, but also as evidence of the truth of the facts as stated by the witness on the prior occasion. Marlow, joined by Coffman, contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, that statements taken in violation of Miranda could be used only for impeachment purposes under the rule of Harris, supra, 401 U.S. 222. They argue that the court's giving of CALJIC No. 2.13 resulted in the jury's improper use of the statements as substantive evidence of guilt.

In People v. Nudd (1974) 12 Cal.3d 204, 209, overruled on other grounds in People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 113, this court declined to impose on trial courts a sua sponte obligation to give a limiting instruction when admitting Miranda-violative statements for impeachment purposes. Marlow, however, contends Nudd is, in this respect, no longer good law in light of Richardson v. Marsh, supra, 481 U.S. at pages 206-207, in which the high court in dictum observed that "in [Harris, supra, 401 U.S. 222], we held that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of [Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436], can be introduced to impeach that defendant's credibility, even though they are inadmissible as evidence of his guilt, so long as the jury is instructed accordingly." (Italics added.) The Courts of Appeal have been divided on the question whether such a sua sponte instructional obligation exists. (Compare People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1088-1091 [no sua sponte obligation] with People v. Duncan (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 613, 620-622 [imposing sua sponte duty].) Recently, however, in People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at page 1134, this court rejected a claim that the admission for impeachment of a defendant's Miranda-violative statement, without a limiting instruction and notwithstanding the giving of CALJIC No. 2.13, constituted error. The same conclusion obtains here.

B. Admission of Evidence that Marlow Requested an Attorney During Police Questioning

Marlow contends his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process of law were infringed when he was cross-examined by the prosecutor and by Coffman's counsel regarding his request for counsel before police questioning, and when the prosecutor, on rebuttal, examined Sergeant Fitzmaurice concerning the same subject. The contention was forfeited for appellate purposes by the lack of a contemporaneous objection. (People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 879, fn. 14, abrogated on other grounds in People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 364.) Were we nevertheless to consider the merits, we would conclude that although the question is close, any error was harmless. (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)

The challenged questioning went as follows:

"[Prosecutor:] Q. . . . It's true that when the police first talked to you they read you your Miranda rights, correct?

"[Marlow:] A. I believe so.

"[Prosecutor:] Q. Well, you asked for a lawyer, didn't you?

"[Marlow:] A. It's been a long time. [¶] I-we went to court a lot of times talking about me asking for a lawyer.

"[Prosecutor:] Q. Okay. Do you remember whether you asked them for a lawyer when you were read your Miranda rights?

"[Marlow:] A. I believe I did.

"[Prosecutor:] Q. They ignored that, right?

"[Marlow:] A. I think so."

On recross-examination, Coffman's attorney, Spears, asked Marlow: "But are you able to reconcile how on the one hand you were screwed up on drugs, and how on the other hand you had the sense to ask for a lawyer during the questioning?" Marlow responded: "I couldn't explain it to you, Mr. Spears."

Spears went on to ask: "One of the first things that happened was that you got what's called the Miranda advisal; is that correct?" Marlow answered: "I believe so." Spears: "And right after getting that advisal, you told the police that you needed to get hold of a lawyer. You made a request for counsel, didn't you?" Marlow: "If it says I did, I did." After Spears pointed out where, in the transcript of the interrogation, Marlow had requested counsel, he continued: "Do you remember making a subsequent or another request for a lawyer?" When Marlow answered negatively, Spears cited another instance in the interrogation when Marlow said he needed to talk to a lawyer.

Finally, in rebuttal, the prosecutor asked Sergeant Fitzmaurice whether, at the start of Marlow's interview, he had read Marlow his Miranda rights and elicited the fact that Marlow had expressed a wish to see an attorney before questioning.

As we said in People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at page 878: "Wainwright v. Greenfield [(1986)] 474 U.S. 284, concerned a prosecutor's argument to the jury that the defendant's repeated refusals to answer questions without first consulting an attorney demonstrated a degree of comprehension inconsistent with the defendant's claim of insanity. This argument was held to be a denial of federal due process rights under the reasoning of Doyle v. Ohio[, supra, ] 426 U.S. 610 [49 L.Ed.2d 91, 96 S.Ct. 2240]. [¶] Wainwright and Doyle are founded on the notion that it is fundamentally unfair to use post-Miranda silence against the defendant at trial in view of the implicit assurance contained in the Miranda warnings that exercise of the right of silence will not be penalized. (Wainwright v. Greenfield, supra, 474 U.S. at p. 295 [88 L.Ed.2d at p. 629, 106 S.Ct. at p. 638].) A similar process of reasoning supports the conclusion that comment which penalizes exercise of the right to counsel is also prohibited. (People v. Fabert (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 604, 610-611 [179 Cal.Rptr. 702]; People v. Schindler (1980) 114 Cal.App.3d 178, 188-189 [170 Cal.Rptr. 461].)"

Counsel for a co-defendant, like the prosecutor, is bound by this principle and thus is precluded from commenting on the defendant's assertion of the right to counsel. (See People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 157 [applying related rule of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615, barring comment by co-defendant's counsel on defendant's failure to testify].)

Respondent argues that the questioning quoted above was aimed, at least in part, not at suggesting Marlow's guilt but instead at showing that during his interrogation his faculties were unclouded, contrary to his testimony that he was mentally impaired due to drug usage. Respondent further contends that a defendant who testifies waives the privilege against self-incrimination and is subject to cross-examination on all relevant matters, of which Marlow's mental status during police questioning was one. Respondent also asserts that Wainwright v. Greenfield does not preclude examination pertaining to the defendant's demeanor and behavior, suggesting that the challenged questioning may be so characterized. These arguments, which are unsupported by citation to any factually similar cases, are not persuasive. Wainwright characterized as Doyle v. Ohio's primary rationale the avoidance of the fundamental unfairness that flows from the state's breach of the implied assurances contained in the Miranda warning, stating broadly: "What is impermissible is the evidentiary use of an individual's exercise of his constitutional rights after the State's assurance that the invocation of those rights will not be penalized." (Wainwright v. Greenfield, supra, 474 U.S. at pp. 294-295.) Coffman's attorney directly probed the inconsistency between Marlow's claim of drug-related impairment and his assertion of his right to counsel during questioning; the prosecutor's cross-examination was not so focused, but instead seemed to address Marlow's refusal to help officers find Novis. The questions by Coffman's counsel and the prosecutor, although apparently aimed at different objects, each made evidentiary use of Marlow's assertion of the right to counsel and thus violated Wainwright.

Even were the prosecutor's questions somehow indirectly aimed at addressing Marlow's mental state at the time of the interrogation, here other evidence (such as officers' personal observations) surely would have been directly probative of Marlow's demeanor and behavior without the necessity of penalizing Marlow's assertion of his right to counsel. (Wainwright v. Greenfield, supra, 474 U.S. at p. 295 ["the State's legitimate interest in proving that the defendant's behavior appeared to be rational at the time of his arrest could have been served by carefully framed questions that avoided any mention of the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to consult counsel"]; cf. People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 878-879 [prosecutor referred to defendant's invocation of right to counsel "primarily as a point of reference within the taped interview to assist the jury in locating an area where the prosecution believed that the tone of defendant's statements . . . appeared to be inconsistent with defendant's statements about the events of the preceding night and about his relationships with the two decedents"].)

As in People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d 833, however, "if the remarks had the objectionable effect of drawing the jury's attention to the exercise of protected rights," the verdicts were certainly not affected by this "brief and mild reference" and, in view of the overwhelming evidence, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 879.) Thus, even assuming Marlow had properly preserved this claim for appeal, any error flowing from questioning him about his invocation of his right to counsel was harmless. Moreover, this lack of prejudice defeats Marlow's claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object.

C. Alleged Massiah Error

Coffman contends her statements to jailhouse informant Robin Long, including her admissions that she had gotten into the shower with Novis and Marlow, that Novis was still alive when Marlow and Coffman went to her apartment to find her PIN, and that Novis had to be killed because they could not leave any victims alive, were obtained in violation of her right to counsel and thus improperly admitted over her motion to suppress. She further contends Long's testimony infected the sentencing process with unreliability, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution. As will appear, Coffman's contention lacks merit because she fails to demonstrate that the government did anything more than accept information that Long elicited from Coffman on her own initiative.

In Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, the high court held that once a judicial proceeding has been initiated against an accused and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, any statement the government deliberately elicits from the accused in the absence of counsel is inadmissible at trial against the defendant. (Id. at pp. 206-207; In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 915.) To prevail on a Massiah claim, a defendant must show that the police and the informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks. (Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436, 459; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1007.) "Specifically, the evidence must establish that the informant (1) was acting as a government agent, i.e., under the direction of the government pursuant to a pre-existing arrangement, with the expectation of some resulting benefit or advantage, and (2) deliberately elicited incriminating statements." (In re Neely, supra, at p. 915.) The requirement of agency is not satisfied when law enforcement officials "merely accept information elicited by the informant-inmate on his or her own initiative, with no official promises, encouragement, or guidance." (Ibid.) A pre-existing arrangement, however, need not be explicit or formal, but may be inferred from evidence of the parties' behavior indicative of such an agreement. (Ibid.) A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress informant testimony is essentially a factual determination, entitled to deferential review on appeal. (People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1247-1248.)

During the hearing on Coffman's motion to suppress statements she made to Robin Long while Long was in jail on a parole violation, San Bernardino County Deputy Sheriff Bobbi New testified officials were aware of Long's practice, while in custody, of engaging in mock fortunetelling with playing cards as a means of eliciting from incarcerated suspects statements that Long would then communicate to law enforcement officials. New testified that Long was placed in protective custody, where she met and talked with Coffman, for reasons other than her alleged status as a police agent. (According to Long's later testimony, because of a prior child endangerment charge she was placed in protective custody whenever she was incarcerated.) Long's parole agent, Frank Mamone, testified at the same hearing that no official had contacted him to arrange any deal for Long's testimony or to change her parole status, and that Long had been released around February 6, 1987, as a normal procedure due to the minor nature of her parole violation (absconding and failing to report to her parole agent). Long herself testified she wanted to learn the details of Coffman's case because two of Long's friends had been murdered, and she wondered if there was a connection between those killings and Coffman's case. Long also testified she did not like being incarcerated and acknowledged she had given information to authorities in an unrelated case in order to get out of jail, but insisted she had been promised nothing in connection with the present case and her testimony would have no bearing on how long she would spend in custody on her current parole violation.

Coffman essentially argues that because Long was a known informant, the circumstance that she was housed near Coffman compels the inference that she was a police agent. The trial court reasonably concluded otherwise, given the testimony showing Long had acted on her own initiative and the absence of any evidence that authorities had encouraged her to supply information or insinuated that to do so would be to her benefit, or that her release from jail was other than in the normal course for a minor parole violation. Consequently, the admission of Long's testimony did not violate Coffman's Sixth or Eighth Amendment rights.

D. Long's Testimony as Assertedly Improper Rebuttal

Coffman contends that Long's testimony was improper rebuttal because it failed to contradict particular elements of the defense case. Instead, she argues, it merely supported a conviction generally and thus should have been presented in the prosecution's case-in-chief. She contends the error violated her state and federal constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel, against self-incrimination, to a fair trial, to confrontation, to non-arbitrary and reliable determinations of guilt, death eligibility and penalty, and to present a defense. She further contends the error constituted an arbitrary denial of a state-created liberty interest and thus violated her federal due process rights. She acknowledges her trial counsel failed to object to the order of proof, thus forfeiting the issue for appellate review, but contends this omission represents ineffective assistance of counsel.

On the merits, Coffman's argument is unpersuasive. The order of proof rests largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the fact that the evidence in question may have tended to support the prosecution's case-in-chief does not make it improper rebuttal. (People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379, 399, disapproved on another ground in People v. Ray (1975) 14 Cal.3d 20, 29-30; People v. Warner (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 900, 906; Evid. Code, § 320; Pen. Code, §§ 1093, subd. (d), 1094.) It is improper for the prosecution to deliberately withhold evidence that is appropriately part of its case-in-chief, in order to offer it after the defense rests its case and thus perhaps surprise the defense or unduly magnify the importance of the evidence. Nevertheless, when the evidence in question meets the requirements for impeachment it may be admitted on rebuttal to meet the evidence on a point the defense has put into dispute. (People v. Harrison (1963) 59 Cal.2d 622, 629.) Because Coffman testified she had nothing to do with what happened in the shower between Marlow and Novis and denied knowing that Marlow had killed Novis in the vineyard, the prosecutor was entitled to rebut her testimony with prior inconsistent statements and admissions to Long. Because an objection would not have been well taken, counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to make one.

E. Marlow's Invocation of the Fifth Amendment

Both defendants challenge the propriety of the process by which Marlow, on cross-examination after his direct testimony in rebuttal to Coffman's testimony, as described below, invoked his privilege against self-incrimination some 44 times when questioned about the Orange County crimes. Respondent acknowledges error occurred, but argues neither defendant suffered any prejudice thereby. Marlow also contends that comment by the prosecutor and Coffman's counsel in their respective closing arguments concerning his failure to testify about the Orange County offenses violated his privilege against self-incrimination and the rule in Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609.

1. Factual context

We first place these contentions in context. Before trial, the prosecutor informed the court and defendants that he would not seek to introduce evidence of the Orange County offenses against Lynell Murray. Accordingly, neither in his opening statement nor in his case-in-chief did he refer to or present evidence of those crimes. In Coffman's counsel's opening statement and Coffman's testimony in her own defense following Marlow's case-in-chief, however, she told the jury about the Orange County killing. The trial court instructed the jury that Coffman's testimony about the Orange County offenses was being admitted only to show Coffman's state of mind and was not to be considered as evidence against Marlow, either as reflecting on his character or as demonstrating a probability that he committed the San Bernardino County offenses.

After Coffman rested, Marlow testified in rebuttal. Just before Marlow took the stand, his counsel sought a ruling precluding cross-examination on the Orange County crimes. The trial court declined to make a ruling at that time. During the course of Marlow's direct examination, his counsel asked him if he had intended to kill Novis. Marlow denied so intending. When his counsel asked him if Novis was still alive at the point when, after choking her, he laid her on the ground in the vineyard, Marlow replied: "I know she was alive. I didn't want to kill her or anybody else." (Italics added.) Just before the start of cross-examination, the court held an in limine hearing on the scope of the proposed cross-examination. The prosecutor argued that Marlow's response as quoted above opened the door to cross-examination on the Orange County homicide. Marlow's counsel contended his client's answer was non-responsive and ambiguous as to what incident he was referring to and that he retained a privilege to refuse to answer questions relating to the Orange County homicide.

The trial court noted that although defendants were currently on trial only for the charged offenses against Novis, Coffman's defense had raised the issue of her relationship with Marlow in an effort to show she acted only under duress and coercion; and Marlow, for his part, had testified to the contrary, namely, that he had not manipulated her, she had manipulated him. The Orange County crimes, the court believed, were highly relevant to the nature of defendants' relationship in connection with the murder of Novis. And, said the court, because Marlow had denied having the intent to kill anybody at any time, the People had "the right to show the relationship in connection with this other murder in Orange County."

Thereafter, Coffman's counsel cross-examined Marlow, asking him various questions about his actions in Orange County. Rather than answer, Marlow stated he was "taking the Fifth" on those questions. Finally, Coffman's counsel asked the court to direct Marlow to answer, stating, "[W]e've had a ruling on that and this is an area I am seemingly entitled to probe." The court disagreed: "The ruling is you could ask questions. I didn't rule on whether or not he could take the 5th Amendment. That issue was not raised." In further discussion outside the presence of the jury, Marlow's counsel clarified that "[Marlow] is not testifying on my advice because he has not come to trial and will not come to trial in Orange County until these proceedings are concluded." The court stated: "n any event, the court has to honor his reliance upon his Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify concerning the Orange County thing. [¶] That was not gone into at all on his direct. [¶] It is true that there are a lot of overlapping things, such as intent to kill, which flow from one case to the next that give the District Attorney a great interest in inquiring into the details of that case. [¶] But there is no way you can force him to answer as against his reliance on the Fifth Amendment." The prosecutor responded: "I know we can't force him to answer. You could instruct him to. I know it wouldn't do any good. We have no control over him, but you legally, as you know, can instruct him that he is required to answer." The court answered: "Yes. I think in view of the fact that he does have a trial pending in Orange County and he has avoided that testimony on the stand here, justice requires that we honor his Fifth Amendment privilege." The court continued: "[A]s a practical matter we all know that taking the Fifth Amendment in view of all the evidence that's come out in this case is a tacit admission to the jury that the worst is true. [¶] And since nobody is trying to convict him of the Orange County case, why, we don't have the problems of the burden of proof. [¶] So far as the information which the jury will-whether we like it or not, consider his refusal to answer is one of the things which is in their heads. [¶] They will be instructed very carefully not to consider that, but it's-" The prosecutor responded: "I'm not sure taking the Fifth this way isn't something they shouldn't be able to consider. That's part of what I'm trying to make my point. [¶] Procedurally, will the court at least permit me to force him to take the Fifth on these issues?" The court acknowledged the prosecutor was "entitled to get his answer."

Before the jury, the prosecutor asked a succession of questions to which Marlow responded with an assertion of his Fifth Amendment privilege. After the 27th such assertion, the court interjected: "I'd better clarify the record on that, counsel. Mr. Marlow, when you say I have to take the Fifth on that, are you intending to say that you refuse to answer the question on the ground that the answer may tend to incriminate you?" Marlow responded in the affirmative. The court then told the jury: "The record may show that when the defendant refers to taking the Fifth, he is in effect stating that he refuses to answer the question on the ground that the answer may tend to incriminate him. [¶] On that basis, he does not have to answer the question." The court also informed the jury that the questions as to which Marlow asserted a privilege were not themselves evidence and were not to be considered as such. The court later instructed jurors with CALJIC No. 2.25, directing them to draw no adverse inference from Marlow's invocation of the privilege.

2. Marlow's contentions

Marlow contends the trial court erred in permitting any cross-examination concerning the Orange County offenses because no evidence had been admitted against him, and he had not testified, concerning that incident. Marlow further contends that once the trial court ruled his invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination regarding the Orange County crimes was proper, it erred in requiring him to assert the privilege in front of the jury and informing the jury that he did so each time because the answer would tend to incriminate him. (See People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 440-442.) Finally, the instruction advising the jury to draw no adverse inference from Marlow's invocation of the privilege did not, he contends, eliminate the prejudice stemming from these circumstances. Respondent contends Marlow waived his Fifth Amendment privilege as to the Orange County crimes by testifying, on direct examination, that he did not want to kill "anybody," inferentially including Lynell Murray, and that he therefore actually no longer had a privilege to assert before the jury. Consequently, respondent urges, Marlow received the benefit of an instruction (CALJIC No. 2.25, telling the jury to draw no adverse inference from the assertion of the privilege) to which he was not entitled. Moreover, respondent points out, the jury was instructed regarding the limited purpose of evidence of the Orange County murder, an offense for which he was not on trial in the present proceeding.

We conclude that Marlow's direct examination response denying he ever wanted to kill Novis "or anybody else" did "open the door" to questioning regarding the Orange County murder, and the trial court abused its discretion in implicitly ruling to the contrary. "A defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf waives the privilege against self-incrimination to the extent of the scope of relevant cross-examination. [Citations.] `It matters not that the defendant's answer on cross-examination might tend to establish his guilt of a collateral offense for which he could still be prosecuted.' " (People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 760-761, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12, and abrogated on other grounds in People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 234; Jenkins v. Anderson (1980) 447 U.S. 231, 236, fn. 3.) "None of [the] fundamental principles [underlying the rule precluding the prosecution from cross-examining a testifying defendant beyond the scope of direct examination, upon the case generally] . . . imply that when a defendant voluntarily testifies in his own defense the People may not fully amplify his testimony by inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding his assertions, or by introducing evidence through cross-examination which explains or refutes his statements or the inferences which may necessarily be drawn from them." (People v. Schader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 770; see also United States v. Hearst (9th Cir. 1977) 563 F.2d 1331, 1340-1341.) In the context of the trial, following Coffman's testimony that Marlow killed Murray, Marlow's testimony denying he wanted to kill "anybody" reasonably would have been understood as referring to Murray, and it would have been unfair not to permit Coffman and the prosecutor to amplify it. Cross-examination of Marlow concerning the events in Orange County, we conclude, thus was relevant and proper, and his purported assertion of the privilege was ineffective. From this conclusion it follows that the trial court did not commit Griffin error (see Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609) in explaining to the jury the meaning of Marlow's purported assertions of the privilege. The trial court should not then have instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.25, or perhaps, on request, should have stricken Marlow's direct testimony regarding his lack of desire to kill anybody. Nevertheless, we see no reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of these irregularities, for Marlow was not charged in this proceeding with the Orange County offenses, and we presume the jury followed the instruction to draw no adverse inferences from his assertion of the privilege. (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 436.)

Marlow further contends that both the prosecutor and Coffman's counsel violated his right against self-incrimination by commenting, in their respective summations, on his failure to testify about the Orange County homicide. (Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 157 [Griffin rule applies to comment by co-defendant as well as prosecutor].) Specifically, the prosecutor commented: "Now the abduction out of that cleaners-and we have only heard Miss Coffman's version of it-is that they are starting to be a good team." Coffman's counsel stated: "When you compare what Miss Coffman did, and starting at the beginning and recounting and answering questions, to what Mr. Marlow did, including picking and choosing what he wanted to talk about, I think that the differences are very extreme. [¶] And I offer that as a suggestion to you. [¶] I do not want to suggest that by exercising his right under the Fifth Amendment, that for that reason, you should disregard Mr. Marlow's testimony, because instruction 2.25 indicates that a person has a right to rely on that." Finally, in his penalty phase closing argument, Coffman's counsel stated: "Greg Marlow never told the police anything about Lynell Murray. And he took the Fifth Amendment, as I remember, here in court when he was asked about what occurred in Orange County."

Marlow forfeited any appellate challenge to the foregoing comments by failing to make a contemporaneous objection at trial or to ask that the jury be appropriately admonished. (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 873-874.) As he contends counsel's failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance, we turn to the merits of the claim. Because Marlow's direct testimony that he did not want to kill "anybody" opened the door to cross-examination concerning the Orange County offenses, as discussed above, the Fifth Amendment no longer shielded him from cross-examination thereon, and both the prosecutor and his co-defendant's counsel were free to comment on his silence or failure to explain the evidence. (See Jenkins v. Anderson, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 236; People v. Schader, supra, 71 Cal.2d at pp. 770-771; Pen. Code, § 1127; Evid. Code, § 413.) Moreover, the remarks by Coffman's counsel seem aimed not at implying that Marlow's failure to testify concerning Orange County signaled his guilt, but rather at suggesting Coffman's credibility was comparatively strong because she took the stand and submitted to cross-examination. In any event, brief and mild references to a defendant's failure to testify, unaccompanied by any suggestion that the jury should draw an inference of guilt from it, are, like the comments Marlow cites, generally held to be harmless. (People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 771.) We see no reason to reach a different conclusion here.

3. Coffman's contentions

Coffman contends the prosecutor's cross-examination causing Marlow to invoke, in front of the jury, his privilege against self-incrimination regarding the Orange County crimes, and the prosecutor's closing argument urging the jury to find both defendants guilty on the basis of Marlow's testimony, improperly invited the jury to infer her guilt and thus deprived her of state and federal constitutional rights, including those to confrontation, due process and a fair trial. Coffman's argument is curious, for absent her testimony about the events in Orange County, the Murray homicide would not have been mentioned in the guilt phase of this trial; Marlow then never would have had occasion to assert his privilege in this connection, as he did, moreover, 11 times in response to cross-examination by Coffman's counsel, in addition to numerous instances during cross-examination by the prosecutor. In any event, we conclude any error in Marlow's cross-examination was harmless as to Coffman; the jury was instructed, whether or not appropriately, with CALJIC No. 2.25 and instructed that questions themselves are not evidence. Presumably, therefore, the jury did not infer that Marlow was effectively admitting every incriminatory fact about which her counsel and the prosecutor asked him. We further conclude the portion of the prosecutor's closing argument that Coffman contends was Griffin error (see Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609; People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 154) is reasonably understood not as a request to infer that Coffman was guilty because Marlow had asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege, but as fair comment on the evidence as it related to Coffman.

F. Admission of Jailhouse Correspondence

Overruling Coffman's objection on grounds of Evidence Code section 352, the trial court granted Marlow's motion to admit into evidence seven letters Coffman wrote to him while both were incarcerated before trial. Coffman contends the court abused its discretion and violated her state and federal constitutional rights in so ruling. She argues the correspondence, in which she expressed love and erotic desire for Marlow and which she occasionally illustrated with swastikas, lightning bolts and drawings of a sexual nature, as well as a map showing the location of her son's residence, was so prejudicial as to require reversal of her conviction. We find no abuse of discretion and no denial of constitutional rights in the admission of the letters.

Evidence Code section 352 permits a trial court, in its discretion, to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will necessitate undue consumption of time or create the substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury. The court's ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 155.) As the trial court reasoned, the letters were probative of the nature of defendants' relationship and relevant to rebut Coffman's defense that she participated in the offenses only because of her fear that Marlow would otherwise harm her or her son. That the letters might have been, as Coffman argues, cumulative of Dr. Walker's testimony pertaining to the cyclic nature of a battering relationship does not mean their introduction into evidence necessarily would take up too much time or confuse the issues. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the letters. Inasmuch as Coffman fails to identify a meritorious ground for their exclusion, she fails to establish that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in this regard.

G. Marlow's Testimony Regarding Coffman's Participation

Coffman contends that in response to the prosecutor's cross-examination, Marlow gave inadmissible opinion testimony on the central question of her guilt and thereby violated her constitutional rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury on every element of the charges, to confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and to a fair and reliable determination of the facts upon which the guilt and penalty verdicts were based. (See Evid. Code, § 800.) The claim is, in substance, one of erroneous admission of evidence, subject to the standard of review for claims of state law error. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Coffman forfeited this contention by failing to make a contemporaneous objection. (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 545 [routine application of state evidentiary law does not implicate defendant's constitutional rights]; Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) For the reasons that follow, had Coffman preserved the claim, we would conclude the challenged testimony represented not Marlow's opinion of Coffman's guilt, but rather his own concessions and recollection of events.

The prosecutor began his cross-examination of Marlow by reading from count 2 of the information, which charged Marlow and Coffman with kidnapping Corinna Novis, and asking if the charge were true. Marlow acknowledged he intentionally kidnapped Novis. The prosecutor continued: "And your testimony is Miss Coffman went along with it all the way and helped you kidnap her, correct?" Marlow answered, "That was the reason, to get a car and money to go to Arizona." The prosecutor then read count 3, charging defendants with kidnapping for robbery, and asked if the allegation were true. Marlow's counsel then objected on the basis the question asked for a legal conclusion. The court overruled the objection, noting: "It is not a legal proposition. He didn't ask him if he was guilty, he just asked if that statement was true. [¶] That's a question of fact. [¶] Now, if he asked was he guilty, that's fine. You have a good objection. [¶] But he is just asking a question of fact whether that . . . is a true statement." Continuing his cross-examination of Marlow, the prosecutor asked: "Your testimony is that when Corinna Novis was kidnapped for purpose of robbery, Miss Coffman went along freely and voluntarily; is that correct?" Marlow answered, "She is the one who approached Miss Novis to start with." Without objection, the prosecutor asked: "Okay. In other words, she was an active, willing participant in that crime?" Marlow answered in the affirmative. The prosecutor then inquired about count 4, charging robbery. "On or about November 7, 1986, in the above named judicial district, the crime of robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211, a felony, was committed by James Gregory Marlow and Cynthia Lynn Coffman, who did willfully, unlawfully and by means of force and fear take personal property from the personal possession and immediate presence of Corinna D. Novis. [¶] That's true also, isn't it?" Marlow assented. "You robbed Corinna Novis, correct?" Marlow demurred: "I didn't rob her. I didn't take nothing from her." The prosecutor asked: "A purse, a wallet, a car?" "Well, a car." "And a purse?" "I never took her purse." The prosecutor clarified: "I mean, if you and Miss Coffman were operating as a team and she actually took the purse instead of you, well-" "Well, then we both took it," Marlow replied. The court then sustained Marlow's counsel's objection on the basis that the question called for a legal conclusion. The prosecutor resumed: "During all these crimes, were you and Miss Coffman acting as a team?" Marlow responded affirmatively.

A witness may not express an opinion on a defendant's guilt. (People v. Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37, 47; People v. Brown (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 820, 827-829.) The reason for this rule is not because guilt is the ultimate issue of fact for the jury, as opinion testimony often goes to the ultimate issue. (Torres, supra, at p. 47; Brown, supra, at pp. 827-828; see Evid. Code, § 805.) "Rather, opinions on guilt or innocence are inadmissible because they are of no assistance to the trier of fact. To put it another way, the trier of fact is as competent as the witness to weigh the evidence and draw a conclusion on the issue of guilt." (Torres, supra, at p. 47.) Coffman contends the admission of Marlow's testimony regarding her culpability violated these longstanding principles. She asserts there was no foundational showing that Marlow understood the legal definitions of the crimes about which he was questioned. She also asserts Marlow had no basis upon which to make any admission or confession of her guilt, and for these reasons his testimony was irrelevant. Coffman further contends that Marlow's status as the only living witness to the crimes, besides herself, rendered his testimony highly prejudicial.

We conclude Coffman's argument lacks merit. In context, the prosecutor was attempting, with some success, to get Marlow to concede the truth of the allegations against him and to describe, as a percipient witness, the degree of defendants' coparticipation during the commission of the offenses against Novis. We see in Marlow's testimony the expression of an opinion regarding neither Coffman's guilt nor her credibility or state of mind.

H. Impeachment of Veronica Koppers

1. Admission of prior inconsistent statements

Marlow's sister, Veronica Koppers, testified for the prosecution concerning events leading up to and immediately following Novis's murder. Before defendants' trial, Koppers was herself tried and convicted of being an accessory to the kidnapping and robbery of Novis. While in custody during her own trial, Koppers took medications for depression and difficulty sleeping (Elavil and Sinequan, respectively); in the present trial, she testified she had problems recalling what happened during the period of her incarceration, including the substance of her testimony at her own trial. Finding Koppers was being deliberately evasive in stating she did not recall what Marlow was wearing and what he had said at the Drinkhouse residence on the night of the offenses and in claiming that the transcript of her prior testimony did not refresh her recollection, the trial court permitted the prosecutor, over Marlow's objection, to read Koppers's former testimony to the jury.

Marlow contends the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to impeach Koppers with her former testimony, because the court's finding of willful evasiveness was not supported by substantial evidence. We find no error.

Evidence Code sections 770 and 1235 except from the general rule against hearsay evidence a witness's prior statement that is inconsistent with the witness's testimony in the present hearing, provided the witness is given the opportunity to explain or deny the statement. (Evid. Code, § 770, subd. (a).) "Normally, the testimony of a witness that he or she does not remember an event is not inconsistent with that witness's prior statement describing the event." (People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1219.) When, however, "a witness's claim of lack of memory amounts to deliberate evasion, inconsistency is implied." (Ibid.) The trial court had the opportunity to view Koppers's demeanor and therefore was in the best position to assess the credibility of her claimed nonrecollection. Marlow asserts that short-term memory loss is a known side effect of Elavil, but no such medical evidence was presented to the trial court in this case. We find no error in the trial court's ruling in this regard. Marlow's derivative claims of constitutional error likewise fail.

2. Trial court's refusal to admit Koppers's prior testimony

Coffman contends the trial court erred in refusing to permit her to impeach Koppers with prior inconsistent statements she had made in the course of her own criminal trial, and that the error deprived Coffman of her state and federal constitutional guarantees including the rights to a fair trial, to confront witnesses and to reliable determinations of guilt and penalty. As framed, the contention distorts the trial court's actual ruling. The court found that Koppers was not unavailable as a witness. It consequently refused to allow a wholesale reading of Koppers's prior testimony, but pledged to continue allowing her impeachment as appropriate on further findings that she was feigning loss of memory. Additionally, although the court was not then addressing an instance where Koppers's current testimony was directly inconsistent with her prior testimony, nothing in its comments suggests it meant to preclude appropriate impeachment in such a situation.

We see no error in the trial court's ruling. Coffman fails to establish that Koppers's failures of recollection rendered her unavailable as a witness so as to except her former testimony from the operation of the rule against hearsay. (See Evid. Code, § 1291.) Subject to an exception not relevant here, Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a) defines "unavailable as a witness" to mean "that the declarant is any of the following: (1) [e]xempted or precluded on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the matter to which his or her statement is relevant[;] [¶] (2) [d]isqualified from testifying to the matter[;] [¶] (3) [d]ead or unable to attend or to testify at the hearing because of then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity[;] [¶] (4) [a]bsent from the hearing and the court is unable to compel his or her attendance by its process[; and] [¶] (5) [a]bsent from the hearing and the proponent of his or her statement has exercised reasonable diligence but has been unable to procure his or her attendance by the court's process." Plainly, Koppers fit none of these categories. As Coffman observes, "California courts have not interpreted Evidence Code sections 240 and 1291 so strictly as to preclude unlisted variants of unavailability. Rather, courts have given the statutes a realistic construction consistent with their purpose, i.e., to ensure that certain types of hearsay, including former testimony, are admitted only when no preferable version of the evidence, in the form of live testimony, is legally and physically available." (People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 226-228.) From this principle, Coffman argues Koppers's failure to qualify under the specific statutory requirements for unavailability does not necessarily compel the conclusion she was not unavailable. Coffman, however, cites no decision approving wholesale admission of former testimony in a case like this, where the declarant was present on the stand, responded to questions, and was appropriately subject to impeachment with prior inconsistent statements from her former testimony when she feigned loss of memory. Indeed, Coffman acknowledges the trial court permitted her to impeach Koppers with portions of her former testimony, but complains that "due to its brevity, its presentation out of context, and the lack of continuity, its meaning was obscured and its import to the jury was lost." Nothing in the trial court's ruling, however, foreclosed Coffman from using appropriate questions to set context and impart continuity in impeaching Koppers's testimony.

Coffman also complains the trial court erred under Evidence Code sections 770 and 1235, and the rule in People v. Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 985, by failing to admit Koppers's prior testimony for the truth of the matters asserted therein. Since she cites no specific ruling to this effect, the contention is apparently derivative of her broader argument that she should have been allowed to read into the record the whole of Koppers's prior testimony. It lacks merit for the reasons previously discussed.

I. Testimony of Dr. Lenore Walker

1. Marlow: Admissibility of opinions; adequacy of limiting instruction

Marlow contends the trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider Dr. Walker's opinion that Coffman was a battered woman in arriving at its verdict against him and in failing to instruct, sua sponte, that such opinion was inadmissible as to him. Marlow notes the trial court had instructed the jury, during Coffman's testimony, that all testimony about her relationship with Marlow that was not directly related to the offenses against Novis was admissible only with respect to Coffman's state of mind. When Dr. Walker took the stand, the trial court instructed the jury that the evidence Walker had taken into account in forming her opinion that Coffman was a battered woman was hearsay as to Marlow and therefore inadmissible against him. Marlow complains, however, that the court did not similarly restrict the admissibility of Dr. Walker's opinions, leaving the jury to use those opinions in deciding his guilt or innocence. Walker's opinions, he argues, as to him essentially constituted bad character evidence, which was inadmissible because he had proffered no favorable character evidence. (See Evid. Code, §§ 1101, 1102.)

We disagree. Marlow points to nothing in the court's instructions expressly or impliedly permitting the use of Dr. Walker's opinions against him. Even in the absence of a contrary instruction, the court repeatedly instructed the jury that Coffman's evidence pertaining to defendants' relationship that was not directly related to the Novis offenses was admissible only as to Coffman's state of mind. Therefore, that the jury employed Dr. Walker's opinions as a form of bad character evidence against Marlow is not reasonably probable. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) Any possible inadequacy in the court's instructions in this regard, moreover, appears harmless in light of other instructions the jury received, cautioning it as to the limited purpose for which evidence of battered woman syndrome was admitted, that the facts underlying hypothetical questions asked expert witnesses were not necessarily true, and that the jury could disregard any expert opinion it found unreasonable. (CALJIC Nos. 2.09, 2.80, 2.82 and 3.32.)

Marlow further contends the admission of Dr. Walker's opinion that Coffman was credible in her accusations against him, and the trial court's failure specifically to instruct the jury that expert testimony is inadmissible to establish credibility, violated his rights to due process of law and a reliable penalty determination as guaranteed by the federal Constitution. Marlow enumerates some 10 instances in which he asserts Dr. Walker testified that, in her professional opinion, Coffman was truthful. Trial counsel failed to object to or move to strike all but one of these instances, however, and as to the remaining instance the objection was on the ground of lack of foundation rather than that the witness was impermissibly rendering an opinion as to Coffman's credibility. Thus, Marlow forfeited the claim he now seeks to raise on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 666.) Because, however, he asserts counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to preserve the point, we address its substance.

On the merits, the challenged opinion that Coffman was credible should have been excluded on a proper objection. The general rule is that an expert may not give an opinion whether a witness is telling the truth, for the determination of credibility is not a subject sufficiently beyond common experience that the expert's opinion would assist the trier of fact; in other words, the jury generally is as well equipped as the expert to discern whether a witness is being truthful. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a); see People v. Cole (1956) 47 Cal.2d 99, 103.) Thus, we have held that a psychological expert may not testify about rape trauma syndrome, a condition analogous to battered woman syndrome, in order to prove that a rape actually occurred, although such testimony is admissible to rehabilitate the credibility of the complaining witness against a suggestion that her behavior after the assault-such as a delay in reporting it-was inconsistent with her claim of having been raped. (People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 247-248, 251; see also People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300 [expert testimony pertaining to failure of parent of child molestation victim to report abuse].) On a number of occasions in the present case, rather than merely explaining, with reference to her expert knowledge, certain aspects of Coffman's behavior that a layperson might find irreconcilable with her claim to have been battered, Dr. Walker testified she believed Coffman's claims of abuse and domination by Marlow were true. To this extent, a timely and specific objection probably should have been sustained.

Assuming error in the admission of Dr. Walker's opinions concerning Coffman's credibility, we nevertheless conclude Marlow did not suffer prejudice. Marlow, of course, was not charged with any offense against Coffman, nor was Dr. Walker's testimony offered to vouch for the credibility of Coffman's testimony regarding Marlow's role in the offenses against Corinna Novis; rather, her testimony was offered to support Coffman's defense that, by virtue of the coercion exerted by Marlow's physical and psychological abuse, as reflected in the diagnosis of battered woman syndrome, she lacked the intent to kill. The trial court, moreover, instructed the jury during Dr. Walker's direct testimony that it could consider the evidence concerning battered woman syndrome only in evaluating Coffman's defense, not against Marlow. We presume the jury followed this instruction. (See People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 79 [jury presumed to follow instruction pertaining to sentencing factors].) We see no reasonable likelihood the jury would have understood the instruction to preclude it from considering against Marlow only the facts underlying Dr. Walker's opinion, not the opinion itself. (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 48.) For these reasons, and because the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 3.32, cautioning that evidence of battered woman syndrome could be considered only for the limited purpose of showing Coffman's mental state, we reject Marlow's additional contention that Dr. Walker's opinion that Coffman was a battered woman and incapable of forming the intent to kill was improper bad character evidence against Marlow. (See Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) The jury, moreover, also received the standard instructions that it was not bound by an expert's opinion and could disregard any opinion found to be unreasonable, and that they were the sole judges of the credibility of a witness and the weight to be accorded his or her testimony. (CALJIC Nos. 2.80, 2.20.) Marlow acknowledges that a trial court generally has no sua sponte duty to give an instruction limiting the purpose for which evidence is received (see People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 64); he fails to persuade us to hold to the contrary with respect to an instruction that Dr. Walker's opinion should not be used in assessing Coffman's credibility.

In sum, despite the admission into evidence of Dr. Walker's opinion concerning Coffman's credibility, reversal is not required. Marlow's related claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and his derivative claims of federal constitutional error likewise must fail.

2. Coffman: Prosecutorial misconduct in cross-examination of Dr. Walker

Coffman contends the prosecutor improperly cross-examined Dr. Walker, over objection and a motion for mistrial, by using hypothetical questions contrary to the evidence, by applying unreasonable, prejudicial assumptions regarding Robin Long's statements, and by asking a prejudicial question regarding an excerpt of a draft report that implied Coffman was malingering. Acknowledging these asserted errors implicate state evidentiary rules in the first instance, Coffman contends they also violated her federal and state constitutional rights to due process, equal protection and a fair trial before an impartial jury, as well as the rights to present a defense, to the effective assistance of counsel and to a reliable determination of guilt and penalty. We conclude the challenged questions constituted proper cross-examination as to the bases of Dr. Walker's opinions (Evid. Code, § 721, subd. (a)); hence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the questioning, and Coffman's derivative claims of constitutional error likewise fail. (See People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642.)

Coffman first contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by asking Dr. Walker whether convincing physical evidence that it took more than one person to kill Novis would alter her opinion regarding Coffman's mental state at the time of the offense. After Coffman's counsel unsuccessfully objected that the question assumed facts not in evidence, Dr. Walker denied that such evidence, without more, would change her opinion. We see no impropriety in the hypothetical question, which was predicated on the forensic evidence showing dirt in the back of Novis's mouth, which in turn suggested that two persons might have participated in the killing (one strangling the victim while the other held her prone on the ground). Because the trial court instructed the jury on the definition of a hypothetical question and reminded it of its role as the arbiter of fact and its obligation to consider whether the facts supporting the question had been adequately proven, Coffman could not have been prejudiced by any lack of foundation for the question.

Coffman asserts a further instance of misconduct in the prosecutor's cross-examining of Dr. Walker, to whom Coffman had denied being present while Marlow was killing Novis, regarding Coffman's inconsistent statements to Robin Long, who had not yet testified at the time of Walker's testimony. The trial court overruled Coffman's objection, admonishing the jury not to consider the evidence unless it ultimately found the foundational facts had been proven. Dr. Walker again denied that such evidence, without more, would alter her opinion, specifically noting she viewed Long's reliability as questionable. For the same reasons why the hypothetical question discussed above was proper, we conclude the prosecutor engaged in no misconduct in asking Dr. Walker about statements Robin Long was expected to testify Coffman had made to her, statements that were inconsistent with those Coffman had made to Dr. Walker and on which Walker testified she had relied in forming her opinion.

We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings. An expert witness may be cross-examined on, among other subjects, the matter upon which his or her opinion is based and the reasons for the opinion, including any statements by the defendant that formed the basis for the expert's opinion. (Evid. Code, § 721, subd. (a); People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 151-152.) Because Dr. Walker acknowledged that she had relied on Coffman's own statements about the abuse Marlow allegedly inflicted on her and her involvement in the charged offenses in forming her opinion concerning Coffman's mental state, the prosecutor was entitled on cross-examination to explore Coffman's inconsistent statements to others, including Long. And because forensic evidence, including the pathologist's testimony that dirt was found in the back of Novis's mouth, suggested that more than one person may have participated in the actual killing, contrary to Coffman's testimony that she did not take part in or witness the killing, we reject Coffman's argument that the prosecutor's hypothetical questions were merely designed to inflame the jury without regard to the evidence. Coffman's purely derivative constitutional claims likewise must fail.

Finally, Coffman complains of misconduct in the prosecutor's cross-examination of Dr. Walker concerning Coffman's expressed desire, noted in Walker's draft report to Coffman's counsel, to marry Marlow so they could die together in the gas chamber holding hands. No objection was made at the time; later, after the jury was dismissed for the day, Coffman's counsel stated he had refrained from objecting at the time in order to avoid drawing attention to the comment and because he acknowledged the comment was part of Walker's interview with Coffman and thus a proper subject of cross-examination. Counsel suggested, however, that the jury be admonished not to consider penalty at that point. The following morning, outside the presence of the jury, counsel for both defendants moved for a mistrial, contending the prosecutor had misused the excerpt from Dr. Walker's report by inappropriately injecting the question of penalty into the guilt phase. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning the circumstances surrounding the comment and the purpose of the question were clear to the jury: "[T]o again probe the expert witness as to her reasons for her testimony as to Miss Coffman's intentions and feelings in this case. [¶] It was one of the things that was considered by the expert and I think was an appropriate thing to inquire about. [¶] It was not emphasized in any way. There was no undue importance given to it. Just one of the things indicating her close relationship and feelings about Mr. Marlow at the time she was being questioned and also her sense of guilt or remorse or lack of either." Counsel for defendants apparently did not pursue their suggestion that the jury be instructed to give no consideration whatsoever to penalty at this phase of the trial, as such an instruction was not given despite the prosecutor's and the court's acquiescence therein.

There was nothing improper about the challenged cross-examination. As respondent points out, Dr. Walker acknowledged relying on Coffman's statements in forming her opinion regarding Coffman's mental state at the time of the offense, and the prosecutor therefore was entitled to question her regarding the bases of that opinion. (Evid. Code, § 721, subd. (a).) Nor were the prosecutor's questions unduly prejudicial.

J. Other Asserted Instance of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Coffman)

In addition to the instances of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel addressed above in connection with other substantive claims of error, Coffman contends her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in putting before the jury, during the guilt phase, otherwise inadmissible evidence of her involvement in the Kentucky and Orange County murders. Although she acknowledges counsel had a purpose for introducing the evidence-to show that Marlow had compelled Coffman to participate in murders for which she lacked criminal intent or malice aforethought, and in which she participated only as a result of battered woman syndrome-Coffman now urges this court to hold that, under the circumstances of this case, "this totally misguided tactical decision" constituted ineffective assistance of counsel requiring reversal of the judgment.

" ` "Reviewing courts defer to counsel's reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a `strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.' " [Citations.] "[W]e accord great deference to counsel's tactical decisions" [citation], and we have explained that "courts should not second-guess reasonable, if difficult, tactical decisions in the harsh light of hindsight" [citation]. "Tactical errors are generally not deemed reversible, and counsel's decisionmaking must be evaluated in the context of the available facts." ' " (People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1254.)

Introducing, in Coffman's defense case, the evidence of her involvement in the Kentucky and Orange County murders was a tactic that, while not risk-free, offered the hope of countering the prosecution's strong proof that Coffman was guilty of intentionally murdering Corinna Novis. To hold that counsel rendered ineffective assistance in doing so would merely be to second-guess this decision with the benefit of hindsight. We will not do so.

K. Sufficiency of Evidence

Defendants each challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdicts and findings as to various charges and special circumstances. "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment of conviction, we examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, presuming in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence, to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 631.) State and federal due process requirements are identical in this regard. (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 269.)

We examine defendants' arguments individually.

1. Sufficiency of evidence that Marlow committed burglary special circumstance, sodomy, and sodomy special circumstance

Marlow first contends that no evidence supported the prosecution's theory of burglary, namely that Novis was alive when defendants entered her apartment or that they formed the intent to commit burglary before she died. The prosecutor noted the absence of any signs of forced entry into Novis's apartment, arguing based on this circumstance that defendants must have entered using a key while Novis was still alive. Marlow argues the argument lacks any foundation in logic. Therefore, Marlow contends, the burglary special-circumstance finding must be reversed.

The felony-murder special circumstance applies to a murder committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in the commission of, the attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit, various enumerated felonies, including, as relevant here, burglary. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) A strict causal or temporal relationship between the felony and the murder is not required; what is required is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to commit the felony at the time he killed the victim and that the killing and the felony were part of one continuous transaction. (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1141; People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 631-632.) Additionally, in this Carlos-era case, the prosecution was required to prove that defendants intended to kill the victim. (See Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 135; People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1139-1140 [overruling Carlos]; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 973, fn. 4 [holding Anderson could not be applied retroactively].)

The jury in this case easily could conclude that defendants had formed the intent to commit burglary before Novis was killed. In particular, the evidence showed that Novis's apartment was difficult to find, and the glove box of her car contained a map of the area where she lived, with the location of her apartment circled. This suggested that Novis told defendants where she lived (and, likely, that she lived alone, enabling defendants to enter without fear of discovery by a roommate). Evidence concerning the answering machine stolen by defendants also supports the jury's verdict on the burglary charge: Coffman and Marlow left the Drinkhouse residence with Novis around 9:00 p.m., and a friend of Novis's who telephoned her around 10:00 p.m. testified the answering machine failed to pick up her call, suggesting that the machine had been disconnected and stolen by that time. Defendants' theory was that, in less than an hour after leaving the Drinkhouse residence, they left Novis in a Fontana vineyard, then drove to the Robbeloth residence in Colton where Marlow changed his clothes, then went to a First Interstate Bank branch and discovered they were unable to access Novis's account because she had given them the wrong PIN, whereupon they for the first time decided to go to Novis's apartment in Redlands to search for the correct PIN. The jury was not required to accept defendants' version of these events. Rather, from the objective evidence before it, the jury rationally could conclude defendants formed the intent to commit burglary before murdering Novis and committed both crimes as part of a continuous transaction.

Marlow also contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the element of penetration necessary to sustain the sodomy conviction and related special circumstance. (§ 286.) The evidence bearing on sodomy came in part from the testimony of the pathologist, Dr. Gregory Reiber. Dr. Reiber's examination discovered sperm heads in the victim's rectum. The sperm could have been placed there from 24 hours to perhaps as long as 96 hours prior to the victim's death. There was no evidence of injury or tearing of the outside of the anus, which although not dispositive was consistent with consensual as opposed to forcible sodomy. No ABO typing or other testing was done to compare Marlow's blood or genetic characteristics with those of the sperm found in the victim. Marlow's expert pathologist, Dr. Robert Bucklin, testified, based on his review of the medical records and other testimony, that the lack of trauma to the victim's anus tended to indicate that no penetration had taken place and that the sperm had been deposited through some other means, such as withdrawal of the penis from the vagina after ejaculation.

The pathologists' testimony regarding the presence of sperm in the victim's rectum was sufficient to establish the element of penetration. Their testimony, moreover, cannot be read in isolation from the circumstances surrounding the offense. Corinna Novis was abducted and forced to accompany defendants to the Drinkhouse residence. When Drinkhouse protested and expressed concern about his own liability, Marlow told him not to worry, stating, "How is she going to talk to anybody if she's under a pile of rocks?" Drinkhouse heard the shower running and then stop, after which Marlow emerged from the bedroom dressed only in trousers. Later, a wet-haired Novis was led, handcuffed and with duct tape across her mouth, from the Drinkhouse residence by Marlow and Coffman. Thus, the evidence-reflecting that defendants maintained control over an unwilling Novis and that Marlow took her into the shower and later killed her, coupled with the pathologists' testimony, clearly supported the jury's conclusion that Marlow committed a forcible sodomy. Moreover, the sodomy special circumstance is satisfied by an attempt to commit sodomy, which in turn consists of acts falling short of actual penetration so long as the perpetrator has done more than mere preparation. (People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 610; see People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 377 [attempted oral copulation].) We have no doubt the evidence here supported the jury's finding on the sodomy special circumstance.

2. Sufficiency of evidence of special circumstances as to Coffman at close of prosecution's case-in-chief; trial court's failure to dismiss felony-murder charge on Coffman's motion pursuant to section 1118.1

Coffman moved for acquittal at the close of the prosecution's case on the ground of insufficient evidence to support the sodomy and burglary special-circumstance allegations. (§ 1118.1.) She now asserts error in the trial court's adverse ruling and its failure to dismiss the felony-murder and all special circumstance allegations. The test applied by the trial court in ruling on a motion for acquittal is the same test applied by the appellate court in reviewing a conviction for sufficiency of the evidence, namely, to determine whether from the evidence then in the record, including reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is substantial evidence of the existence of every element of the offense charged. (People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 261; People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 695, disapproved on another ground in People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220-1221.) Coffman first contends there was no substantial evidence that she intended to kill Novis, as required in this Carlos-era case (see Carlos v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 135; People v. Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1139-1140 [overruling Carlos]; People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 973, fn. 4 [holding Anderson could not be applied retroactively]), and that the trial court therefore erred in failing to dismiss the special circumstance allegations pursuant to section 1118.1. We are unpersuaded. The prosecution's evidence of Coffman's participation in the crimes was sufficient to permit the trial court to reasonably find that Coffman knew of and shared Marlow's intent to kill Novis in order to eliminate the witness to their crimes. The evidence included, among other acts, Coffman's leading Novis into a bedroom at the Drinkhouse residence; standing guard while Novis was handcuffed to a bedpost; alerting Marlow to Drinkhouse's behavior suggesting he might be trying to leave the house while defendants were holding Novis and trying to obtain her PIN; emerging, in changed clothing, from the bedroom where Novis was being held, which was adjacent to the bathroom in which the shower had been heard to run during this period; leading the handcuffed Novis, whose hair was wet and whose mouth was taped shut, from the Drinkhouse residence; and driving Marlow and Novis in Novis's car to the vineyard where the body was found. Testimony that the date of Novis's death could be estimated only within a five- or six-day span, and the evidence that sperm can be preserved in a living person for up to 96 hours, neither undermined the prosecution's case nor dictated a contrary verdict. The record at the conclusion of the prosecution's case thus contains substantial evidence of Coffman's participation, with the required intent, in the murder and each of the felonies underlying the special circumstance findings. Even were we to agree with Coffman that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the sodomy special circumstance for insufficient evidence at the close of the prosecution's case, reversal of the remainder of the judgment would not be required, as the evidence more than sufficed to support the remaining special circumstance allegations at the time of the court's ruling.

Coffman further argues the evidence showed two kidnap offenses, one involving bringing Novis from the mall to the Drinkhouse residence and the other taking her from the residence to the vineyard. She urges that the first kidnapping was not part of a continuous transaction with the killing because it was a kidnapping for robbery completed at the time of their arrival at the residence and that the second kidnapping was incidental to the killing and thus cannot support a felony-murder-kidnap special circumstance. To the contrary: Based on the evidence presented to it, the jury could reasonably conclude that defendants murdered Novis to advance the underlying felonious purposes of kidnapping, robbery, burglary and sexual assault, none of which was merely incidental to the murder. Although Coffman relies on People v. Ford (1966) 65 Cal.2d 41, overruled on other grounds in People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 35, that case is not on point. In that case, the defendant shot a deputy sheriff who had stopped his car, which defendant had been driving aimlessly for several hours after a reported robbery. This court concluded that insufficient evidence supported a conviction of felony murder because the robbery and escape from it did not motivate the defendant's conduct in killing the officer. (Id. at p. 57.) Here, as respondent argues, the evidence clearly showed the murder was committed to facilitate and conceal the other offenses.

Coffman additionally contends that the prosecution's theory of the case, supported by the testimony of Robin Long, was that the robbery and burglary were complete before the commission of the murder, that after committing the robbery and burglary, but before the killing, defendants had reached a place of temporary safety, and that the robbery and burglary hence were not part of one continuous transaction with the killing for purposes of the felony-murder rule. (See People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 631-632.) As discussed above in connection with Marlow's similar claim, we reject Coffman's initial premise. On the evidence presented to it, the jury could reasonably have believed defendants formulated the intent to commit burglary before killing Novis and carried out the burglary after doing so.

L. Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct in Guilt Phase Argument

Coffman contends the prosecutor engaged in a pattern of misconduct during his guilt phase summation by misstating the law, impugning the integrity of defense counsel, and arguing that evidence of other bad acts by Coffman, indicating her criminal disposition, proved her guilt of the present charges. The misconduct, she asserts, denied her due process, a fair trial and a reliable determination of the facts in a capital trial in violation of her rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and their state constitutional analogues. The claim is, in substance, one of deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.

A prosecutor's conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it "infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process." (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44; accord, Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 416 U.S. 637, 643.) In other words, the misconduct must be "of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial." (United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 108 [addressing prosecutorial duty of disclosure].) A prosecutor's conduct " `that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair' " violates California law " `only if it involves " `the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.' " ' " (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 167.)

Turning to the specific claims of misconduct, we note that, at trial, Coffman failed to object or seek an admonition with respect to four of the five instances of improper argument she cites in her brief. As to those four instances, she therefore has forfeited her claims for purposes of this appeal. (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 970.) She asserts, however, that counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective assistance. In any event, we find no prejudicial misconduct.

First, Coffman claims the prosecutor misstated the law of robbery in arguing he had proven defendants guilty of murder committed in the course of that crime. Responding to defendants' arguments that Novis was killed after the underlying felonies were completed, the prosecutor sought to convey that the evidence sufficed for a finding that defendants had formed the intent to commit those felonies, as required for the special circumstances alleged in this case, before the murder. As the prosecutor argued: "The essence of these special circumstances is that the murder itself must be to facilitate the underlying crimes of burglary, robbery, kidnapping, but it doesn't have to happen simultaneously. [¶] If the decision was in the mind of the perpetrator of the crimes that it would help them get away with the crime by murdering this person, the special circumstances is [sic] satisfied. It doesn't matter when they are murdered." The prosecutor proceeded to give a hypothetical example of a murder committed during the course of a robbery and went on to argue: "If you determine, as the evidence makes abundantly clear, that Corinna Novis was killed to eliminate her as a witness, to kidnap for robbery[,] for burglary and for sodomy, that is a murder during the course of those crimes. [¶] Pure and simple. You can't have a purer example of killing somebody to facilitate the commission of the crime. [¶] . . . [¶] We had kind of an example of that in this case and it related to Corinna Novis's checks. [¶] From the evidence, when Corinna is kidnapped they probably take her purse with the checks in them pretty quickly. You can assume the checks were in her purse. [¶] Corinna gets killed the night they take her. But when is the robbery involving the checks actually completed? Isn't it actually completed days later when the checks are forged and they pass the checks to get the money? That is what they really want. [¶] You see, here is a case where they have killed Corinna a couple of days before they actually complete that part of the robbery they were intending. But because the thought was we are going to take all of her money, it doesn't matter they killed her a couple of days before the checks were cashed. Same principle applies to the burglary."

The prosecutor's remarks, taken in context, somewhat inartfully urged the jury to find that defendants formed the intent to rob Novis before killing her, even though they did not obtain all the fruits of the crime until after the killing. The jury, moreover, was correctly instructed with the elements of robbery and with the proposition that any statement by an attorney inconsistent with the court's instructions as to the law must be disregarded. Consequently, there was no reasonable likelihood any juror would have applied the prosecutor's comments erroneously. (People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 970.)

Next, Coffman complains the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to categorically refuse to consider defendants' testimony and to summarily convict them because their respective testimony was mutually irreconcilable. She further contends the prosecutor's argument for conviction illogically relied on admissions contained in the very testimony he was urging the jury to disregard. Contrary to Coffman's argument, no misconduct appears, as the prosecutor was merely asking the jury to conclude that both defendants had been willfully false in a material part of their testimony and therefore the jury should reject their conflicting testimony and rely on the objective evidence supporting a determination of their guilt of the charged offenses. We see no reasonable likelihood any juror would have misunderstood the argument in the manner Coffman suggests. (People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 970; see CALJIC No. 2.21.2.)

Coffman further argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by urging conviction based on defendants' other bad acts, as reflected in the uncharged Kentucky and Orange County killings. Both she and Marlow objected to the prosecutor's reference to the other crimes on the basis the evidence of those crimes had been admitted, and the jury had been instructed to consider it, only as it related to Coffman's defense of coercion. Marlow moved for a mistrial; Coffman joined in the motion, which the court denied, reasoning: "The only use of argument was for the purpose of showing the relationship between the two parties and how they worked together, rather than one under the influence of the other. [¶] That was the purpose for which that evidence was introduced. The argument was appropriate." As the trial court reasoned, the prosecutor's remarks, in context, did not urge a finding of guilt based on defendants' other bad acts or criminal disposition, but instead properly suggested that each defendant bore responsibility for the crimes because neither acted under the other's coercion.

Coffman additionally cites as misconduct the prosecutor's reference to the testimony of the Taco Bell employee who testified Coffman had reacted violently when told the restaurant was closed; the prosecutor commented that Coffman on that occasion appeared "mad, angry, violent, pushy." Contrary to Coffman's argument, the quoted characterization of her behavior hardly amounts to an implication that she was of a criminal disposition. And the prosecutor's reference to Coffman's antisocial conduct before she met Marlow (carrying a gun and trying to run down Doug Huntley while living in Arizona) clearly comprised part of his argument that she was not the sort who is "dominated by any man as she's suggesting. [¶] She can take care of herself." Because there is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have misapplied the prosecutor's argument in the manner Coffman contends, no misconduct appears.

Coffman also asserts the prosecutor impugned the integrity of defense counsel by depicting the duress and battered woman syndrome defense as manufactured by defense counsel together with the defense expert, Dr. Walker. The prosecutor commented: "If you look at statements to the police, all of Miss Coffman's conduct before Mr. Jordan [her defense counsel] and Dr. Walker come on the case, you just don't see the picture of this battered woman, desperately battered woman. [¶] Once Dr. Walker and Mr. Jordan come on the case-. . . . That's when Miss Coffman decides she is the battered woman." Respondent argues, to the contrary, the prosecutor's point was that Coffman, "on her own, amplified her claims of abuse" when she learned in the course of preparing a defense that it would be advantageous to do so. In our view, the prosecutor's argument is susceptible of either interpretation. Nevertheless, were we to address the merits of the contention despite the want of an objection below, we would conclude any misconduct was harmless, given the fleeting nature of the comment and the overwhelming weight of the evidence against Coffman.

Coffman additionally argues the prosecutor misstated to the jury crucial items of evidence. Specifically, she complains, the prosecutor attributed planning activity, including donning attractive clothing before going to the Redlands Mall to abduct Novis and securing a gun and handcuffs from the Koppers residence and Paul Koppers's truck, to both Coffman and Marlow although, Coffman asserts, it was Marlow alone who engaged in or directed that activity. The prosecutor also allegedly misstated the evidence when he asserted, in support of the burglary special circumstance, that defendants intended to burglarize Novis's apartment before they killed her when, according to Coffman, no evidence supported the assertion. The prosecutor further allegedly misstated the testimony of the pathologist, Dr. Reiber, in urging the jury to conclude that three hands were needed to strangle Novis and inaccurately stated "they" (inferentially, both defendants) participated in burying Novis, when the only evidence in the record bearing on the point was Marlow's statement to detectives that he had done so.

A prosecutor engages in misconduct by misstating facts or referring to facts not in evidence, but he or she enjoys wide latitude in commenting on the evidence, including urging the jury to make reasonable inferences and deductions therefrom. (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 819, 823, 827-828.) In our view, the challenged comments generally fall within the permitted range of fair comment on the evidence. The thrust of the prosecutor's argument was that defendants jointly engaged in the offenses against Corinna Novis, regardless of whose idea it was to dress up or procure a gun and handcuffs. Although Coffman characterizes the burglary of Novis's apartment as an afterthought that arose when defendants' efforts to obtain cash from her bank account initially proved unavailing, the jury was entitled to infer that defendants entertained a broader purpose in abducting and murdering her. Dr. Reiber's testimony supported the prosecutor's argument that both defendants participated in the act of strangling Novis; the prosecutor's suggestion that defendants acted together in covering Novis's grave, even if unsupported by the testimony, could not have prejudiced Coffman in view of the relatively insignificant nature of the comment and the overwhelming weight of the evidence against her. Consequently, Coffman is not entitled to reversal of her conviction on this basis. Because any possible misconduct was harmless on this record, Coffman's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel lacks merit.

M. Asserted Instructional Error

1. Instruction on forcible sodomy as supporting first degree felony murder; failure to instruct on second degree murder

Coffman contends, and respondent concedes, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury in this case that forcible sodomy could support a finding of first degree murder. Under California law as it existed in 1986 when Novis was killed, and until the approval of Proposition 115 by the voters in the general election of June 1990, forcible sodomy was not included in section 189's enumeration of felonies supporting a first degree felony-murder conviction. The error, however, was harmless, because the jury's verdicts on the robbery and burglary charges and related special circumstance allegations reflect that the first degree murder conviction was grounded upon other, valid legal theories of felony murder. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 368.) Coffman, argues, to the contrary, that the submission to the jury of the natural and probable consequences theory of aider and abettor liability meant the jury did not necessarily find she had the requisite specific intent to commit robbery, burglary and sodomy. Given, however, that the jury was instructed that aider and abettor liability required knowledge of the perpetrator's criminal purpose and acting with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging or facilitating the commission of the crime (see CALJIC No. 3.01), her argument lacks merit.

Coffman further argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on second degree felony murder based on sodomy. Any error in this regard clearly was harmless in light of the jury's findings on the robbery and burglary charges and related special circumstances, including its findings of intent to kill as to each special circumstance allegation. (See People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721, overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 149, and disapproved on other grounds in People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 684, fn. 12 [error in omitting instruction harmless when factual question posed by that instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to defendant under other, properly given instructions].)

Coffman also contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on second degree murder as a lesser included offense of either premeditated and deliberate first degree murder or first degree felony murder. She theorizes that defendants completed their robbery of Novis when they arrived at the Drinkhouse residence, at which point the kidnapping became one for extortion (of Novis's PIN) rather than robbery. Coffman further suggests that when she and Koppers took Novis's purse and drove her car to a 7-Eleven store, while Marlow remained at the Drinkhouse residence with Novis, Coffman had reached a place of temporary safety definitively terminating the prior robbery as to her, even though Novis remained captive under Marlow's control. She contends that, had she been the actual perpetrator of the robbery, once away from the victim, she would at that point have reached a place of temporary safety and that, as an aider-abettor, her liability for robbery could not exceed what it would have been had she been the perpetrator. She contends further that the sodomy, assuming it occurred, was solely for Marlow's sexual gratification, not as part of a conditional threat to extract information. She asserts that the prosecutor's theory of the crimes-that, from the moment they accosted Novis, defendants must have had a plan to take all of her property-is "at variance with the way in which common criminals happen to commit crimes."

We disagree with Coffman's premise that the robbery terminated at the point when defendants brought Novis to the Drinkhouse residence; far from being a place of safety, the residence was the home of another person whom the evidence showed defendants felt the necessity of monitoring and impliedly threatening, lest he reveal their criminal activity, during the period of their occupation while they maintained control over the captive Novis. Nor did the robbery terminate as to Coffman during her temporary absence from the house. Rather, the evidence shows all of defendants' offenses against Novis to have been part of a continuous transaction for purposes of felony-murder liability. Because no evidence supported the theory that defendants murdered Novis in the course of some lesser included felony rather than robbery, the trial court had no obligation to instruct on second degree felony murder. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733.) And any error in failing to instruct on second degree implied-malice murder as a lesser included offense of premeditated and deliberate first degree murder was harmless, because the factual question posed by the omitted instruction necessarily was resolved unfavorably to Coffman under the instructions on the special circumstance allegations, which required a finding of intent to kill. (People v. Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 721.) Finally, to the extent Coffman argues that evidence of her use of drugs around the time of the offenses supported an instruction on second degree murder on the theory that intoxication precluded formation of the specific intent to kill as necessary for first degree murder, we observe the jury was instructed that if it found defendants were intoxicated at the time of the offenses, it should consider that fact in determining whether they had the intent or mental state required for the crimes of murder, kidnapping, kidnapping for robbery, robbery and residential burglary. That the jury convicted Coffman of all of the charged offenses and found true the special circumstance allegations, which required it to find intent to kill, indicates it found she was not so intoxicated as to be unable to form the required mental states; consequently, a more favorable outcome had a second degree murder instruction been given was not reasonably probable. (People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.

2. Asserted error in instructions concerning battered woman syndrome and related defenses

Coffman contends the trial court erred in refusing her request for certain instructions pertaining to her defense based on battered woman syndrome. She further contends the instructions the court actually gave on battered woman syndrome and its relation to the mental states required to prove the charged offenses were prejudicially deficient. For the reasons that follow, we disagree.

Consistent with her defense that she participated in the offenses against Novis because she feared Marlow would harm her or her son, Coffman asked the trial court to instruct the jury that battered woman syndrome evidence, if believed, might negate any intent to kill; that battered woman syndrome evidence might be sufficient, by itself, to raise a reasonable doubt whether Coffman had the intent to kill Novis; that battered woman syndrome evidence could support a reasonable doubt whether Coffman had the intent required to "encourage or facilitate" Marlow in killing Novis; that a defense of duress may be based on threats of harm to persons other than the accused; and that a defendant is not an accomplice if he acted under threats or menaces sufficient to give him cause to believe his life would be endangered if he refused to help.

The trial court refused the requested instructions. Instead, the court instructed the jury that it could consider evidence of battered woman syndrome solely for the purpose of determining whether Coffman had actually formed the mental state required for the charged offenses of murder, kidnapping, kidnapping for robbery, robbery, residential burglary and sodomy by the use of force, and for the special circumstance allegations. The court further instructed that a person is not guilty of a crime when he or she engages in conduct that is otherwise criminal, when the person is acting under threats or menaces that would cause a reasonable person to fear that his or her life would be in immediate danger if he or she did not engage in the conduct charged, and the person then believed that his or her life would be so endangered. The court instructed that this rule does not apply to threats, menaces and fear of future danger to the person's life, or when the person commits a crime punishable with death. The court also instructed, however, that such evidence, if believed by the jury, might still be relevant in determining whether or not the defendant had formed the intent or mental state required for the crimes charged. The court also instructed that an act committed by a person who is in a state of voluntary intoxication is no less criminal by virtue of the person's having been in such a condition, that voluntary intoxication was no defense to the charge of sodomy by force, and that evidence of intoxication could be considered in determining whether defendants had the mental state or specific intent required for the crimes of murder, kidnapping, kidnapping for robbery, robbery and residential burglary.

Coffman complains the instructions given were incomplete, inaccurate and erroneous with respect to (1) the relationship between battered woman syndrome and coercion; (2) the crimes to which the defense of coercion applies, and the applicability of coercion to aider-abettor liability; (3) the principle that coercion, as shown by battered woman syndrome, can negate intent to kill, which was an element of first degree murder and the special circumstances; (4) the defense of necessity; and (5) the relationship between battered woman syndrome and Coffman's credibility. More specifically, she complains the instructions failed to inform the jury that it could consider evidence of battered woman syndrome in evaluating the defense of coercion, in determining whether Coffman perceived herself or any of her family members to be in imminent peril from Marlow, and in assessing her credibility and conduct pertaining to her jailhouse exchange of letters with Marlow.

Under appropriate circumstances, "a trial court may be required to give a requested jury instruction that pinpoints a defense theory of the case by, among other things, relating the reasonable doubt standard of proof to particular elements of the crime charged. [Citations.] But a trial court need not give a pinpoint instruction if it is argumentative [citation], merely duplicates other instructions [citation], or is not supported by substantial evidence [citation]." (People v. Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 558.)

We conclude the instructions given here correctly and (with one exception) adequately informed the jury that it could consider the evidence of battered woman syndrome in determining whether Coffman had formed the mental state or specific intent required for the charged offenses, and the trial court therefore did not err in refusing Coffman's proposed instructions. At least one of the requested instructions properly could have been refused as argumentative because it would have directed the jury to draw inferences favorable to Coffman from specific evidence on a disputed question of fact. (People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1135.) The instruction on threats of harm to a third person was also properly refused under the evidence presented. Because the defense of duress requires a reasonable belief that threats to the defendant's life (or that of another) are both imminent and immediate at the time the crime is committed (People v. Lo Cicero (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1186, 1191, disapproved on another point in Curl v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1292, 1301, fn. 6; People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1012), threats of future danger are inadequate to support the defense. Because any danger to Coffman's child (who was living in Missouri) was not shown to be immediate, the trial court correctly rejected Coffman's proposed instruction on this point.

Contrary to Coffman's argument, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on the defense of necessity, which Coffman never raised at trial and which finds no support in the evidence in this case. The defense of necessity generally recognizes that "the harm or evil sought to be avoided by [the defendant's] conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged." (People v. Richards (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 768, 777.) The defendant, who must have possessed a reasonable belief that his or her action was justified, bears the burden of proffering evidence of the existence of an emergency situation involving the imminence of greater harm that the illegal act seeks to prevent. (People v. Patrick (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 952, 960; People v. Condley, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1011-1013.) As respondent rightly points out, "t is not acceptable for a defendant to decide that it is necessary to kill an innocent person in order that he [or she] may live, particularly where, as here, Coffman's alleged fear related to some future danger." Our observations in People v. Anderson, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pages 777-778, although referring specifically to the duress defense in the context of gang-related killings, are pertinent here. "A person can always choose to resist rather than kill an innocent person. The law must encourage, even require, everyone to seek an alternative to killing. Crimes are often committed by more than one person; the criminal law must also, perhaps especially, deter those crimes. California today is tormented by gang violence. If duress is recognized as a defense to the killing of innocents, then a street or prison gang need only create an internal reign of terror and murder can be justified, at least by the actual killer. Persons who know they can claim duress will be more likely to follow a gang order to kill instead of resisting than would those who know they must face the consequences of their acts. Accepting the duress defense for any form of murder would thus encourage killing." (Ibid.)

Finally, with respect to Coffman's contention that the instructions given were deficient because they failed to inform the jury that it could consider the evidence of battered woman syndrome in assessing her credibility or her conduct in sending letters to Marlow while in jail or in determining whether she perceived imminent peril to herself from Marlow, we note her proffered instructions failed to convey these concepts, which are not shown to fall in the category of general principles of law so closely and openly connected with the facts before the court as to come within the court's sua sponte instructional obligations. (See People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531.) Accordingly, the contention must fail.

3. CALJIC No. 2.15

Defendants contend the trial court erred in instructing the jury, according to CALJIC No. 2.15, that the jury could infer from defendants' conscious possession of stolen property their guilt of the "crimes alleged," without limitation to theft-related offenses. They are correct. (People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 248-249.) In view of the overwhelming evidence of defendants' guilt, however, and the panoply of other instructions that guided the jury's consideration of the evidence (e.g., CALJIC Nos. 2.90 [presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt standard of proof], 2.00 [defining direct and circumstantial evidence], 2.02 [sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove specific intent], 3.31 [requirement of union of act and specific intent], 1.01 [duty to consider instructions as a whole]), we see no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for either Marlow or Coffman had the instruction not been given. (Prieto, supra, at p. 249.)

4. CALJIC Nos. 2.04, 2.06

Coffman contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could infer she harbored a consciousness of guilt if it found certain predicate facts. CALJIC No. 2.04, as given in this case, provides: "If you find that a defendant attempted to or did persuade a witness to testify falsely or attempted to or did fabricate evidence to be produced at the trial, such conduct may be considered by you as a circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt. However, such conduct is not sufficient in itself to prove guilt and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for your determination." And, as given here, CALJIC No. 2.06 provides: "If you find that a defendant attempted to suppress evidence against himself or herself in any manner, such as by the intimidation of a witness, by destroying evidence [or] by concealing evidence, such attempts may be considered by you as a circumstance tending to show a consciousness of guilt. However, such evidence is not sufficient in itself to prove guilt and its weight and significance, if any, are matters for your consideration." She contends these instructions denied her a fair trial by irrationally permitting an inference of guilt of all of the charged offenses based on evidence of her consciousness of guilt of only some offense or offenses less than capital murder. (Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307, 314-315.) She also may be understood to contend that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that she committed the requisite predicate acts (i.e., attempting to persuade a witness to testify falsely, to fabricate evidence, or to conceal or destroy evidence).

We disagree. First, unlike CALJIC No. 2.15, CALJIC Nos. 2.04 and 2.06 do not direct the jury to infer guilt of the "crimes alleged" and thus do not give rise to an irrational presumption of guilt of all charges, without limitation, from evidence relevant only to a theft-related offense. Coffman merely speculates that the evidence of her consciousness of guilt present in this case might relate only to the less serious charges against her. Because CALJIC Nos. 2.04 and 2.06 instructed the jury to infer a consciousness of guilt only if it first found from the evidence that defendants had engaged in the described conduct, and further informed the jury such evidence was not, in itself, sufficient to prove guilt, the instructions properly guided the jury's consideration of the evidence and did not lessen the prosecution's burden of proof. (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1223-1224.)

Second, to the extent Coffman contends that facts giving rise to an inference of consciousness of guilt must be conclusively established before CALJIC Nos. 2.04 and 2.06 may be given, she is incorrect; there need only be some evidence in the record that, if believed by the jury, would sufficiently support the suggested inference. (People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 597-598; see also People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1246.) The evidence in this case clearly warranted the giving of these instructions. Relevant to CALJIC No. 2.04, for example, defendants' jailhouse correspondence included references to "Jack," a fictitious actual perpetrator of the crimes, suggestive of an effort to persuade each other to testify falsely or to fabricate evidence. As for CALJIC No. 2.06, the evidence showed that defendants discarded their own identifying documents together with Novis's near a Taco Bell restaurant in Laguna Beach, that Coffman switched license plates on Novis's car, and that she wiped fingerprints from the car before abandoning it in Big Bear. The trial court, therefore, did not err in giving CALJIC Nos. 2.04 and 2.06. Additionally, as objections to these instructions would not have been well taken, Coffman's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance in failing to make them.

5. Accomplice instructions

Defendants challenge several aspects of the accomplice instructions given in this case. Coffman complains the trial court incorrectly defined the term "accomplice" for the jury. She also contends witnesses Richard Drinkhouse and Veronica Koppers were accomplices as a matter of law, and the jury should have been instructed accordingly. She further asserts that the modified version of CALJIC No. 3.18 given in this case forced the jury to perform the "impossible mental gymnastic" of simultaneously distrusting (when offered against Marlow) and not distrusting (when offered in her own behalf) her testimony. Marlow (joined by Coffman) similarly urges error in the instruction directing the jury to apply the general rules of credibility when weighing his testimony in his own defense, but distrusting his testimony against Coffman if it found him to be her accomplice. We conclude defendants' contentions lack merit.

The relevant principles governing accomplice testimony are well settled. No conviction can be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless such testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, an "accomplice" being one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial. (§ 1111.) Accessories, therefore (defined as persons who, after a felony has been committed, harbor, conceal or aid a principal in the felony with the intent that the principal avoid criminal liability therefor and knowing that the principal has committed the felony or been charged with or convicted thereof), are not accomplices as to whose testimony corroboration is required. (§§ 31, 32; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 833-834.) Whether a person is an accomplice is a question of fact for the jury unless the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom are undisputed. (Fauber, supra, at p. 834.)

Here, the jury was instructed that "[a]n accomplice is a person who was subject to prosecution for the identical offense charged in any count against the defendant on trial by reason of aiding and abetting." Coffman contends the instruction was erroneous because only if the jury found Marlow was an aider and abettor of the crimes, not the perpetrator, could it apply the instruction to him. Because the evidence showed Marlow was the perpetrator, Coffman reasons, the jury would have concluded it could convict her on the strength of his testimony without the required corroboration. Viewing the instructions as a whole, we do not think the jury would have misunderstood its charge along the lines Coffman suggests. As respondent points out, Marlow was entitled to a presumption of innocence, and it was obvious to the jury that defendants stood accused of being accomplices to each other and that its task was to determine whether one acted as an aider and abettor to the other or whether the two acted in concert. That any deficiency in this instruction affected the verdict is not reasonably probable. (People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 163-164.)

The jury also was instructed as follows: "You are to apply the general rules of credibility when weighing Cynthia Coffman's testimony in her own defense. [¶] But if you find her to be an accomplice, then in weighing her testimony against James Gregory Marlow you ought to view it with distrust. [¶] This does not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard such testimony. [¶] But give to it the weight to which you find it to be entitled after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the evidence in the case. [¶] You are to apply the general rules of credibility when weighing James Gregory Marlow's testimony in his own defense. [¶] But if you find him to be an accomplice then in weighing his testimony against Cynthia Coffman you ought to view it with distrust. [¶] This does not mean that you may arbitrarily disregard such testimony. [¶] But give to it the weight to which you find it to be entitled after examining it with care and caution and in the light of all the evidence in the case." Marlow essentially contends the artificiality of the distinction between defensive and offensive testimony in the context of this case rendered the instruction virtually impossible for the jury to follow and undermined the presumption of innocence. We disagree. Because the evidence abundantly supported an inference that each defendant acted as an accomplice to the other, and because each testified and, to some extent, sought to blame the other for the offenses, the court was required to instruct the jury that an accomplice-defendant's testimony should be viewed with distrust to the extent it tended to incriminate the co-defendant. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 217-218.) Such, essentially, is what the foregoing instruction did. The instruction correctly informed the jury that, insofar as it assigned one accomplice-defendant's testimony any weight in determining the co-defendant's guilt, it must view such testimony with distrust and find sufficient corroboration, as elsewhere defined for the jury. We see no reason to believe this relatively straightforward task was beyond the jury's capabilities. Contrary to Marlow's argument, the instruction did not undermine the presumption of innocence or deprive defendants of due process. As we have observed: "[T]he testimony of a defendant ought not to be viewed without distrust simply because it is given by a defendant. Under the law, a defendant is surely equal to all other witnesses. But, under that same law, he is superior to none." (Id. at p. 219; see ibid., fn. 23.)

We reject Coffman's further contention that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that Richard Drinkhouse and Veronica Koppers were accomplices as a matter of law. As noted above, an accomplice is one who is subject to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant. (§ 1111.) Although both Drinkhouse and Koppers suffered convictions for their role in the offenses against Novis (Drinkhouse by a plea of guilty to false imprisonment and Koppers, following a jury trial, for being an accessory and for receiving stolen property), the record lacks evidence from which the jury could have found that either Drinkhouse or Koppers aided or abetted, or otherwise facilitated, with the requisite intent, any of defendants' criminal actions. Consequently, neither was, at least as a matter of law, an accomplice whose testimony the jury should have been instructed to view with distrust.

Finally, we reject Coffman's complaint that the trial court erred prejudicially in omitting, from the accomplice instruction pertaining to defendants' testimony, the requirement that the burden is on a defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the co-defendant is an accomplice, as was correctly stated in the general accomplice instructions pertaining to Drinkhouse and Koppers, to trigger the corroboration requirement. First, to the extent the instruction failed to impose on Coffman the burden of proving Marlow was an accomplice as a prerequisite to applying the corroboration rule to his testimony and to being directed to view it with distrust, she was not prejudiced. Second, because the court's instruction directed the jury to view Marlow's testimony with distrust if it found him to be an accomplice, the jury implicitly was told to make a finding in this regard, and in doing so most likely, and correctly, would have applied the preponderance standard as it was instructed to do with respect to Koppers and Drinkhouse. Thus, it is not reasonably probable Coffman would have received a more favorable outcome had the instructions been modified to include the omitted language.

6. Instruction on natural and probable consequences doctrine; refusal of Coffman's requested limiting instruction

The trial court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 3.02, on the natural and probable consequences doctrine of aider and abettor liability. Using CALJIC No. 3.01, the court defined aiding and abetting and, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.81.17, informed the jury that, in order to return a true finding on any special circumstance allegation, the jury had to find that the defendant had the specific intent to kill or to aid another in the killing of a human being. Coffman voiced no objection to these instructions as given. On appeal, however, she contends the instruction on natural and probable consequences was prejudicially defective in failing to inform the jury that "natural and probable" means "reasonably foreseeable," thereby permitting the jury to convict her of murder without sufficient evidence of the required mental state. Coffman contends she suffered further prejudice by the court's refusal to instruct the jury that it must not use evidence of the Kentucky and Orange County killings in arriving at any verdict and that such evidence was admitted solely on the question of whether she intended to kill or to encourage or facilitate Marlow's killing the victim. Finally, Coffman contends the natural and probable consequences doctrine is unconstitutional in capital cases because it predicates criminal liability on negligence, in violation of due process. We find no merit in her contentions.

Elaborating on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, in People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 261, and People v. Croy (1985) 41 Cal.3d 1, 12, footnote 5, we observed that an aider and abettor "is guilty not only of the offense he intended to facilitate or encourage, but also of any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by the person he aids and abets." As the Court of Appeal in People v. Brigham (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1039 noted, although variations in phrasing are found in decisions addressing the doctrine-"probable and natural," "natural and reasonable," and "reasonably foreseeable"-the ultimate factual question is one of foreseeability. (Id. at pp. 1050, 1054; see People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 316-322.) "A natural and probable consequence is a foreseeable consequence" (People v. Fabris (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 685, 698, disapproved on another ground in People v. Atkins (2001) 25 Cal.4th 76, 90, fn. 5); the concepts are equivalent in both legal and common usage. Coffman cites no authority for the contention that the term "natural and probable consequences" is one having a meaning peculiar to the legal context and that, therefore, the term must be expressly defined for the jury. (See People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 967.) Indeed, in People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 535, the Court of Appeal found sufficient, without inclusion of the phrase "reasonably foreseeable," the instruction Coffman challenges here. We agree with the Nguyen court that CALJIC No. 3.02 correctly instructs the jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. To the extent Coffman contends that imposition of liability for murder on an aider and abettor under this doctrine violates due process by substituting a presumption for, or otherwise excusing, proof of the required mental state, she is mistaken. Notably, the jury here was also instructed with CALJIC No. 3.01, advising that an aider and abettor must act with the intent of committing, encouraging or facilitating the commission of the target crime, as well as CALJIC No. 8.81.17, which required, for a true finding on the special circumstance allegations, that defendants had the specific intent to kill the victim. These concepts fully informed the jury of applicable principles of vicarious liability in this context.

Nor did the trial court err in refusing Coffman's requested instruction that it was not to use evidence of the Kentucky and Orange County killings, which had been admitted solely on the issue whether Coffman entertained the intent to kill or to encourage or facilitate Marlow in killing the victim, in reaching its verdict in this case. The requested instruction was duplicative of CALJIC Nos. 2.09, instructing the jury about evidence admitted for a limited purpose, and 2.50, advising it to use such evidence not to find criminal propensity but rather to determine whether the necessary element of intent was proven. (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 659.) When Coffman introduced evidence of the Kentucky and Orange County killings, moreover, the jury was specifically instructed as to its limited purpose. We presume it followed these instructions. (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 436.)

Finally, we reject the premise of Coffman's argument that the application of the natural and probable consequences doctrine in capital cases unconstitutionally predicates murder liability on mere negligence. Liability as an aider and abettor requires knowledge that the perpetrator intends to commit a criminal act together with the intent to encourage or facilitate such act; in a case in which an offense the perpetrator actually commits is different from the originally intended crime, the natural and probable consequences doctrine limits liability to those offenses that are reasonably foreseeable consequences of the act originally aided and abetted. (See People v. Nguyen, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 531.) Moreover, by finding true the special circumstance allegations against Coffman, the jury in this case necessarily found she possessed the intent to kill. Having found no error in these instructions as given in this case, we perforce reject Coffman's claim that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to them.

IV. Penalty Phase

A. Adequacy of Notice of Aggravating Evidence and Asserted Boyd Error as to Coffman

Coffman contends the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence that she had in the past engaged in nonviolent criminal and non-criminal conduct, in violation of the rule in People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762 and her rights to due process, equal protection and a fair trial before an impartial jury, as well as her rights to present a defense and to have a reliable determination of guilt and penalty as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and analogous provisions of the state Constitution. She further contends the prosecutor provided inadequate (or no) notice of such evidence, thereby violating section 190.3 and the same state and federal constitutional provisions. We conclude the challenged evidence was properly admitted, some as properly noticed aggravating evidence and the remainder as rebuttal to Coffman's evidence in mitigation.

Governing principles may be summarized as follows. Except for evidence in proof of the offense or special circumstances that subject a defendant to the death penalty, the prosecution may present no evidence in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. (§ 190.3.) Any aggravating evidence not relating to the sentencing factors enumerated in section 190.3 is inadmissible in the penalty phase. (People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 773-776.) Aggravating evidence must pertain to the circumstances of the capital offense (§ 190.3, factor (a)), other violent criminal conduct by the defendant (id., factor (b)) or prior felony convictions (id., factor (c)); only these three factors, and the experiential or moral implications of the defendant's age (id., factor (i)), are properly considered in aggravation of penalty. (See People v. Wader, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 657 [a majority of statutory sentencing factors can only be mitigating, citing cases so holding as to factors (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (k), and noting that whether factor (j) is exclusively mitigating is undecided]; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 831 [factor (i)].) Evidence offered as rebuttal to defense evidence in mitigation, however, is not subject to the notice requirement of section 190.3 and need not relate to any specific aggravating factor. (In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 206-207; § 190.3.)

First, Coffman complains that although the notice of aggravation specified, with respect to the brandishing incident, only that the prosecution intended to introduce evidence concerning her possession and brandishing of a loaded handgun and the surrounding facts and circumstances, in Barstow on April 5, 1986, the prosecution improperly presented evidence that Coffman possessed, and was under the influence of, either cocaine or methamphetamine on that date; she evaded arrest; she was verbally abusive, rude and loud in speaking with the police; she was arrested for possession of a derringer, possession of a drug and being under the influence of the drug; and, about one year before the April 5, 1986, incident, she was angry at Huntley and drove a car close enough to him to force him to move out of the way. Second, Coffman complains that the prosecution presented unnoticed, non-statutory aggravating evidence that after the murder of Lynell Murray, Coffman behaved in a celebratory manner at a Denny's restaurant, embracing Marlow, talking loudly, ordering and consuming food and wine, and using Murray's credit card to pay for the meal; and that Coffman subsequently used Murray's credit card again at a sporting goods store in Big Bear.

We conclude the prosecution gave sufficient notice to Coffman of the April 5, 1986, brandishing incident and its surrounding circumstances. Contrary to Coffman's implicit argument, she was not entitled to notice of all the testimony the prosecution intended to present. (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1219.) We note that although Coffman objected to the introduction of evidence relating to the incident and sought a mistrial on that basis, she did not claim she was denied discovery and did not seek a continuance to defend against the evidence.

We further conclude that the testimony regarding Coffman's behavior at the time of the April 5, 1986, brandishing incident, the incident about a year earlier involving driving at Huntley in her car, and her conduct after the killing of Lynell Murray did not constitute improper non-statutory aggravation. Regarding the brandishing and driving incidents, the prosecutor expressly offered the circumstances of these incidents as rebuttal to Coffman's defense-which she introduced with the aim of negating or mitigating her guilt in the initial phase of trial and later continued to assert in her case in mitigation in the penalty phase-that she had at all times pertinent to the current offenses acted under Marlow's domination. That is, the prosecutor properly sought to rebut Coffman's evidence by showing that before she ever met Marlow, she had behaved violently and aggressively and had demonstrated a willingness to possess and use a firearm. In addition, the evidence of Coffman's behavior following the Murray offenses was both properly noticed as part of the "facts and circumstances surrounding" the kidnapping, robbery, rape and murder of Murray and admissible as pertinent to section 190.3, factor (b). Thus, we reject Coffman's claims of error.

B. Testimony of Dr. Craig Rath

1. Asserted prosecutorial misconduct in suggesting through inadmissible evidence that Marlow fit the definition of a sexual sadist serial killer

In his direct testimony in Coffman's case in mitigation, clinical psychologist Craig Rath, Ph.D., opined that Coffman could not be classified as a serial killer, primarily because serial killers are "almost exclusively male." On cross-examination, the prosecutor reviewed with Dr. Rath the various characteristics of serial killers and whether they applied to Coffman, observing, "I'm not talking about Mr. Marlow at all." Dr. Rath stated he knew of no cases of female sexually sadistic serial killers and repeatedly insisted that certain identified traits were characteristic only of male serial killers. The trial court instructed the jury that Dr. Rath's testimony was offered only as to Coffman and was inadmissible as to Marlow. Marlow now contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting Dr. Rath's opinion that sexual sadist serial killers are exclusively male in an impermissible effort to induce the jury to use Rath's testimony against Marlow.

We first observe that Marlow forfeited this claim of misconduct by failing to make contemporaneous objection at trial, although he objected on other grounds not renewed here. As previously noted, a prosecutor's conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it "infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process." (People v. Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 44.) A prosecutor's conduct " `that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair' " violates California law " `only if it involves " `the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.' " ' " (People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 167.) The prosecutor's cross-examination of Dr. Rath properly sought to impeach Rath's opinion that Coffman did not meet the criteria for a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder and could not properly be classified as a serial killer. (Evid. Code, §§ 773, subd. (a) [scope of cross-examination], 801, subd. (b) [permissible bases for expert opinion]). He did not examine Rath concerning whether Marlow could be so classified. We find no misconduct.

2. Asserted prosecutorial misconduct and trial court error in failing to limit cross-examination of Dr. Rath

Coffman contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by, in effect, presenting, during his cross-examination of Dr. Rath, his own unsupported theory that Coffman was a sociopath and a serial killer. The trial court's failure to confine the prosecutor to the proper scope of cross-examination, she argues, constituted prejudicial error. Noting that the prosecutor, during his guilt phase cross-examination of Dr. Lenore Walker, had sought to demonstrate that Coffman fit the diagnostic criteria for antisocial personality disorder by eliciting examples of criminal conduct in which Coffman had engaged before she met Marlow, Coffman further maintains the prosecutor, during the penalty phase, continued this tactic of introducing evidence of her bad acts to prove a criminal disposition, contrary to Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a). Coffman acknowledges that her counsel attempted, in his case in mitigation, to counter the prosecutor's suggestion that she was a sociopath by eliciting from Dr. Rath the opinion that serial killers are almost exclusively male and that Coffman did not fit the profile of a serial killer. She then complains that the ensuing cross-examination "was not rebuttal but a continuation of the themes which the prosecution itself had originally raised in the trial." In particular, Coffman argues, the prosecutor improperly examined Dr. Rath concerning the Rappaport article (see fn. 42, ante) in order to reinforce the suggestion that she was of a criminal disposition. Coffman also contends the prosecutor improperly questioned Dr. Rath concerning whether a sexual sadist serial killer could be female and whether Coffman's bragging about the offenses, as testified to by jailhouse informant Robin Long, was consistent with the behavior of a serial killer. In this connection, she also complains that the prosecutor wrongly put before the jury, during the penalty phase, non-statutory aggravating evidence including that she had carried a gun in Barstow before ever meeting Marlow and that, shortly after the murder of Lynell Murray, she behaved exuberantly in a Denny's restaurant in the City of Ontario. Coffman argues the above evidence was improper rebuttal, as her defense did not attempt to portray her as "having a character incompatible with antisocial conduct."

Although Coffman at one point objected to the cross-examination of Dr. Rath as going beyond the scope of the direct examination, she did not object to the evidence of her behavior before or after the Murray killing or other evidence of violent criminal conduct the prosecutor had introduced in aggravation. She thus failed to preserve these claims for appeal. In any event, we find the challenged cross-examination entirely proper as an exploration of the basis of Dr. Rath's opinion, and the evidence of Coffman's conduct was proper rebuttal to her penalty phase defense. The trial court, therefore, did not err in failing to "confine" the prosecutor's cross-examination of Rath, and the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by probing into the basis of Dr. Rath's opinions. As no ground appears on which additional objections would have succeeded in limiting the scope of the cross-examination, Coffman's trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to make them.

C. Testimony of Katherine Davis and Marlene Boggs

1. As nonnoticed aggravation and improper propensity evidence

Marlow complains that the testimony by his former wife, Katherine Davis, and her mother, Marlene Boggs, presented during Coffman's case in mitigation (discussed in detail, post) constituted, in essence, nonnoticed evidence in aggravation and improper evidence of his propensity for violence. He further asserts that Coffman's counsel actively concealed from his defense team their intention to call Davis and Boggs. The admission of their testimony, he contends, thus violated Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) and deprived him of his rights to due process and a reliable penalty determination as guaranteed by the federal Constitution.

Marlow did not object to the evidence on the ground that it had not been included in the notice of aggravating evidence, but rather questioned its relevance to Coffman's case in mitigation and asserted it constituted non-statutory aggravating evidence. He therefore has forfeited this contention for appellate purposes. (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 453, fn. 15.)

In any event, we disagree with the substance of the contention. As pertinent to the introduction of aggravating evidence, section 190.3 provides: "Except for the evidence in proof of the offense or special circumstances which subject a defendant to the death penalty, no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to the trial." The statute thus contemplates that the prosecution will give notice of the aggravating evidence it will present, but omits any mention of a co-defendant's obligation to provide notice of penalty phase evidence. Moreover, the testimony of Davis and Boggs was not introduced by the prosecution in aggravation of Marlow's penalty, but by Coffman in mitigation of her own, and the trial court specifically admonished the jury not to consider the evidence as aggravation against Marlow. We presume the jury followed the admonition. (People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 435.) Defendant Marlow thus was not forced to defend against aggravating evidence without proper notice. Marlow's assertion that Coffman's counsel "actively concealed" their intention to call the witnesses, unsupported by any evidence in the record apart from counsel's failure to mention them in his opening statement, adds nothing to his argument.

Marlow further contends the testimony of Davis and Boggs should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 1101 as improper evidence of a propensity for violence. Again, we observe he failed to object on this specific ground at trial and thus has forfeited the contention for purposes of this appeal. (See People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 453, fn. 15.) In any event, the contention lacks merit. Marlow relies on People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 921, overruled on another ground in People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at page 724, footnote 6, where we rejected a claim of error in the exclusion of evidence of violent criminal activity on the part of a third person, offered to show that person was more likely the killer than was the defendant. Farmer, however, is distinguishable, in that here the trial court admitted the testimony of Davis and Boggs to rebut Marlow's insistence that Coffman was the instigator of Novis's murder: In overruling Marlow's objection to the evidence as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial, the trial court stated: "I think this is legitimate evidence to impeach the position which he has taken in opposition to her defense." We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. Moreover, before the jury retired to deliberate on penalty, the trial court specifically instructed it regarding the criminal acts it could consider as aggravating circumstances in the case and cautioned that it could not consider any evidence other than those enumerated aggravating circumstances. We again presume the jury followed these instructions. (Boyette, supra, at p. 436.)

2. Restriction on examination of Davis

Although Davis described in detail the course of her relationship with Marlow and his behavior toward her, Coffman challenges several rulings by the trial court that restricted certain aspects of the examination, claiming they violated her federal constitutional rights, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, to present mitigating evidence (Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604-605; Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 113-114) and to due process of law (Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346). In order to assess the propriety and effect of the challenged rulings, we find it necessary to set forth Davis's testimony in some detail.

Davis testified she met Marlow in 1977, when she was 18 or 19 years old and he was two years older. At their first meeting, they were somewhat hostile toward each other, but a few weeks later she and several of her friends took Marlow to her parents' house, where Davis and Marlow "partied" and had sex together for the first time. Later, when they were among a group of other teenagers and she was not immediately friendly to him, Marlow made a comment that greatly embarrassed her and caused her to be very angry toward him. Not long after that incident, Marlow appeared at the door of her apartment and demanded admission, beating on the door and threatening to destroy her car.

The next time she saw Marlow, he behaved like a gentleman and was attentive, romantic and considerate; on that occasion, she took him to a party she was attending. On the way, Marlow asked her to keep a handgun in her purse. Later that evening, Marlow pointed the gun at a man who was demanding drugs from him and who had broken the driver's window of the car Davis was driving, and gave him a "whipping." Still later that night as Davis and Marlow were visiting at the trailer of some friends, that man, one Jeff Tailor, and another man, both carrying shotguns, forced their way in. Tailor pointed his shotgun at Marlow. Davis, interposing herself between Marlow and Tailor, created a sufficient diversion to enable Marlow to grab both shotguns. After a scuffle, Marlow ran the two intruders off the property. The following morning, police arrested Marlow. Davis eventually bailed him out of custody and married him the same day.

Their marriage was initially happy, but their drug use and other behavior soon displeased Davis's parents, with whom they were living, and resulted in Davis and Marlow moving to Indianapolis to live with friends there. After the move, Marlow began accusing Davis of flirting with other men. He started manifesting fits of rage and would slap or hit her with his fist for no reason; on one occasion, he cut her on the shoulder and forearm with his pocketknife as she sat in the bathroom. Because of the tension and violence between Davis and Marlow, they soon were no longer welcome in their friends' house. At that point, they returned to Kentucky and stayed with her paternal grandparents. There, Marlow kept Davis isolated in their bedroom or elsewhere in the house most of the time, preventing her from talking with her relatives. After two weeks, they moved into a vacant house owned by Davis's maternal grandparents. There, on one occasion, Marlow became enraged and choked Davis into unconsciousness. When Davis became pregnant, Marlow was happy; they decided to name their child Joshua Luke. Marlow then wanted the couple to move back to McCreary County, Kentucky, where Davis had previously lived and where she had many relatives and friends. Davis feared such a move because of Marlow's intense jealousy. She was so distraught over the prospect of the move that she stabbed herself in the leg with a pair of scissors. Immediately after that incident, Marlow left the house, whereupon Davis's father chased him with a pistol and shot at him.

Over the course of her relationship with Marlow, Davis testified, she "wasn't a person any more"; she "didn't have any spirit," "didn't talk to other people," and "hardly even [made] eye contact with other people." She lost 73 pounds during their marriage, and her hair "fell out by the wads." Davis had tried to encourage Marlow to join her in attending church services, but on one occasion he responded by throwing her on the bed, getting on top of her and saying, in a menacing voice, "I am the devil and I own you."

Despite the extensive scope of the foregoing testimony, Coffman contends the trial court committed error of constitutional magnitude in precluding her from examining Davis concerning (1) her subjective reaction to Marlow's sexual performance; (2) the precise nature of Marlow's embarrassing remark; (3) the specific grounds for Marlow's arrest following the altercation in the trailer with two men armed with shotguns; (4) the identity of a person with respect to whom Marlow was particularly jealous in his relationship with Davis; (5) the size of the links on a chain Marlow often carried; (6) the reasons why Davis often cried and whether she lay awake at night during their stay in Indianapolis; and (7) whether Davis feared she would be killed if she returned with Marlow to McCreary County. The excluded evidence, Coffman contends, would have corroborated Dr. Walker's guilt phase testimony concerning battered woman syndrome and supported a lingering doubt of Coffman's guilt of the Novis and Murray homicides; thus, she urges, it constituted potentially mitigating evidence she was constitutionally entitled to have the jury consider. (See Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 586; Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, 455 U.S. 104; Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393, 395-399.)

As Coffman correctly observes, the cited authorities hold that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution require that the sentencer not be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence. Nevertheless, the trial court determines relevancy in the first instance and retains discretion to exclude evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will create substantial danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. (People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 64.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence described above. Davis's testimony presented to the jury a picture of a woman who endured abuse from Marlow similar to that described by Coffman, and thus tended to support Coffman's claim that she had acted under duress in committing the offenses. The additional details of Davis's abuse were either irrelevant to Coffman's circumstances, or their probative value was so slight as to be substantially outweighed by the danger of misleading the jury. The trial court properly excluded them.

D. Admission of Marlow's 1980 Statement Concerning Three Robberies

During the penalty phase, Supervising Probation Officer Evelyn Frantz read into the record a statement that defendant Marlow had made to a probation officer in connection with his 1980 guilty plea to three counts of robbery. In the statement, Marlow described the robberies he had committed in an apartment complex in Upland, a leather goods store in Upland, and a methadone clinic in Ontario, all in November 1979. Marlow now contends admission of his statement was error under the rules of Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, In re Wayne H. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 595, People v. Hicks (1971) 4 Cal.3d 757 and People v. Harrington (1970) 2 Cal.3d 991.

Marlow failed to preserve this issue for appellate review by making contemporaneous objection at trial, but he contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in this regard. In any event, the claim lacks merit.

A line of California authorities, beginning with People v. Quinn (1964) 61 Cal.2d 551, held that statements made under certain circumstances by criminal defendants to probation officers in the course of the preparation of a probation report were inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings. In Quinn, for example, the probation officer told the defendant he would not recommend probation if defendant failed to tell the truth; this court held that the "[d]efendant's admissions following this threat or implied promise of leniency were . . . involuntary," and their introduction into evidence required reversal. (Id. at p. 554; see also People v. Harrington, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 999 [statements made to probation officer in the hope that candor would persuade the officer to make a favorable report to the court were held inadmissible either as substantive evidence or for impeachment]; but see People v. Alesi (1967) 67 Cal.2d 856, 861 [statements made by defendant on advice of counsel, with no assertion of privilege at the time the statements were made, were admissible at a later trial].) In People v. Hicks, supra, 4 Cal.3d at pages 761-763, emphasizing the "paramount" nature of the policy of encouraging free and unfettered communication between a defendant and his or her probation officer, this court held it was error to admit a defendant's statement made, on the advice of a probation officer, to a judge in a related case. Similar rules were adopted in the context of juvenile proceedings. (E.g., Ramona R. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 807-810 [Cal. Const. precludes use of minor's testimony at fitness hearing in juvenile court in later adult criminal trial]; In re Wayne H., supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 598-601 [statements made by juvenile to probation officer held inadmissible in any subsequent proceeding as substantive evidence or for impeachment].)

In Minnesota v. Murphy (1984) 465 U.S. 420, however, the high court held that the federal Constitution does not compel exclusion from criminal proceedings of a defendant's statement to a probation officer. The court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing, but must be affirmatively asserted, except in limited situations involving inherently compelling pressure to speak (e.g., when the declarant is undergoing custodial interrogation), the threat of a penalty for exercising the privilege, or, related to the latter, a gambler's failure to file a gambling tax return. (Id. at pp. 429-430, 434, 439.) Although the defendant in Minnesota v. Murphy was required to speak-and speak truthfully-with his probation officer, he was not precluded from asserting the privilege and was not shown to have been subject to any penalty for doing so. Consequently, the high court held, his statements were voluntary and thus admissible. (Id. at pp. 436-439.) Following Minnesota v. Murphy, and in light of article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, the Court of Appeal in People v. Goodner (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1330-1332, held that statements made by a defendant to a probation officer during a presentence investigation interview could be used against him, at least in the absence of any evidence that the probation officer had threatened defendant with an unfavorable recommendation if he or she refused to give a statement. (Accord, People v. Pacchioli (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1340.) Thus, the Goodner court recognized, our decision in People v. Hicks, supra, 4 Cal.3d 757, did not survive Proposition 8. Marlow's claims, therefore, must fail.

E. Admission of Marlow's Refusal to Discuss Involvement in Methadone Robbery

Marlow contends the prosecutor violated the rule of Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. at pages 617-618 (Doyle), in eliciting testimony from Detective Scharf of the Ontario Police Department that in 1979, after being advised of and waiving his Miranda rights and answering several questions relating to methadone found in his possession, Marlow refused to answer questions about the clinic robbery. Marlow failed to object at trial on the ground he now advances and therefore has forfeited the contention for purposes of this appeal (People v. Hughes, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 332), but he contends his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in this respect. We conclude Marlow is not entitled to relief.

Doyle holds that the prosecution may not, consistent with due process and fundamental fairness, use post-arrest silence following Miranda warnings to impeach a defendant's testimony at trial. (Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 617-618.) Respondent asserts Doyle has no application here because Scharf testified, not in impeachment, but before Marlow took the stand. We find this contention inconsistent with the rationale of Doyle, that the impeachment by postwarning silence there condemned was "fundamentally unfair because Miranda warnings inform a person of his right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used against him." (Anderson v. Charles (1980) 447 U.S. 404, 407-408.) No less unfair is using that silence against a defendant by means of the prosecutor's examination of an interrogating detective even before the defendant has had the opportunity to take the stand.

Respondent further asserts, citing People v. Hurd (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1084, that Doyle does not protect against prosecutorial use of a defendant's refusal to answer selected questions after waiving Miranda rights and electing to speak to law enforcement authorities. The Hurd court stated: "A defendant has no right to remain silent selectively. Once a defendant elects to speak after receiving a Miranda warning, his or her refusal to answer questions may be used for impeachment purposes absent any indication that such refusal is an invocation of Miranda rights. . . . [Defendant] was not induced by the Miranda warning to remain silent. . . . [¶] . . . We do not think Doyle was meant to preclude the prosecutor from commenting on highly relevant evidence bearing on [defendant's] credibility, including [defendant's] refusal to provide critical details, when he had voluntarily waived his right to remain silent." (Id. at pp. 1093-1094.)

Other courts have taken a different view. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has held that a suspect may selectively waive his Miranda rights by agreeing to answer some questions but not others. (United States v. Soliz (9th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 499, 503-504, overruled on another ground in United States v. Johnson (9th Cir. 2001) 256 F.3d 895; United States v. Garcia-Cruz (9th Cir. 1992) 978 F.2d 537, 541-542.) Several other federal circuits have specifically held that Doyle precludes the use of partial silence to the extent that the defendant relied on a Miranda warning in refusing to answer specific questions. (Hockenbury v. Sowders (6th Cir. 1983) 718 F.2d 155, 159; United States v. Scott (7th Cir. 1995) 47 F.3d 904, 906-907; United States v. May (10th Cir. 1995) 52 F.3d 885, 890; United States v. Canterbury (10th Cir. 1993) 985 F.2d 483, 486.) In United States v. Harrold (10th Cir. 1986) 796 F.2d 1275, the federal Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reasoned, "To the extent that a defendant clearly relies on a Miranda warning to refuse to answer specific questions, he had been induced by the government to do it and his silence may not be used against him." (Id. at p. 1279, fn. 3.) We need not, in this case, determine whether comment on Marlow's refusal to answer questions pertaining to the robbery violated Doyle, because any such error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of other witnesses' testimony regarding Marlow's involvement in the robbery and the incident's relatively minor significance in the prosecution's case in aggravation. The lack of prejudice stemming from the assumed error is fatal to Marlow's related claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to the challenged comments.

F. Other Asserted Prosecutorial Misconduct

Coffman contends the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct during his penalty phase argument, violating her rights under state and federal law. As noted above, a prosecutor's conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it "infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process." (People v. Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 44; accord, Darden v. Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. at p. 181; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, supra, 416 U.S. at p. 643.) In other words, the misconduct must be "of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial." (United States v. Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at p. 108.) A prosecutor's conduct " `that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair' " violates California law " `only if it involves " `the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.' " ' " (People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 167.) By failing to make contemporaneous objection in this situation, where the record supports no contention that to do so would have been futile, Coffman failed to preserve any of her claims of prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase argument. (People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 970.) She contends, however, that her trial counsel's failure to make appropriate objection constituted ineffective assistance. In any event, as will appear, Coffman's contention that the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct lacks merit, and her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.

Coffman first contends the prosecutor improperly asserted that the very fact she was defending against the charges in this case with a defense of domination or duress, and in a posture conflicting with Marlow's defense, was itself evidence of sociopathy. She quotes the following portion of the prosecutor's argument: "And I think this theory, the alternative theory, that the defendants' classic sociopaths synergistic result affect each other results in this violent crime spree, really is the best theory to explain all the evidence you've got, for one thing. [¶] I mean, how can you get a fact pattern where each defendant can claim at least plausibly that they were dominated and controlled by the other defendant? [¶] Well, we have heard about sociopaths and what they are. [¶] They are people that abuse and exploit everyone they meet their whole life, right? [¶] So if you have two sociopaths, of course, they probably abused and exploited each other." In the same vein, Coffman contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by suggesting that, to the extent her defense drew upon her fear of harm to her son as motivating her to participate with Marlow in the charged crimes (in the face of evidence that she failed to mention any such fear to investigating officers after her arrest and that she wished to take Josh from his grandparents and have him come to live with herself and Marlow), Coffman was exploiting and "abusing" her son. With these arguments, the prosecutor appears to have been urging the jury to adopt a particular interpretation of the evidence, not-as Coffman asserts-misstating the law by asserting that the mere proffer of a defense is itself evidence of guilt. Likewise, the prosecutor's characterizations of Coffman's personality ("an uncontrollable temper," "utterly arrogant," "total disrespect for authority") did not purport to express a professional expertise, but constituted instead permissible comment on the evidence. There was no misconduct and no basis on which to object.

Coffman complains the prosecutor misstated evidence in arguing that the jury should draw no inferences favorable to Coffman from the testimony of Marlow's former wife, Katherine Davis, regarding the abuse she suffered at Marlow's hands. The prosecutor said: "I think in the-the thing I talked about in our guilt phase argument that I found repulsive that-is that battered woman syndrome we see one of Mr. Marlow's former wives. [¶] She clearly fits into that category. [¶] Of course, you'll remember she got out as quickly as she could. [¶] She had injuries. Corroboration. [¶] Miss Coffman's defense team is hoping that the genuine repulsion that we all feel towards that kind of a crime will somehow wash over Mr. Marlow and make her seem better. [¶] And I think they are trying to exploit that in this battered woman syndrome stuff." Coffman points out that Davis testified Marlow left her after a particularly violent episode, not that she (Davis) left Marlow. Coming as it did in the context of the prosecutor's argument emphasizing the evidence of Coffman's responsibility for the offenses, however, this minor misstatement would not, to a reasonable probability, have unfairly influenced the jury. Coffman further argues the prosecutor misrepresented the evidence in attributing ownership of the shovel with which Novis was buried, and the handcuffs with which Novis and possibly Murray were restrained, to both Coffman and Marlow, rather than Marlow alone. But the record contains sufficient evidence of defendants' joint participation in the offenses to support the prosecutor's use of the third person plural pronoun.

Coffman complains the prosecutor improperly referred to non-statutory aggravating evidence in referring in his penalty phase closing argument to her celebratory behavior at the Denny's restaurant following the murder of Lynell Murray. (People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 773.) We see no misconduct in the prosecutor's discussion of this evidence, which arguably tended to suggest Coffman's voluntary, active role in the crimes, contrary to her defense of domination and duress, and thus bore on section 190.3, factor (a), the circumstances of the offense.

Coffman further contends the prosecutor committed Davenport error (see People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289-290) in suggesting that deficiencies in her defense of duress constituted aggravating evidence. Clearly, however, in context the prosecutor was merely commenting on the state of the evidence, as he was entitled to do. No misconduct appears.

G. Asserted Instructional Errors

1. Marlow: Instruction that jury could consider all evidence received during both phases of trial

Marlow (joined by Coffman) complains the trial court exacerbated the erroneous admission of evidence in the guilt phase by instructing the jury, in the penalty phase, that it could consider all evidence received during both phases of the trial. (CALJIC No. 8.85.) The giving of this instruction, he contends, deprived him of a reliable penalty adjudication because it invited the jury to consider as evidence such matters as the Kentucky homicide, his alleged membership in the Aryan Brotherhood, his swastika tattoo, and Dr. Walker's opinion that he was a batterer, all of which evidence was admitted only for purposes of Coffman's defense. The instruction, Marlow urges, also permitted the jury to consider his assertedly coerced confession. Coffman also argues the instruction improperly allowed the jury to consider all the evidence she contends was erroneously admitted against her during the guilt phase of trial.

To the extent defendants argue the trial court erred in failing to clarify the instruction, they forfeited their appellate challenge by failing to request such clarification. (People v. Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 630; see People v. McLain (1988) 46 Cal.3d 97, 113.) In any event, the totality of the instructions as given properly guided the jury's consideration of penalty. In particular, before the commencement of penalty phase deliberations, the court instructed the jury as to the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors against which to evaluate the evidence (CALJIC No. 8.85), that evidence had been admitted against one defendant and not the other (CALJIC No. 2.07), that evidence had been admitted for a limited purpose (CALJIC No. 2.09), how to assess an expert's testimony (CALJIC No. 2.80), and the use of prior consistent or inconsistent statements as evidence (CALJIC No. 2.13). The jury was also properly instructed on the use of statements, taken in violation of Miranda, for impeachment purposes, and regarding Marlow's assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. Defendants therefore were not denied a reliable penalty determination as guaranteed by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.

2. Coffman: Failure to define implied malice

Coffman contends that the trial court's failure to instruct the sentencing jury on the definition of implied malice, given the lack of such an instruction in the guilt phase as well, resulted in "grave uncertainty" whether the jury rendered an individualized penalty based on Coffman's own personal conduct and responsibility, in violation of the Eighth Amendment's requirement of reliability in capital sentencing. She argues that the jury might have been so confused by the instructions actually given, including the definition of murder under section 187, a definition of first degree felony murder, and an instruction on murder liability predicated on an aiding and abetting theory, that it may have imposed the death sentence based on a belief that Coffman was guilty of murdering Lynell Murray even if it also concluded she lacked the intent to kill.

The contention lacks merit. The evidence relating to Lynell Murray's killing was properly admitted as other violent criminal conduct under section 190.3, factor (b). When the prosecution has introduced evidence, during the penalty phase, of a defendant's other violent criminal conduct, the trial court is not required, absent a request, to instruct on the elements of specific crimes that such evidence tends to prove. (People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 987; People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 72.) Here, Coffman never requested an instruction defining implied malice, and the trial court thus had no duty so to instruct. Given the abundant evidence, including Coffman's own guilt phase testimony, showing her active participation in the murder and other offenses against Lynell Murray, we see no reasonable likelihood the jury was confused by the lack of an instruction defining implied malice. (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 801-802.)

3. Coffman: Asserted defects in principal penalty phase instructions

Coffman contends the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that certain sentencing factors could only be considered in mitigation might have confused the jury as to the scope of its sentencing discretion and constituted error under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. She argues the introduction of the various sentencing factors by the phrase "whether or not" could have led the jury to conclude that the absence of such factors constituted aggravation. She also asserts the failure to explicitly designate aggravating and mitigating factors violated state and federal guarantees of equal protection inasmuch as, in non-capital sentencing, the factors are separately designated. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 421, 423.)

We have repeatedly held that sentencing factors need not be labeled as mitigating or aggravating, and we see no reasonable likelihood the jury would have misunderstood any mitigating factor as aggravating (see, e.g., People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 443-444; People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 801-803), or that the absence of a mitigating factor was itself an aggravating one (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 315). Further, we see no merit in Coffman's equal protection argument, for capital and non-capital defendants are not similarly situated for purposes of the choice among sentencing options.

Coffman challenges a number of other aspects of the standard sentencing instruction. She contends CALJIC No. 8.88, in its use of the terms "so substantial" and "warrants," was vague and misleading as to the jury's duty to return a death verdict only if aggravating circumstances outweighed those in mitigation, and only if it found death to be the appropriate sentence. We have held to the contrary. (People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 315-316.) She also faults the instruction for failing to inform the jury that if the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh those in mitigation, a sentence of life without the possibility of parole was mandatory. As she acknowledges, we have rejected this argument. (People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 593-594; People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 978.) Nor, contrary to Coffman's argument, was the instruction constitutionally defective for not informing the jury that even if it found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating ones, it still could return a verdict of life without the possibility of parole. (People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 997.) Coffman further contends the instruction unconstitutionally failed to inform the jury that in order to reach a death verdict, it had to find that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones beyond a reasonable doubt and that death was the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. We have rejected these contentions. (People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 782.) Contrary to Coffman's further contention, the instruction was not defective for failing to inform the jury as to which side bore the burden of persuading it of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a death verdict in this case. (People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 643.) Nor was the instruction defective for failing to require the jury to make unanimous separate findings on each of the aggravating circumstances or to render a statement of reasons for its death verdict. (People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 701; Medina, supra, at p. 782.) We decline to reconsider these holdings.

Finally, Coffman contends the instructions improperly suggested to the jury that it must unanimously agree on the presence of mitigating factors-in particular, the alleged duress or domination by Marlow-before it could consider them in determining her sentence. As we explain, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury so interpreted the court's instructions. (People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 801.)

The issue arose in the following context. During a conference among the court and counsel to select jury instructions to govern the penalty phase deliberations, Marlow asked that the jury be instructed that in order to consider any aggravating factor, all 12 jurors were required to agree that the factor had been proven. Although the court initially denied the request, it later reversed itself and instructed the jury that "[a]ll twelve jurors must agree as to the existence of any aggravating factor before it may be considered by you. [¶] If the jury does not unanimously agree that the existence of an aggravating factor has been proved, no juror may consider it in reaching their personal penalty decision." After reading the jury the list of sentencing factors found in section 190.3, factors (a) through (k), the court said: "I have previously read to you the list of aggravating circumstances which the law permits you to consider if you-if you found that any of them is established beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence."

Coffman contends the jury would have understood the court's reference to "the list of aggravating circumstances" to encompass mitigating circumstances, noting the instructions did not specifically advise the jury that no unanimity was needed as to the latter. She contends further that the prosecutor, in his summation, essentially characterized "the manipulative and exploitive way Marlow used" Coffman as an aggravating circumstance within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (a). Because the jury could not believe Coffman had acted under duress or substantial domination without also believing Marlow had engaged in such duress or domination, she reasons the instructions would have led the jury to believe it must unanimously find the factual underpinning to the mitigating factor of section 190.3, factor (g), contrary to the rule of McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) 494 U.S. 433, 439-444.

We disagree. Nothing in the instructions told jurors to consider any mitigating factor only if they unanimously found it to be supported by the evidence; the unanimity requirement was explicitly directed to aggravating factors. Nor did anything in the prosecutor's comments on Coffman's duress defense suggest that Marlow's exploitation of Coffman should be weighed against her as a factor in aggravation. To the extent the prosecutor suggested that Coffman exploited Marlow, we presume the jury, as instructed, weighed in aggravation only the factors specifically defined as aggravating, namely (as relevant to Coffman) the circumstances of the offense (factor (a)) and other violent criminal conduct (factor (b)).

Finally, contrary to Coffman's argument, California's sentencing process remains constitutionally valid after Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584. (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 139.)

H. Other Asserted Instance of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (Marlow)

Marlow contends his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in connection with the admission of evidence concerning the serological testing of urine stains on Lynell Murray's clothing. Marlow notes that in a hearing prior to the testimony of criminalist Dan Gregonis, who performed the testing, the prosecutor stated he would not seek to introduce evidence of any testing beyond the base tests (identifying the urine as bodily fluid) and ABO typing, and that such testing would, "in my opinion [make] Mr. Marlow look less culpable than the base evidence did in my opinion. . . . [¶] But the record should be clear in case later on someone accuses me of trying to make Mr. Marlow more guilty than he was . . . ." The prosecutor continued: "I don't try the defense case in this case. I think it's going to look worse for Mr. Marlow the way they are asking me to do it than the way it is." The court observed, "There are all sorts of tactical reasons for doing things in the presentation of the case," and asked Marlow's counsel to comment. After noting the necessity of a Kelly-Frye hearing (see People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24; Frye v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013; see also People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 591) on serological evidence going beyond ABO typing, counsel said: "[The prosecutor], as he indicated, does not wish to proceed there[;] that is fine. I'm not asking him for advice on our tactics, and it is our belief that it is in Mr. Marlow's interest." Later in the hearing Marlow's counsel observed further: "Our tactic has been dictated through the events of this trial that we are not putting up an affirmative defense to the Huntington Beach incident." Before the jury, Gregonis testified that test results were inconclusive as to the identity of the source of the urine. In response to examination by Marlow's counsel, Gregonis acknowledged the stains on Murray's clothing were consistent with the clothing's coming into contact with, and absorbing, a pre-existing urine deposit.

In declining to present additional serological evidence, Marlow's counsel clearly considered his client's interests and entertained a tactical purpose to which he alluded on the record. Perhaps he sought to minimize the significance of the stains rather than focus the jury's attention on them, as surely would occur if additional evidence of forensic testing of the urine stains was presented. In any event, because this is not a case in which there simply could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel's action, Marlow's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails for purposes of this appeal. (People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 266-267.)

I. Denial of Coffman's Motion for New Trial

Coffman's motion for a new trial relied on many of the contentions advanced in this appeal, including the trial court's denial of defendants' severance motions, the denial of the motions to change venue, the denial of her motion to suppress her post-arrest statements taken in violation of Miranda and the testimony of Robin Long, insufficiency of the evidence to support the burglary and sodomy special-circumstance findings, in addition to others not renewed here. The trial court denied the motion, commenting it was convinced that "any jury anywhere" would have convicted Coffman and returned a death verdict. Coffman contends the trial court should have granted the motion or otherwise stricken the special circumstance findings or exercised its power to reduce her sentence to life imprisonment.

"We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for a new trial under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard." (People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 526.) As to the grounds that Coffman has renewed in the course of this appeal, we have concluded none merits reversal of the judgment. Coffman thus fails to establish a "manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion" in the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial on those grounds. (See People v. Delgado (1993) 5 Cal.4th 312, 328.) As to the grounds she chose not to renew before this court, she fails to show that the trial court made any error of law rendering the denial of the motion for a new trial an abuse of discretion. Nor does Coffman articulate a basis on which the trial court should have stricken the special circumstance findings or reduced her sentence to life imprisonment.

J. Cumulative Error

Defendants contend the cumulative effect of the errors in both phases of their trial denied them a fundamentally fair trial and a reliable penalty determination. We have found merit in three claims of error in the proceedings (error in the process whereby Marlow repeatedly asserted his privilege against self-incrimination before the jury, and instructional errors as to both defendants in instructing on first degree sodomy murder and in the giving of CALJIC No. 2.15 without limitation to theft offenses) and have noted two claims of error by Marlow that, if not forfeited by lack of contemporaneous objection, would have had merit (the admission of Dr. Walker's opinions as to Coffman's credibility and the admission of evidence that Marlow requested an attorney during police questioning). Additionally, we have assumed error in the admission of evidence that Marlow, after receiving Miranda warnings, refused to discuss the 1980 methadone clinic robbery, for the purpose of resolving his related claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to object thereto. With respect to each claim individually, we have concluded that any error was harmless under the applicable standard. Reviewing these errors cumulatively, we reach the same conclusion. "[N]one of the errors, individually or cumulatively, `significantly influence[d] the fairness of [defendants'] trial or detrimentally affect[ed] the jury's determination of the appropriate penalty.' " (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 139.)

K. Constitutionality of the Death Penalty

Defendants raise the following challenges to the constitutionality of the death penalty law, all of which have previously been rejected:

Coffman argues that the statute under which she was convicted and sentenced to death fails to adequately narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, as required by the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution (Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 877), and creates a substantial and constitutionally unacceptable likelihood that the death penalty will be imposed in a capricious and arbitrary fashion. We have held to the contrary. (E.g., People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 632.)

Marlow argues that the 1978 death penalty law is unconstitutional because it lacks procedural safeguards necessary to ensure consistent, rational application of the death penalty. In particular, he notes, it fails to require written findings as to the aggravating factors selected by the jury, proof beyond a reasonable doubt and jury unanimity concerning aggravating factors, and a finding that death is the appropriate punishment beyond a reasonable doubt; it also lacks "a procedure to enable a reviewing court to evaluate meaningfully the sentencer's decision" and a presumption that life without parole is the appropriate sentence. Marlow also contends the statute invites arbitrariness and capriciousness by failing to designate which sentencing factors are aggravating and which are mitigating, by failing to require that the jury not consider inapplicable mitigating circumstances, and by permitting allegations of unadjudicated criminal activity to be used as a basis for imposing a sentence of death. We disagree. (E.g., People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1078; People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1078; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 190; People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1256.)

L. Disproportionality of the Death Penalty as to Coffman

Invoking her right to intracase proportionality review (People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 476; see People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 450), Coffman contends the death sentence is disproportionate to her personal culpability and thus violates the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution and its state analogue, California Constitution, article I, section 17. We disagree. Unlike the psychologically immature 17-year-old defendant in Dillon, who fatally shot the victim in a panic during an attempted raid on the victim's illicit marijuana field, Coffman, 24 years old at the time of the offenses, was found by the jury to have committed murder and to have engaged in the charged felonies with the intent to kill or to aid or abet Marlow in killing the victim. The jury also heard evidence that Coffman, together with Marlow, had committed another similar murder and other felony offenses in Orange County. Evidently the jury was not persuaded that Coffman suffered from such physical abuse or emotional or psychological oppression as to warrant a sentence less than death. Contrary to Coffman's argument, the offenses here were of the most serious nature, and her sentence clearly befits her personal culpability.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
GEORGE, C. J.
KENNARD, J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
BROWN, J.
MORENO, J.

James Marlow, left March 1992, right June 2007, an ex-convict from Kentucky who was known as 'The Folsom Wolf,' traveled with his girlfriend, Cynthia Coffman, who abandoned a husband and kids to randomly kill young girls with Marlow. He got the death penalty in 1990 for abducting, raping and strangling Lynel Murray, 19, of Huntington Beach on Nov. 12, 1986.

Cynthia Coffman

Cynthia Coffman

Cynthia Coffman

Cynthia Coffman

James Gregory Marlow

James Gregory Marlow

Cynthia Coffman was sentenced to die for the 1986 San Bernardino County kidnaping, robbery, sodomy
and murder of 20-year-old Corinna Dell Novis.

b2ux · Dec 24, 2012

Anna Cunningham

Classification: Serial killer
Characteristics: Parricide - Poisoner - To collect insurance money
Number of victims: 5
Date of murder: 1918 - 1922
Date of arrest: April 11, 1925
Date of birth: 1873
Victim profile: Her husband David Cunningham and her children Isabelle, 28; Harry, 23; Charles, 18; and Walter, 13
Method of murder: Poisoning (arsenic)
Location: Lake County, Indiana, USA
Status: Sentenced to life in prison without parole on one count in 1925

Mrs. Anna Cunningham of Chicago, admits that she killed her husband and four children. A fifth child, also poisoned, may live.

The Cunninghams lived on a farm at Bachley Corners, Ind. In 1919 the father died there. His death was much the same in circumstances as those that followed – intense stomach pains, a sudden attack and several days of illness. She collected the $1,000 insurance and the family moved to Gary. A year later a daughter, Isabelle, 28, died. She had been insured for $1,000 just five weeks before her death.

Harry, 23, was the next victim. He died in 1923, less than a year after he had been insured for $2,500. Then Charles suffered the same fate. He was insured for only $850. In 1923 the youngest son, Walter, 13, died. His insurance amounted to only, $180.

When the last of the boys, David, Jr., was seized with a sudden attack and taken in a hospital, authorities began to investigate the series of deaths in the Cunningham family. The bodies were exhumed, their organs tested, and Mrs. Cunningham arrested. Her confession followed.

Anna Cunningham, Chicago Serial Killer - 1925

FULL TEXT (Article 1 of 3): Chicago, April 10.—Does the brain of a Borgia lurk back of the sweet, motherly face of Mrs. Anna Cunningham? Authorities, investigates the death of Mrs. Cunningham’s husband and four children at intervals of a year, intimate that such is their belief.

Mrs. Cunningham, recovering in a hospital from an attempt to strangle herself, has admitted the poisoning of three children.

Dr. Thomas Carver aroused the interest of authorities in the matter when Mrs. Cunningham’s 20-year-old son, David jr., was taken to the hospital and found suffering from arsenical poisoning. Large quantities of poison were found in the Cunningham home. Mrs. Cunningham said she bought it to spray plants. She collapsed when questioned further.

The family lived until seven years ago at Bachley’s Corners, Ind., on a little farm. When David Cunningham, the father, died they moved to Gary.

Mrs. Anna Cunningham attended church regularly at Bachley’s Corners. Neighbors respected her, but they all said she was a “little queer.” She was eccentric and had peculiar ideas about children and other things.

In 1919 the father died there. His death was much the same as those that followed – intense stomach pains, a sudden attack and a few days’ illness, all indicating poison. He had been insured for $1,000.

Then Mrs. Cunningham sold the farm of 37 acres for $4,000 to Mrs. Katherine Betts, who owned an adjoining farm.

Harry Cunningham urged that the family go to Gary. A year after they left Bachley’s Corners, Isabelle, 28, died. She had been insured for $1,000 just five weeks later, at the age of 18. He was insured for only $320.

In 1923 the younger brother, Walter, 13, died, insured for only $180.

The last to be attacked was David jr., who was rushed from a Gary hospital in Chicago, where he is fighting to save his life. Insurance carried in his name totaled $1,000.

Harry, 23, was the next victim of the sudden illness. He died in 1921, less than a year after he had been insured for $2,500.

Charles, the second brother to die, suffered the same fate a year before her death and Mrs. Cunningham had paid but one premium.

All policies named the mother as beneficiary.

Mae Cunningham, 17, who is the only surviving girl in the family, said that her mother had been ailing and hysterical at times after they moved to Gary.

“She used to chase us around with the butcher knife,” she said. “That was when she got fits. Usually she’d collapse after having worked herself up into a frenzy.”

“She had a bible, which she used to take into her room. She would lock the door and read it for hours at a time.”

[“Hold Mother In Poison Case - Mrs. Anna Cunningham Confesses to Killing Three Children,” syndicated (Central Press), The Emporia Gazette (Ka.), Apr. 16, 1925, p. 8]

*****

FULL TEXT (Article 2 0f 3): Crown Point, Ind. - Confinement in prison for the rest o her natural life was the sentence meted out to Mrs. Anna Cunningham, 49 year old widow, by a jury in Lake-co criminal court today, which found her guilty of first degree murder in connection with the fatal poisoning of her ten-year old son, Walter. The jury deliberated more than 24 hours.

Before Judge Martin; Smith could formally pass sentence, defense counsel petitioned the judge to withhold sentence until the defense could file a motion for a new trial. The request was granted. Mrs. Cunningham sobbed bitterly when the judge read the jury's verdict, but did not collapse.

MYSTERY DEATHS

Suspicion first rested on Mrs. Cunningham in connection with the mysterious deaths, of five members of her family in sis years when David Cunningham, Jr., 24, became ill suddenly in Gary and was removed to a Chicago hospital for treatment last April.

Oscar Wolff, coroner of Cook-co (Chicago) investigated on information given by George Arnold, 25, a cousin of David Cunningham, who said the Cunninghams had lived principally on insurance paid on lives of the five deceased members.

Mrs. Cunningham was arrested in Gary April 11. The charge followed examination of the vital organs of the bodies of Walter, 10, and Harry, 23, her sons. Physicians found traces of poison in Walter’s organs, but none in those of the other young man.

The accused woman signed a confession on April 15. On the same day she fell ill into a state of coma, from which she was revived only after hours of effort. In the confession, which was later repudiated as having been obtained when she was in a delicate condition, Mrs. Cunningham said she fatally poisoned Isabelle, 20; Charles, 18, and Walter, 19. She also admitted having poisoned David Jr., who is only partially recovered. She said she fed the poison to her children on bread and butter sandwiches.

Indicted on three first degree charges on June 2, by the Lake-co criminal court grand jury, Mrs. Cunningham on July 16 went on trial for the alleged killing of her youngest child.

David Cunningham Jr., and Mae, 19, are the only survivors of the family. In her purported confession, Mrs. Cunningham said she poisoned the three children and also tried to kill herself so they all could “join in Heaven” David Sr., the father and husband. Physicians have pronounced the woman a victim of epileptic psychosis.

Deaths in the family began on July 2, 1918, when the father and husband died. Isabelle died December 31, 1919; Harry on October 18, 1921, Charles, September 21, 1921, and Walter, September 15, 1922.

David, last to become ill, is partially paralyzed, but gradually is recovering.

[“Life Term Prison Is Given Indiana Woman - Convicted Poisoner Collapses When Verdict of Jury Is Read - Appeal Is Noted - Slaying of Two Other Children Is Charged to Prisoner,” syndicated (AP), Jul. 26, 1925, p. 1]

*****

FULL TEXT (Article 3 of 3): Crown Point, Ind.,. Oct. 12, —Without funds to perfect an appeal to the Indiana supreme court, Mrs. Anna Cunningham, forty-nine, convicted of poisoning her son Walter, will enter the state penitentiary at Indianapolis tomorrow to begin a life sentence for murder. Judge Martin Smith in the Lake county criminal court today denied a motion for a new trial.

In a confession obtained in Chicago after her arrest and repudiated during the trial, the gray-haired widow said she had given poison to four of her children, three of whom died. The defense contended the mother was unbalanced mentally at the time the disputed confession was made.

Mrs. Cunningham’s husband, a farmer near Valparaiso, and three children, Isabelle, 18; Charles, 19, and Walter, 13, all died during six years. An investigation revealed that Walter, the last to die, had been poisoned.

When arrested the widow stud she had killed the children because she loved them and wanted them to join the father “in heaven.” She declared she too had taken poison in hopes of joining him.

[“Poison Mother Enters Prison - Mrs. Cunningham Denied New Trial Motion,” syndicated (AP), Oct. 13, 1925, p. 1]

UnknownMisandry.blogspot.com

SEX: F RACE: W TYPE: S MOTIVE: PC-nonspecific.

MO: "Black widow" poisoner of husband and children.

DISPOSITION: Life sentence on one count, 1925.

Anna Cunningham

b2ux · Dec 24, 2012

CHOATE Pearl *1907 ...

Victims - 7
aka 1930s 1965 ...
Urteil:

no real information is available on this one....

b2ux · Dec 24, 2012

Daisy Louisa DE Melker

Birth name: Daisy Louisa Hancorn-Smith

Classification: Serial killer
Characteristics: Poisoner - Parricide - To collect insurance money
Number of victims: 3
Date of murders: 1923 / 1927 / 1932
Date of arrest: April 1932
Date of birth: June 1, 1886
Victims profile: William Alfred Cowle, 50 (her husband) / Robert Sproat, 44 (her second husband) / Rhodes Cecil Cowle, 20 (her son)
Method of murder: Poisoning (strychnine - arsenic)
Location: Germiston, Gauteng, South Africa
Status: Executed by hanging at Pretoria Central Prison on December 30, 1932

The case attracted almost unprecedented public interest. Queues of spectators lined up for hours each day before the proceedings began. On the final day of the trial, some spectators who had waited overnight to ensure a place in the court sold their seats for up to 30 dollars each!

At that time it was normal for anyone accused of murder under South African law to be tried by a judge and jury, although the law allowed them the option of being tried by a judge and two assessors. Since public opinion weighed so heavily against Mrs de Melker, she had opted, on the advice of her legal counsel, for the latter.

The proceedings were opened before Mr Justice Greenberg and two senior magistrates, Mr J.M.Graham and Mr A.A. Stanford. Mrs De Melker faced three charges. Firstly that, on or about 11 January, 1923, and at or near Bertrams, in the district of Johannesburg, she had murdered her husband, William Alfred Cowle, by poisoning him with strychnine. Secondly, that on about 6 November, 1927, in the same district, she had murdered her second husband, Robert Sproat, by poisoning him with strychnine and, thirdly, that on or about 5 March, 1932, in the district of Germiston, she had murdered her son, Rhodes Cecil Cowle, by administering him poison, namely arsenic.

Daisy De Melker (nee Hancorn-Smith) was born on 1 June, 1886, at Seven Fountains near Grahamstown. She was one of eleven children. When she was twelve, she went to Bulawayo to live with her father and two of her brothers.

Three years later, she become a boarder at the Good Hope Seminary School in Cape Town. She returned to Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1903, but apparently found rural life unexciting, because it was not long before she returned to South Africa and enrolled at the Berea Nursing Home in Durban.

On one of her holidays in Rhodesia, she met and fell in love with a young man named Bert Fuller who was a civil servant in the Native Affairs Department at Broken Hill. They planned to marry in October, 1907. However, Fuller contracted black-water fever and died, with Daisy at his bedside, on the very day they had planned to marry. Fuller left a will bequeathing £100 to his fiance.

In March 1909, about eighteen months after the death of Bert Fuller, Daisy Hancorn-Smith married William Alfred Cowle, a plumber, in Johannesburg. She was 23; he was 36. The couple had five children, four of whom died. The first were twins, who died in infancy; their third child died of an abscess on the liver; and the fourth suffered convulsions and bowel trouble and died at the age of 15 months. Their last, and only surviving child, Rhodes Cecil, was born in June 1911.

Early on the morning of 11 January, 1923, William Cowle become ill soon after taking Epsom salts prepared by his wife. The first doctor who attended him did not consider his condition serious and prescribed a bromide mixture. But, Cowle's condition deteriorated rapidly. Not long after the doctor had left, he took a turn for the worse. His wife summoned the neighbours to help and called for another doctor.

Cowle was in excruciating pain when the second doctor arrived. He foamed at the mouth, was blue in the face, and screamed in agony if anyone touched him until he died. Faced with these symptoms, the second doctor suspected strychnine poisoning and refused to sign the death certificate. A postmortem was subsequently performed by the acting District Surgeon, Dr Fergus. The cause of death was certified to be chronic nephritis and cerebral hemorrhage. Daisy Cowle, the sole beneficiary of her husband's will, inherited £1795.

At the age of thirty-six, and three years to the day after the death of her first husband, Daisy Cowle married another plumber. His name was Robert Sproat, and he was ten years her senior. In October 1927, Robert Sproat became violently ill. He was in great agony and suffered severe muscle spasms similar to those experienced by William Cowle. He recovered.

A few weeks later, he suffered a second fatal attack after drinking some beer in the company of his wife and stepson, Rhodes. He died on 6 November, 1927. Dr Mallinick, the attending physician, certified that the cause of death was arteriosclerosis and cerebral hemorrhage. No autopsy was performed. Following Robert Sproats death, his widow inherited over £4000, plus a further £560 paid by his pension fund.

On 21 January, 1931, Daisy Sproat married for the third time. Her husband was a widower, Sydney Clarence De Melker, who like her previous two husbands was a plumber. By this time, Rhodes Cowle was 19. His sister in law, Eileen De Melker thought him lazy and remarked that he was often unwilling to get up for work in the morning.

However, another witness at his mother's trial described him as 'bright and conscientious'. A girl who met Rhodes at a party a few weeks before his death maintained that he was a real gentleman. Certainly the evidence conflicted, but none of it explained why Daisy De Melker decided to kill Rhodes. In the case of her first two husbands, the motive seemed clearly to be financial gain. But why kill her son?

Rhodes seems to have been under the impression that he would come into an inheritance at the age of 21. Perhaps he was demanding more than she could give him and was becoming a burden to her? The most obvious answer is that she simply didn't like him. He was a disappointment to her. She had pampered him all his life, but he rarely showed her any consideration in return.

Whatever the cause, late in February 1932, Mrs de Melker traveled many kilometers from Germiston to Turffontein, to obtain a quantity of arsenic from a Chemist there. She used her former name, Sproat, and claimed that she required the poison to destroy a sick cat.

Less than a week later, on Wednesday, 2 March, 1927, Rhodes took ill at work after drinking coffee from a thermos flask which his mother had prepared for him. A fellow worker, James Webster, also became violently sick. Webster, who had drunk very little of the coffee, recovered within a few days, but Rhodes died at home at midday on the following Saturday. A post-mortem followed and the cause of death was given as Cerebal malaria. Rhodes was buried at New Brixton cemetery the following day.

On 1 April, Mrs de Melker received £100 from Rhodes life insurance policy. But the story does not end there. By this time, William Sproat, her dead husband's brother, had become, suspicious. Eventually these suspicions were conveyed to the authorities.

On 15 April, the police obtained a court order permitting them to exhume the bodies of Rhodes Cowle, Robert Sproat and William Cowle. The first body to be removed was that of Rhodes Cowle. The corpse was found to be in an unusually good state of preservation - which is characteristic of the presence of arsenic in large quantities.

Sure enough, the government analyst was able to isolate traces of arsenic in the viscera, backbone and hair. Although the bodies of William Cowle and Robert Sproat were largely decomposed, traces of strychnine were found in the vertebrae of each man. Their bones also had a pinkish discolouration, suggesting that the men had taken pink strychnine, which was common at the time. Traces of arsenic were also found in the hair and fingernails of James Webster, Rhodes' colleague.

A week later, the police arrested Mrs de Melker and charged her with the murder of all three men. Public interest in the De Melker case grew, and the newspapers gave the story a great deal of coverage. The Turffontein chemist from whom she had bought the arson that killed her son, recognized De Melker from a newspaper photograph as being Mrs D.L. Sproat who had signed the poisons register and went to the police.

The De Melker trial lasted thirty days. Sixty witnesses were called for the Crown and less than half this number, for the defense. To present the forensic evidence, the Crown employed the services of Dr J. M. Watt, an expert toxicologist and Professor of Pharmacology at the Witwatersrand University. In summing up, before giving his verdict, the judge pointed out that the State had been unable to prove conclusively that Cowle and Sproat had died of strychnine poisoning. 'It does not convince me, nor does it convict the accused,' he said. On the third count, however, he had come to the 'inescapable conclusion' that Mrs De Melker had murdered her son. This was evident because:

(a)Rhodes Cowle had died of arsenic poisoning;

(b)The coffee flask held traces of arsenic;

(c)The accused had put the arsenic into the flask (I can see no escape from the conclusion that the accused put arsenic into the flask..,') on the Wednesday prior to Rhodes Cowle's death; and

(d)The defense of suicide was untenable.

When the judge finally turned to pass sentence on Mrs De Melker, her face whitened, and for a moment all the strength seemed to leave her body. 'You have been found guilty of the murder of your son, Rhodes Cecil Cowle. Do you have anything to say before 1 pass sentence of death on you?' A hushed silence fell over the court. 'I am not guilty of poisoning my son.' 'There is only one sentence 1 can pass,' responded the judge, and, so saying, he condemned her to death by hanging.

On the morning of 30 December, 1932, Daisy de Melker was hanged.

De Melker, Daisy Louisa Cowle

Thrice married, South African Daisy de Melker lost her first two husbands under mysterious circumstances, but homicide detectives were not prone to stirring up a widow's grief in the chivalrous 1920s.

It took the death of Daisy's 20-year-old son, Rhodes Cowle, on March 5, 1932, to set tongues wagging, and de Melker soon found herself behind bars. An autopsy performed on Rhodes Cowle revealed lethal doses of arsenic in his system, and a pharmacist in Germiston, a Johannesburg suburb, recalled selling some of the poison to Daisy. Increasingly suspicious, the authorities exhumed late husbands William Cowle and Robert Sproat -- deceased in 1923 and 1927, respectively -- with traces of poison revealed in both corpses.

Confronted with the damning evidence, Daisy confessed. She had dispatched her husbands for insurance money, killing off her son when he began to blackmail her, threatening to tip the police unless she parted with her savings.

Convicted of triple murder in a speedy trial, Daisy de Melker was hanged in Johannesburg on December 30, 1932.

Michael Newton - An Encyclopedia of Modern Serial Killers - Hunting Humans

Daisy Louisa C. De Melker (1 June 1886 - 30 December 1932), (née Hancorn-Smith) simply known as Daisy de Melker, was a trained nurse who poisoned two husbands with strychnine for their life insurance while living in Germiston in the central Transvaal (now Gauteng), and then poisoned her only son with arsenic for reasons which are still unclear. She is historically the second woman to have been hanged in South Africa.

Daisy de Melker was accused of three murders but was only convicted of one, that of killing her son. The charges of poisoning her husbands were never proved in a court of law. It was William Sproat, the younger brother of her second husband, who fingered her because he wanted Robert Sproat's will in favour of Daisy declared invalid. Daisy refused to refund an alleged loan from Mrs Jane Sproat, Robert's mother, to Robert; she regarded it as a gift and argued that it was not stipulated in the will as a loan. William Sproat won the civil case regarding the will, which ran concurrently with the murder trial, and was awarded costs. Daisy withdrew on the date Justice Greenberg sentenced her for murder. William's was a Pyrrhic victory however. To pay her exorbitant legal costs Daisy had to hock all her assets. She was declared insolvent and was eventually buried in a prison pauper's grave.

Early Life

Daisy Hancorn-Smith was born on 1 June 1886, at Seven Fountains near Grahamstown, South Africa. She was one of eleven children. When she was twelve, she went to Bulawayo, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) to live with her father and two of her brothers. Three years later, she became a boarder at the Good Hope Seminary School in Cape Town. She returned to Rhodesia in 1903, but apparently found rural life unexciting, because it was not long before she returned to South Africa and enrolled at the Berea Nursing Home in Durban.

On one of her holidays in Rhodesia, she met and fell in love with a young man named Bert Fuller who was a civil servant in the Native Affairs Department at Broken Hill. They planned to marry in October 1907. However, Fuller contracted black water fever and died, with Daisy at his bedside, on the very day they had planned to marry. Fuller left a will bequeathing £100 to his fiancé.

In March 1909, about eighteen months after the death of Bert Fuller, Daisy married William Alfred Cowle, a plumber, in Johannesburg. She was 23 and he was 36. The couple had five children, four of whom died. The first were twins, who died in infancy; their third child died of an abscess on the liver; and the fourth suffered convulsions and bowel trouble and died at the age of 15 months. Their last, and only surviving child, Rhodes Cecil, was born in June 1911.

First Murder: William Cowle (first husband)

Early on the morning of 11 January 1923, William Cowle become ill soon after taking Epsom salts prepared by his wife. The first doctor who attended him did not consider his condition serious and prescribed a bromide mixture. But, Cowle's condition deteriorated rapidly. Not long after the doctor had left, he took a turn for the worse.

His wife summoned the neighbours to help and called for another doctor. Cowle was in excruciating pain when the second doctor arrived. He foamed at the mouth, was blue in the face, and screamed in agony if anyone touched him, until he died.

Faced with these symptoms, the second doctor suspected strychnine poisoning and refused to sign the death certificate. A postmortem was subsequently performed by the acting District Surgeon, Dr Fergus. The cause of death was certified to be chronic nephritis and cerebral haemorrhage. Daisy Cowle, the sole beneficiary of her husband's will, inherited £1795.

Second Murder: Richard Sproat (second husband)

At the age of thirty-six, and three years to the day after the death of her first husband, Daisy Cowle married another plumber. His name was Robert Sproat, and he was ten years her senior. In October 1927, Robert Sproat became violently ill. He was in great agony and suffered severe muscle spasms similar to those experienced by William Cowle. He recovered. A few weeks later, he suffered a second fatal attack after drinking some beer in the company of his wife and stepson, Rhodes.

He died on 6 November 1927. Dr Mallinick, the attending physician, certified that the cause of death was arteriosclerosis and cerebral haemorrhage. No autopsy was performed. Following Robert Sproat's death, his widow inherited over £4000, plus a further £560 paid by his pension fund.

Third Murder: Rhodes Cecil Cowle (son)

On 21 January 1931, Daisy Sproat married for the third time. Her husband was a widower, Sydney Clarence De Melker, who like her previous two husbands, was a plumber.

Late in February 1932, Mrs de Melker travelled many kilometres from Germiston on the East Rand to Turffontein, to obtain a quantity of arsenic from a chemist there. She used her former name, Sproat, and claimed that she required the poison to destroy a sick cat. Less than a week later, on Wednesday, 2 March 1932, Rhodes took ill at work after drinking coffee from a thermos flask which his mother had prepared for him. A fellow worker, James Webster, also become violently sick. Webster, who had drunk very little of the coffee, recovered within a few days, but Rhodes died at home at midday on the following Saturday. A postmortem followed and the cause of death was given as cerebral malaria. Rhodes was buried at New Brixton cemetery the following day.

On 1 April, Mrs de Melker received £100 from Rhodes life insurance policy. But the story does not end there.

Reasoning behind her son's murder

At the time of his death, Daise de Melkers only son Rhodes Cowle was 20. His sister in law, Eileen De Melker thought him lazy and remarked that he was often unwilling to get up for work in the morning. However, another witness at his mother's trial described him as 'bright and conscientious'. A girl who met Rhodes at a party a few weeks before his death maintained that he was a ‘real gentleman’. Certainly the evidence conflicted, but none of it explained why Daisy De Melker decided to kill Rhodes. In the case of her first two husbands, the motive seemed clearly to be financial gain.

Rhodes seems to have been under the impression that he would come into an inheritance at the age of 21. One theory is that he was demanding more than Daisy could give him and was becoming a burden to her. The most obvious answer is that she simply didn't like him and that he was a disappointment to her. She had pampered him all his life, but he rarely showed her any consideration in return.

Arrest, Trial and Execution

By this time, William Sproat, Daisy de Melker's second dead husband's brother, had become suspicious and these suspicions were conveyed to the authorities. On 15 April 1932, the police obtained a court order permitting them to exhume the bodies of Rhodes Cowle, Robert Sproat and William Cowle.

The first body to be removed was that of Rhodes Cowle. The corpse was found to be in an unusually good state of preservation - which is characteristic of the presence of arsenic in large quantities. Sure enough, the government analyst was able to isolate traces of arsenic in the viscera, backbone and hair. Although the bodies of William Cowle and Robert Sproat were largely decomposed, traces of strychnine were found in the vertebrae of each man. Their bones also had a pinkish discolouration, suggesting that the men had taken pink strychnine, which was common at the time.

Traces of arsenic were also found in the hair and fingernails of James Webster, Rhodes' colleague who had survived.

A week later, the police arrested Mrs de Melker and charged her with the murder of all three men. Public interest in the De Melker case grew, and the newspapers gave the story a great deal of coverage. The Turffontein chemist from whom she had bought the arson that killed her son, recognized De Melker from a newspaper photograph as being Mrs D.L. Sproat, who had signed the poisons register, and went to the police.

The De Melker trial lasted thirty days. Sixty witnesses were called for the Crown and less than half this number, for the defence. To present the forensic evidence, the Crown employed the services of Dr J.M. Watt, an expert toxicologist and Professor of Pharmacology at the Witwatersrand University. In summing up, before giving his verdict, the judge pointed out that the State had been unable to prove conclusively that Cowle and Sproat had died of strychnine poisoning. "It does not convince me, nor does it convict the accused,” he said.

On the third count, however, he had come to the 'inescapable conclusion' that Mrs De Melker had murdered her son. This was evident because:

Rhodes Cowle had died of arsenic poisoning

The coffee flask held traces of arsenic

The accused had put the arsenic into the flask

The defence of suicide was untenable

When the judge finally turned to pass sentence on Mrs De Melker, her face whitened but she still proclaimed her innocence.

Daisy de Melker was condemned to death by hanging. The sentence was carried out and on the morning of 30 December 1932, Daisy de Melker (aged 46 years) was hanged at Pretoria Central Prison.

Daisy de Melker in Popular Culture

De Melker has become somewhat of a South African icon, and has entered popular myth. If a door blew shut in the wind they would say “it was the ghost of Daisy de Melker”. If a child’s hair was unkempt and wild, they said “you look like Daisy de Melker”.

Rumour (fuelled by tourism operators no doubt!) has it that De Melker's spirit haunts Ward 7 of the Transvaal Children's Hospital (now the Florence Transition Home) in Braamfontein. It is here that she worked as a nurse and learnt about poisons.

In 1993 a television mini-series was made about Daisy de Melker, with Susan Coetzer in the title role.

In September 2005 a drag musical Daisy's Well Hung starring Robert Coleman as "Daisy" was staged at the Women’s Jail on Constitution Hill in Johannesburg (where De Melker was imprisoned prior to being hanged). This show attempted to transform the dour figure of De Melker into a poltergeist of a husband-killing femme fatale.

Wikipedia.org

SOUTH AFRICA'S MOST FAMOUS POISONER

DAISY DE MELKER: 1932
On 17 October, 1932, at Johannesburg High Court, there began the trial of Daisy Louisa de Melker, who was charged with the murder of two husbands and her twenty year-old son, Rhodes. The case attracted almost unprecedented public interest. Queues of spectators lined up for hours each day before the proceedings began. On the final day of the trial, some spectators who had waited overnight to ensure a place in the court sold their seats for up to 30 shillings each!

At that time it was normal for anyone accused of murder under South African law to be tried by a judge and jury, although the law allowed them the option of being tried by a judge and two assessors. Since public opinion weighed so heavily against Mrs de Melker, she had opted, on the advice of her legal counsel, for the latter.

The proceedings were opened before Mr Justice Greenberg and two senior magistrates, MrJ.M.Graham and Mr A.A. Stanford. Mrs De Melker faced three charges. Firstly that, on or about 11 January 1923, at or near Bertrams, in the district of Johannesburg, she had murdered her husband, William Alfred Cowle, by poisoning him with strychnine. Secondly, that on about 6 November 1927, in the same district, she had murdered her second husband, Robert Sproat, by poisoning him with strychnine and, thirdly, that on or about 5 March 1932, in the district of Germiston, she had murdered her son, Rhodes Cecil Cowle, by administering him poison, namely arsenic.

Daisy De Melker (nee Hancorn-Smith) was born on 1 June 1886, at Seven Fountains near Grahamstown. She was one of eleven children. When she was twelve, she went to Bulawayo to live with her father and two of her brothers. Three years later, she became a boarder at the Good Hope Seminary School in Cape Town.

She returned to Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) in 1903, but apparently found rural life unexciting, because it was not long before she returned to South Africa and enrolled at the Berea Nursing Home in Durban.

On one of her holidays in Rhodesia, she met and fell in love with a young man named Bert Fuller who was a civil servant in the Native Affairs Department at Broken Hill. They planned to marry in October 1907. However, Fuller contracted black-water fever and died, with Daisy at his bedside, on the very day they had planned to marry. Fuller left a will bequeathing £100 to his fiancé.

In March 1909, about eighteen months after the death of Bert Fuller, Daisy Hancorn-Smith married William Alfred Cowle, a plumber, in Johannesburg. She was 23; he was 36. The couple had five children, four of whom died. The first were twins, who died in infancy; their third child died of an abscess on the liver; and the fourth suffered convulsions and bowel trouble and died at the age of 15 months. Their last, and only surviving child, Rhodes Cecil, was born in June 1911.

Early on the morning of 11 January 1923, William Cowle become ill soon after taking Epsom salts prepared by his wife. The first doctor who attended him did not consider his condition serious and prescribed a bromide mixture. But, Cowle's condition deteriorated rapidly. Not long after the doctor had left, he took a turn for the worse. His wife summoned the neighbours to help and called for another doctor. Cowle was in excruciating pain when the second doctor arrived. He foamed at the mouth, was blue in the face, and screamed in agony if anyone touched him until he died.

Faced with these symptoms, the second doctor suspected strychnine poisoning and refused to sign the death certificate. A postmortem was subsequently performed by the acting District Surgeon, Dr Fergus. The cause of death was certified to be chronic nephritis and cerebral haemorrhage. Daisy Cowle, the sole beneficiary of her husband's will, inherited £1795.

At the age of thirty-six, and three years to the day after the death of her first husband, Daisy Cowle married another plumber. His name was Robert Sproat, and he was ten years her senior. In October 1927, Robert Sproat became violently ill. He was in great agony and suffered severe muscle spasms similar to those experienced by William Cowle. He recovered. A few weeks later, he suffered a second fatal attack after drinking some beer in the company of his wife and stepson, Rhodes. He died on 6 November 1927. Dr Mallinick, the attending physician, certified that the cause of death was arteriosclerosis and cerebral haemorrhage. No autopsy was performed. Following Robert Sproats death, his widow inherited over £4000, plus a further £560 paid by his pension fund.

On 21 January 1931, Daisy Sproat married for the third time. Her husband was a widower, Sydney Clarence De Melker, who like her previous two husbands, was a plumber.

By this time, Rhodes Cowle was 19. His sister in law, Eileen De Melker thought him lazy and remarked that he was often unwilling to get up for work in the morning. However, another witness at his mother's trial described him as 'bright and conscientious'. A girl who met Rhodes at a party a few weeks before his death maintained that he was a ‘real gentleman’. Certainly the evidence conflicted, but none of it explained why Daisy De Melker decided to kill Rhodes. In the case of her first two husbands, the motive seemed clearly to be financial gain. But why kill her son?

Rhodes seems to have been under the impression that he would come into an inheritance at the age of 21. Perhaps he was demanding more than she could give him and was becoming a burden to her? The most obvious answer is that she simply didn't like him. He was a disappointment to her. She had pampered him all his life, but he rarely showed her any consideration in return.

Whatever the cause, late in February 1932, Mrs de Melker travelled many kilometres from Germiston to Turffontein, to obtain a quantity of arsenic from a chemist there. She used her former name, Sproat, and claimed that she required the poison to destroy a sick cat. Less than a week later, on Wednesday, 2 March 1932, Rhodes took ill at work after drinking coffee from a thermos flask which his mother had prepared for him. A fellow worker, James Webster, also become violently sick. Webster, who had drunk very little of the coffee, recovered within a few days, but Rhodes died at home at midday on the following Saturday. A post-mortem followed and the cause of death was given as cerebral malaria. Rhodes was buried at New Brixton cemetery the following day.

On 1 April, Mrs de Melker received £100 from Rhodes life insurance policy. But the story does not end there.

By this time, William Sproat, her dead husband's brother, had become, suspicious. Eventually these suspicions were conveyed to the authorities. On 15 April 1932, the police obtained a court order permitting them to exhume the bodies of Rhodes Cowle, Robert Sproat and William Cowle.

The first body to be removed was that of Rhodes Cowle. The corpse was found to be in an unusually good state of preservation - which is characteristic of the presence of arsenic in large quantities. Sure enough, the government analyst was able to isolate traces of arsenic in the viscera, backbone and hair. Although the bodies of William Cowle and Robert Sproat were largely decomposed, traces of strychnine were found in the vertebrae of each man. Their bones also had a pinkish discolouration, suggesting that the men had taken pink strychnine, which was common at the time. Traces of arsenic were also found in the hair and fingernails of James Webster, Rhodes' colleague.

A week later, the police arrested Mrs de Melker and charged her with the murder of all three men. Public interest in the De Melker case grew, and the newspapers gave the story a great deal of coverage. The Turffontein chemist from whom she had bought the arson that killed her son, recognized De Melker from a newspaper photograph as being Mrs D.L. Sproat, who had signed the poisons register, and went to the police.

The De Melker trial lasted thirty days. Sixty witnesses were called for the Crown and less than half this number, for the defence. To present the forensic evidence, the Crown employed the services of Dr J.M. Watt, an expert toxicologist and Professor of Pharmacology at the Witwatersrand University. In summing up, before giving his verdict, the judge pointed out that the State had been unable to prove conclusively that Cowle and Sproat had died of strychnine poisoning. “It does not convince me, nor does it convict the accused,” he said. On the third count, however, he had come to the 'inescapable conclusion' that Mrs De Melker had murdered her son. This was evident because:

Rhodes Cowle had died of arsenic poisoning;
The coffee flask held traces of arsenic;
The accused had put the arsenic into the flask (‘I can see no escape from the conclusion that the accused put arsenic into the flask..,') on the Wednesday prior to Rhodes Cowle's death; and
The defence of suicide was untenable.

When the judge finally turned to pass sentence on Mrs De Melker, her face whitened, and for a moment all the strength seemed to leave her body.

“You have been found guilty of the murder of your son, Rhodes Cecil Cowle. Do you have anything to say before I pass sentence of death on you?” A hushed silence fell over the court.

”I am not guilty of poisoning my son.”

”There is only one sentence I can pass,” responded the judge, and, so saying, he condemned her to death by hanging.

On the morning of 30 December 1932, Daisy de Melker was hanged.

Strychnine

Strychnine is a colourless, crystalline powder with an exceptionally bitter taste. It is obtained from Strychos nux vomica and other plants. About one and a half grains (100 Milligrams) constitutes a fatal dose. Although 15 mg of the poison has proved fatal, and toxic symptoms can result from a dose as small as 5 mg.

Strychnine poisoning causes the muscles of the back to go into spasms, causing convulsions so intense that the body aches violently. This symptom called opisthotonus, can last up to two minutes, during which time the victim is conscious and in extreme pain. Sometimes the muscles of the face are drawn up in a horrifying smile of death referred to as the risus sardonicus in some older textbooks. Eventually these muscles tensions prevent the lungs from working. Death, from either respiratory failure or exhaustion, usually follows within an hour.

In the past strychnine has been used as rat poison. At one time, there was also a plethora of strychnine-based 'tonics' available. These were usually prescribed to invalids and people recovering from long illnesses. Tiny amounts of the drug have the effect of raising the blood pressure slightly, which tends to create a general feeling of well being. Not surprisingly, accidental deaths and suicides from strychnine were fairly common. These would result if the bottle had not been shaken properly and the patient would take a dose of the concentrated strychnine liquid, which had accumulated at the bottom of the bottle.

Daisy de Melker

b2ux · Dec 24, 2012

Amelia Elizabeth DYER

A.K.A.: "The Reading Baby Farmer"

Classification: Serial killer
Characteristics: The most prolific baby farm murderer of Victorian England
Number of victims: 6 - 100 +
Date of murder: 1880 - 1896
Date of arrest: April 4, 1896
Date of birth: 1839
Victim profile: Children ("adopted" illegitimate infants for lump-sum payments)
Method of murder: Strangulation
Location: Reading, Berkshire, England, United Kingdom
Status: Executed by hanging at Newgate Prison on June 10, 1896

Amelia Dyer was a 'baby farmer'. Someone who, for a fee, would look after children, usually illegitimate, until a home could be found for them. Born in 1829 and raised in Bristol to respectable parents and trained as a nurse before deciding that 'adopting' illegitimate infants was a more lucrative career.

In 1879 she was sentenced to six months' hard labour after being found guilty on a charge of neglect. A doctor had become suspicious of the number of infants who had died while in Mrs Dyer's care and had reported the matter to the authorities. On her release she spent several periods in mental institutions before resuming her child-care activities.

In 1895 she moved to Kensington Road, Reading and began advertising. It was not long before small bodies were being fished out of the Thames. One of the bodies recovered had a tape around its neck and was wrapped in a parcel. The paper enclosing the corpse had an address on it and this was traced to Mrs Dyer. The tiny corpse was identified as Helena Fry.

Dyer was eventually arrested on 4th April 1896. By May, seven tiny bodies had been recovered from the Thames, all had the tape around their necks and all were parcelled. Three of the bodies were identified as four-month-old Doris Marmon, thirteen-month-old Harry Simmonds and the daughter of Elizabeth Goulding. The others were to remain unidentified. She soon confessed, saying "You'll know all mine by the tape around their necks." While in Reading police station she made two attempts to commit suicide.

She came to trial at the Old Bailey in May 1896 charged with just the murder of Doris Marmon, to which she pleaded guilty. The defence tried to prove insanity but failed, despite her dubious mental history. The jury took five minutes to find Dyer guilty and she was sentenced to death. James Billington hanged her at Newgate on 10th June 1896. Police suspected that at least 20 other children had disappeared in a similar manner in the few months before her arrest.

Dyer Amelia

Amelia Dyer was a 'baby farmer'. Someone who, for a fee, would look after children, usually illegitimate, until a home could be found for them. Mrs Dyer was 57-years-old and used the Salvation Army as a reference. In 1895 she moved to Reading and began advertising.

It wasn't long before small bodies were being fished out of the Thames. One of the bodies recovered had a tape around its neck and was wrapped in a parcel. The paper enclosing the corpse had an address on it and this was traced to Mrs Dyer, but she had moved on.

She was eventually arrested in April 1896. By May seven tiny bodies had been recovered, all had the tape around their necks and all were parcelled. She soon confessed, saying You'll know all mine by the tape around their necks.

She came to trial in May 1896 at the Old Bailey. She was in fact only tried for the murder of 4 month old Doris Marmon. The defence tried to prove insanity but failed. The motive for the murders seemed to be nothing more than greed, as soon as she was in reciept of the boarding fees she would kill the children to make room for more. The jury took five minutes to find her guilty and she was sentenced to death. She was hanged at Newgate on 10th June 1896 by James Billington.

Amelia Elizabeth Dyer née Hobley (1838 – 10 June 1896) was the most prolific baby farm murderer of Victorian England. She was tried and hanged for one murder, but there is little doubt she was responsible for many more similar deaths—possibly 400 or more—over a period of perhaps twenty years.

Background

Unlike many of her generation, Amelia Dyer was not the product of grinding poverty. She was born the youngest of 5 (with 3 brothers, Thomas, James and William, and a sister, Ann) in the small village of Pyle Marsh, just east of Bristol (now part of Bristol's urban sprawl known as Pile Marsh), the daughter of a master shoemaker, Samuel Hobley, and Sarah Hobley née Weymouth. She learned to read and write and developed a love of literature and poetry. However, her somewhat privileged childhood was marred by the mental illness of her mother, caused by typhus. Amelia witnessed her mother's violent fits and was obliged to care for her until she died raving in 1848. Researchers would later comment on the effect this had on Amelia, and also what it would teach Amelia about the signs exhibited by those who appear to lose their mind through illness.

After her mother's death Amelia lived with an aunt in Bristol for a while, before serving an apprenticeship with a corset maker. Her father died in 1859, her eldest brother Thomas inheriting the family shoe business. In 1861, at the age of 24, Amelia became permanently estranged from at least one of her brothers, James, and moved into lodgings in Trinity Street, Bristol. There she married George Thomas. George was 59 and they both lied about their ages on the marriage certificate to reduce the age gap. George deducted 11 years from his age and Amelia added 6 years to her age—many sources later reported this age as fact, causing much confusion.

Nursing

For a couple of years, after marrying George Thomas, she trained as a nurse, a somewhat gruelling job in Victorian times, but it was seen as a respectable occupation, and it enabled her to acquire useful skills. From contact with a midwife, Ellen Dane, she learnt of an easier way to earn a living—using her own home to provide lodgings for young women who had conceived illegitimately and then farming off the babies for adoption or allowing them to die of neglect and malnutrition (Ellen Dane was forced to decamp to the USA, shortly after meeting Amelia, to escape the attention of the authorities).

Unmarried mothers in Victorian England often struggled to gain an income, since the 1834 Poor Law Amendment Act had removed any financial obligation from the fathers of illegitimate children, whilst bringing up their children in a society where single parenthood and illegitimacy were stigmatized. This led to the practice of baby farming in which individuals acted as adoption or fostering agents, in return for regular payments or a single, up-front fee from the babies’ mothers. Many businesses were set up to take in these young women and care for them until they gave birth. The mothers subsequently left their unwanted babies to be looked after as "nurse children".

The predicament of the parents involved was often exploited for financial gain: if a baby had well-off parents who were simply anxious to keep the birth secret, the single fee might be as much as £80. £50 might be negotiated if the father of the child wanted to hush up his involvement. However, it was more common for these expectant young women, whose "immorality" even precluded acceptance, at that time, into workhouses, to be impoverished. Such women would be charged about £5.

Unscrupulous carers resorted to starving the farmed-out babies, to save money and even to hasten death. Noisy or demanding babies could be sedated with easily-available alcohol and/or opiates. Godfrey's Cordial—known colloquially as "Mother's Friend", (a syrup containing opium)—was a popular choice, but there were several other similar preparations. Many children died as a result of such dubious practices: "Opium killed far more infants through starvation than directly through overdose." Dr. Greenhow, investigating for the Privy Council, noted how children "kept in a state of continued narcotism will be thereby disinclined for food, and be but imperfectly nourished." Death from severe malnutrition would result, but the coroner was likely to record the death as "'debility from birth,' or 'lack of breast milk,' or simply 'starvation.'" Mothers who chose to reclaim or simply check on the welfare of their children could often encounter difficulties, but some would simply be too frightened or ashamed to tell the police about any suspected wrongdoing. Even the authorities often had problems tracing any children that were reported missing.

This was the world opened up to her by the now-departed Ellen Danes. Amelia had had to leave nursing with the birth of a daughter, Ellen Thomas. In 1869 the elderly George Thomas died and Amelia needed an income.

Murders

Amelia was apparently keen to make money from baby farming, and alongside taking in expectant women, she would advertise to nurse and adopt a baby, in return for a substantial one-off payment and adequate clothing for the child. In her advertisements and meetings with clients, she assured them that she was respectable, married, and that she would provide a safe and loving home for the child.

At some point in her baby farming career, Amelia was prepared to forego the expense and inconvenience of letting the children die through neglect and starvation; soon after the receipt of each child, she murdered them, thus allowing her to pocket most or all of the entire fee.

For some time, Dyer eluded the resulting interest of police. She was eventually caught in 1879 after a doctor was suspicious about the number of child deaths he had been called to certify in Dyer's care. However, instead of being convicted of murder or manslaughter, she was sentenced to six months' hard labour for neglect. The experience allegedly almost destroyed her mentally, though others have expressed incredulity at the leniency of the sentence when compared to those handed out for lesser crimes at that time.

Upon release, she attempted to resume her nursing career. She had spells in mental hospitals due to her alleged mental instability and suicidal tendencies; these always coincided with times when it was convenient for her to "disappear". Being a former asylum nurse Amelia knew how to behave to ensure a relatively comfortable existence as an asylum inmate. Dyer appears to have begun abusing alcohol and opium-based products early in her killing career; her mental instability could have been related to her substance abuse. In 1890, Dyer cared for the illegitimate baby of a governess. When she returned to visit the child, the governess was immediately suspicious and stripped the baby to see if a birthmark was present on one of its hips. It wasn't, and prolonged suspicions by the authorities led to Dyer having, or feigning, a breakdown. Dyer at one point drank two bottles of laudanum in a serious suicide attempt, but her long-term abuse had built up her tolerance to opium products, so she survived.

Inevitably, she returned to baby farming, and murder. Dyer realized the folly of involving doctors to issue death certificates and began disposing of the bodies herself. The precarious nature and extent of her activities again prompted undesirable attention; she was alert to the attentions of police—and of parents seeking to reclaim their children. She and her family frequently relocated to different towns and cities to escape suspicion, regain anonymity—and to acquire new business. Over the years, Dyer used a succession of aliases.

In 1893, Dyer was discharged from her final committal at Wells mental asylum. Unlike previous "breakdowns" this had been a most disagreeable experience and she never entered another asylum. Two years later, Dyer moved to Caversham, Berkshire, accompanied by an unsuspecting associate, Jane "Granny" Smith, whom Amelia had recruited from a brief spell in a workhouse and Amelia's daughter and son-in-law, Mary Ann (known as Polly) and Arthur Palmer. This was followed by a move to Kensington Road, Reading, Berkshire later the same year. Smith was persuaded by Amelia to be referred to as 'mother' in front of innocent women handing over their children. This was an effort to present a caring mother-daughter image.

Case study: the murder of Doris Marmon

In January 1896, Evelina Marmon, a popular 25-year-old barmaid, gave birth to an illegitimate daughter, Doris, in a boarding house in Cheltenham. She quickly sought offers of adoption, and placed an advertisement in the "Miscellaneous" section of the Bristol Times & Mirror newspaper. It simply read: "Wanted, respectable woman to take young child." Marmon intended to go back to work and hoped to eventually reclaim her child.

Coincidentally, next to her own, was an advertisement reading: "Married couple with no family would adopt healthy child, nice country home. Terms, £10". Marmon responded, to a "Mrs. Harding", and a few days later she received a reply from Dyer. From Oxford Road in Reading, "Mrs Harding" wrote that "I should be glad to have a dear little baby girl, one I could bring up and call my own." She continued: "We are plain, homely people, in fairly good circumstances. I don't want a child for money's sake, but for company and home comfort. ... Myself and my husband are dearly fond of children. I have no child of my own. A child with me will have a good home and a mother's love".

Evelina Marmon wanted to pay a more affordable, weekly fee for the care of her daughter, but "Mrs Harding" insisted on being given the one-off payment in advance. Marmon was in desperate straits, so she reluctantly agreed to pay the £10, and a week later "Mrs Harding" arrived in Cheltenham.

Marmon was apparently surprised by Dyer's advanced age and stocky appearance, but Dyer seemed affectionate towards Doris. Evelina handed over her daughter, a cardboard box of clothes and the £10. Still distressed at having to give up care for her daughter, Evelina accompanied Dyer to Cheltenham station, and then on to Gloucester. She returned to her lodgings "a broken woman". A few days later, she received a letter from "Mrs Harding" saying all was well; Marmon wrote back, but received no reply.

Dyer did not travel to Reading, as she had told Marmon. She went instead to 76 Mayo Road, Willesden, London where her 23-year-old daughter Polly was staying. There, Dyer quickly found some white edging tape used in dressmaking, wound it twice around the baby's neck and tied a knot. Death would not have been immediate. (Amelia later said "I used to like to watch them with the tape around their neck, but it was soon all over with them")

Both women allegedly helped to wrap the body in a napkin. They kept some of the clothes Marmon had packed; the rest was destined for the pawnbroker. Dyer paid the rent to the unwitting landlady, and gave her a pair of child's boots as a present for her little girl. The following day, Wednesday 1 April 1896, another child, named Harry Simmons, was taken to Mayo Road. However, with no spare white edging tape available, the length around Doris' corpse was removed and used to strangle the 13 month-old boy.

On April 2, both bodies were stacked into a carpet bag, along with bricks for added weight. Dyer then headed for Reading. At a secluded spot she knew well near a weir at Caversham Lock, she forced the carpet bag through railings into the River Thames.

Dyer's downfall

Discovery of corpses

Unknown to Dyer, on 30 March 1896, a package was retrieved from the Thames at Reading by a bargeman. It contained the body of a baby girl, later identified as Helena Fry. In the small detective force available to Reading Borough Police headed by Chief Constable George Tewsley, a Detective Constable Anderson made a crucial breakthrough. As well as finding a label from Temple Meads station, Bristol, he used microscopic analysis of the wrapping paper, and deciphered a faintly-legible name—Mrs Thomas—and an address.

This evidence was enough to lead police to Dyer, but they still had no strong evidence to connect her directly with a serious crime. Additional evidence they gleaned from witnesses, and information obtained from Bristol police, only served to increase their concerns, and D.C. Anderson, with Sgt. James, placed Dyer's home under surveillance. Subsequent intelligence suggested that Dyer would abscond if she became at all suspicious. The officers decided to use a young woman as a decoy, hoping she would be able to secure a meeting with Dyer to discuss her services. This may have been designed to help the detectives to positively link Dyer to her business activities, or it may have simply given them a reliable opportunity to arrest her.

It transpired that Dyer was expecting her new client (the decoy) to call, but instead she found detectives waiting on her doorstep. On April 3 (Good Friday), police raided her home. They were apparently struck by the stench of human decomposition, although no human remains were found. There was however, plenty of other related evidence, including white edging tape, telegrams regarding adoption arrangements, pawn tickets for children's clothing, receipts for advertisements and letters from mothers inquiring about the well-being of their children.

The police calculated that in the previous few months alone, at least twenty children had been placed in the care of a "Mrs. Thomas", now revealed to be Amelia Dyer. It also appeared that she was about to move home again, this time to Somerset. This rate of murder has led to some estimates that Mrs Dyer may, over the course of decades, have killed over 400 babies and children, making her one of the most prolific murderers ever, as well as the most prolific murderess ever.

Helena Fry, the baby removed from the River Thames on March 30, had been handed over to Dyer at Temple Meads station on March 5. That same evening, she arrived home carrying only a brown paper parcel. She hid the package in the house but, after three weeks, the odor of decomposition prompted her to dump the dead baby in the river. As it was not weighted adequately, it had been easily spotted.

Amelia Dyer was arrested on April 4 and charged with murder. Her son-in-law Arthur Palmer was charged as an accessory. During April, the Thames was dragged and six more bodies were discovered, including Doris Marmon and Harry Simmons—Dyer's last victims. Each baby had been strangled with white tape, which as she later told the police "was how you could tell it was one of mine". Eleven days after handing her daughter to Dyer, Evelina Marmon, whose name had emerged in items kept by Dyer, identified her daughter's remains.

Inquest and trial

At the inquest into the deaths in early May, no evidence was found that Mary Ann or Arthur Palmer had acted as Dyer’s accomplices. Arthur Palmer was discharged as the result of a confession written by Amelia Dyer. In Reading gaol she wrote (with her own spelling and punctuation preserved):

Sir will you kindly grant me the favour of presenting this to the magistrates on Saturday the 18th instant I have made this statement out, for I may not have the opportunity then I must relieve my mind I do know and I feel my days are numbered on this earth but I do feel it is an awful thing drawing innocent people into trouble I do know I shal have to answer before my Maker in Heaven for the awful crimes I have committed but as God Almighty is my judge in Heaven a on Hearth neither my daughter Mary Ann Palmer nor her husband Alfred Ernest Palmer I do most solemnly declare neither of them had any thing at all to do with it, they never knew I contemplated doing such a wicked thing until it was to late I am speaking the truth and nothing but the truth as I hope to be forgiven, I myself and I alone must stand before my Maker in Heaven to give an answer for it all witnes my hand Amelia Dyer.

—April 16, 1896

On 22 May 1896, Amelia Dyer appeared at the Old Bailey and pleaded guilty to one murder, that of Doris Marmon. Her family and associates testified at her trial that they had been growing suspicious and uneasy about her activities, and it emerged that Dyer had narrowly escaped discovery on several occasions. Evidence from a man who had seen and spoken to Dyer when she had disposed of the two bodies at Caversham Lock also proved significant. Her daughter had given graphic evidence that ensured Amelia Dyer's conviction.

The only defence Dyer offered was insanity: she had been twice committed to asylums in Bristol. However, the prosecution argued successfully that her exhibitions of mental instability had been a ploy to avoid suspicion; both committals were said to have coincided with times when Dyer was concerned her crimes might have been exposed.

It took the jury only four and a half minutes to find her guilty. In her 3 weeks in the condemned cell, she filled five exercise books with her "last true and only confession". Visited the night before her execution by the chaplain and asked if she had anything to confess, she offered him her exercise books, saying, "isn't this enough?" Curiously she was subpoenaed to appear as a witness in Polly's trial for murder, set for a week after her own execution date. However it was ruled that Amelia was already legally dead once sentenced and that therefore her evidence would be inadmissible. Thus her execution was not delayed. On the eve of her execution Amelia heard that the charges against Polly had been dropped. She was hanged by James Billington at Newgate Prison on Wednesday, 10 June 1896. Asked on the scaffold if she had anything to say, she said "I have nothing to say", just before being dropped at 9am precisely.

Later developments

It is uncertain how many more children Amelia Dyer murdered. However, inquiries from mothers, evidence of other witnesses, and material found in Dyer’s homes, including letters and many babies' clothes, pointed to many more.

The Dyer case caused a scandal. She became known as the "Ogress of Reading", and she inspired a popular ballad:

The old baby farmer, the wretched Miss Dyer
At the Old Bailey her wages is paid.
In times long ago, we'd 'a' made a big fy-er
And roasted so nicely that wicked old jade.

Subsequently, adoption laws were made stricter, giving local authorities the power to police baby farms in the hope of stamping out abuse. Despite this and the scrutinizing of newspaper personal ads, the trafficking and abuse of infants did not stop. Two years after Dyer's execution, railway workers inspecting carriages at Newton Abbot, Devon found a parcel. Inside was a three-week-old girl, but though cold and wet, she was alive. The daughter of a widow, Jane Hill, the baby had been given to a Mrs. Stewart, for £12. She had picked up the baby at Plymouth—and apparently dumped her on the next train. It has been claimed that "Mrs. Stewart" was Polly, the daughter of Amelia Dyer.

Identified victims

Doris Marmon, 4 months old

Harry Simmons, 13 months old

Helena Fry, Age unknown, 1 year old or less

Jack the Ripper Speculation

Because she was a murderer alive at the time of the Jack the Ripper killings, some have suggested that Amelia Dyer was Jack the Ripper, who killed the prostitutes through botched abortions. This suggestion was put forward by author William Stewart, although he preferred Mary Pearcey as his chosen suspect. There is, however, no evidence to connect Dyer to the Jack the Ripper murders.

Amelia Dyer – The Reading Baby-farmer

Amelia Elizabeth Dyer was perhaps the best known and most prolific murderous baby farmer.

Mrs Dyer was 56 years old when she moved from Bristol to Caversham in Reading in 1895 and began advertising for babies to look after. On the 30th of March of 1896, a bargeman recovered the corpse of 15-month old Helena Fry from the river Thames at Reading. Helena's body was wrapped in a brown paper parcel which had the name of a Mrs. Thomas and her address on it – Piggott’s Road Lower Caversham. Mrs. Thomas was one of Mrs. Dyer's aliases.

It took the police some time to trace Mrs. Dyer as she had already moved on, changing her address quite frequently and also using various aliases. In the meantime, a Cheltenham barmaid, 23 year old Evelina Marmon, had answered a newspaper advert from a "Mrs Harding" seeking a child for adoption. She met "Mrs Harding" and paid her a £10 fee to take her four month old baby daughter Doris on the 31st of March 1896. She felt comfortable with the arrangement as "Mrs Harding" appeared to be a respectable and motherly person. The following day Mrs. Dyer “adopted” another child, Harry Simmons.

The police finally located Mrs. Dyer, who they kept under surveillance for several days before mounting a “sting” operation using a young woman to pose as a potential customer. She was arrested on April the 4th, 1896 when she opened the door to the person she thought would be this customer only to find two policemen standing there.

The two tiny bodies of Doris and Harry were found in the Thames on April the 10th, 1896, both wrapped in a carpet bag and both white tapes round their necks. In all, the corpses of seven babies, all of whom had been strangled, were recovered from the Thames and each one had the same white tape around their neck. She soon confessed saying, "You’ll know all mine by the tape around their necks.".

She made two attempts to commit suicide in Reading police station. She came to trial before Mr. Justice Hawkins at the Old Bailey on the 21st and 22nd of May 1896 charged with Doris' murder in the first instance, so that if she was acquitted, she could be tried for another. This was standard practice until recently in cases of multiple murder. Miss Marmon identified Mrs Dyer in court as "Mrs Harding". The defence tried to prove insanity but failed to convince the jury who took just 5 minutes to find her guilty. Although there was strong evidence of her dubious sanity, her crimes were also appalling and the jury seemed to give far more weight to that aspect. Mr. Justice Hawkins sentenced her to death.

During her three weeks in the condemned cell, she filled five exercise books with her "last true and only confession." In a compassionate move the authorities removed her from Newgate for a few hours so that she would not have to hear the hanging of Milsom, Fowler and Seaman the day before her own execution. The chaplain visited her on the evening of the 9th and asked her if she had anything to confess - she offered him her exercise books saying "isn't this enough?"

She was hanged the following morning (10th of June 1896) by James Billington, becoming at 57, the oldest woman to be executed since 1843. She was given a drop of five feet as she weighed some 15 stones. Her ghost was said to haunt Newgate prison. No one will ever know the exact number of her victims but at the time of her arrest, she had been carrying on her trade for 15 to 20 years. She may have murdered as many as 400 babies in all.

Amelia Elizabeth Dyer was perhaps the best known and most prolific murderous baby farmer. She was convicted of the murder of 4 month old Doris Marmon who had been entrusted to her care, having received £10 to look after her.

Doris' tiny body was found in the Thames on April the 10th 1896, together with that of one year old Harry Simmons, both wrapped in a carpet bag and both with her trade mark white tapes round their necks. The Crown decided to proceed only with Doris' murder in the first instance, so that if Mrs. Dyer was acquitted they would be able to try her for another. This was standard practice until recently.

Mrs Dyer who was fifty-seven years old at the time of her arrest moved to Reading in 1895 where she began advertising for babies to look after.

On the 30th of March of 1895 a bargeman recovered the corpse of 15 month old Helena Fry from the river Thames at Reading. Helena's body was wrapped in a brown paper parcel which had Mrs. Dyer's address on it. It took the police some time to trace the identity of the owner of the parcel as Mrs. Dyer had moved on, changing her address quite frequently and also using various aliases.

They eventually caught up with her and she was arrested on April the 4th 1896. The corpses of seven babies, all of whom had been strangled had been recovered from the Thames, all had the same white tape around their necks. She soon confessed, saying "You’ll know all mine by the tape around their necks." While in Reading police station she made two attempts to commit suicide.

She came to trial at the Old Bailey the 21st of May 1896, the trial lasting two days. The defence tried to prove insanity but failed to convince the jury who took just five minutes to find her guilty. Although there was strong evidence of her dubious sanity her crimes were also appalling and the jury seemed to give far more weight to that aspect. Mr. Justice Hawkins sentenced her to death and while in the condemned cell she filled five exercise books with her "last true and only confession."

She decided not to appeal and so her execution was set for three weeks after sentence. The chaplain visited her the night before her execution and asked her if she had anything to confess - she offered him her exercise books saying "isn't this enough?"

She was hanged the following morning (10th June 1896) by James Billington at Newgate, becoming the oldest woman to be executed since 1843. No-one will ever know the exact number of her victims, but at the time of her arrest she had been carrying on her trade for fifteen to twenty years.

The baby butcher: One of Victorian Britain's most evil murderers exposed

September 28, 2007

The advertisement in the "Miscellaneous" column of the Bristol Times & Mirror newspaper was poignant.

"Wanted," it read, "respectable woman to take young child."

It was a sadly common request in Victorian Britain, where life was particularly hard for unmarried mothers.

The ad had been placed by 25-year-old Evelina Marmon, who two months earlier, in January 1896, had given birth in a boarding house in Cheltenham to a little girl she named Doris.

Evelina was a God-fearing farmer's daughter who had gone astray, left the farm for city life and resorted to work as a barmaid in the saloon of the Plough Hotel, an old coaching inn.

With her blonde hair, busty figure and quick wit, she was popular with its male customers - though which one of them made her pregnant has gone unrecorded.

And now she was deserted, with a baby she loved but knew she could not bring up on her own.

She would have to find a foster home for little Doris - to have her "adopted out", in the language of the time - go back to work and hope in time to be able to reclaim her child.

Quite by chance, next to her own ad, was another: "Married couple with no family would adopt healthy child, nice country home. Terms, £10."

It seemed the answer to her prayers, and she quickly contacted the name at the bottom, a Mrs Harding.

From Oxford Road in Reading, Mrs Harding replied in ecstatic terms.

"I should be glad to have a dear little baby girl, one I could bring up and call my own."

She described her situation. "We are plain, homely people, in fairly good circumstances. I don't want a child for money's sake, but for company and home comfort.

"Myself and my husband are dearly fond of children. I have no child of my own. A child with me will have a good home and a mother's love."

Mrs Harding sounded every bit the respectable, caring woman that Evelina hoped to find for Doris and she wrote at once begging her not to consider anyone else until they had met.

The reply came back: "Rest assured I will do my duty by that dear child. I will be a mother, as far as lies in my power.

"It is just lovely here, healthy and pleasant. There is an orchard opposite our front door." Evelina could visit whenever she wished.

The only issue between them was that Evelina really wanted to pay a weekly fee for her daughter to be looked after whereas Mrs Harding preferred - indeed, insisted on - a full adoption and a one-off payment in advance of £10, for which "I will take her entirely, and she shall be of no further expense to you".

Reluctantly, the desperate mother agreed, and a week later Mrs Harding, clutching "a good warm shawl to wrap round baby in the train for it is bitter cold", arrived in Cheltenham.

Evelina was surprised to discover that the woman she had been corresponding with was more elderly than she had expected and thick-set beneath her long cape. But she seemed affectionate as she swaddled little Doris in the shawl.

Evelina handed over a cardboard box of clothes she had packed - nappies, chemises, petticoats, frocks, nightgowns and a powder box - and the £10, and received in return a signed receipt.

She accompanied Mrs Harding to Cheltenham station and then on to Gloucester, where she stood weeping amid the choking steam on the platform as the 5.20pm train took her little girl away. She returned to her lodgings a broken woman.

A few days later, she had a letter from Mrs Harding saying all was well. Evelina wrote back straight away. She never received a reply.

Evelina and little Doris Marmon had fallen victim to one of the murkiest of all the many social evils in Britain just over a century ago - the "baby farmers".

Infant mortality was high and children's lives were cheap. Many families in straitened circumstances were happy to dispose of an infant to a new home and not ask too many questions about where and to whom it was going.

Some, like Evelina, had every intention of retrieving their youngsters.

Others were just glad to see the back of them - one less mouth to feed, one less burden in the struggle to survive.

They were prey to the unscrupulous, the immoral and the murderous, and none was quite as chillingly evil as the "caring woman" to whom Doris had just been entrusted.

"Mrs Harding" was one of the many aliases of Amelia Dyer, a hardfaced brute of a woman, whose crimes are recalled in a new book.

In our child-centred society today, it is hard to comprehend a time when there were dead babies by the thousands, droves of missing Madeleines, scores of Myra Hindleys, and hardly anyone batted an eyelid.

It was in such an environment that Amelia Dyer plied her gruesome trade for more than a quarter of a century.

She was "the angel-maker", as she once explained to her own little daughter, Polly, curious about the babies that kept appearing in the household and then disappearing.

She was sending little children to Jesus, she said, because He wanted them far more than their mothers did.

At 9pm, the train from Gloucester pulled into Paddington station in London - not Reading, as she had told Doris's mother - and Dyer struggled off, carrying a carpet bag, the box of baby clothes and the baby herself, whimpering in the shawl. She took a bus to Willesden, and got off at Mayo Road.

At the door of No 76, she was greeted by her daughter Polly, now aged 23, a grown-up, married woman.

Once inside their rented rooms, Dyer lifted the lid of a work basket and rifled through the tangle of threads and thimbles for some white edging tape, enough to wrap twice around the soft folds of Doris's neck.

Next the tape was pulled tight, held for a second, and then tied in a knot. Doris would have struggled until her limbs went limp, her mouth opening and closing in a last, silent bid for life.

Then she joined the scores - no one ever knew exactly how many - Dyer had already sent to their maker.

The two women bound the body in a napkin, then picked over the clothes in the cardboard box, keeping the good items, earmarking the rest for the pawnbroker. From Evelina's £10, Dyer paid the rent she owed to her unwitting landlady, and even gave her a pair of child's boots as a present for her little girl.

The very next day - Wednesday April 1, 1896 - another infant, 13-month-old Harry Simmons, was brought to Mayo Road in return for a £10 payment.

This time there was no spare tape to be found in the work basket, so the knot was unpicked around Doris's neck and the same white length used to strangle him.

The following evening, the two corpses were stuffed, one on top of the other, into Dyer's carpet bag and weighted down with bricks.

Then she took the bus to Paddington and the train to Reading.

There she lugged her heavy load though the streets down to the river and a lonely spot she knew well, by a footbridge over a weir at Caversham Lock.

In the darkness she pushed the bag through the railings until it fell and she heard it smack into the waters beneath.

As she turned to leave, a man hurried passed on his way home and called out "Goodnight".

Later, his evidence at the Old Bailey would help send 58-year-old Dyer to the gallows.

Unlike many of her generation, Amelia Dyer was not the product of grinding poverty.

She was born in a small village near Bristol in 1838, daughter of a master shoemaker, and learned to read and write and had a love of literature and poetry.

She trained as a nurse, a gruelling job but a skilled and respectable one.

From a midwife, she learned of a less arduous way of earning a living - providing lodgings in her own home for young women who, in an unforgiving age, were pregnant outside of wedlock.

From the moment their bump began to show they were shunned by polite society or sacked if they were in work.

So for a fee, unscrupulous businesses offered to take in these young women and see them through to the birth. After the mothers left, their unwanted babies would be looked after as "nurse children".

The money differed. If the girl was from a well-off background with parents anxious to keep her plight secret, it might be as much as £80.

Or, say, £50 if the father of the child was prepared to contribute in order to hush up his involvement.

But more often these were impoverished girls, whose "immorality" meant even the workhouse wouldn't take them, and for them the deal might be done for a fiver.

To cut costs, the farmed-out babies were starved, and to reduce the aggravation of looking after them they were sedated with easily-available alcohol and opiates.

Godfrey's Cordial, a syrup laced with laudanum and known colloquially as "The Quietness", was a favourite to put a child fast asleep. And if the child died, so be it. Most did, sooner or later.

One such establishment was described with horror by a police officer who uncovered it in Brixton, London.

In one room, five three and four-week-old infants were lying in filth, three under a shawl on a sofa and two stuffed into a small crib.

They were ashen-faced and emaciated like miniature crones, their bones visible through transparent skin.

They lay open-mouthed, in a state of torpor, eyes glazed, scarcely human. What chilled the policeman was the silence: "Instead of the noises to be expected from children of tender age, they were lying without a moan from their wretched lips, and apparently dying."

Five infants were in another room, in slightly better condition because a weekly fee was still being exacted for them instead of the single "premium" that had been paid for the ones encouraged to die quickly.

However immoral this business - and the immorality usually stretched to those who deposited children there, in full realisation of their fate - it was one much in demand, and lucrative. There was a pile of cash to be made here, as Amelia Dyer realised.

Her own particular refinement was not to bother with letting the children die through neglect and starvation, but to murder them straight away and pocket all the money.

Year on year, Dyer dodged the police and the inspectors of the newly-formed NSPCC.

She was caught once after a doctor was called to certify the death of one child too many and raised the alarm.

But instead of manslaughter, she was convicted of causing a child to die by neglect and served six months' hard labour in prison, an experience that nearly destroyed her.

After that she tried going back to nursing. She had spells in mental hospitals after suicide attempts.

But always she returned to baby farming, eventually drawing her own family into the business.

She stopped calling doctors to issue death certificates and disposed of the bodies secretly.

They moved homes frequently - Bristol, Reading, Cardiff, London - as often as they scented the police closing in or mothers and fathers on their trail trying to reclaim their children.

The killing stopped only after a bargeman piloting a cargo up the Thames at Reading saw a brown paper parcel lying in in shallow water near the bank.

He fished it out with a boat hook, pulled at one end and a leg and a tiny human foot appeared.

A police inspection revealed the body of a little girl, aged six to 12 months.

White tape was knotted round her neck. One piece of the brown paper had a railway label on it from Temple Meads Station, Bristol and the faint outline of handwriting.

A name - "Mrs Thomas" - and an address in Reading could just be made out.

Four days later, on April 3, Good Friday, police raided that address and were immediately struck by the stench of human decomposition, though no body was found.

But white tape was, in a sewing basket, and in cupboards were bundles of telegrams arranging adoptions, pawn tickets for children's clothing, receipts for advertisements and letters from mothers inquiring after their little ones.

In the past few months alone, they worked out, 20 children at least had been placed in the care of "Mrs Thomas", now revealed as Amelia Dyer.

The police had arrived just in time. She was about to do a moonlight flit again, this time to Somerset.

The body found by the bargee turned out to be that of Helena Fry, illegitimate offspring of Mary Fry, a servant girl from Bristol, and a well-to-do local merchant.

The child had been handed over to Dyer at Bristol Temple Meads station on March 5.

But when Dyer got home to Reading that evening, all she had with her was a brown paper parcel two feet long.

She hid it in the house, until, after three weeks, the smell became unbearable.

Then she was seen leaving the house with the parcel, saying she was going to the pawnshop.

In fact she threw in the bundle in the river. But it did not sink, as the bargee discovered.

The river was now dragged. Three tiny bodies were found, then the carpet bag with Doris and Harry inside, her last victims.

The next day, Evelina Marmon, whose name had cropped up in Dyer's correspondence, was brought to Reading and identified her daughter on the mortuary slab.

It had been a mere 11 days since she had entrusted her child to "Mrs Harding".

"She was in perfect health when I sent her away," was all the distraught woman could mutter.

Dyer was hanged at Newgate Prison after a trial in which her plea of insanity was rejected.

Her daughter gave graphic evidence that ensured her conviction (while going unpunished herself for reasons still not clear). The jury was out for just four-and-a-half minutes before condemning her.

The details of what she had done caused a scandal. Stricter adoption laws gave local authorities the power to police baby farms and stamp out abuse. Personal ads of newspapers were to be scrutinised.

But baby trafficking did not stop. Two years after Dyer's execution, railway workers inspecting carriages shunted into a siding at Newton Abbot from the Plymouth express found a parcel tied up with string.

Inside was a three-week-old girl, cold and wet but just alive.

She was the daughter of a widow, Jane Hill, and had been given to a woman named Mrs Stewart for £12.

"The little one would have a good home and a parent's love and care," Mrs Stewart had written. Then she had picked up the baby at Plymouth - and dumped her on the next train.

Who was "Mrs Stewart"? None other, it was thought, than Polly, Amelia Dyer's daughter. The evil lived on.

DYER, Amelia Elizabeth (England)

That a man should kill a child is appalling; that a woman should kill a child is unthinkable; but a woman who kills eight children and perhaps many more . . .

Amelia Dyer was known as the Reading Baby-farmer; having once been a member of the Salvation Army, she was a figure of trust to those parents or guardians who, over the years, accepted her offer to adopt unwanted children, and were more than happy to pay her the regular boarding fees for their upkeep. But their trust was badly shaken when in 1885 a boatman on the Thames noticed something unusual floating in the water. Rescuing it, he was shocked to find that, wrapped in a brown paper parcel, was a dead baby, with a tape tied tightly round its neck. The parcel bore an address: Mrs Thomas, Piggotts Road, Lower Caversham.

The police immediately went to the address, only to discover that their quarry had moved away and had, moreover, changed her name. Worse was to follow, for within the next few days two more bodies were found floating in the river, each in a separate parcel, each having been strangled by the tape around its throat.

In the widespread hunt that ensued, Mrs Dyer, alias Thomas, alias Harding, alias Stanfield, was found, and when arrested on a charge of murdering a little girl named Fry, admitted her guilt, adding, ‘You’ll know all mine by the tapes around their necks.’

That statement was tragically borne out when no fewer than a further four small corpses were fished out of the Thames, and it was suspected that there could have been many more similarly strangled over the years during which she had been a babyfarmer, four more children having recently disappeared.

It would appear that she would place an advertisement in local papers, worded as follows:

I should be glad to have a dear little baby girl, one I could bring up and call my own. First I must tell you we are plain, homely people, in fairly good circumstances. We live in our own house. I have a good and comfortable home. We are out in the country and sometimes I am alone a good deal. I do not want a child for money’s sake but for company and home comfort. Myself and my husband are dearly fond of children. I have no child of my own. A child with me will have a good home and a mother’s love and care. We belong to the Church of England. Although I want to bring the child up as my own, I should not mind the mother or any other person coming to see the child at any time. It would be a satisfaction to see and know the child was getting on all right. I only hope we can come to terms.

The latter offer of access was impossible, of course, Amelia Dyer repeatedly changing her name and address. Women who responded to the advertisement usually handed over a parcel of clothes, ten pounds in cash, a considerable sum in those days, and the baby – which she never saw again.

When her house was searched by the police, no less than three hundredweight (336 lb) of children’s clothes were found, together with a large number of pawn tickets for baby clothes.

In May 1896 Amelia appeared in court charged with murdering a four-month-old baby girl named Doris Marmon and a boy, Harry Simmons. Her plea, that she was insane, was not accepted, the jury taking only five minutes to find her guilty, and she was sentenced to death. Confident of a reprieve, doubtless because of her age – she was 57 – she spent her time in the condemned cell praying and writing poems, one of which survives:

By nature, Lord, I know with grief,

I am a poor fallen leaf

Shrivelled and dry, near unto death

Driven with sin, as with a breath.

But if by Grace I am made new,

Washed in the blood of Jesus, too,

Like to a lily, I shall stand

Spotless and pure at His right hand.

And not content with the hypocritical tone of the verse, she had the appalling gall to sign it ‘Mother’.

In accordance with the regulations, which stipulated that executions should take place at 8 a.m. on the first day after the intervention of three Sundays from the day on which the sentence was passed – in this case 10 June 1896 – Amelia herself was taken into care, James Billington, the public executioner, a muscular ex-coalminer, having temporarily adopted her. He escorted her up the steps of the scaffold behind the high walls of Newgate Prison and there guided her on to the trapdoors, where he hooded her. The prison bell had already been tolling for the past fifteen minutes and would continue to do so for the same length of time after the execution had taken place. Crowds had gathered outside, waiting to see the regulatory black flag which would be raised on the prison’s flagpole at the moment the trapdoors opened, and also, within the next few minutes, to read the Certificate of Death which had to be displayed near the principal entrance to the prison. They did not have long to wait, for Billington, never one to linger, and no doubt recalling the manner in which Amelia Dyer had strangled her helpless charges, positioned his version of a tape, the noose, around her neck and swiftly operated the drop – sending the cold-blooded killer plummeting into the depths of the pit.

Whether Amelia’s spirit departed with her, though, is another matter, it being rumoured that her ghost haunted the chief warder’s office for some years following her execution.

SEX: F RACE: W TYPE: N MOTIVE: CE

MO: "Baby farmer" who killed infants of unwed mothers.

DISPOSITION: Hanged June 10, 1896.

Amelia Dyer

Amelia Dyer
(UnknowmMisandry.blogspot.com)

Amelia Dyer lured new mothers with newspaper advertisements like this one.

(UnknowmMisandry.blogspot.com)

b2ux · Dec 24, 2012

Ellen Etheridge

Classification: Serial killer
Characteristics: Poisoner - Jealousy because her husband showered all his affections upon his eight children
Number of victims: 4
Date of murder: June/October 1913
Date of arrest: October 1913
Date of birth: 1866
Victim profile: Four of her stepchildren
Method of murder: Poisoning (arsenic)
Location: Bosque County, Texas, USA
Status: Pleaded guilty. Sentenced to life imprisonment on December 23, 1913

Ellen Etheridge (1912-1913) was 22 years old when she married a Texas millionaire and inherited an instant family of 8 stepchildren. She became incurably jealous of her husband's devotion to their children and poisoned (arsenic) 4 of them, two at a time, about six months apart. Autopsies revealed poisoning in the latter pair, and she was arrested and confessed. She was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Etheridge, Ellen

A solid family background and religious training did not spare the second wife of Texas rancher J.D. Etheridge from pangs of jealousy. When they were married in the spring of 1912, she thought the wealthy widower admired her for herself.

It soon became apparent though, that he was more concerned with finding someone who would cook his meals and clean his Iarge Bosque County home, northwest of Waco. Ellen warmed his lonely bed and tended house, but she began to feel neglected as her husband showered his affection on the children -- eight in all -- who were the living images of her lamented predecessor. Jealousy gave way to envy, then to hatred.

During June of 1913, Ellen launched her plan to thin the herd, employing poison to eliminate a pair of the offensive children. On October 2, two more died, but the coincidence was too extreme. Authorities were curious, and poison was discovered by post-mortem tests. In custody, the second Mrs. Etheridge confessed her crimes and drew a term of life imprisonment.

Ellen Etheridge, Texas Serial Killer Who Murdered 4 Children - 1913

“Slew Four Step-Children. – Woman Says Jealousy of Her Husband’s Affection Prompted Her to Act.”

Oct. 16, 1913

Waco, Tex., Oct 16. – Mrs. Ellen Etheridge, second wife of J. D. Etheridge, a farmer, of Bosque county, confessed she murdered two of her stepchildren last June and two on Oct. 2 by administering poison, according to a statement given out by H. K. Dillard, prosecuting attorney of Bosque.

Jealousy because her husband showered all his affections upon his eight children was assigned by the assigned as the reason for her act.

Mrs. Etheridge was married to her present husband last Spring. She is a daughter of the Rev. John Walker of Matagorda County.

*****

“Woman Gets Life - Sentence Mrs. Ellen Etheridge Convicted Of Poisoning One Of Her Children Today.”

Dec. 23, 1913

Meridian, Texas, Dec. 23. – Mrs. Ellen Etheridge today was convicted of poisoning her step-child and sentenced to life imprisonment. She still awaits a trial on the charge of killing three other step-children by the poison route.

*****

“Aged Woman Faces Longest Sentence, of Any Convict Now in Penitentiary of Texas; Entered Pen 17 Years Ago”

Feb. 21, 1930

HUNTSVILLE, Tex., Feb. 21 – A-64-year-old woman, Mrs. Ellen Etheridge, has a longer sentence than any other convict in the Texas prison system.

Seventeen years ago Mrs. Etheridge was found guilty in Bosque county of murder of four of her stepchildren and attempted murder of a fifth and assessed four life sentences and one of five years.

The woman allegedly poured lye down the children’s throat. The fifth child, a boy of 13, ran for medical treatment and later was the state’s leading witness.

When she arrived at the Goree state farm for women, four miles south of here, Mrs. Etheridge’s complexion was fair and her hair was dark. Today her hair is streaked with silver and her shoulders are stooped.

A model prisoner during the long confinement, Mrs. Etheridge still hopes for a pardon that she may die a free woman. She is given the privilege of roaming the woods and farm without a guard. She returns to be locked behind the bars. In her spare time she makes lace and sells it to the public, acquiring in this way enough money to have her body sent home if she should die in prison.

SEX: F RACE: W TYPE: S MOTIVE: PC-domestic

MO: "Black widow" poisoner of stepchildren.

DISPOSITION: Life sentence after guilty plea.

b2ux · Dec 24, 2012

Nancy Farrer

Classification: Serial killer
Characteristics: Poisoner - Mentally ill child nurse
Number of victims: 4
Date of murder: 1851 - 1852
Date of birth: ????
Victim profile: Four persons in a family for whom she was working
Method of murder: Poisoning (arsenic)
Location: Cincinnati, Ohio, USA
Status: Convicted of murder in 1852. The Supreme Court of Ohio ordered a new trial. On retrial she was found insane. She was sent to a lunatic asylum

A Question of Sanity

Judging the sanity of criminal defendants is a difficult proposition for courts. Since the beginning of the Anglo-American criminal justice system, courts have struggled with just how to apply the medical issue of mental illness to the legal arena.

The issue of legal insanity was still relatively new when Nancy Farrer of Cincinnati, Ohio was put on trial in 1852 for committing a series of murders by poisoning.

Courts had first reckoned with insanity with the case of Daniel M’Naughten in 1843, after M’Naughten killed an employee of the British Prime Minister whom he thought was the leader of an outlandish plot against him. During his trial, witnesses testified to the fact that he was insane, and the jury acquitted him, finding him “not guilty by reason of insanity.”

The verdict caused a major brouhaha in England, and the House of Lords came up with a legal standard for determining the guilt of people who were obviously mentally ill.

The M’Naughten Rules, as they became known, essentially boil down to the belief that a defendant should not be held responsible for his actions if he could not tell that his actions were wrong at the time he committed them.

When Nancy Farrer went on trial, Ohio and many other states in the United States had not yet formally adopted the Rules.

In the early 1850s, Nancy Farrer, a nurse, was highly regarded by the patients she cared for, as well as by their families. It is clear from the record that while she was considered kind, the court held Nancy in low regard — with apparent good reason.

“There is full testimony to the effect, that in several households, Nancy, though awkward, and in many respects incapable, proved herself to be a kind and affectionate nurse,” the Ohio Supreme Court wrote in 1853. “She hardly ever spoke except when spoken to — asked no questions — never ran after company — readily did what she was bid.”

The court’s low regard for Nancy was partially based on the now-disproved “science” of phrenology — a system by which advocates believed a person’s intelligence, health and general psyche could be determined by the shape and character of the skull.

“In person, she is remarkably ugly,” the court wrote. “The eyes encroach on the space proper to the brain. Her head, in shape rather than size, is unfavorable to the usual presumption of sound mind and full capacity.”

Based in part on Nancy’s skull and her family history, the court found that she was insane. The court’s opinion in this matter is questionable.

“Testimony shows, that, thus marked out from the common characteristics of our fellow beings by her personal appearance, and thus apparently deficient in capacity, the facts of Nancy’s history agree with the conclusions so given by medical men,” Justice John A. Corwin wrote. “Nancy was not such a woman as others. And her training was such, as rather to destroy than to improve the little mind with which nature may have gifted her. Her father, an Englishman, (who became a Mormon, and with Nancy and her mother, lived for some time at Nauvoo,) died of drunkenness in the hospital at Cincinnati. Her mother was a Mormon, and fancied herself a prophetess — Nancy imagined herself “the same as her mother.”

Despite Justice Corwin’s reliance on Nancy’s appearance as proof of her insanity, there is significant other, more acceptable proof, that something was wrong with the girl.

The Forrest Murders

In 1851, Nancy entered the service of the Elisha Forrest family and proceeded to poison every member of the family, resulting the deaths of Mrs. Forrest (her given name is lost to history) and two children within a week of her arrival.

Apparently, Nancy had a problem with the fact that Mrs. Forrest had made her re-clean the kitchen floor after spilling some water, but just what caused her to begin her killing remains a mystery.

“She had a notion of speaking back about it,” a friend, Mary Ann Dankey, testified at Nancy’s trial. “But she thought she’d fix her for it.”

Shortly after that exchange, Mrs. Forrest took ill after eating a supper Nancy prepared.

“Mrs. Forrest has been taken with vomiting and heaving, just like Mrs. Green,” Nancy told a member of the household, referring to a former employer who had also died.

While Mrs. Forrest lingered, and appeared to be recovering, another servant remarked that it was odd that the mistress of the house would take a turn for the worse after begining to recover. Again, Nancy referred to the late Mrs. Green.

“It was just the same way with Mrs. Green,” she replied. “Mrs. F. took to heaving just like Mrs. Green and I do not think she will recover.”

Mrs. Forrest did not recover and died the next day.

A week after Mrs. Forrest was buried, her son, John Edward Forrest took ill in the same fashion. He died shortly after he began vomiting a greenish bile.

After Johnny died, someone pointed out that Nancy was “unfortunate to live where so many people died.”

For the first time, the extent of Nancy’s murderous ways was made evident.

“Yes,” Nancy replied. “Five have died where I lived. First were Mrs. Green and her baby, and Mrs. Isherwood’s baby died a day or two after I left.”

Nancy predicted even more tragedy for the Forrest household.

“Jimmy will go next, and Billy, and the old man, and I expect they’ll all go of one complaint,” she said.

Then she tried to make light of the situation.

“How lucky I am with sick folks,” she said. “They all die.”

“Maybe you killed them,” Dankey replied.

“Maybe I did,” Nancy said.

Jimmy Forrest was Nancy’s next victim. Before he died, in fact, before he ever became ill, she predicted his demise to another witness.

“In a week or two, Jimmy will die,” she said.

Dankey pointed out that Jimmy was outside playing with other children and looked quite healthy. What did Nancy mean, the witness asked.

“I don’t know. Only he won’t eat,” she said.

Jimmy did get sick, vomiting green bile like his mother and brother. He died quickly, but not without considerable suffering. He claimed it was the “onion syrup” that Nancy was giving him that made him ill.

While Jimmy was in his sickbed, Nancy refused to eat dinner with the rest of the family, although that was her custom. That night, Elisha and Billy Forrest both became violently ill. They both recovered, however.

The number of deaths in the Forrest household, even in the 1850s when multiple deaths from mysterious illnesses was more common, prompted Elisha Forrest to ask that Jimmy’s corpse be autopsied.

A Dr. Dandridge conducted the post-mortem (in the Forrest home) and ruled that Jimmy had taken arsenic. He asked if Forrest had any rat poison around, to which Elisha replied no.

Dandridge would later testify that when poison was mentioned, Nancy became “quite excited and anxious.”

She refused to let Dandridge and Forrest discuss the matter outside her hearing and “if we were talking, she would walk up close to to wish to know what we were saying.”

The day after Jimmy’s funeral, Elisha Forrest found a paper outside Nancy’s room. It was wrapping paper bearing the label “Dr. Salter’s Drug Store.”

William Salter testified that about three weeks before the stomach of James Forest was brought to his brother to analyze, he sold Nancy five cents worth of arsenic, done up in a paper like that produced by Mr. Forrest. Nancy said she wanted it to kill rats.

Other druggists testified to the purchase by Nancy, at different times and places, of large quantities of arsenic; one thinks he sold Nancy arsenic as long as six months before the death of James. One of the druggists says she got from him “enough to poison twenty people.”

Nancy’s Trial and the Aftermath

The trial of Nancy Farrer was, understandly, a notable event in the community of Cincinnati (approximately 115,000 people lived there according to the 1850 census), but it was a rather straight-forward affair until it got to the point where the case was about to go to the jury.

Unlike the trials of the current era that involve questions of sanity, there were no expert witnesses at Nancy’s trial to debate whether her actions were or were not those of a sane person. Instead, witnesses to her crimes were paraded before the jury which was then instructed — with erroneous instructions, Justice Corwin later wrote — about mental competency.

The trial court asked the jury to decide “Was Nancy Farrer, at the time this act was committed, capable of judging whether this act was right or wrong, and did she know at the time that it was an offence against the laws of God and man?

“So far as the girl Nancy is concerned, you will carefully examine the testimony, touching her knowledge of right and wrong, and if you find she was able to distinguish between them, then, no matter of how low an order may be her intellect, or how depraved her character, she is guilty as charged, if you have no reasonable doubt as to her commission of the act.”

Corwin wrote that this reliance on reasonable doubt as to Nancy’s sanity was the incorrect standard.

“The court characterized the old rule, requiring insanity to be proved beyond all reasonable doubt, as a doctrine, which though useful in its time, is too hard to uphold,” Corwin wrote. “And I cannot see that a reasonable doubt of a prisoner’s sanity can legally arise, except upon a preponderance of testimony.”

The jury did not find Nancy to be insane beyond a reasonable doubt, and although Corwin said he would have preferred an additional instruction about “irresistable impulse” (”The power of self-control — ‘free agency’ — is said to be quite as essential to criminal accountability as the power to distinguish between right and wrong”), had the jury not misbehaved in other ways, he would have let stand its verdict of guilty.

Fortunately for Nancy Farrer, the jury misconduct in her case gave Corwin the opportunity to toss out its verdict.

The post-conviction review of the trial showed that:

A member or members of the jury, on the second or third day of their deliberation, obtained a newspaper containing what purported to be a part of the proceedings had at the trial;

Two members of the jury received and consumed of spirituous liquors, (which, in one instance, may have been prescribed by a physician, and in the other, may have been necessary to health, though not prescribed)

After the jury received the charge of the court, some of the jurors held communication with their friends and acquaintances in the street, the persons so violating their duty, being at the open windows of their consulting room. “Various questions were put to the jury, as to whether they had agreed upon their verdict — whether they were likely to agree — how they were divided; some of which questions were answered from the jury room.”

The prosecuting attorney was desired by one of the jurors to cause a change of clothing to be sent to one of the jurors. It appears, however, that he made no reply.

Other communications and conversations passed, and occurred between the jurors at the windows and persons on the side walk below.

These errors, the court found, combined with the mistaken instructions on insanity, provided Corwin with sufficient grounds to overrule the jury verdict. He further ruled that it was clear that Nancy Farrer was insane and not criminally responsible for her actions.

Unfortunately, the records don’t show what happened to Nancy, although it is unlikely that she remained at large to kill again.

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